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PROVINCIAL TABLES.

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APPENDIX.

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PROVINCIAL TABLE I.

VARIATIONS IN POPULATION OF TAHSILS
SINCE 1891.

NOTE.—The populations shown for 1891 have been adjusted on account of territorial changes between 1891 and 1901.

PROVINCIAL TABLE I. The variations in the population of tahsils since the previous census.

Serial number of district.	Name of district.	Serial number of tahsil.	Name of tahsil.	Total.			Males.			Females.		
				Census, 1891.	Census, 1901.	Increase + Decrease—.	Census, 1891.	Census, 1901.	Increase + Decrease—.	Census, 1891.	Census, 1901.	Increase + Decrease—.
1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.
1	Dehra	1	Dehra ...	117,438	127,094	+9,656	71,889	74,477	+2,588	45,649	52,617	+7,068
		2	Chakrata ...	50,697	51,101	+404	28,435	28,349	—86	22,262	22,752	+490
			Total ...	168,135	178,195	+10,060	100,324	102,826	+2,502	67,911	75,369	+7,558
2	Saharanpur.	3	Saharanpur ...	312,498	334,681	+22,183	165,426	178,452	+13,026	147,072	156,229	+9,157
		4	Deoband ...	205,627	220,152	+14,525	112,685	119,020	+6,335	92,942	101,132	+8,190
		5	Roorki ...	230,493	286,903	+56,410	159,227	154,338	—4,889	131,271	132,565	+1,294
		6	Nakur ...	192,657	203,494	+10,837	103,013	109,033	+6,020	89,644	94,461	+4,817
			Total ...	1,001,280	1,045,230	+43,950	540,351	560,843	+20,492	460,929	484,387	+23,458
3	Muzaffarnagar.	7	Muzaffarnagar ...	206,496	239,064	+32,568	113,613	129,596	+15,983	92,883	109,468	+16,585
		8	Kairana ...	200,157	224,679	+24,522	107,701	119,573	+11,872	92,456	105,106	+12,650
		9	Jansath ...	193,533	216,411	+22,878	103,922	114,670	+10,748	89,611	101,741	+12,130
		10	Burbana ...	172,688	197,034	+24,346	92,992	105,404	+12,412	79,696	91,630	+11,934
			Total ...	772,874	877,188	+104,314	418,228	469,243	+51,015	354,646	407,945	+53,299
4	Meerut.	11	Meerut ...	326,054	342,143	+16,089	178,105	184,391	+6,286	147,949	157,762	+9,813
		12	Ghaziabad ...	247,141	276,518	+29,377	132,078	147,598	+15,520	115,063	129,920	+14,857
		13	Mawana ...	177,868	200,399	+22,531	94,317	105,481	+11,164	83,551	91,918	+8,367
		14	Baghat ...	259,656	297,506	+37,850	140,303	169,617	+29,314	119,353	137,889	+18,536
		15	Sardhana ...	169,692	180,141	+11,449	90,639	95,836	+5,197	78,153	84,305	+6,152
		16	Hapur ...	212,047	243,468	+31,421	111,902	127,650	+15,748	100,145	116,818	+16,673
			Total ...	1,391,459	1,540,176	+148,717	747,244	820,563	+73,319	644,214	719,612	+75,398
5	Bulandshahr.	17	Anupshahr ...	222,481	278,152	+55,671	117,271	146,249	+28,978	105,210	131,903	+26,693
		18	Bulandshahr ...	281,928	332,262	+50,334	148,045	174,038	+25,993	133,883	159,224	+25,341
		19	Sikandrabad ...	224,368	260,819	+36,451	119,878	138,604	+18,726	104,490	122,245	+17,755
		20	Khurja ...	221,187	266,838	+45,651	116,427	140,217	+23,790	104,710	126,621	+21,911
			Total ...	949,914	1,138,101	+188,187	501,621	599,108	+97,487	448,293	538,993	+90,700
6	Aligarh.	21	Atranli ...	164,073	198,034	+33,961	87,644	105,142	+17,498	76,429	92,892	+16,463
		22	Aligarh ...	229,767	268,012	+38,245	122,475	142,444	+19,969	107,292	125,568	+18,276
		23	Iglas ...	107,227	118,803	+11,576	57,628	63,267	+5,639	49,599	55,536	+5,937
		24	Khair ...	150,656	178,867	+28,211	80,138	91,472	+11,334	70,518	81,395	+10,877
		25	Hathras ...	208,264	225,574	+17,310	111,709	121,120	+9,411	96,555	101,444	+4,889
		26	Sikandra Rao ...	183,185	211,632	+28,447	99,149	109,427	+10,278	84,036	103,105	+19,069
			Total ...	1,043,172	1,200,822	+157,650	558,743	634,872	+76,129	484,429	566,950	+82,521
7	Muttra.	27	Muttra ...	234,914	246,621	+11,707	125,990	132,524	+6,534	108,924	118,997	+10,073
		28	Chhata ...	153,465	173,756	+20,291	81,410	91,955	+10,545	72,055	82,161	+10,106
		29	Mat ...	89,451	97,370	+7,919	47,407	51,997	+4,590	42,044	45,373	+3,329
		30	Mahaban ...	133,488	136,566	+3,078	72,319	74,016	+1,697	61,169	62,820	+1,651
		31	Sadabad ...	102,103	108,886	+6,783	55,534	59,868	+4,334	46,569	50,018	+3,449
			Total ...	713,421	763,099	+49,678	382,660	409,030	+26,370	330,761	354,069	+23,308
8	Agra.	32	Itmadpur ...	153,761	159,681	+5,920	83,200	86,482	+3,282	70,561	73,200	+2,639
		33	Pirozabad ...	112,163	119,775	+7,612	60,292	64,381	+4,089	51,861	55,394	+3,533
		34	Bah ...	125,848	123,591	—2,257	66,037	63,177	—2,860	59,011	57,414	—1,597
		35	Fatehabad ...	108,446	114,733	+6,287	58,744	62,106	+3,362	49,702	52,628	+2,926
		36	Agra ...	272,718	291,041	+18,323	146,817	155,420	+8,603	125,901	135,621	+9,720
		37	Keranli ...	106,977	123,812	+16,835	57,667	66,164	+8,497	49,310	57,648	+8,338
		38	Khairagarh ...	123,693	127,692	+3,999	66,662	69,093	+2,431	57,031	59,599	+2,568
			Total ...	1,003,796	1,060,528	+56,732	540,469	569,822	+29,353	463,327	491,706	+28,379
9	Farukhabad.	39	Kananj ...	117,229	114,215	—3,014	62,642	60,918	—1,724	54,587	53,267	—1,320
		40	Tirwa ...	169,673	180,086	+10,413	92,332	98,859	+6,527	76,341	81,227	+4,886
		41	Chhibramau ...	111,114	126,705	+15,591	60,159	68,684	+8,525	50,955	57,721	+6,766
		42	Farukhabad ...	244,896	250,352	+5,456	131,858	134,334	+2,476	113,038	116,018	+2,980
		43	Kaimganj ...	143,557	168,606	+25,049	76,836	92,427	+15,591	66,721	74,179	+7,458
		44	Aligarh ...	79,218	85,848	+6,630	40,513	47,445	+6,932	32,705	39,403	+6,698
			Total ...	858,657	925,812	+67,155	461,340	500,807	+39,467	397,317	424,915	+27,598
10	Mainpuri.	45	Mainpuri ...	171,152	183,160	+12,008	93,782	100,034	+6,252	77,370	82,136	+4,766
		46	Bhongaon ...	193,368	226,940	+33,572	107,109	123,246	+16,137	86,259	103,694	+17,435
		47	Karhal ...	100,237	98,328	—1,909	51,675	53,241	+1,566	48,562	44,474	—4,088
		48	Shikohabad ...	140,093	167,659	+27,566	76,477	85,511	+9,034	63,616	72,118	+8,502
		49	Mustafabad ...	155,253	163,150	+7,897	81,756	88,611	+6,855	73,497	79,549	+6,052
			Total ...	762,163	829,357	+67,194	410,799	437,356	+26,557	345,364	371,901	+26,537
11	Etawah.	50	Etawah ...	168,023	216,142	+48,119	107,563	116,601	+9,038	60,460	69,541	+9,081
		51	Bharthana ...	169,079	191,141	+22,062	92,847	103,546	+10,699	77,123	87,123	+10,000
		52	Bidhara ...	167,650	208,182	+40,532	103,259	119,441	+16,182	64,374	81,141	+16,767
		53	Auraila ...	172,097	193,393	+21,296	93,166	103,595	+10,429	78,941	89,174	+10,233
			Total ...	727,829	838,758	+110,929	396,775	437,513	+40,738	246,774	280,959	+34,185
12	Etah.	54	Etah ...	227,330	239,779	+12,449	123,489	140,074	+16,585	103,841	119,705	+15,864
		55	Karganj ...	191,723	205,210	+13,487	104,811	113,512	+8,701	86,912	92,698	+5,786
		56	Aliganj ...	161,084	170,550	+9,466	87,670	111,540	+23,870	73,410	98,140	+24,730
		57	Jalaut ...	121,049	130,200	+9,151	65,570	72,253	+6,683	55,479	62,144	+6,665
			Total ...	701,176	745,739	+44,563	382,530	437,377	+54,847	219,731	260,697	+40,966

The variations in the population of tahsils since the previous census—(continued).

PROVINCIAL TABLE I.

Serial number of district.	Name of district.	Serial number of tahsil.	Name of tahsil.	Total.			Males.			Females.		
				Census, 1891.	Census, 1901.	Increase + Decrease—	Census, 1891.	Census, 1901.	Increase + Decrease—	Census, 1891.	Census, 1901.	Increase + Decrease—
1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.
13	Bareilly.	58	Faridpur ...	119,805	128,861	+9,056	65,453	60,784	+4,331	54,352	59,077	+4,725
		59	Bareilly ...	238,182	325,630	+27,168	160,805	176,851	+15,646	137,677	149,299	+11,622
		60	Aonla ...	195,950	211,836	+15,886	103,803	113,126	+9,223	92,047	98,710	+6,663
		61	Mirganj ...	95,300	103,198	+7,898	49,750	54,432	+4,682	45,550	48,766	+3,216
		62	Baheri ...	207,063	193,412	-13,651	109,122	103,222	-5,900	97,941	90,190	-7,751
		63	Nawabganj ...	124,849	127,160	+2,311	66,597	68,389	+1,802	57,762	58,771	+1,009
			Total ...	1,010,949	1,090,117	+49,168	555,620	585,304	+29,684	485,329	504,813	+19,484
14	Dijnor.	64	Dijnor ...	200,039	203,972	+3,933	106,378	107,044	+666	93,661	96,928	+3,267
		65	Najibabad ...	156,873	153,896	-2,977	82,135	79,392	-2,743	73,738	74,504	+766
		66	Nagina ...	183,147	156,698	-26,449	96,166	82,215	-13,941	86,991	74,683	-12,308
		67	Dhampur ...	254,011	265,185	+11,174	133,543	138,040	+4,503	120,468	127,189	+6,721
			Total ...	794,070	779,951	-14,119	418,212	406,697	-11,515	376,859	373,254	-3,605
15	Budaun.	68	Gonnaur ...	126,410	162,291	+35,881	68,507	88,348	+19,841	57,933	73,943	+16,010
		69	Bisauli ...	183,716	211,607	+27,791	98,605	113,231	+14,626	85,111	98,276	+13,165
		70	Sahaswan ...	193,070	193,628	+558	104,225	104,923	+698	89,846	88,705	-1,141
		71	Budhan ...	226,673	233,141	+6,468	120,297	129,012	+8,715	106,376	113,229	+6,853
		72	Dataganj ...	195,053	215,186	+20,133	106,715	116,706	+9,991	89,968	98,480	+8,512
			Total ...	925,982	1,025,753	+99,771	498,319	553,120	+54,771	427,633	472,633	+45,000
16	Moradabad.	73	Moradabad ...	240,795	245,369	+4,574	126,025	129,291	+3,266	114,770	116,078	+1,308
		74	Thakurdwar ...	121,174	116,814	-4,360	64,268	62,174	-2,094	56,906	51,640	-5,266
		75	Bilari ...	231,947	216,340	-15,607	123,416	115,782	-7,634	104,531	100,558	-3,973
		76	Sambhal ...	245,919	215,836	-30,083	129,303	129,818	+515	116,316	116,068	-248
		77	Amroha ...	186,183	206,564	+20,381	97,811	107,906	+10,095	89,372	98,658	+9,286
		78	Hasanpur ...	153,680	161,020	+7,340	82,749	86,253	+3,504	70,931	74,767	+3,836
			Total ...	1,170,398	1,191,993	+21,595	623,572	631,224	+7,652	555,826	560,769	+4,943
17	Shahjahanpur.	79	Shahjahanpur ...	273,146	265,467	-7,679	144,664	139,811	-4,853	128,482	125,656	-2,826
		80	Jalalabad ...	159,799	175,674	+15,875	87,065	97,731	+10,666	71,733	79,943	+8,210
		81	Tilhar ...	237,385	257,045	+19,660	129,110	139,064	+9,954	108,275	117,071	+8,796
		82	Pawayan ...	219,222	223,359	+4,137	131,467	120,313	-11,154	114,755	103,016	-11,739
			Total ...	918,551	921,535	+2,984	495,306	499,919	+4,613	423,245	420,616	-2,629
18	Pilibhit.	83	Bisalpur ...	190,864	190,333	-531	102,602	104,700	+2,098	88,262	91,633	+3,371
		84	Pilibhit ...	199,039	184,922	-14,117	104,624	97,557	-7,067	94,415	87,865	-6,550
		85	Purampur ...	95,205	89,081	-6,124	51,036	47,358	-3,678	44,169	41,726	-2,443
			Total ...	485,108	470,339	-14,769	258,262	249,615	-8,647	226,846	220,724	-6,122
19	Cawnpore.	86	Akbarpur ...	102,256	107,723	+5,467	51,897	57,868	+5,971	47,369	49,661	+2,292
		87	Bilhanur ...	157,593	156,261	-1,332	85,318	83,631	-1,687	72,215	72,570	+355
		88	Bhoganpur (Pukhrayan) ...	120,806	141,346	+20,540	64,162	74,476	+10,314	56,644	66,871	+10,227
		89	Cawnpore ...	324,628	338,507	+13,879	178,830	187,037	+8,207	145,798	151,470	+5,672
		90	Derapur ...	140,008	149,593	+9,585	74,473	79,573	+5,100	65,535	69,720	+4,185
		91	Nawal ...	98,784	92,860	-5,924	51,261	47,909	-3,352	47,523	44,951	-2,572
		92	Shikarpur ...	147,823	147,910	+87	77,763	78,189	+426	70,060	69,721	-339
		93	Ghatampur ...	117,797	124,662	+6,865	61,868	64,890	+3,022	56,129	59,772	+3,643
			Total ...	1,200,695	1,258,868	+58,173	648,092	673,932	+25,840	501,603	584,986	+83,383
20	Fatehpur.	94	Fatehpur ...	175,452	171,598	-3,854	90,183	87,126	-3,057	85,269	84,472	-797
		95	Khajia ...	206,711	199,223	-7,488	107,316	102,864	-4,452	99,995	96,359	-3,636
		96	Ghazipur ...	92,389	91,222	-1,167	48,119	47,023	-1,096	44,270	44,199	-71
		97	Khaga ...	224,605	224,348	-257	114,203	112,368	-1,835	110,402	111,980	+1,578
			Total ...	699,157	686,391	-12,766	359,821	347,381	-12,440	339,836	337,010	-2,826
21	Banda.	98	Banda ...	112,912	98,574	-14,338	56,912	49,306	-7,606	55,970	49,178	-6,792
		99	Pailani ...	88,544	80,521	-8,023	45,350	40,917	-4,433	43,194	39,677	-3,517
		100	Babera ...	96,284	77,395	-18,889	47,961	38,385	-9,576	48,323	39,010	-9,313
		101	Kamasin ...	83,297	78,773	-4,524	42,817	39,915	-2,902	40,980	38,858	-2,122
		102	Mau ...	73,658	64,921	-8,737	37,506	32,875	-4,631	36,152	32,046	-4,106
		103	Karwi ...	87,687	78,410	-9,277	44,506	39,677	-4,829	43,181	37,793	-5,388
		104	Badana ...	77,922	74,755	-3,167	39,255	37,448	-1,807	38,007	37,307	-700
		105	Girwan ...	85,528	77,706	-7,822	43,057	38,956	-4,101	42,471	38,750	-3,721
			Total ...	705,832	631,058	-74,774	356,894	317,599	-39,295	348,938	313,459	-35,479
22	Hamirpur.	106	Hamirpur ...	81,133	71,625	-9,508	42,018	36,723	-5,295	39,115	34,902	-4,213
		107	Rath ...	126,920	125,731	-1,189	63,543	62,292	-1,251	63,377	63,439	+62
		108	Kulpahar ...	127,567	111,926	-15,641	64,647	56,330	-8,317	62,920	55,596	-7,324
		109	Mahoba ...	74,200	61,938	-12,262	37,770	31,071	-6,699	36,430	30,867	-5,563
		110	Maudaha ...	103,900	87,322	-16,578	52,625	43,788	-8,837	51,276	43,534	-7,742
			Total ...	513,720	458,542	-55,178	260,603	230,204	-30,399	253,117	228,338	-24,779
23	Allahabad.	111	Allahabad ...	342,446	338,820	-3,626	176,851	173,648	-3,203	165,595	165,172	-423
		112	Sirathu ...	129,832	129,204	-628	65,481	64,617	-864	64,501	64,587	+86
		113	Manjhanpur ...	131,688	129,708	-1,980	66,925	65,741	-1,184	64,763	64,067	-696
		114	Soroan ...	186,876	186,768	-108	90,801	91,240	+439	96,076	95,518	-558
		115	Phulpur ...	176,851	171,653	-5,198	87,701	84,705	-2,996	89,150	86,948	-2,202

The variations in the population of tahsils since the previous census—(continued).

PROVINCIAL TABLE I.

Serial number of district.	Name of district.	Serial number of tahsil.	Name of tahsil.	Total.			Males.			Females.		
				Census, 1891.	Census, 1901.	Increase + Decrease.	Census, 1891.	Census, 1901.	Increase + Decrease.	Census, 1891.	Census, 1901.	Increase + Decrease.
1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.
23	Allahabad (continued).	116	Handia ...	187,089	183,281	-3,808	94,126	90,713	-3,413	92,963	92,568	-395
		117	Karchana ...	134,818	127,327	-7,491	68,961	63,848	-5,113	65,857	63,479	-2,378
		118	Barah ...	63,816	55,503	-8,313	32,651	27,826	-4,825	31,165	27,677	-3,488
		119	Meja ...	195,221	167,014	-28,207	98,062	82,316	-15,746	97,159	84,698	-12,461
			Total ...	1,548,737	1,489,358	-59,379	781,509	744,654	-36,855	767,228	744,704	-22,524
24	Jhansi.	120	Jhansi ...	145,680	145,371	-309	79,788	76,214	-3,574	65,892	69,157	+3,265
		121	Man ...	115,724	100,298	-15,426	59,003	50,681	-8,322	56,721	49,617	-7,104
		122	Garotha ...	88,926	66,963	-21,963	45,618	33,821	-11,797	43,308	33,142	-10,166
		123	Moth ...	59,089	55,638	-3,451	30,119	28,079	-2,040	28,970	27,559	-1,411
		124	Lalitpur ...	157,153	144,638	-12,515	81,768	73,318	-8,450	73,385	71,320	-2,065
25	Jaloun.	125	Mahroni ...	117,047	103,851	-13,196	59,668	53,184	-6,484	57,379	50,667	-6,712
			Total ...	683,619	616,759	-66,860	355,964	315,297	-40,667	327,655	301,462	-26,193
		126	Orai ...	67,702	59,065	-8,637	34,621	30,163	-4,458	33,081	28,902	-4,179
		127	Kalpi ...	78,754	75,692	-3,062	40,521	38,864	-1,657	38,233	36,828	-1,405
		128	Jalaun ...	147,090	160,381	+13,291	76,148	83,033	+6,885	70,442	77,348	+6,906
26	Benares.	129	Kunch ...	102,815	104,588	+1,773	52,800	51,217	+1,417	50,015	50,371	+356
			Total ...	396,361	399,726	+3,365	201,090	206,277	+5,187	192,271	193,449	+1,178
		130	Benares ...	580,467	557,541	-22,926	296,936	283,441	-13,495	283,531	274,100	-9,431
		131	Gangapur ...	89,934	86,703	-3,231	45,317	43,382	-1,935	44,617	43,371	-1,246
		132	Chandauni ...	251,542	237,840	-13,702	125,200	118,274	-6,926	126,342	119,566	-6,776
27	Mirzapur.		Total ...	921,943	882,084	-39,859	467,453	445,047	-22,406	454,490	437,037	-17,453
		133	Mirzapur ...	372,015	332,340	-39,675	183,490	162,859	-20,631	168,625	163,481	-5,144
		134	Chunar ...	185,582	176,582	-9,000	91,031	86,013	-5,018	91,551	90,519	-1,032
		135	Robertsganj ...	241,770	221,717	-20,053	120,477	108,474	-12,003	121,302	113,243	-8,059
		136	Konrh ...	291,218	285,240	-5,978	145,092	139,139	-5,953	146,126	146,101	-25
28	Jaunpur.	137	Chakia ...	70,914	66,601	-4,313	36,251	33,590	-2,661	34,663	33,011	-1,652
			Total ...	1,161,508	1,082,430	-79,078	576,841	530,075	-46,766	585,167	552,355	-32,812
		138	Jaunpur ...	278,482	269,131	-9,351	139,196	131,658	-7,538	139,286	137,473	-1,813
		139	Marinhe ...	253,402	243,792	-9,610	126,839	119,031	-7,799	126,572	121,761	-4,811
		140	Machhlishahr ...	214,677	233,431	+18,754	122,003	115,338	-6,665	121,774	118,093	-3,681
29	Ghazipur.	141	Kutahan ...	236,832	269,438	+32,606	144,622	182,753	+38,131	142,210	136,685	-5,525
		142	Kirakat ...	201,556	187,128	-14,428	101,399	91,048	-10,351	103,167	96,080	-7,087
			Total ...	1,264,940	1,202,920	-62,020	634,950	589,828	-45,122	629,999	613,092	-16,907
		143	Ghazipur ...	319,385	266,871	-52,514	161,244	133,163	-28,081	158,141	133,768	-24,373
		144	Muhammabad ...	251,823	226,760	-25,063	123,534	109,868	-13,666	128,280	116,892	-11,388
30	Ballia.	145	Zamania ...	216,930	237,867	+20,937	119,394	112,417	-6,977	127,536	125,420	-2,116
		146	Saidpur ...	206,615	182,320	-24,295	102,648	89,257	-13,391	103,967	93,063	-10,904
			Total ...	1,021,753	913,818	-107,935	506,820	444,735	-62,085	517,933	469,983	-47,950
		147	Ballia ...	406,151	405,623	-528	190,103	190,095	-8	216,048	215,529	-519
		148	Rasra ...	307,645	288,226	-19,419	152,888	143,014	-9,874	154,767	145,212	-9,555
31	Gorakhpur.	149	Bansdih ...	281,531	293,919	+12,388	131,127	140,860	+9,733	147,401	163,059	+15,658
			Total ...	995,327	987,768	-7,559	477,118	473,959	-3,159	618,209	613,799	-4,410
		150	Bansgaon ...	451,606	438,361	-13,245	222,512	216,929	-5,583	229,094	222,335	-6,759
		151	Maharajganj ...	511,450	504,325	-7,125	261,719	253,111	-8,608	269,731	250,914	-18,817
		152	Padrauna ...	605,551	595,706	-9,845	303,206	295,792	-7,414	302,845	299,914	-2,931
32	Basti.	153	Hata ...	430,069	428,846	-1,223	215,406	213,694	-1,712	214,573	215,152	+579
		154	Deoria ...	617,793	493,822	-123,971	254,220	241,662	-12,558	253,564	232,160	-21,404
		155	Gorakhpur ...	477,588	496,011	+18,423	240,122	249,881	+9,759	237,466	246,130	+8,664
			Total ...	2,994,057	2,957,074	-36,983	1,497,284	1,470,469	-26,815	1,496,773	1,459,695	-37,078
		156	Domariaganj ...	313,090	322,321	+9,231	156,572	163,007	+6,435	154,518	169,314	+14,796
33	Azamgarh.	157	Bansi ...	362,724	402,277	+39,553	183,916	203,414	+19,498	178,868	194,873	+16,005
		158	Harralya ...	351,609	333,801	-17,808	179,055	169,626	-9,429	172,541	164,175	-8,366
		159	Basti ...	377,935	393,079	+15,144	193,309	200,182	+6,873	184,026	192,447	+8,421
		160	Khalilabad ...	350,486	394,675	+44,189	192,176	193,317	+1,141	184,011	195,354	+11,343
			Total ...	1,785,844	1,816,153	+30,309	907,337	935,556	+28,219	878,507	910,297	+31,790
34	Naini Tal.	161	Dargan ...	264,551	224,827	-39,724	145,315	129,561	-15,754	144,173	131,123	-13,050
		162	Azamgarh ...	289,489	284,114	-5,375	147,532	155,103	+7,571	150,491	167,128	+16,637
		163	Sagri ...	344,723	312,234	-32,489	174,532	165,103	-9,429	170,191	167,128	-3,063
		164	Mohammabad ...	469,817	421,740	-48,077	232,042	208,919	-23,123	230,912	212,521	-18,391
		165	Mohammabad ...	302,746	295,870	-6,876	181,416	182,638	+1,222	178,999	184,122	+5,123
35	Naini Tal.		Total ...	1,785,625	1,529,785	-255,840	867,611	757,314	-110,297	861,614	772,471	-89,143
		166	Naini Tal ...	46,189	43,738	-2,451	24,549	25,140	+591	10,790	15,133	+4,343
		167	Huatar ...	109,175	93,445	-15,730	57,051	53,670	-3,381	59,827	49,527	-10,300
		168	Kashpur ...	73,169	67,632	-5,537	39,051	35,840	-3,211	34,145	28,737	-5,408
		169	Tarai Estate ...	157,355	118,422	-38,933	74,125	61,920	-12,205	67,170	55,352	-11,818
36	Naini Tal.		Total ...	559,841	511,237	-48,604	289,549	272,679	-16,870	287,722	252,757	-34,965

The variations in the population of tahsils since the previous census—(concluded).

PROVINCIAL TABLE I.

of district.	Name of district.	Serial number of tahsil.	Name of tahsil.	Total.			Males.			Females.		
				Census, 1891.	Census, 1901.	Increase + or Decrease—	Census, 1891.	Census, 1901.	Increase + or Decrease—	Census, 1891.	Census, 1901.	Increase + or Decrease—
				5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.
35	Almorah.	170	Champawat ...	97,968	122,023	+24,055	49,790	62,663	+12,873	48,178	59,360	+11,182
		171	Almora ...	318,900	343,870	+24,970	161,278	174,088	+12,810	157,622	169,782	+12,160
			Total ...	416,868	465,893	+49,025	211,068	236,751	+25,683	205,800	229,142	+23,342
36	Garhwāl	172	Pauri ...	407,818	429,900	+22,082	200,319	211,588	+11,269	207,499	218,312	+10,813
			Total ...	407,818	429,900	+22,082	200,319	211,588	+11,269	207,499	218,312	+10,813
37	Luc-know.	173	Lucknow ...	448,461	454,896	+6,435	238,406	240,359	+1,953	210,055	214,537	+4,482
		174	Malihabad ...	175,542	184,230	+8,688	91,846	95,882	+4,036	83,696	88,348	+4,652
		175	Mobanlalganj ...	150,160	154,115	+3,955	76,949	78,708	+1,759	73,211	75,407	+2,196
			Total ...	774,163	793,241	+19,078	407,201	414,949	+7,748	366,962	378,292	+11,330
38	Unao.	176	Unao ...	192,894	204,850	+11,956	98,934	104,887	+5,953	93,960	99,963	+6,003
		177	Safipur ...	210,141	225,400	+15,259	111,336	118,488	+7,152	98,805	107,002	+8,197
		178	Purwa ...	293,152	290,910	-2,242	144,148	142,620	-1,528	149,004	143,290	-5,714
		179	Mohan ...	257,449	255,389	-2,060	135,094	133,020	-2,074	122,355	122,869	+514
			Total ...	953,636	976,639	+23,003	489,512	499,015	+9,503	464,124	477,624	+13,500
39	Rae Bareilly.	180	Rae Bareilly ...	221,875	223,505	+1,630	110,966	110,828	-138	110,909	112,677	+1,768
		181	Dalman ...	275,786	270,900	-4,886	135,041	131,972	-3,069	140,745	138,928	-1,817
		182	Digbijalganj ...	276,740	278,086	+1,346	137,090	138,591	+1,501	139,650	139,495	-155
		183	Salon ...	262,120	261,270	-850	129,883	128,699	-1,184	132,237	132,571	+334
			Total ...	1,036,521	1,033,761	-2,760	512,980	510,090	-2,890	523,541	523,671	+130
40	Sitapur.	184	Sitapur ...	291,190	311,264	+20,074	153,725	163,794	+10,069	137,465	147,470	+10,005
		185	Biswan ...	271,894	297,277	+25,383	141,872	155,320	+13,448	130,022	141,957	+11,935
		186	Sidhauli ...	269,122	299,492	+30,370	141,791	167,389	+25,598	127,331	142,103	+14,772
		187	Misrikh ...	243,207	267,440	+24,233	129,794	143,334	+13,540	113,413	124,106	+10,693
			Total ...	1,075,413	1,175,473	+100,060	567,182	619,837	+52,655	508,231	555,636	+47,405
41	Hardoi.	188	Hardoi ...	306,071	282,158	-23,913	165,564	152,270	-13,294	140,507	129,888	-10,619
		189	Shahabad ...	248,034	250,533	+2,499	133,312	133,473	+161	114,722	117,060	+2,338
		190	Bilgram ...	281,747	293,948	+12,201	150,803	156,899	+6,096	130,944	137,049	+6,105
		191	Sandila ...	277,359	266,195	-11,164	146,818	139,891	-6,927	130,541	126,304	-4,237
			Total ...	1,113,211	1,092,834	-20,377	596,497	582,533	-13,964	516,714	510,301	-6,413
42	Kheri.	192	Muhamdi ...	258,617	257,989	-628	138,708	136,887	-1,821	119,909	121,102	+1,193
		193	Nighasan ...	279,376	281,123	+1,747	148,182	148,133	-49	130,194	132,990	+2,796
		194	Lakhimpur ...	365,622	366,026	+404	191,145	193,609	+2,464	171,477	172,417	+940
			Total ...	903,615	905,138	+1,523	482,035	478,629	-3,406	421,580	426,509	+4,929
43	Fyzabad.	195	Fyzabad ...	316,586	334,327	+17,741	160,872	174,239	+13,367	155,714	160,088	+4,374
		196	Akbarpur ...	241,702	243,929	+2,227	122,697	122,823	+126	119,005	121,106	+2,101
		197	Bikapur ...	288,890	296,776	+7,886	142,172	146,363	+4,191	146,718	150,413	+3,695
		198	Tanda ...	369,781	350,342	-19,439	186,861	175,978	-10,883	182,920	174,364	-8,556
			Total ...	1,216,959	1,225,374	+8,415	612,602	619,403	+6,801	604,357	605,971	+1,614
44	Gonda.	199	Gonda ...	404,172	384,021	-20,151	205,533	194,070	-11,463	198,639	189,951	-8,688
		200	Tarabganj ...	385,560	364,993	-20,567	196,553	186,857	-9,696	189,007	178,136	-10,871
		201	Utraula ...	669,497	654,181	-15,316	344,317	333,277	-11,040	325,180	320,904	-4,276
			Total ...	1,459,229	1,403,195	-56,034	746,403	714,204	-32,199	712,826	688,991	-23,835
45	Bahraich.	202	Bahraich ...	356,958	377,588	+20,630	185,047	194,761	+9,714	170,911	182,827	+11,916
		203	Kaisarganj ...	332,193	348,172	+15,979	173,193	181,120	+7,927	159,000	167,052	+8,052
		204	Nanpara ...	311,281	325,587	+14,306	164,327	168,585	+4,258	146,954	157,052	+10,098
			Total ...	1,000,432	1,051,347	+50,915	523,567	544,416	+20,849	476,865	506,931	+30,066
46	Sultānpur.	205	Sultānpur ...	330,964	340,211	+9,247	162,215	166,383	+4,168	168,749	173,828	+5,079
		206	Amethi ...	219,208	217,207	-2,001	106,512	106,583	+71	112,696	110,624	-2,072
		207	Musāfirkhana ...	251,221	261,036	+9,815	122,268	123,366	+1,098	128,953	132,670	+3,717
		208	Kadipur ...	274,458	265,450	-9,008	139,491	133,600	-5,891	134,967	131,850	-3,117
			Total ...	1,075,851	1,083,904	+8,053	530,486	534,932	+4,446	545,365	548,972	+3,607
47	Partabgarh.	209	Partābgarh ...	306,427	316,580	+10,153	148,426	153,642	+5,216	158,001	162,938	+4,937
		210	Kunda ...	332,876	323,508	-9,368	162,522	158,359	-4,163	170,354	165,149	-5,205
		211	Patti ...	271,592	272,760	+1,168	134,223	134,181	-42	137,369	138,579	+1,210
			Total ...	910,895	912,848	+1,953	445,171	446,182	+1,011	465,724	466,666	+942
48	Barnāuli.	212	Ramsanehighat ...	377,527	387,670	+10,143	188,763	195,283	+6,520	188,764	192,387	+3,623
		213	Nawābganj ...	242,975	254,160	+11,185	125,970	131,340	+5,370	117,005	122,820	+5,815
		214	Fatchpur ...	315,652	335,407	+19,755	165,301	175,904	+10,603	150,351	159,503	+9,152
		215	Haidargarh ...	194,752	202,086	+7,334	97,081	101,440	+4,359	97,671	100,646	+2,975
			Total ...	1,130,906	1,179,323	+48,417	577,115	603,967	+26,852	553,791	575,356	+21,565

MINING AND MINERS

POPULATION OF TENSILES BY REGION.

PROVINCIAL TABLE II.

Population of Tahsils by religion.

Serial number of district.	Name of District.	Name of Tahsil.	Total population.			Hindus.			Musalmans.			Others.		
			Total.	Males.	Females.	Total.	Males.	Females.	Total.	Males.	Females.	Total.	Males.	Females.
	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.	14.	15.
	Dehra Dún.	Dehra ...	127,094	74,477	52,617	98,437	57,504	40,933	23,677	14,330	9,347	4,980	2,643	2,337
		Chakrata ...	51,101	28,349	22,752	49,838	27,475	22,363	984	672	312	279	202	77
		Total, Dehra Dún ...	178,195	102,826	75,369	148,275	84,979	63,296	24,661	15,002	9,659	5,259	2,845	2,414
2	Sahāranpur.	Sahāranpur ...	334,681	178,452	156,229	197,554	105,984	91,570	133,288	70,280	63,008	3,839	2,188	1,651
		Deoband ...	220,152	119,020	101,132	164,191	89,472	74,719	53,010	27,942	25,068	2,951	1,606	1,345
		Roorki ...	286,903	154,338	132,565	189,075	101,792	87,283	95,103	50,703	44,400	2,725	1,843	882
		Nakur ...	203,494	109,033	94,461	131,799	71,411	60,388	60,732	36,378	33,154	1,963	1,044	910
		Total, Sahāranpur ...	1,045,230	560,843	484,387	682,619	368,650	313,960	351,133	185,503	165,630	11,478	6,681	4,797
3	Muzaffarnagar.	Muzaffarnagar ...	239,064	129,596	109,468	165,100	89,671	75,429	70,861	38,016	32,845	3,103	1,909	1,194
		Kaifana ...	224,679	119,573	105,106	154,627	82,961	71,666	67,480	35,190	32,290	2,572	1,422	1,150
		Jansath ...	216,411	114,670	101,741	119,717	70,586	70,131	63,419	33,271	30,148	3,275	1,813	1,462
		Burhāna ...	197,034	105,404	91,630	137,389	73,894	63,495	53,532	28,213	25,319	6,113	3,297	2,816
		Total, Muzaffarnagar ...	877,188	460,243	407,945	606,833	326,112	280,721	255,292	134,690	120,602	15,063	8,441	6,622
4	Meerut.	Meerut ...	312,143	184,381	157,762	233,210	125,750	107,460	101,118	53,751	47,361	7,815	4,877	2,938
		Ghāziabad ...	276,518	147,598	128,920	211,589	113,532	98,057	62,545	32,746	29,799	2,381	1,320	1,061
		Mawana ...	200,309	105,481	91,918	148,444	78,458	69,986	49,445	25,652	23,793	2,510	1,371	1,139
		Baghpat ...	297,506	159,617	137,889	241,814	129,879	111,935	48,293	24,631	21,662	9,399	5,107	4,292
		Sardhana ...	180,141	95,836	84,305	131,747	70,432	61,315	38,980	20,298	18,682	9,414	5,106	4,308
		Hapur ...	213,468	127,650	115,818	178,924	94,474	84,450	61,514	31,607	29,907	3,030	1,569	1,461
		Total, Meerut ...	1,540,175	820,563	719,612	1,145,728	612,525	533,203	359,895	188,688	171,207	31,552	19,350	15,202
5	Bulandshahr.	Anupshahr ...	278,152	146,249	131,903	228,013	120,272	107,741	47,174	24,336	22,838	2,965	1,641	1,324
		Bulandshahr ...	332,262	174,038	158,224	244,611	128,692	115,919	80,531	41,488	39,043	7,120	3,838	3,262
		Sikandrabad ...	260,849	138,604	122,245	215,206	114,870	100,336	41,792	21,695	20,097	3,851	2,039	1,812
		Rhurja ...	266,838	140,217	126,621	212,339	111,635	100,704	47,712	24,892	22,820	6,787	3,690	3,097
		Total, Meerut ...	1,138,101	599,108	538,993	900,169	475,469	424,700	217,209	112,411	104,798	20,723	11,229	9,195
6	Aligarh.	Atrauli ...	198,034	105,142	92,892	165,555	88,314	77,241	30,887	15,972	14,915	1,592	856	736
		Aligarh ...	268,012	142,444	125,568	212,166	112,814	99,352	48,434	25,666	22,768	7,412	3,964	3,448
		Iglas ...	118,803	63,267	55,536	110,070	58,647	51,423	7,647	4,061	3,583	1,086	556	530
		Khair ...	178,867	94,472	84,395	162,596	83,833	76,763	15,119	8,019	7,100	1,152	620	532
		Hathras ...	225,574	121,120	104,454	200,627	107,521	93,106	21,465	11,605	9,820	3,462	1,934	1,628
		Sikandra Rao ...	211,532	108,427	103,105	182,792	93,813	88,979	25,371	12,908	12,463	3,369	1,706	1,663
		Total, Aligarh ...	1,200,822	634,872	565,950	1,033,806	546,942	486,864	148,913	78,294	70,649	18,073	9,636	8,137
7	Muttra.	Muttra ...	246,521	132,524	113,997	214,319	115,150	99,199	30,556	16,425	14,131	1,616	949	667
		Chhata ...	173,756	91,595	82,161	151,306	79,858	71,448	21,067	10,986	10,081	1,383	751	632
		Mat ...	97,370	51,997	45,373	89,279	47,694	41,585	7,164	3,798	3,866	927	505	422
		Mahaban ...	136,566	74,046	62,520	126,655	68,801	57,854	8,973	4,739	4,234	938	506	432
		Sadabad ...	108,886	58,868	50,018	98,507	53,376	45,131	9,327	4,950	4,377	1,052	512	510
		Total, Muttra ...	763,099	409,030	354,069	680,096	364,879	315,217	77,087	40,898	36,189	5,916	3,253	2,663
8	Agra.	Itimadpur ...	159,881	86,482	73,399	112,201	77,042	65,159	14,057	7,502	6,555	3,623	1,938	1,685
		Ferozabad ...	119,775	64,381	55,394	105,087	56,750	48,337	11,919	6,168	5,781	2,739	1,463	1,276
		Rah ...	123,591	60,177	57,414	117,804	63,030	54,774	4,187	2,287	1,900	1,600	860	740
		Fatehabad ...	114,733	62,105	52,628	106,675	57,834	48,841	6,665	3,520	3,145	1,393	751	642
		Agra ...	291,044	155,120	135,924	216,074	115,723	100,351	61,893	33,606	31,227	10,137	6,031	4,046
		Kerauli ...	123,812	66,161	57,651	109,172	58,293	50,879	13,938	7,491	6,447	702	380	322
		Khairagarh ...	127,692	68,093	59,599	118,529	63,214	55,285	8,319	4,387	3,962	814	462	352
		Total, Agra ...	1,060,528	568,822	491,706	915,512	491,916	423,626	123,978	64,961	59,017	21,008	11,945	9,063
9	Farukhabad.	Kanauj ...	114,215	60,948	53,267	95,161	51,241	43,920	18,533	9,423	9,110	521	284	237
		Tirwa ...	180,086	98,859	81,227	167,066	92,339	75,627	11,826	6,318	5,478	291	172	122
		Chhibramau ...	126,705	68,884	57,821	113,780	62,208	51,572	12,690	6,536	6,154	235	149	95
		Farukhabad ...	250,352	134,334	116,018	213,229	115,076	98,144	35,128	18,029	17,099	2,094	1,229	775
		Kanimganj ...	168,606	90,427	78,179	143,110	77,937	65,153	21,466	11,857	12,579	1,030	593	417
		Aligarh ...	85,848	47,445	38,403	81,121	45,060	36,421	4,237	2,333	1,901	199	112	78
		Total, Farukhabad ...	925,612	500,897	424,915	814,658	443,821	370,837	103,880	54,556	52,324	4,274	2,520	1,754
10	Mainpuri.	Mainpuri ...	183,180	100,034	83,146	169,950	92,865	77,085	11,716	6,332	5,414	1,484	837	647
		Bhongal ...	226,910	123,216	103,694	216,253	117,626	98,627	9,730	5,093	4,647	957	537	429
		Karhal ...	98,398	53,924	44,474	92,776	50,972	41,804	4,596	2,547	2,319	726	405	321
		Shikohabad ...	157,659	85,641	72,118	144,599	78,719	65,841	11,759	6,014	5,711	1,310	744	565
		Mustafabad ...	163,189	89,611	74,569	151,031	82,133	68,898	9,663	5,097	4,566	2,456	1,381	1,105
		Total, Mainpuri ...	823,357	451,356	378,001	774,600	422,315	352,255	47,794	25,107	22,657	6,933	3,904	3,059
11	Etāwah.	Etāwah ...	216,142	116,931	99,211	194,017	105,439	88,578	19,663	10,673	9,599	2,452	1,410	1,044
		Bharthana ...	191,111	103,946	87,165	183,215	100,732	84,183	5,615	3,020	2,595	381	194	187
		Bidhuna ...	206,152	113,041	93,111	195,926	107,414	88,512	9,779	5,316	4,463	477	311	166
		Aunsiya ...	193,333	103,995	89,338	181,579	97,911	83,955	11,141	5,597	5,244	313	154	159
		Total, Etāwah ...	806,738	438,913	368,825	760,337	414,605	355,128	46,288	24,606	21,857	3,633	2,078	1,557

PROVINCIAL TABLE II.

Population of tahsils by religion—(continued).

Serial number of district.	Name of district.	Name of Tahsil.	Total population.			Hindus.			Musalmans.			Others.		
			Total.	Males.	Females.	Total.	Males.	Females.	Total.	Males.	Females.	Total.	Males.	Females.
1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.	14.	15.
23	Allahabad.	Allahabad ...	338,820	173,648	165,172	249,171	128,200	120,971	81,793	40,964	40,829	7,856	4,484	3,372
		Sirathu ...	129,204	64,617	64,587	109,322	55,194	54,328	19,568	9,363	10,205	114	60	54
		Manjhanpur ...	129,798	65,741	64,057	116,796	59,327	57,469	12,907	6,365	6,542	93	49	46
		Sorau ...	186,758	91,240	95,518	161,854	79,261	82,590	24,838	11,944	12,894	66	32	34
		Phulpur ...	171,653	84,705	86,948	148,123	73,507	74,616	23,488	11,173	12,315	42	25	17
		Handia ...	183,251	90,713	92,538	167,013	82,826	84,187	16,266	7,885	8,381	2	2	...
		Karchana ...	127,327	63,848	63,479	117,091	58,672	58,419	10,044	5,004	5,040	192	172	20
		Barah ...	55,503	27,826	27,677	53,478	26,712	26,766	2,013	1,108	905	12	6	6
		Meja ...	167,014	82,316	84,698	158,105	77,872	80,233	8,718	4,355	4,363	191	89	102
		Total, Allahabad (a)*...	1,489,358	744,654	744,704	1,281,153	641,574	639,579	199,635	98,161	101,474	8,570	4,919	3,651
		Total, Allahabad (b)*...	1,493,755	747,425	746,330	1,285,503	644,303	641,200	199,680	98,201	101,479	8,572	4,921	3,651
24	Jhānsi.	Jhānsi ...	145,371	76,214	69,157	125,313	65,444	60,869	15,257	8,074	7,183	3,801	2,696	1,105
		Mau ...	100,298	50,631	49,667	94,061	47,550	46,511	5,340	2,613	2,697	897	488	409
		Garotha ...	66,963	33,821	33,142	64,257	32,456	31,801	2,518	1,261	1,254	188	101	87
		Moth ...	55,638	28,079	27,559	53,265	26,849	26,416	2,119	1,090	1,029	254	140	114
		Lalitpur ...	141,638	73,318	71,320	135,727	68,821	66,906	3,981	2,051	1,930	4,930	2,418	2,491
		Mahroni ...	103,851	53,184	50,667	98,061	50,201	47,860	1,681	873	811	4,106	2,110	1,996
		Total, Jhānsi ...	616,759	315,207	301,462	571,684	291,321	280,365	30,899	15,995	14,901	14,176	7,981	6,195
25	Jalaun.	Orai ...	59,065	30,163	28,902	53,668	27,428	26,240	5,252	2,646	2,606	145	89	56
		Kalpi ...	75,692	38,861	36,838	69,316	35,652	33,664	6,258	3,136	3,122	118	76	42
		Jalaun ...	160,381	83,033	77,348	152,895	79,225	73,679	7,450	3,785	3,665	36	23	13
		Kuneh ...	104,588	54,217	50,371	98,419	51,061	47,358	6,084	3,116	2,968	85	40	43
		Total, Jalaun ...	399,726	206,277	193,449	374,298	193,366	180,932	25,044	12,683	12,361	384	228	156
26	Benares.	Benares ...	557,541	283,441	274,100	487,655	246,878	240,777	67,708	35,295	32,413	2,178	1,268	910
		Gangapur ...	86,703	43,332	43,371	82,658	41,318	41,340	4,024	2,001	2,023	21	13	8
		Chandauli ...	237,840	118,274	119,566	218,528	108,900	109,628	19,130	9,276	9,854	182	98	81
		Total, Benares ...	882,084	445,047	437,037	788,841	397,096	391,745	90,862	46,572	44,290	2,381	1,379	1,002
27	Mirzapur.	Mirzapur ...	332,340	162,859	169,481	307,551	150,310	157,244	23,994	12,185	11,809	792	364	428
		Chunar ...	176,532	86,013	90,519	162,889	79,394	83,495	13,188	6,418	6,770	455	201	254
		Robertsganj ...	221,717	108,474	113,243	213,082	104,242	108,840	7,914	3,566	4,048	721	366	355
		Konrh ...	285,240	139,139	146,101	262,792	128,252	134,540	22,111	10,861	11,547	37	23	14
		Chakia ...	66,601	33,590	33,011	61,602	31,076	30,526	4,995	2,511	2,484	4	3	1
		Total, Mirzapur ...	1,082,430	539,075	552,355	1,007,919	493,274	514,645	72,502	35,811	36,658	2,009	957	1,052
28	Jaunpur.	Jaunpur ...	269,131	131,658	137,473	236,441	116,140	120,292	32,571	15,450	17,121	119	59	60
		Mariab ...	243,792	119,031	124,761	230,471	112,574	117,897	13,307	6,450	6,857	14	7	7
		Machhlishahr ...	233,431	115,338	118,093	215,791	106,847	108,944	17,580	8,457	9,123	60	31	26
		Kataban ...	269,438	132,753	136,685	233,524	116,434	117,096	35,882	16,297	19,585	32	22	10
		Kerakat ...	187,128	91,018	96,080	176,820	86,050	90,770	10,091	4,877	5,214	217	121	96
		Total, Jaunpur ...	1,202,920	589,828	613,092	1,093,047	538,054	554,993	109,431	51,531	57,900	412	213	199
29	Ghāzipur.	Ghāzipur ...	266,871	133,163	133,708	240,653	120,713	119,940	25,803	12,233	13,570	415	217	188
		Mulhamadabad ...	226,760	109,868	116,892	202,523	98,794	103,729	23,995	10,950	13,045	242	124	118
		Zamania ...	237,897	112,447	125,450	209,513	100,102	109,411	27,830	12,118	15,712	491	227	267
		Saidpur ...	182,320	89,257	93,063	170,061	83,520	86,541	12,131	5,668	6,463	128	69	69
		Total, Ghāzipur ...	913,818	444,735	469,083	822,780	403,129	419,651	89,759	40,969	48,790	1,279	637	612
30	Ballia.	Ballia ...	405,623	199,035	215,528	382,204	179,274	202,930	23,101	10,630	12,471	318	191	127
		Rasra ...	288,226	143,014	145,212	264,065	131,821	132,244	24,036	11,131	12,905	125	62	63
		Bansdih ...	293,919	140,860	153,059	274,388	132,028	142,360	19,462	8,798	10,664	69	34	35
		Total, Ballia ...	987,768	473,969	513,799	920,657	443,123	477,531	66,599	30,559	36,040	512	287	225
31	Gorakhpur.	Binsgaon ...	438,364	216,029	222,335	411,408	202,822	208,586	26,857	13,169	13,719	69	39	30
		Maharajganj ...	504,225	253,411	250,814	441,322	223,218	221,101	59,911	30,154	29,757	62	39	23
		Padrauna ...	595,706	295,792	299,914	567,918	281,918	285,970	57,770	28,532	29,238	18	12	6
		Hata ...	428,846	213,694	215,152	392,739	195,525	197,214	36,087	18,153	17,934	29	16	4
		Deoria ...	493,822	241,662	252,160	453,731	222,252	231,479	40,006	19,359	20,647	85	51	34
		Gorakhpur ...	496,011	249,881	246,130	447,956	225,600	222,356	46,328	23,372	22,956	1,727	909	518
		Total, Gorakhpur ...	2,957,074	1,470,160	1,486,915	2,658,074	1,321,365	1,336,709	297,019	145,098	148,981	1,981	1,065	915
		Domariaganj ...	322,321	163,097	159,224	340,238	171,744	178,494	82,066	41,254	40,842	17	9	8
32	Basti.	Basti ...	402,277	201,414	199,863	332,701	168,112	164,589	69,552	35,289	34,263	21	13	11
		Hazriya ...	333,891	169,626	164,265	306,429	155,735	150,694	27,306	13,859	13,447	66	32	34
		Basti ...	393,079	200,192	192,887	343,102	171,829	168,273	49,889	25,310	24,579	88	53	25
		Khalilabad ...	394,675	199,317	195,358	323,766	163,719	160,947	70,875	35,587	35,288	31	11	23
		Total, Basti ...	1,516,133	763,556	752,579	1,346,236	674,439	662,007	209,688	104,990	103,980	229	115	111
33	Azamgarh.	Dumraon ...	224,827	111,090	113,737	209,113	103,647	105,466	15,667	7,410	8,257	47	23	14
		Azamgarh ...	251,114	129,561	121,553	211,187	104,635	106,547	52,395	24,667	27,728	74	29	28
		Mahul ...	312,231	155,196	157,035	274,729	137,353	137,376	37,145	17,712	19,433	89	37	32
		Sugri ...	421,740	208,912	212,828	374,102	184,767	189,335	99,330	24,992	24,338	308	169	148
		Mohammadabad ...	306,870	152,638	154,232	246,251	121,956	124,295	52,794	23,291	29,503	825	421	494
		Total, Azamgarh ...	1,529,785	757,314	772,471	1,313,371	653,365	659,066	214,631	103,942	111,589	1,789	907	876

*(a) Excluding population enumerated at Ajodhya mela.

*(b) Including population enumerated at Ajodhya mela.

Population of tahsils by religion—(continued).

PROVINCIAL TABLE II.

Serial number of District.	Name of district.	Name of tahsil.	Total population.			Hindus.			Muslimans.			Others.		
			Total.	Males.	Females.	Total.	Males.	Females.	Total.	Males.	Females.	Total.	Males.	Females.
1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.	14.	15.
34	Naini Tal.	{ Naini Tal ... Bihar ... Kashipur ... Tarai Estate ...	43,788 93,415 55,632 118,422	25,140 53,070 29,840 64,920	18,598 40,376 25,792 53,602	40,637 82,681 34,314 76,825	23,140 46,385 18,387 41,416	17,488 36,296 15,927 34,379	1,972 10,390 21,107 42,510	1,405 6,159 11,330 23,420	567 3,910 9,777 19,030	1,120 365 211 87	586 226 123 61	513 139 89 33
		Total, Naini Tal ..	311,337	172,970	138,267	233,457	129,367	104,090	75,988	42,614	33,371	1,702	989	803
35	Almora	{ Champawat ... Almora ...	122,023 343,870	62,663 171,088	59,360 169,782	119,940 340,073	61,479 171,900	58,461 168,173	1,329 2,723	859 1,623	469 1,100	755 1,074	325 565	439 509
		Total, Almora ...	465,893	236,751	229,142	460,013	233,379	226,634	4,051	2,482	1,669	1,829	890	939
36	Garhwāl... Pauri		429,900	211,588	218,312	424,618	207,633	217,015	4,111	3,493	918	841	462	379
		Total, Garhwāl ..	429,900	211,588	218,312	424,618	207,633	217,015	4,111	3,493	918	841	462	379
37	Lucknow	{ Lucknow ... Mellihat ... Molana ... Ganj.	454,896 154,240 154,115	210,359 95,884 78,708	214,537 88,348 75,407	323,429 158,559 139,774	172,843 83,119 71,663	151,046 75,410 68,111	123,025 25,537 14,238	62,169 12,659 7,001	60,866 12,878 7,237	8,112 131 103	5,817 71 41	2,625 60 59
		Total, Lucknow ...	783,211	414,949	378,292	621,762	327,105	294,567	162,800	81,819	59,081	8,679	5,935	2,714
38	Unao	{ Unao ... Sadpur ... Purwa ... Mehar ...	204,850 225,490 290,910 255,359	104,887 118,488 142,620 133,020	99,963 107,002 118,290 122,369	191,617 197,635 274,691 233,058	98,129 103,141 134,805 122,263	93,368 93,494 140,096 111,695	13,173 27,816 15,896 21,394	6,670 14,321 7,763 10,733	6,503 13,494 8,133 10,661	169 37 113 37	89 24 52 24	72 14 61 13
		Total, Unao ...	976,639	499,015	477,624	826,011	459,341	438,673	78,278	39,487	38,791	347	187	160
39	Rae Bareilly.	{ Rae Bareilly ... Dahma ... Dighlisaiganj ... Salon ...	223,505 270,900 278,086 261,270	110,828 131,972 138,591 128,609	112,677 138,928 139,495 132,571	205,302 257,518 233,071 227,894	101,994 125,355 126,316 112,575	103,368 132,133 126,758 115,319	18,042 33,336 24,999 33,351	8,742 6,564 12,269 16,106	9,300 6,772 12,730 17,215	161 46 19 25	92 23 6 18	63 23 7 7
		Total, Rae Bareilly	1,033,761	510,099	523,671	913,783	456,270	477,516	89,728	43,681	46,047	245	139	106
40	Sitapur	{ Sitapur ... Biswan ... Siddauli ... Misrih ...	311,261 297,277 269,492 267,440	163,794 155,320 167,359 143,334	147,470 141,957 142,103 124,106	250,000 248,452 255,242 246,233	132,601 129,953 154,470 131,994	117,399 118,499 126,772 114,239	60,467 48,767 43,962 21,163	30,713 25,329 22,776 11,301	29,724 23,428 21,186 9,562	797 68 288 44	450 38 143 89	347 30 115 5
		Total, Sitapur ...	1,175,473	619,837	555,636	999,927	629,018	470,909	174,349	90,149	84,200	1,197	670	527
41	Hardoi	{ Hardoi ... Shahabad ... Bilgram ... Sandila ...	252,158 230,533 233,948 266,195	152,270 133,473 156,599 139,891	129,888 117,069 137,019 126,304	260,267 216,051 265,557 231,844	140,612 115,933 112,239 122,408	119,655 100,121 123,348 199,436	21,404 33,929 24,232 34,310	11,407 17,230 14,595 17,460	9,997 16,690 13,637 16,550	467 530 129 41	251 301 65 23	246 249 64 18
		Total, Hardoi ...	1,092,534	682,533	510,301	973,762	521,192	452,560	117,575	60,701	57,174	1,207	640	567
42	Kheri	{ Muhamdi ... Nighasan ... Lakhimpur...	257,999 281,123 366,026	136,857 148,133 193,609	121,102 132,990 172,417	223,133 245,117 312,409	118,576 129,834 165,313	104,557 116,283 147,096	34,540 36,873 63,289	18,145 19,106 28,119	16,395 16,677 25,170	316 193 328	166 103 177	150 30 151
		Total, Kheri ...	905,139	478,629	426,509	780,659	412,723	367,936	123,708	65,460	58,212	777	446	331
43	Fyzabad	{ Fyzabad ... Ajudhya mela ...	307,599 26,723	155,405 18,634	152,194 7,894	263,975 26,361	133,798 17,713	130,177 7,648	41,459 1,312	20,119 1,102	21,340 240	2,165 26	1,488 19	677 6
		Total, Fyzabad Tahsil ...	334,322	174,239	160,088	290,336	151,511	137,825	42,801	21,221	21,580	2,190	1,507	683
	Fyzabad	{ Albarpur ... Bikapur ... Tanda ...	243,929 296,776 350,842	122,823 146,363 175,978	121,106 150,413 174,364	218,650 277,202 301,449	110,532 137,121 161,792	108,118 140,081 149,657	25,154 19,446 48,694	12,251 9,174 24,084	12,903 10,272 21,610	125 128 199	40 68 102	85 60 97
		Total, Fyzabad*(a) ...	1,225,374	619,403	605,971	1,086,637	550,956	535,681	130,095	66,730	69,365	2,642	1,717	925
		Total, Fyzabad*(b) ...	1,204,967	605,403	599,561	1,067,006	537,564	529,442	135,312	66,140	69,202	2,619	1,699	920
44	Gonda	{ Gonda ... Tarabganj ... Utraula ...	384,921 364,993 654,181	191,070 186,857 333,277	189,951 178,136 320,904	331,130 335,410 522,465	167,483 171,714 266,093	163,647 163,696 256,426	62,648 20,286 181,517	26,500 14,982 67,119	26,148 14,304 61,398	243 297 199	87 161 119	156 136 80
		Total, Gonda ...	1,403,195	714,204	688,991	1,189,005	605,236	583,763	213,451	108,601	104,850	739	367	372
45	Bahraich	{ Bahraich ... Kaisarganj ... Nanpara ...	377,588 348,472 325,587	194,761 181,120 168,535	182,827 167,052 157,052	318,956 284,443 253,153	164,590 148,190 130,890	154,366 136,253 122,263	58,304 63,662 71,708	29,962 32,891 37,258	28,342 30,771 34,450	328 67 726	209 39 387	119 28 393
		Total, Bahraich ...	1,051,347	544,416	506,931	866,552	443,670	412,882	193,674	100,111	93,563	1,121	635	486
46	Sultanpur.	{ Sultanpur ... Amethi ... Munsa ... Kadipur ...	310,211 217,207 261,036 265,460	166,393 106,583 128,366 133,600	173,828 110,624 132,670 131,850	291,774 206,194 217,840 248,071	143,559 101,118 107,822 124,974	148,215 105,076 110,018 123,097	48,808 11,008 43,053 17,371	22,776 5,461 20,466 8,622	25,532 5,547 22,587 8,749	129 5 143 8	48 4 78 4	81 1 65 4
		Total, Sultanpur ...	1,083,904	534,932	548,972	963,879	477,473	486,406	119,740	57,325	62,415	283	134	151

*(a) Including population enumerated at the Ajudhya mela.

*(b) Excluding population belonging to other districts.

PROVINCIAL TABLE II.

Population of tahsils by religion—(concluded).

Serial number of district.	Name of District.	Name of Tahsil.	Total population.			Hindus.			Muslims.			Others.		
			Total.	Males.	Females.	Total.	Males.	Females.	Total.	Males.	Females.	Total.	Males.	Females.
1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.	14.	15.
47	Partabgarh.	Partabgarh	316,580	153,612	162,968	250,569	136,059	144,510	35,876	17,500	18,376	135	83	52
		Kunda ...	323,508	158,359	165,149	292,533	143,344	149,189	29,947	14,998	15,949	28	17	11
		Patti ...	272,760	134,161	138,579	244,797	120,568	124,229	27,857	13,354	14,503	106	59	47
	Total, Partabgarh ...		912,848	446,132	466,666	817,899	399,971	417,928	94,680	45,852	48,828	269	159	110
48	Bara Banki.	Ramzanohi-ghat	367,670	195,283	192,387	322,425	163,610	158,815	64,815	31,436	33,379	439	237	193
		Nawabganj	251,169	131,349	122,520	199,732	104,091	95,641	53,914	27,005	26,909	514	244	270
		Fatehpur...	335,407	175,994	159,593	276,180	145,596	130,584	58,927	30,133	28,794	360	175	125
		Haidargarh	232,086	101,440	100,646	180,267	90,822	89,445	21,818	10,617	11,201	1	1	...
Total, Bara Banki ...			1,179,323	603,967	575,356	978,604	504,119	474,485	199,474	99,191	100,283	1,245	657	588

Page	Line	For	Read
150	8	teach	teak
153	14	Articles	Article
155	20	of	or
159	2	regained	regained
160	34	correct	erect
192	21	restrictions	restriction
205	5	raise	rise
205	19	below	blow
206	10	Vorsbury	Vorsburg

v

THE DUTCH IN MALABAR

CHAPTER I

A. MALABAR ON THE EVE OF THE ADVENT OF THE DUTCH.

THE name 'Malabar' in its wider sense is applied to the two native states of Travancore and Cochin and the British District of Malabar. In its narrower sense it is applied only to the British District of that name. The origin of the name has given rise to much speculation. It is interesting to note that the name 'Malabar' by which the country is commonly referred to in the writings of foreign travellers and authors, is rarely used in indigenous literature. Al Biruni seems to have been the first to refer to the country by this name. In the writings of the early travellers we find different variations of the word Malabar; for example 'Manibar', 'Minibar', 'Melibar', 'Mulaiibar', etc. 'Malabar' is certainly not an indigenous word, even though the first part of it, 'Mala' may be considered as the Dravidian term for mountain. Some scholars have suggested the possibility of the derivation of the suffix 'bar', from the Arabic 'bar', which means a continent. It can also be taken as a variant of the Sanskrit 'vara', which means a region; thus 'Malabar' is considered to have been derived from 'Malavaram'. But we have rarely come across any reference to the country as 'Malavaram' in Sanskrit literature. In the Keralaipathi we find the country being frequently referred to as 'Malanadu', 'Malanadu' (Malayalam) or 'Malainadu' (Tamil), literally means the hill country. Probably Malabar is a variant of the indigenous term 'Malanadu'.

1 The word Malanadu is used to refer not only to Malabar, but to the adjoining districts also. Thus the 'Malakuta' of Yuan Chwang's accounts has been identified with 'Malainadu' which includes the Malayalam-speaking countries on the west coast and the modern districts of Tanjore, Madura and Coimbatore.

'Malayalam' is invariably used to refer to the language of the country. But it denotes the territory also. It is composed of the two words 'Mala' (hill) and 'alam' (depth) or 'ala' (wave). 'Malankara' is another name by which the country is known. It may be interpreted to mean 'Mala' (hill) and 'Kara' (shore) or as 'Malayala Kara'.

'Kerala' is the name which the Malayalees like most for their country. But it came to be applied to the country only since the advent of the Aryans. The original name of the country was 'Chera', and it is by this name that it is referred to in the various classics of the Tamil literature. Dr. Caldwell was inclined to think that 'Kerala' was the original form of the word and that 'Chera' was derived from 'Kerala'. But there is a greater possibility for the word 'Kerala' to have come from 'Chera'. Scholars like Rev. Foulkes and Dr. Gundert point out that 'Keralam' is the Canarese dialectical form of the word

Ref: "Ancient Geography of India" by General Cunningham P 629.

"Malakutta of Yuan Chwang" by Prof. K. A. N. Sastri in the Proceedings of the Oriental Conference, 1930, P. 176.
Nadayar Introduction by Dr. Pope, P. X.
Indian Antiquary Vol. XVIII, PP. 239-242.
South Indian Inscriptions " Vol. I, Part I, P. 2, Note I.

1. 'Malankara' does not seem to have been a very common name. Generally it is found in the religious literature of the Syrian Christians. The Archbishop of the Syrian Christians of Malabar is styled as 'Malankara Metropolitian'.

2. The name Kerala has had a long usage. The Mahabharata, the Ramayana, the Vayupurana, the Matsya and Markandeya Puranas make mention of Kerala. The famous Rock Edict of Asoka (R. E. II) refers to the ruler of Kerala as 'Kerala Putra'. The *Perrillus* refers to the ruler of Kerala as 'Ceraobora'. The 'Ceraobora' of the *Perrillus* and the 'Caelobora' of Pliny have been correctly identified with the 'Keralaputra' of the Asokan edicts.

3. Prof. P. T. Srinivasa Iyengar says that the name of the country in its original form of 'Chera' occurs in the *Tittiriyaraanyaka* as 'Chera padah'. But this interpretation is not accepted by scholars as Sayana uses the word 'Chera to mean snake and not the country of Chera.

'Cheram'; Some scholars contend that 'Keralam' is derived from 'Keram', the name of the cocoanut palm which grows luxuriantly in the country. But it seems more probable to accept that 'Keram' is derived from the Dravidian root Cheram.

Malabar had never been a single political unit in any period of her history. Of course tradition speaks of political unity in the days of the Perumals; but a student of history has genuine doubts whether the country at any time had been brought under unified control by any Perumal. When the Dutch arrived on the Malabar coast, there were as many as forty-six petty chieftains and four ruling houses in the country. Tradition ascribes the origin of their autonomy to Cheraman Perumal, the last of the Perumals, who is said to have partitioned his empire among his relatives and dependents and gone on a pilgrimage to 'Mecca'. The authenticity of this tradition is questioned by many historians. There is ample evidence to show that these dynasties and principalities were in existence long before the alleged division of the country by Cheraman Perumal. Probably the story about the partition of Cheraman Perumal's dominions was invented in later centuries as a convenient explanation for the state of affairs in the country.

1 To prove that roots and words beginning with the palatal consonant K change into the guttural consonant K in Canarese, the following examples may be given:—

Tamil

Cey (to do)

Cevi (ear)

Ceri (a hamlet)

Centamarai (red lotus)

Chennir (red water, blood)

Kennir

Kendavara

Keri

Kivi

Key

Canarese

"Raja Sir Annamalai Chettiar Commemoration Volume", 1941. Article on "Ceranadu and Tamil" by Vidwan S. Arumugha Mudaliar, p. 131.

2. The story of Cheraman Perumal's partition of the empire and pil-

grimage to Mecca is one of the unsolved puzzles of Kerala history. We find the story of the Perumal's conversion in Malayalam works like the Keralaipathi, in Mohommadan accounts like the 'Tohfat ul Mujahideen', in foreign accounts like the Joint Commissioner's Report and Letters of Visscher and in Tamil Classics like the Peria Puranam. These accounts disagree fundamentally in many details, even though they all agree in saying that Cheraman was the last

The leading princes of Malabar when the Dutch arrived in the country were the Rajas of Travancore and Cochin, the Zamorin of Calicut and the 'Kolathiri' or Raja of Chirakkal.

Travancore was only one among the many small kingdoms of the south. North of Travancore lay the minor principalities of Attingal, Peritally, Desinganadu, Maruthu Kulangara, Kayamkulam, Porakkad, Punnar, Tekkumkur, Vadakkumkur and Idappally. The Portuguese influence had never been strong in Travancore; in fact Travancore had never been under the influence of any power in any period of her history. Even though the small principalities lying between Travancore and Cochin were enjoying a status of independence, Travancore was exercising considerable control over them. Many of them were ruled by princes related to the royal house of Travancore. Even the others had no fear of annexation by Travancore. Inter-statal wars were a regular feature of political life in medieval Malabar, but conquests never led to annexation. The most important events which radically changed the political character of Malabar during the hundred years of Dutch rule in the country were the annihilation of these principalities by Travancore and the rise of Travancore as the predominant power in Malabar.

of the Perumals; It is interesting to note that almost all the religious sects known to South India—Mohammedanism, Buddhism, Jainism, Christianity, Saivism—have claimed Cheraman as their convert. Latest researches into this subject prove that Cheraman never embraced any foreign religion, but died a Saivite

1 The Royal family of Travancore was known as Trippappuli Swaroopam,

that of Cochin as Perimpadappu Swaroopam, that of Calicut as Nedyitripappu Swaroopam and that of Chirakkal as Kolathu Swaroopam. It was by these names that the Rajas used to refer to each other in their correspondence.

According to the popular traditions of the country, Cheraman Perumal gave the northern part of his dominions to the Kolathiri when he partitioned his empire. The Kolathiri was crowned as the 'lord of Kerala'. If the Perumal was to return after his pilgrimage, the Kolathiri was to become his 'Ithakur' (their-apparent); if he did not return he was to have Cheraman's crown. The southern portions of the empire were given to the Raja of Travancore and the central regions to the Raja of Cochin. When the Zamorin came to meet the Perumal, the latter had only one "Desam" to give him. But the Perumal gave him his sword with the blessing that he may "die, kill and seize" and make himself master of all Malanadu.

Cochin was the chief port on the Malabar coast. It had passed into the hands of the Portuguese very early in the 16th century. Nearly a century and a half of Portuguese administration of the port had raised it to the status of one of the predominant centres of trade in the East. Baldaeus says that Cochin could compare well with some of the best ports of Europe and could "justly challenge the second place after Goa among the Indian cities". Before Goa was constructed, Cochin was the official residence of the Portuguese Viceroy. The port extended to a mile and a half in length and a mile in breadth. Caesar Frederick, a Venetian merchant who visited Malabar in the latter half of the sixteenth century, describes Cochin as the "chiefest place that the Portugals have in the Indies next unto Goa".

The native kingdom of Cochin extended from Porakkad in the south to Chettwaye in the north.¹ The cardinal point of interest in Malabar politics before the advent of the Europeans was the keen hostility between the two kingdoms of Cochin and Calicut. The Zamorin of Calicut was the most powerful of the princes of Malabar. His ambition was to subdue the whole of Malabar with the assistance of the foreign Mohammedans with whom he was on friendly terms. The history of Cochin's independence is a very chequered one; in fact Cochin had never enjoyed an uninterrupted period of independence. Duarte Barbosa says that before the arrival of the Portuguese the Raja of Cochin was not considered as a sovereign at all.² The Zamorins of Calicut had made it a regular custom to invade Cochin and enforce their

1. Of the possessions of Cochin Visscher mentions 'Moutan', 'Coeromad', 'Vypeen', 'Cranganore', and 'Iyoor'. 'Moutan' is identified with 'Mattam' and 'Coernad' with 'Kurunadu'. Both these territories were later conquered by the Raja of Travancore. Cranganore was situated at the southern end of the Chettwaye island. It was the famous capital of the Chera rulers—known as Kodungallur in Malayalam literature, as 'Muziris' in the writings of early western travellers, as 'Muyirikkodu', 'Muchiri' and 'Makotai Pattanam' in Tamil books and inscriptions and as 'Vanji' in the Sangam classics. It had its lost independent status and was always under the protection of either the Raja of Cochin or the Zamorin of Calicut. Iyoor was a small principality lying between Cranganore and Chettwaye.

2. Barbosa says that the Cochin Raja could neither coin money, nor even roof his house with tiles. Description of the coasts of Africa and Malabar, p. 156.

Spain or Portugal. Severe penalties were imposed by the States-General on those who attempted to trade with the Catholic Kingdoms. Meanwhile vigorous attempts were being made in Holland to organise an expedition to the East. The Dutch gained much valuable information about the East from a traveller by name John Huyghen Van Linschoten who was a resident at Goa from 1583 to 1589, in the train of the Portuguese Archbishop. When Linschoten returned to his country in 1592, he placed at the service of the States-General the vast store of knowledge which he had gathered during his travels. He obtained a licence from the States-General to publish his work, one part of which setting forth the routes to India, was published in 1595. It had immediate results. Within a few months, a squadron of four ships was despatched under Cornelius Houtman to the East. He returned in 1597 after concluding a treaty with the King of Bantam. Houtman's example was soon followed by many adventurous captains and by 1601 about fifteen fleets consisting of sixty-five ships had sailed to the East. The Dutch Government soon realised the danger of 'separate voyages'. The different companies were already showing signs of mutual jealousy and rivalry and the Government realised that their disunity would lead to their extermination. Meanwhile Philip II had ordered his Indian fleet "to close in on the Hollanders at the Straits of Malacca and to impress whatever private shipping might there be found to aid in their destruction". The Portuguese Government was using its influence with the native princes to shut out the Dutch. The Dutch realised that their strength lay in unity and on the 20th of March, 1602, the various companies were amalgamated under the name "General Chartered East India Company". Those companies which refused to join the United Company were excluded from the trade with the East. The States General granted to the new company the exclusive right of navigation to the East of the Cape of Good Hope and the west of the Straits of Magellan for twenty-one years. It was empowered to make war or peace, to seize foreign ships, to establish colonies, construct forts and to coin money.

The first achievement of the United Company was the routing of the Portuguese near Bantam in 1602. It was followed by a series of successes. In April 1607, they

destroyed the Spanish fleet in Gibraltar. The Dutch ambition in the East was to gain possession of the Spice Islands. The instructions issued to the Dutch Governor-General were that "the commerce of the Moluccas, Amboyna and Banda should belong to the Company and that no other nation in the world should have the least part"¹. In 1619 the Dutch succeeded in establishing their capital at Batavia.

Though most of the early expeditions were sent to the Malay Archipelago, the Dutch had despatched factors to the Indian mainland as early as 1602. Some Dutch factors arrived in Gujārat to see whether trade relations could be established with India. But it is reported that those factors were seized by the Portuguese when they were proceeding from Surat to Calicut. They were taken to Goa and hanged there. In 1603 the Dutch sent a big expedition of 13 ships to the West Coast of India under Steven Van der Hagen. The fleet arrived in the west coast in 1604. Van der Hagen concluded a treaty of alliance with the Zamorin of Calicut on the 11th November 1604. This treaty marks the first connection of the Dutch with Malabar. The treaty refers to the Zamorin as 'Emperor of Malabar'. The main object of this alliance was 'to expel the Portuguese from the territories of His Highness and the rest of India'. The Dutch were also allowed to build a fort at Calicut. The readiness shown by the Zamorin to enter into an alliance with the new-comers for driving out the old ally, shows the weakness of the Portuguese influence in Malabar at that time. Calicut had been the main centre of Portuguese trade; but the relations of the Zamorin with the Portuguese were seldom friendly. There is some truth in the statement of Moens, however strongly prejudiced he was against the Portuguese, that 'as soon as the Portuguese had taken possession of the navigation and trade in these regions, the trade of Calicut decreased and fell into its decline.' The princes of Malabar were aware of the fact that the Portuguese trade in their country was in no way beneficial to them. It was the domination of the Portuguese in the eastern seas that forced them to keep up their trade relations. But, when this was challenged by a stronger power which the Portuguese could not successfully resist, the princes in Malabar were encouraged to turn against their old ally.

¹ Hunter : *History of British India* Vol. I, P. 383.

The Dutch East India Company succeeded in obtaining footing in other parts of India also. As early as 1602 they had built a factory at Surat. But it was soon destroyed. In 1605 they established a factory at Masulipatam. It was followed by another at Nizampatam in the next year. By 1615 the Company had established many factories on the Coromandel Coast, with Pulicat as their head-quarters.

The Dutch signed a new treaty with the Zamorin on October 16, 1608¹. It was negotiated by Admiral Peter William Van Hoeven; the object of the treaty was 'the ruin and destruction of the Portuguese together with their associates'. 'Associates' here most probably refers to the 'Perumpadappu Swaroopam'. The Zamorin insisted that the Admiral should besiege the town of Cochin which was at that time in the hands of the Portuguese.

The Dutch had made their position very strong in the Malay Islands and Ceylon before they ventured into Malabar. They captured Malacca from the Portuguese in 1641. They attacked the Portuguese in Ceylon in 1638. The Dutch had obtained a footing in Ceylon as early as 1610. They were strengthening their position there with a view to driving the Portuguese entirely out of the island. The Portuguese power was very weak in Ceylon. They had only 500 Europeans in Colombo at the beginning of its siege by the Dutch, nor was it well fortified. The Dutch compelled Colombo to surrender in May 1656. The Dutch power was further strengthened by the arrival of the Right Worshipful Rijklof Van Goens with a large fleet. By 1658 the Portuguese were driven out of their last stronghold in Ceylon. It was easy for the Dutch to attack the Portuguese dominions in Malabar when once they had established their position in Ceylon. From Ceylon the Dutch could carry on their operations against the Portuguese settlements in the West Coast. The town of Quilon was the first object of their attack. Quilon was at that time a great political and commercial centre. The Portuguese had a strong fort there. It was also the seat of the Roman Catholic Bishop². The influence of the Portuguese in Quilon is testified by the English traveller Ralph Fitch who passed by Quilon in 1588.

¹ October 16, 1608, is the date given by Moens. Mr. Galletti says the correct date is October 13.

² Quilon was the seat of the first Roman Catholic Bishopric in India.

He describes Quilon¹ as "a fort of the Portugals from whence commeth great store of pepper which commeth from Portugall." The conquest of Quilon was however no easy task. Admiral Van Goen's sailed from Colombo with a small force against Quilon. He managed to seize the Portuguese fortress there on December 29, 1658 (833 M. E.)

From there he proceeded to Cannanore. But Van Goens received orders to undertake no further operations in Malabar and to send back 500 men to Batavia. Therefore, he returned to Colombo. On his way back he stationed a strong garrison at Quilon to guard the fortress they had captured from the Portuguese. But they were immediately attacked by an army of 3000 Portuguese and 1000 Nairs. Finding the defence of the place hopeless, Governor Van der Meyden sailed to Colombo and withdrew the garrison on the 14th April, 1659.

The attempts of the Dutch to capture the Portuguese strongholds in Malabar were renewed in 1660. Van Goens sailed with a small fleet against Malabar. He was joined by a fleet of six ships commanded by Governor Van der Meyden. The Dutch reached Ayacotta on the 10th February, 1661. They signed a treaty with the Zamorin with the object of attacking the Portuguese forts of Pallipport and Cranganore. It was agreed to divide the loot equally between the Dutch and the Zamorin if the attempt was to be successful. Among the captives, the Christians were to be entrusted to the Dutch, "Portuguese priests were to be expelled, the forts to be pulled down . . . the Dutch to administer justice, the Dutch to have all pepper at a fixed price except one third which the native chiefs or their merchants should keep for their own trade". The main motive of the Zamorin was to take possession of Cochin with the help of the Dutch. Van der Meyden landed at Pallipport on the 15th February, 1661 and attacked the Portuguese fort there. There was only a very weak

¹ Captain Nieuhoff, the Dutch Director of the East India Company in Quilon, gives the following description about the Portuguese strongholds there. "The city is fortified with a stone wall of eighteen to twenty feet high and eight bastions, The Friars of St Paul and the Franciscans had each a monastery there adorned with stately chapels and steeples. Besides these, there were four other Portuguese Churches here dedicated to as many Romish Saints. . . . The castle (the residence of the Portuguese Governor) is the strongest the Portuguese were ever masters of on the coast of Malabar."

garrison of 100 to 150 Europeans and 200 Nairs at Palliport. The Portuguese had made arrangements for reinforcements from Cochin, but it was too late when help came. The Dutch took possession of the fort. Meanwhile the Portuguese garrison defending the fort had escaped through the lake. Van der Meyden handed over Palliport to the Zamorin and sailed back to Ceylon. The Portuguese abandoned all ideas of re-capturing the fort of Palliport and concentrated their attention on Cochin and Cranganore. The Dutch were aware of the Portuguese strength in Quilon. Therefore, Governor Van der Meyden had decided to postpone all attempts at the capture of Cochin. The Dutch plan was to consolidate their conquests and strengthen their position before launching an attack against Cochin. But the capture of Cochin had always been the pivot of their plans in Malabar. They knew very well that "once the Portuguese were turned out of Cochin, they were turned out of India"¹. That was the reason why Van Goens insisted on seizing Cochin. "In every case" he said "even if our nation should make peace with the Crown of Portugal the design on Cochin must be kept in mind"². He wrote to the Governor-General and Council of India about the necessity of seizing Cochin. "If we are so lucky as to defeat them (the Portuguese in Cochin) the whole coast of Malabar and the pepper trade will be ours".

The power of the Dutch in Malabar was steadily ascending and the chiefs and princes were anxious to secure their friendship. When the Dutch were hatching plans for an attack on the Cochin fort, Paliath Achen, the commander-in-chief and the chief minister of Cochin, approached them at Palliport and "placed himself immediately under the Company, surrendered his person, land and subjects to the Company"³. He signed a treaty with Van Goens on the 12th of March 1661 on board the 'Muscaat

1 De Weert—(Quoted by K. M. Pannikar in 'Malabar and the Dutch')

2 Batavia Diary, 1661. Quoted by Galletti.

3 Prof. K. A. Nilakanta Sastri, commenting on this treaty, says: "This is not a treaty in the usual sense. It is an instruction or request from Paliath Achen, Komi Menon, to the Dutch Company to protect him from danger from the Portuguese and other enemies who have hostile designs against him and his possessions in Vypeen and elsewhere" Mr. Sastri calls this agreement 'a shrewd stroke of business' on the part of Paliath Achen. Refer to his paper 'Some Documents on Cochin History', I. H. R Commission, Proceedings of Meetings. Vol XV.

Boom'. Paliath Achen confesses in this treaty that he was in a 'position of embarrassment', 'powerless to save himself and stand against his enemies' and therefore he was compelled to look out for a powerful nation which will maintain and protect his land and subjects. The Company took him under its protection on condition that 'noither he nor his legal successors should ever make a treaty or alliance with the Portuguese directly or indirectly'. This treaty shows the great prestige of the Dutch Company and the desparate position of the Malabar chiefs at that time. The treaty, no doubt, enhanced the prestige and influence of the Dutch in Malabar considerably.

CHAPTER II

THE DUTCH OCCUPATION OF COCHIN

THE history of the Dutch relations with Cochin should be studied in the background of the complicated politics of the country. Certain adoptions made in the ruling family of Cochin had given rise to bitter internecine struggles and thrown the state into utter confusion. In the 17th century the Cochin ruling family was divided into five tavazhies¹ or branches. They were (1) Muttatavazhi, (2) Ilaya tavazhi, (3) Muringur, (4) Chazhiyur and (5) Palluritti. Of these five families, the reigning prince Rama Varma was from the Ilaya tavazhi branch. He adopted some princes from the Mutta tavazhi and Palluritti branches as his successors. Two princes² were adopted from the Mutta tavazhi branch, and in July 1646, Rama Varma the eldest of these princes became the ruler. Soon quarrels arose between the Mutta tavazhi and Palluritti branches; Vira Kerala Varma of the latter family deposed Rama Varma and drove him out along with his brother with the help of the Portuguese. The members of the banished family secured the support of one of the feudatories of the Zamorin and tried to regain their position. But, they were defeated at a battle which took place at Trichur. The Zamorin immediately took up the cause of the banished princes and made preparations for an attack on Cochin. The throne having again fallen vacant, some princes

1 Patappattu. Page 2.

2 Introduction to the Patappattu; Oollur S. Parameswara Iyer.

were adopted from the Vettathu family (Tanur) in North Malabar. The Vettom princes were traditional friends of the Portuguese. The anointment of the prince was held in the Portuguese cathedral at Cochin and he was sworn in as the Portuguese King's brother-in-arms. None of the local chieftains-or neighbouring princes took part in these ceremonies on the ground that the Vettom family was not so ancient or noble as the Mutta tavazhi. Fr. Sebastiani rightly observes that this adoption was the root cause of all the subsequent troubles in Cochin.

Now there were two principal parties in Cochin, one supporting the Vettom princes and the other supporting the Mutta tavazhi princes. The leading supporter of the Mutta tavazhi princes was the Zamorin. They had also as their allies the Rajas of Vadakkumkur, Thekkumkur and Edappalli. Pajiath Achen, the premier chief of Cochin, was secretly helping the exiled princes. The principal supporters of the Vettom princes were, of course, the Portuguese. The princes of Porakkad, Valluvanad and Chempakassery were their other allies.

The Dutch had hitherto taken little part in the affairs of Cochin. They were anxiously waiting for an opportunity to get a foothold there. The influence of the Dutch Company at that time seems to have been very great. The author of the 'Patappattu' describes the Company as a 'mighty elephant' and speaks of the 'big guns, ammunitions and ships' of the Dutch as a great terror to Malabar. On the advice of the Palham chief, the Mutta tavazhi prince, Vira Kerala Varma, proceeded to Colombo to seek the help of the Dutch. Vira Kerala Varma explained to the Governor General the whole case, specially laying stress on the fact that the Portuguese had been illegally supporting the claims of the usurpers. The Dutch promised immediate help. A conference was held with the Zamorin at Ayacotta and a plan of attack was drawn up. The Zamorin was to attack by land and the Dutch by sea, while the Rajas of Vadakkumkur and Thekkumkur were to lead a simultaneous attack alongside the river.

The Dutch fleet under Van Goens at Pulicat received orders from Batavia for the campaign on the west coast. He collected a huge fleet numbering about 24 ships from Colombo and other

parts. He was joined by the ships of Commodore Roodhas at Manapare, and the whole fleet arrived at Quilon on the 5th December. The Dutch fleet consisted of nearly 4,000 soldiers including 27 companies of Europeans. The Portuguese offered no resistance. But the Nairs of the queen of Quilon ably resisted the enemy. In the encounter with the Nairs, about 13 Dutchmen were killed and about 30 were wounded, while "the ways and fields were sown with dead Malabaris".¹ The Dutch entered the town which had been abandoned by the Portuguese; they set fire to the palace there and the temple attached to it.

After capturing Quilon, Van Goens sailed for Cranganore.²

The Dutch landed at Cranganore on the 2nd January, 1662 and approached the Portuguese town early on the morning of the 3rd. The Zamorin immediately sent an army to help the Dutch, and the Dutch laid siege to the fortress. The Portuguese fortress was under the command of Urbano Fialho Ferreira. The Dutch opened fire against the fortress, determined to storm the town. The author of the 'Patappattu' says that the Dutch commander sent word to the Portuguese garrison that he was determined to have his dinner in the Cranganore Fort on the following day. But, the ceaseless firing of the Dutch seemed to have no results in the beginning. Fr. Sebastiani gives an interesting story that the Dutch sent a messenger with a white flag for truce. But, Urbano Ferreira sent back the messenger to tell Van Goens that the fort was full of valuable articles and that if he was very particular to enter the fort, he himself would send him the ladder to scale the walls! This insulting reply infuriated the Dutch and they resolved to seize the fort on any account. The Dutch wanted to find out a vulnerable point in the fort and to attack there. Captain Nieuhoff who was deputed for this task managed to get information about the weak points in the Portu-

1 Galletti quotes from the accounts of Schouten, the surgeon in the Company's service who accompanied the expedition

2 Captain Nieuhoff says "Mr Van Goens set sail the same day with the ships the 'Walnut tree' and the 'Ulieland' towards Cranganore, Commodore Gotske being to follow with the rest. . . . on the 29th we set sail in the ship 'Exchange' to follow the fleet. . . . We landed without any opposition except that the enemy discharged some of its great cannons against us from Cranganore, but without any loss on our side".

3 Sebastiani, Bk. 1. Chap XIII.

guese defences and attacked that side on January 15. It is stated that the plans of the Portuguese were betrayed to the Dutch by Paliath Achen who had already signed a treaty with them. The Portuguese fought courageously, but their commandant fell pierced by a wound; and they retired to the Jesuit Church. The Dutch rushed into the Fort and the Portuguese, finding further defence impossible, surrendered. On the Portuguese side about 120 Europeans and many Nairs were killed. The Dutch lost about 70 men among whom were important officers like Poolman, Sobulenburg, Simon Wending and Lieutenant Silvester. The Portuguese had many buildings and churches in Cranganore. Baldaeus says that the Dutch found there a noble College of the Jesuits with a fine library attached to it, a Franciscan church and a stately cathedral adorned with tombs of the Archbishops of the place. Outside the fort there was a seminary belonging to the St. Thomas Christians (Syrian Christians) where many students and priests were studying Syriac. There were in all seven churches in Cranganore. Baldaeus* says that the town showed traces of Portuguese decadence¹ but from various other accounts he himself gives, Cranganore seemed to have been a flourishing town. Its decadence set in with its conquest by the Dutch. The Dutch at first entrusted it to the local Raja who was to be their vassal.

After the capture of Cranganore, the Dutch forces moved south towards Cochin, subjugating the Island of Vypeen on their way. They established their headquarters in a Portuguese church and built a fort called 'New Orange'. Their idea was to bombard Cochin from New Orange. The *morale* of the Portuguese defenders had been considerably shattered by the brilliant victories scored by the Dutch at Cranganore. Bishop Sebastiani says that he received a letter from the Paliath chief asking him to go over to Chennamangalam for some important confidential negotiations. The Portuguese were prepared to recognise the right of the Mutta tavazhi to succeed the Vettom prince in order to avoid an encounter with the Dutch. They were anxious about the fate of the Syrian Catholics in Cochin in the event of a Dutch conquest of the fort. But, before any settlement could be arranged, the Dutch had launched their attack on Cochin².

1, Baldaeus I. Chap XVIII.

2 Sebastiani II. Chap. XIII.

The Zamorin with his troops advanced to Elankunnapuzha to help the Mutta tavazhi prince. The Mutta tavazhi prince had meanwhile met the Dutch commander on board the ship and promised all possible help. He undertook to supply the Dutch with food materials from the neighbouring districts.

The Portuguese Governor had convened a conference consisting of his officers, the Cochin prince and Goda Varma, the junior prince, to discuss about the steps to be taken for the defence of Cochin. The junior prince advised the Cochin Raja to escape before the enemy advanced, but he was steadfast in his resolve "to fight for the crown and country".

Van Goens landed some miles south of Cochin and marched along the shore to the Church of St. Iago. From there he advanced towards Mattancherry. Vira Kerala Varma had specially requested the Dutch admiral that there should be no indiscriminate slaughter after the capture of the town. He was very anxious that his sister, the old queen-mother, and the Brahmans and the *gosha* women in the fort should suffer no harm. The Dutch pretended to be friends of the natives, and announced that they had come not to hurt them, but only to help them by defeating the Portuguese. But their persuasion was of no avail; and the Nairs put forth a stout resistance¹.

Baldaeus says that the Nairs were all intoxicated with opium. But their heroism was in vain. All the three Vettom princes were killed in the fight². The Nairs had fortified themselves in a temple very near the palace. But the Dutch attacked them and chased them from there. In the encounter about 400 Nairs were killed and many times their number wounded. Rani Gangadhara Lakshmi, the old queen-mother, took refuge in the temple, but she was taken prisoner and brought before the Dutch general by Hendrik Van Rhede³ (author of the famous work, 'Hortus Malabaricus'). Van Rhede was instantly promoted to the rank of captain as a recognition of his service.

1 Nieuhoff says "They all appeared in arms against us and several times attacked us like mad men throwing themselves among our ranks though they were sure to die in the attempt and thrusting themselves upon our swords and spikes not like men, but like wild boars and enraged bears".

2 Tavernier says that four princes were killed. Ref Bk. I, Chapt. XVI.

3 Nieuhoff says "The old Queen would fain have hid herself in a corner of the top of the Pagode, but was found out by Captain Henry Rede and brought into our camp".

When the queen-mother was brought before Van Goens, the Mutta tavazhi prince paid his respects to her. She readily recognised him as the legal prince¹.

Many Nair chiefs were killed or taken prisoners in the battle².

Goda Varma, the Vettom prince, had escaped to Ernakulam. The Dutch proposed to pursue him and attack his stronghold there. But, meanwhile, the Raja of Chempakassery, a staunch ally of the Vettom prince, had arrived at Ernakulam with reinforcements. When the Dutch heard about this, they gave up the idea of pursuit.

The Dutch now decided to attack the main fortress. Their army was then divided into three companies—one on the southern side under Van Goens, one on the western side under Commodore Isbrand Goske and one on the eastern side under Commodore Root Bans. The Dutch started bombarding the town from their fortress of New Orange at Vypeen. Captain Was was ordered to rush on the fortress and take it by storm before sunrise on Sunday the 5th February. But he was killed in his attempt and his army retreated in confusion. The siege continued for three weeks during which not a day passed without attacks and sorties. Winter was fast approaching, and the besieging forces were reduced in number to 1400 men. Meanwhile, the Portuguese received reinforcements from their ally, the Raja of Chempakassery. Further five ships arrived from Goa for Portuguese help. The Dutch were badly in need of many war materials, and the outbreak of the monsoon had spoiled their plans. Van Goens thought it better to raise the siege and retire to Batavia. The retreat was effected in such a clever way that the Portuguese came to know of it only after the whole garrison had left. "All night a Dutch constable named Boerdrop had been running about bawling out at the top of his voice words of command such as 'stand', 'halt', 'who is there?'; a friendly Jew in the meanwhile sounded the gong till early vespers; and these tricks put the besieged

¹ Fr Sebastian says that she was compelled by the Dutch to recognise the Mutta tavazhi prince as heir

² The Tirupunithurai Granthavarai says that Raghavan Coil was wounded and he escaped and that two Namboodiries of Muriyattutta were carried away by the Dutch on board their ship as prisoners.

14th of December 1662 and one of the clauses of the treaty was that all conquered places should be restored to their former masters immediately after the publication of the treaty. Day¹ says that the Dutch General had deliberately withheld the information about the signing of the peace so that it should not prevent his conquest of Cochin. It is said that when the Portuguese accused Van Goens of this charge he coolly replied that he was only playing the same game which the Portuguese themselves had played on the Dutch at the capture of Pernambuco in Brazil not many years ago. Even otherwise, the Dutch had a sound justification in refusing to restore Cochin and Cannanore to the Portuguese. When the Portuguese Viceroy demanded the restoration of these places on the ground that they were captured after the signing of the treaty, the Dutch replied that "it was true the treaty was ratified on the 14th of December, 1662, but only came into force so far as the last was concerned after the publication of the said peace which took place three months after the said ratification". Cochin was captured in January and Cannanore in February 1663, but the treaty was published only in March. Therefore the Dutch were not obliged to surrender their conquests².

The capture of Cochin from the Portuguese marks a very important landmark in the history of the Dutch in Malabar. The Portuguese flag ceased to fly over Malabar and the Dutch were left undisputed masters of the country³.

1 Day—"Land of the Perumals" P. 117.

2 Francois Martin who visited Cochin in 1669 observes in this connection: "There have been nevertheless some protests against this capture, the King of Portugal holding that this action was against the terms and subsequent to the treaty of peace concluded between the two nations in Europe. But such protests must needs be upheld more by right of force than by way of proceedings."

The question was finally decided by the treaty of 1669 between Holland and Portugal which stated that Cochin and Cannanore should remain in the hands of the Dutch.

3 Baldaeus says that the Dutch were very liberal in the treatment accorded to the Portuguese "Being thus become entirely masters of Cochin, after it had been 150 years in the possession of the Portuguese, the Dutch General made it his chiefest care to issue his orders not to molest the Portuguese, but to observe punctually the articles of capitulation."

Company. The Paliam chief was to be in charge of the administration, and the junior princes were not to interfere in the State affairs. The provisions of this agreement were not pleasing to the junior princes. The princes were encouraged by the Nair chieftains who also disliked the interference of the Dutch in internal affairs. The junior princes defied the authority of the Raja and the State was thrown into Civil War. The Raja himself had to leave the capital fearing the troubles of the nobles and the junior princes. He wrote a letter to the Governor General at Batavia in March 1677 informing him of the situation in his State. The Raja received the reply on the 8th of September. The Governor General was of opinion that the Raja himself should settle the affairs of his State. He advised the Raja to return to his capital and protect the "fair name and pride of the Company and the Swaroopam". The Governor General again asserted the mutual confidence between the Company and the Raja, and eagerly desired that it should never be strained.

The Raja tried his best to restore order and peace in his family and State. But the troubles only intensified.

Van Rheede was succeeded by Jacob Lobo as Commander of Cochin. Lobo signed a new treaty with the Raja on the 21st of May 1678. This agreement stated that the junior princes should not interfere in the State affairs. They were not to go against the orders of the Raja on pain of very severe punishment. They could not enter the Cochin port without the consent of the Raja. The Paliam chief was to manage the administration in consultation with the Raja and the Commander. If the Paliam chief failed to discharge his duties satisfactorily, the Raja could appoint a new chief with the permission of the Commander. Certain arrangements were made for the collection of revenue due to the Raja. The Nairs were told that they would be severely punished if they attempted to create trouble in the State. Some regulations were made concerning the protection of the Christian subjects in Cochin.

The agreement virtually handed the Cochin State over to the Company. It reduced the position of the Raja to that of a mere dependent of the Company. The administration was to be carried on by the Paliam chief who was to be responsible to the Company. The Raja was the nominal head of the State, but he could exercise very little powers. The position of the Raja was

very pitiable. The junior princes were all enraged against him and the Nair nobles were openly supporting the princes. The threat of punishment meted out to the Nair nobles and the junior princes resulted only in aggravating their hostility. They were now planning for deposing the Raja and destroying the Dutch influence in the State. There was no love lost between the local merchants and the Company's merchants; and therefore there was considerable difficulty in the collection of customs and duties. The Dutch Commander at that time—Martin Huysman signed a new agreement with the Raja on the 3rd of May, 1681 at Chennamangalam. This agreement provided another opportunity to the Dutch for tightening their grip over Cochin. The first clause of the agreement declared the Paliam chief as the head of the administration. The allowances for the princes were fixed at the former rates (*i.e.*, 3000 tanams for the Raja, 1500 fanams for the Elaya Raja, 750 fanams for Rama Varma and 450 fanams for Goda Varma.) The paliam chief should see that the allowances were properly given to the princes. The Elaya Raja was not to interfere in State affairs. No adoptions were to be made to the Royal family without the consent of the Company. In short, the affairs of the state were to be conducted by the Paliam chief under instructions from the Commander. He was to be assisted by three others including an officer of the Company.

Captain Hendrick Reins was selected to represent the Company as stipulated in the agreement. Meanwhile, the Paliam chief died leaving as his heir a minor by name Ittikkannachen. The Raja appointed Ittikkannachen as the prime minister, but as he was a minor, it was necessary to appoint a counsellor. The Raja consulted the Dutch Commander Gulmer Vorsburg as to the appointment of new counsellors, and a fresh agreement was signed between the two on July 25, 1684. Captain Hendrick Reins who was appointed as the Company's representative was to exercise the powers of the prime minister. The minor Paliam chief, Ittiakkannachen, was of course the chief minister in name. He was to be assisted by two counsellors who were also named in the agreement¹. The treasurer of the State was Perimbala Shenoi—a dependent of the Company. He had not been regular in keeping the accounts and he was never on good terms with the local officers. The Raja had desired the removal of Perimbala

¹ Vadakkenjeril Ramer and Parathurathil Ittinikumaran.

Shenoi and the appointment of a new hand, but the Commander was not prepared to remove him. Thus the Company had the command of both the treasury and the dewanship, and the Raja was reduced to the position of a mere cypher. The Raja was conscious of his growing helplessness. But, he had no other alternative but to depend on the Dutch as he had estranged the junior princes and the nobles. The Paliam chief was only a minor, and as such he was not powerful. Even otherwise the Raja could not rely on the support of the Paliam chief as he was more a dependent of the Company than of the Raja. The Dutch were the de-facto rulers of Cochin, and they exercised their authority even in minor matters of the State like the appointment of local officials.

In 1687 Isaak Van Deelan was appointed Commander of Cochin. The highhanded interference by the Company in internal matters drove the Raja to desperation and he himself secretly helped the outbreak of troubles in the state. Some loyal Nair nobles pledged their support for ousting the Dutch from Cochin. The Dutch Governor General at Batavia was constantly informed of the steady deterioration of Dutch influence in Cochin. Events were fast developing in the direction of a rapprochement between the Raja and his nobles against the Dutch. But a dispute of succession arose in Cochin meanwhile, and the Raja was again put to the necessity of depending on Dutch power.

It had been decided at a meeting of the Raja, Elaya Raja, the Dutch Governor and the Paliam chief at Chennamangalam in May 1681, to adopt some princes and princesses from the Chaliyur family. This decision was given effect to in 1689. But this adoption was not welcome to some nobles especially the Rajas of Parur, Mangat and Manakulam. The Chaliyur princes were dependents of the Dutch, and therefore, their cause was upheld by the Company. The Nair nobles supported the Vettom princes and demanded that adoption should be made from that family. The Vettom princes were popular with the people and the Raja himself was prepared to support them because of his hostility towards the Dutch. But, Paliath Achen stood firmly by the Dutch and the Chaliyur branch. The Dutch had alienated every one at Cochin and their position was very precarious. The Nair nobles invited the Vettom prince to assume leadership. In

1691 he arrived at Mangat accompanied by 'Ayinikkuttil Nambidi.

The author of 'Keralolpathi' says that the Dutch and the Cochin Raja frightened at this new turn of events, appealed to the Zamorin for help through the Raja of Cranganore. The Zamorin consented to come to their help and signed a truce for 12 years with the Dutch. The Dutch ceded Chettwaye to the Zamorin and agreed to pay the expenses of the war. The Calicut forces commanded by Krishnan, the 'Talachchennore' of Chowghat, crossed into Alangad and Parur. The Dutch forces were commanded by Hendrick Van Rheede. The supporters of the Vettom princes were commanded by Mangat Raja. He was defeated by the Dutch, and Parur and Alangad were plundered by the victors. The Zamorin got Chettwaye as was originally promised.

The war of the Vettom succession secured the premier position of the Dutch once again in Cochin and established it on an unquestionable basis. The Dutch with the help of the Zamorin broke the power of the Nair nobles and local Rajas who had been their bitter enemies. The position of the Dutch as king-makers in Cochin became undisputed. Cochin was reduced to the position of a mere Dutch principality.

The Raja of Cochin died in 1687. The administration of Cochin was in great confusion in the time of his successor. Ittikannachen, the Paliath chief, was never loyal to the new Raja, and he joined sides with his enemies. Collection of customs and revenues fell into arrears. The Company's Indian agent, Bavan Prabhu, was secretly intriguing against the Raja and encouraging these irregularities. Isaac Van Declan, the Dutch Commander, died on the 25th December 1693, and the Raja was in a helpless position. He wrote a letter (on 22nd of Jan. 1694) to the Governor General at Batavia acquainting him of the situation in Cochin. He complained of the hostile attitude of the new Paliath Achen. "Formerly there were loyal and efficient men in the Paliath family", he wrote¹ "but now it is managed by minor urchins.....There are many Swaroopis in my State of which the Paliath is only one. We had done our best to improve the

1 Translated from the Malayalam document.

position of the Paliam family. But now all of them have turned against me because of their youthful recklessness.....I have enemies both inside and outside the fort. Therefore, I am put to very hard difficulties. The Menons in my service are not given correct accounts, and customs and duties are not properly remitted to my Government. Bavan is at the root of all these confusions and he is in the pay of my enemy, the Zamorin.' The Raja earnestly appealed to the Governor General to do all that was necessary to stop these irregularities. The Raja got the reply that the new Commander, Adrian Van Mattan and the new Commissar General would set matters right and do their best to improve the position of the Company and the Raja. But the irregularities of Bavan Prabhu only became worse. The Commander was also anxious to keep his friendly relation with the Zamorin. The Raja again sent a letter to the Governor General at Batavia (Idavom 871 M. E. 1696 A. D.) complaining of the hostile attitude of the Company's agents. The Commissar of the Company had met the Zamorin at Ponnani and received presents from him. The Raja also drew the attention of the Governor General to the poor state of the finances of the Swaroopam. What enraged the Raja most was the attitude of the Commissar in courting the friendship of the Zamorin. The Raja was seriously afraid that the Dutch may fall under the influence of the Zamorin, which would mean the destruction of his Swaroopam.

In 1697 Hendrick Zwardercroon was appointed Commander of Cochin. The Cochin Raja passed away in 1698 and he was succeeded by Prince Rama Varma. A new agreement was entered into between the Raja and Zwaadercroon. Some arrangements were made regarding the finances of the State. The Company renewed its pledge to protect the State from all its enemies. The Raja in turn promised to send help to the Company if it was attacked by its enemies. This agreement finally set the seal of servitude on the Cochin principality and made it merely an appendage of the Dutch Company.

CHAPTER III

THE ZAMORIN AND THE DUTCH

WHEN the Dutch established their power in Cochin, the most resourceful and aggressive of the princes of Malabar

was the Zamorin of Calicut. The Zamorin had been the traditional enemy of the Portuguese, and he extended a willing support to the Dutch to drive out the Portuguese from Cochin. The main ambition of the Zamorin was to gain possession of Cochin through Dutch help. But, the Zamorin was disillusioned at the very beginning when the Dutch signed an agreement with the Cochin Raja undertaking to protect him from all outside attack. The Dutch were careful in seeing that the Zamorin did not become too powerful in Malabar. The Zamorin demanded that at least the island of Vypeen should be ceded to him, but the Dutch were not prepared for that. Thus both the Dutch and the Zamorin knew from the very outset that their relations could not be cordial. There was traditional enmity between the Zamorin and Cochin. Visscher¹ refers to the continual warfare between the two kingdoms and attributes it to the division of the Malayalee community into the two factions—Panniyurkur and Chovarakur. “No firm or lasting peace is ever made” writes Visscher, “but merely so to speak, a cessation of hostilities, invariably followed by a renewal of war”. But how far this tradition of the two rival factions was responsible for these constant wars is not certain. More often these wars had originated from their claims on places in each other's territories. The warfare between the rival kings of Cochin and Calicut continued for over 250 years after the arrival of the Portuguese in Malabar; and we have instances of at least nine such conflicts². Both the Portuguese and the Dutch had cleverly availed themselves of all opportunities to better their interests in the Malabar coast. But the commitment of the Dutch to protect Cochin from her enemies had brought considerable loss to the Company. The Dutch Governor General once wrote bitterly to the Cochin Raja. “I do not know how much treasure and how much blood had been spent by the Hon'ble Company to aggrandise your family.....”³ But, it was very late when the Company came to the conclusion⁴ “that the Raja of Cochin was no longer to be supported in his interminable fights with the Zamorin.

We have seen before, that the Dutch had ceded Chettways to the Zamorin in 1691 in return for the help he had given in the

1 Visscher's Letters, IV.

2 History of Kerala K, P. P. Menon, Vol. I. P. 484.

3 Letter of Jan Van Horn dated 15th November 1705.

4 Resolution of the Supreme Govt. at Batavia.

"war of the Vettom succession." Chettwaye was of great strategic importance for an attack on Cochin. It lay in the territories of Payyencherry Nair, a feudatory of the Zamorin. As soon as the Zamorin gained possession of Chettwaye he took advantage of the position to use it against his hereditary enemy, the Raja of Cochin. He built a line of fortresses on the Cochin frontier and strongly garrisoned them¹. The Zamorin was fully aware of the fact that his treaty with the Dutch would not be longstanding. Further, the Raja of Cochin was trying his best to bring about a rupture of the peace between the Zamorin and the Dutch. Therefore the Zamorin took all possible steps to enlarge the circle of his friends. The Raja of Kayamkulam was already his ally. Bavan Prabhu was keenly supporting the Zamorin. He was sent to Porakkad, Parur, Tekkumkur and Vadakkumkur to enlist their support for the Zamorin. The Dutch were anxious to avoid war, and they invited the Zamorin and his allies to a conference in January 1701. But the king of Calicut knew that it was only a ruse to gain time and he attacked the Cochin territory. In 1702 the Raja of Porakkad joined sides with the Zamorin and attacked Cochin territory. The Raja of porakkad was an ally of the Company and therefore the Company interfered in the matter and restored peace between the two. Parur also was on hostile terms with Cochin. The Raja of Parur complained to the Dutch that the Cochin Raja was committing outrages in his territories. The Company felt that the grievances of the Raja of Parur were not legitimate and decided to declare war against him. The Zamorin was canvassing the support of Vadakkumkur by proposing an adoption from the Raja's family.

In 1705 the Zamorin died. But his successor continued the war against Cochin. In 1707 he attacked Kodasseri and Muriyanad. Hitherto the Dutch had not actively interfered in the war even though they were frequently reminded by the Cochin Raja of their moral obligation to support him. Now the Dutch Commander decided to take stern steps against the growing aggression of the Zamorin. The Zamorin was told that the Cochin Raja and the other victims of his aggression were in the protection of the Company, and as such,

¹ The important fortresses were Pappanetty, Kattur, Mapransta and Oorakam Truttam.

an attack on them would be tantamount to an attack on the Dutch. The Zamorin expressed his desire to be on friendly terms with Cochin. He also stated that the war against Kodasseri had been provoked by the Kaimal himself and that he had no intention of becoming an enemy of the Company. The Zamorin sent his representatives to Cochin to meet the Commander. A temporary peace was concluded but it was broken in February 1708. The Company was however anxious to avoid war and further negotiations were started with the Zamorin. The Zamorin himself was desirous of peace and on August 30, 1708 he wrote to the Commander to fix a date for an interview with him. The Zamorin was informed that an interview could be held only after deciding the points of dispute. After a series of correspondence, between the Zamorin and the Commander, peace was concluded on the 10th of January 1710. According to the terms of the treaty the Zamorin had to hand over Chettwaye to the Dutch. The Payyancherry Nair and Cranganore Raja who were formerly feudatories of the Zamorin came under the protection of the Company. The Raja of Cochin also gained certain territories.

The treaty of 1710 was not approved of by the heir-apparent of Calicut and the Commander-in-chief Dharmot Panikker. The Zamorin was a peace-loving man and he was anxious to stop all war before the Mamankam festival,¹ which was fast approaching. But the loss of Chettwaye was a serious blow to Calicut and the chiefs of the army and other nobles were very anxious to recover it as early as possible. They knew very well that Chettwaye would be used by the Dutch for operations against them and wanted to prevent it. Visscher speaks of the strategic importance of Chettwaye; "Chettwaye is another fort about twelve leagues from Cochin serving partly to protect commerce and partly as a defence against the Zamorin whose dominions

1 The Mamankam (Mahamakham) was the greatest national festival of Malabar till two centuries ago. The festival was held on the banks of the Periyar river near Tirunavaye once in twelve years. A regular change used to take place in all offices (including even kingship) in all contracts and in all tenures after a period of twelve years (a Vyalavattam). The Mamankam was the great occasion when all the existing relations were re-adjusted by the princes and the people. In the early centuries the kings used to abdicate after a period of twelve years in favour of their successors. But after the power of royalty had become very prominent, this practice was given up. The festival was attended by representatives of all parts of Kerala. Tradition attributes its origin to Parasuram, the legendary hero of Kerala.

ding the fort at Chettwaye and the Zamorin got some of his men under the disguise of labourers to be employed by them and to take an opportunity of surprising the Dutch. The two lieutenants who had the overseeing of the work were one evening diverting themselves with a game at tables in a guard room about half a mile from the fort. They had let some of their soldiers go straggling about and the disguised natives took the opportunity to kill the sentinels, signal to the ambushade and take the half-built fort.....The Zamorin caused the English flag to be hoisted and the fort was destroyed". How far the account given by Hamilton is correct is open to question, Hamilton was a traveller in the East Indies between the years 1688 and 1723, and he is likely to have first-hand information of these matters. But the story of sending soldiers disguised as labourers is not found in the Letters of Visscher. However, it is clear that the Dutch were taken by surprise at Chettwaye and the Zamorin was able to score a signal success.

¹ The fort fell into the hands of the Zamorin who made a surprise attack. The loss of Chettwaye was a serious blow to the Dutch prestige in Cochin. "When the tidings of this disaster reached Cochin", says Visscher, "it caused a universal panic among the Dutch and gave rise to a spirit of indolence among the natives". Ketel, the Dutch Commandant, marched against Chettwaye with three battalions. He was opposed by Mangatt Achen, the Zamorin's General. But the Dutch were able to disperse the army. "Many were cut down, others drowned in the river and others took refuge in the fort at Chettwaye where their defeat caused a great panic"². If the Commandant had followed up his victory by attacking the fort, the Zamorin would have abandoned it in alarm. But, instead of doing this Ketel marched with his troops into a neighbouring village and thus gave time to the enemy to prepare for the defence. The Zamorin's forces got fresh supplies from the English and erected barricades at the entrances to the fort. Ketel decided to attack the fort on the 1st of February and scale the walls, but when the troops reached the walls they found that they had forgotten to bring their scaling ladders and were forced to retire foiled with the loss of eightymen. The Zamorin took advantage of this

2 Ibid.

opportunity to build a fort at Pappanetty between Chettwaye and Cranganore. It was fortified with three trenches and manned with a strong troop of soldiers among whom were some Portuguese and English officers.

Towards the end of 1715, three Captains arrived from Batavia with reinforcements. They attacked the fort early in 1716, but, "owing partly to some misunderstanding among the officers and partly to the faint-heartedness of Captain Pluis, the second in command, who trembled at the sound of a cannon", the attempt failed. When the defenders saw the advance of the Dutch, they rushed out of the fort on the opposite side. The Dutch troops who were stationed there thought that it was a sudden assault on them and fled in disorder. Immediately the Zamorin's forces returned to the forsaken fortress. The failure of the expedition created universal consternation. To add to that there was a rumour abroad that the allied princes were going to desert the Dutch. The Raja of Parur proceeded against Cranganore. Hearing about this Ketel advanced with his men to the assistance of the garrison at Cranganore.

When the news of the repeated failures of the Dutch reached Batavia, they decided to send a large force to make a successful attack against Chettwaye. They attributed the success of the Zamorin to the treachery of their Indian allies. Therefore they declined the offer of help made by Ali Raja and Kolattiri. In 1716 William Bakker Jacobsz was despatched from Batavia as Admiral and Commander-in-chief. Johannes Hertenberg was sent to supersede Ketel as Commander. They brought with them a huge army of about 30,000 soldiers, consisting of Europeans and Javanese and joined with the forces of the Raja of Cochin. Bakker Jacobsz arrived in Cochin on the 23rd of November 1716. One of his first steps was to inform the different princes and chieftains of Malabar of his intention to punish the Zamorin. Letters were sent to as many as 42 chieftains in Malabar¹. The

¹ Galletti's Introduction, to "Description of Malabar" P. 30.

To the Raja of	Porcã
"	Repolim
"	Calicoilan
"	De-Marta
"	Signatty
"	Trevancore
"	Teckenkore
"	Berkenkore
"	Paritaly

Dutch attacked Pappanetty (on the 16th January 1717), where the Zamorin was entrenched with his forces. The Dutch resolved to attack Pappanetty on three points simultaneously. The attack started early morning and it was carried out with such great force that the Zamorin was compelled to raise a flag of truce. But the Dutch paying no heed to this, carried on their attack. The Dutch capturing two trenches advanced to the third to which the Zamorin's forces had retreated. The Zamorin's forces under Dharmoth Panikker defended with great courage and inflicted heavy losses on the Dutch. But they could withstand no longer and again hoisted a flag of truce. They promised to leave the fort; but meanwhile the European officers within the fort had set fire to the powder magazine so that it might not fall into the hands of the enemy. That created a big confusion and the infuriated Dutch slaughtered as many as three thousand of the Zamorin's troops. They destroyed the fort rasing it to the ground. The Dutch sent some ships to attack Chettwaye. But meanwhile the

To the Ameen of	Attinga
"	Cochin
To the Raja of	Cartadavil
"	Aijrore
"	Palcachery
"	Valavanatty
"	Colastry
"	Cranganore
To the second	
prince of	Mangatty
"	Bardella
To the Pula of	Carriatta
" Gurip of	Trevancore
" 7,000 of	Caraporam
" 30,000 of	Cururnadda
To the Palyat	
" 3,000 of	Baijpin
	Codachery Caymal
	Corretty Caymal
	Changara Codda Cay
	Mannacotta Atsja
	Tottacherry Taleheno
	Murianatty Nambiar
	Aynicity Nanbeddy
	Raja of Paru
	Balnore of Bargara
	Adergia of Cannanore
	Caymal of Cunattuna
	Tevengul Nairo
	Para Elladam
	Palurgatty Caymal
	Tachetta Munancur
	Caymal of Angecaym
	Payenchery Nairo

Chettwaye fort had been abandoned by the defenders and that, too easily fell into the hands of the Dutch. The Dutch advanced into the interior and occupied Maprana, Towlainpuri, Avatorti and Urakam. Desultory fighting was still continuing and the Dutch too were anxious for peace. If the General had chosen to advance his victorious banners he could no doubt have made himself master of the Zamorin's court at Ponnani and of Calicut itself. But Bakker Jacobsz did not have a very large force under his command and further the expected re-inforcements from Ceylon did not arrive. Also it was not the policy of the Dutch Company at that time to assume the sovereignty over extensive territories. They were mainly interested in trade, and all that they desired was to get the products of Malabar at a lower price. The Dutch made peace with the Zamorin on December 17, 1717. Both parties agreed to be in perpetual alliance and friendship. The Zamorin proposed to pay a war indemnity of 85,000 fanams. The Dutch General was conscious of the fact that 85,000 fanams was too poor a sum to be received as a war indemnity. But he was prepared to accept this nominal amount in view of the financial difficulties of the Zamorin. The Zamorin, had to cede Chettwaye and Pappinivattam to the Dutch. Dharmot Panikker "the chief firebrand of the treason of Chettwaye" was held responsible for all these calamities, and in order to avert such calamities in future, he was to be dismissed from the Zamorin's services. All the lands and properties belonging to Panikker were forfeited to the Company. The Company undertook to help the Zamorin against foreign invaders. In turn, the Zamorin promised to help the Company in case of an attack from outsiders. The Zamorin also promised to be friendly with Cochin. The Dutch were given certain commercial privileges in Calicut. They were allowed to erect factories at Ponnani, Calicut and several other places. The Dutch promised to cede Punnattur Swaropam to the Zamorin and abandon their territorial claims there. The Zamorin was not to receive any fugitives from the Dutch side. The French were to be given no commercial privileges in the Zamorin's territories. Similarly, the Zamorin was to refuse permission to the Portuguese and the English for trade in his country. The Zamorin gave up all his claims over the territories of

"Payyencherry Nair". They were placed under the special protection of the Company. The Zamorin was not to receive any fugitives from the Cochin court.

The treaty was not acceptable to the authorities at Batavia. They were dissatisfied with the Dutch General for being satisfied with a small indemnity and for handing over to the king of Cochin some of the territories ceded by the Zamorin.

Though the Zamorin was defeated by the Dutch forces, it was not a final defeat. The gains on the side of the Dutch were not sufficient to justify the enormous expenditure they had to incur in the war. However, the campaign of 1717 restored the Company's prestige in Malabar at least for some time.

CHAPTER IV

TRAVANCORE AND THE DUTCH

THE Dutch had very little to do with the State of Travancore in the first phase of their history in Malabar. They were concentrating their attention on Cochin as they believed the mastery over Cochin would secure for them the trade monopoly of Malabar. Their success in driving out the Portuguese from Cochin had resulted in the total subordination of that state. It left them in an obligation to protect an important state of Malabar from all its enemies, and thus we find the Dutch involved in the complicated politics of Malabar. No doubt, the Dutch made use of their sovereign position in Cochin to augment their trade; but the security of their trade depended upon their success in adjusting the political balance between Cochin and Calicut. Travancore rose into prominence in Malabar only in 1729 with the accession of Prince Marthanda Varma.

When the Dutch first came to Malabar, Travancore was a very small principality. Van Goens wrote in 1675 "Travancore begins with the West Cape of Comorin and ends on the coast about two hours walk or less north of Tengapatnam." Besides Travancore, there were many important principalities in the south, namely, Attingal, Quilon, Kayamkulam, Elayadathu Swaroopam, etc.

We have already seen that the Portuguese possessions at Quilon had been attacked by the Dutch in 1661. The Dutch at that time were not anxious to establish their supremacy in

Quilon, but they were only interested in destroying the influence of the Portuguese. The attack on Quilon was carried out by Admiral Van Goens who managed to defeat the Nair troops there and destroy the Portuguese fortifications. After pillaging and plundering the town, the Dutch left for Cranganore.

In 1662 the Dutch signed a treaty with the Raja of Travancore at Kallada. Its main object was to gain the supremacy for trade in pepper.

In 1663 and 1664 the Dutch deputed Captain Nieuhoff who was a factor at Quilon to negotiate with the chief princes of Travancore. The first kingdom which he visited was Kayamkulam, which was at that time ranked as the second principality of Travancore.

Nieuhoff says, "We arrived at Kalkolang on the 22nd January 1664. I gave notice of my arrival by our interpreter to the king who soon after returned in company of a Residoor from the king to fetch me to court.....After the first ceremonies and compliments such as are usual in this place were passed, I surrendered my credentials to the king who received them with a great deal of respect and seeming satisfaction." After signing an agreement with the Raja of Kayamkulam, Nieuhoff went to Porakkad. On arrival at Porakkad the Captain was informed that the Raja had left for Kodamalur some ten days before. He met the Raja at Kodamalur. Nieuhoff gives the following account about his visit. "After the usual respect paid, I delivered to him my credentials which he, having received, ordered all his attendants and an interpreter among the rest to withdraw, because he had a mind to discourse with me alone in Portuguese, which he understood very well. - I told him that I was sent on purpose by my masters to His Majesty to assure him of their friendship and to pay the money stipulated by the last treaty.....The king gave for answer that it never had been a custom to weigh the pepper at Cochin, and that therefore he hoped the Company would not introduce any novelties in his territories.....I agreed that the pepper should be received and weighed at Porka.....The king appeared to be highly satisfied thereat, desiring that a factor might be sent thither forthwith, to buy and receive the pepper." The Raja of Porakkad was a clever diplomat and he told Nieuhoff that "he had caused the flags of the English and some other nations to be

taken down and the Dutch flag to be set up " in his territories. He wanted to impress upon the Captain the troubles he had undertaken to secure the interests of the Dutch.

Nieuhoff next visited Madathumkur—the territory that lies between Kayamkulam and Quilon. The demands that the Dutch made upon the king were " to forbid the importation of opium, the peeling of the wild cinnamon and the exportation of pepper." The Mohomedan merchants who had the trade monopoly there opposed the proposals of the Dutch. After some persuasions the Dutch "overcame" all difficulties, the king having granted them all that they demanded except the peeling of wild cinnamon."

Though Madathumkur was a small principality, it was an important centre of pepper trade, and the Captain was anxious to come to an agreement with the king.

After signing the agreement Nieuhoff went to Quilon to interview the Raja of Travancore. After some negotiations a treaty was signed between the Dutch and the chief princes of Travancore. The articles of agreement were (1) "Nobody shall import, sell or exchange opium into these countries" (Karunagapalli, Travancore. Quilon and Kottarakara) except the Dutch East India Company.

(2) "Nobody without any exception shall be permitted to export any pepper or cinnamon out of this country or sell them to anybody except to the said Company."

(3) "A certain price was settled betwixt both parties and what share each should have in the customs, whereby all former pretensions and exceptions should be annulled."

Nieuhoff had some difficulty in negotiating this treaty. When he first visited the Raja of Travancore, the Raja expressed his dissatisfaction at the conduct of the Dutch in Quilon. He insisted on paying reparations to the Queen of Quilon. The Queen of Quilon had also complained about the delay the Dutch were making in paying the customs due to her. Finally, all points of dispute were settled in an interview and a friendly alliance was signed between the Dutch and the Queen. Nieuhoff gives the following description about the interview. "After I had paid the

1 Quoted from Travancore State Manual by Nagam Ayya, Vol. I. Ch. : VI. P. 307.

rebel chieftains simultaneously at a given signal. He posted horsemen between Nagercoil and Trivandrum for carrying out this order. When these preparations were going on, the elder of the Thampis came to the palace one morning to pay his respects to the Maharaja. But the guards on duty (acting under the instructions of the Raja) prevented him from entering the palace. The Thampi lost his life in his encounter with the guards. The younger Thampi who attempted to avenge the death of his brother was killed by the Raja. Orders were immediately issued to arrest all the rebels and in a few hours, the Pillamars were seized. Forty two of the nobles were sentenced to death. The brahmins who had taken part in the rebellion were banished from the State. The properties of all the rebels were confiscated to the State. "This was the first and most important blow struck against the Malabar Political system", says Pannikker. "With it went the feudal conception of Malabar Polity".

After the suppression of his enemies, Marthanda Varma turned his attention to the extension of his dominions. Quilon was the first prey to the aggression of Marthanda Varma. The royal family of Quilon was a branch of the Travancore House. In 1731 the Quilon Raja formed an alliance with the Raja of Kayamkulam by adopting some members from the family of the latter. Marthanda Varma was not consulted on this step. He considered it as a hostile combination of Quilon and Kayamkulam against his power and on this pretence led a powerful army against Quilon. Marthanda Varma destroyed the forts of Quilon and other defensive works. The Raja of Quilon sued for peace; he promised to break off his alliance with Kayamkulam and agreed to the annexation of his territory by Travancore after his death. The Quilon Raja was brought to Trivandrum where he was placed in one of the state palaces as a prisoner. A small garrison of soldiers was stationed at Quilon for the maintenance of peace there.

Meanwhile, Attingal had been amalgamated with Travancore. Attingal was the maternal house of the Travancore princes. Marthanda Varma persuaded the Queen of Attingal to resign her sovereign authorities to Travancore.

The acquisition of Attingal and Quilon alarmed the other Rajas. The Raja of Kayamkulam began to concert means to

prevent the further aggressions of Marthanda Varma. In October 1773 Ichara Patare, a Ragaidoor of the Raja of Kayamkulam, accompanied by two of the Cochin Raja's friends, called upon the Dutch Governor, Adrian Matten. He stated that the Raja of Travancore was making great preparations to attack Kayamkulam on the 16th of that month. The Raja of Kayamkulam being an ally of the Dutch, earnestly sought their assistance against Marthanda Varma. Ichara Patare also stated that Marthanda Varma was trying to persuade Tekkenkore and Porakad to join the war. But the Commander was in no mood to promise help to Kayamkulam. By a resolution of the Batavia Government in 1721, the Company was not allowed to interfere in the wars of local princes, and therefore Adrian Matten gave a convenient excuse. He told Ichara Patare "that the cause of these troubles was owing to the Raja of Culli-Quilon, having without any provocation, invaded the Marta territories. He continued that he could give no assistance, "but as the chief of Peritally had refused leave to the Travancoreans to pass through his country to attack Culli-Quilon, they had better join their forces to those of the Peritally chief."¹ But advice was not what kayamkulam sought from the Dutch. The Raja stood in immediate need of military help. So he hurried towards the chieftains of the Northern States. The kings of the northern principalities assembled under the persidentship of the Cochin Raja and resolved to assist the Raja of Quilon in regaining his lost kingdom. They sent secret emissaries to Trivandrum to inform the captive prince about their plans. The Raja of Quilon managed to escape from Trivandrum. He joined sides with the Raja of Kayamkulam and attacked the territories of Travancore at Kallada and Mavelikara. The Travancore forces under the Dalawa resisted, but they were obliged to retreat.

The Maharaja made vast preparations for a simultaneous attack on Cochin and Kayamkulam. The Travancore army was strengthened with additions of cavalry and infantry. New fire arms were obtained from English merchants trading at Anjengo and Edava. In 1734 Quilon and Kayamkulam were attacked by the Maharaja's forces under the command of Thanu Pillai and Sthanapathy. Kumaraswami Pillai and Rama Iyen. Several battles were fought against the Kayamkulam troops which were

¹ Day. Land of the Perumals.

under the command of the Raja himself. In the course of these battles the Kayamkulam Raja was killed, but his soldiers continued to fight. He was succeeded by his younger brother who carried out the operations with greater vigour. Marthanda Varma strengthened his army by a new body of recruits. Rama Iyen went over to Tinnevely from where he brought a regiment of Maravars. Rama Iyen himself took command of the army and marched to Kayamkulam. The Kayamkulam Raja appealed to Cochin and the Dutch for help, but finding that no help was forthcoming sued for peace. Consequently, hostilities were suspended and the war came to a close.

In the same year Marthanda Varma annexed Elayadath Swaroopam. The Raja of Elayadath Swaroopam died leaving as his successor a princess. The real administration was in the hands of a Sarvadhikariakar. Marthanda Varma seized the principality and banished the Sarvadhikariakar. The princess was allowed to stay either at Trivandrum or at Kottarakara, but of course after relinquishing all her claims to her kingdom.

Meanwhile, the Raja of Quilon had died and his country was taken over by the Kayamkulam Raja basing his claim on the adoption. Marthanda Varma repudiated the claims of the Kayamkulam Raja over Quilon on the ground that the former adoptions had been cancelled by the deceased Quilon Raja. Further he claimed that Quilon should be amalgamated with Travancore as its royal family was related to the Travancore royal family.

The Dutch were alarmed at the astonishing successes of Marthanda Varma. It was highly necessary to their interests to prevent any one prince growing too powerful in Malabar. The Dutch had hitherto endeavoured to secure their position as arbitrators in Malabar, but the activities of Marthanda Varma convinced them that they could not continue this position any further. They were particularly interested in the fate of Quilon and Kayamkulam as they had their own factories there. Still they had refused to interfere in the first stages of the war as they legitimately feared that it would endanger their interests. But now it became no longer possible for them to remain passive spectators. The Dutch Governor at Cochin, Adrian Matten, sent a messenger to the Maharaja asking him to stop further

aggressions on Kayamkulam and Quilon. Marthanda Varma received the messenger with great courtesy, but sent a reply to the Governor that His Excellency need not trouble himself about affairs which did not concern him. He added that he would take special interest in promoting the commercial prosperity of the Company, but he regretted to find the Governor attempting to interfere with the internal affairs of Travancore.

In 1739 Van Imhoff, "the bitter enemy of his opponents, and a most intolerant Governor came from Ceylon to examine into and report upon the Cochin accounts"¹. In his report to the Supreme Government at Batavia dated 6th July 1739, he wrote "The king of Travancore having been successful in the wars which he had undertaken, had rendered himself so much respected among the chief kings of the Malabar coast, that he was looked upon by every one with eyes of jealousy and apprehension". He was of opinion "that if that were requisite for the Company to maintain a balance of power amongst the chiefs of the Malabar coast, it could never be made to preponderate more to the prejudice or danger of the Company than in favour of that prince who was almost wholly attached to their competitors, and whose increase of power could not but be pregnant with the most alarming consequences to their interests"².

So, Van Imhoff decided to curtail the rising power of Travancore and took up the cause of the exiled princess of Elayadathu Swaroopam. Day says that it would have been more judicious if the Cochin council had waited for reinforcements from Batavia. The troops in Cochin consisted of only 462 infantry and 23 artillery. But matters were regarded as too serious to admit of delay. Further it was believed that the neighbouring petty chieftains would join sides with the Dutch as soon as they started the war. In 1740 he sent a protest to the King of Travancore espousing the cause of the exiled princess. Imhoff himself carried the message and it is said that he threatened an invasion of the Travancore territory finding that the Raja would not yield to his persuasions. The Raja replied that "doubtless he might do so, but there were forests into which he could retire in safety". Imhoff retorted that "where Travancoreans could go, the Dutch

¹ Day. *Land of the Perumals*.

² Stavorinus' *Voyages to the East Indies*. Vol. III. P. 240.

could follow"¹. The interview is said to have abruptly closed with a scornful remark from the Raja that he had himself been thinking of some day invading Europe with his Munchies (canoes) and fishermen.

Finding that there were no prospects of an amicable settlement, Van Imhoff decided to proceed against Travancore. He wrote to Ceylon for a detachment of infantry and artillery and strengthened the Dutch army at Quilon.

In 1741 Imhoff installed the exiled princess of Elayadathu Swaroopam on her throne. In return the Dutch gained "a large farm at Airoor about three Dutch miles from Quilon and also Bichoor in the Berkencoor country"². When Marthanda Varma heard about the activities of the Dutch, he gathered his soldiers and straightway attacked the Dutch and the Elayadathu Swaroopam princess. The Dutch were utterly defeated and Elayadathu Swaroopam was formally annexed to Travancore. The Rani fled to Cochin and placed herself under the protection of Van Imhoff³. The Raja captured all the Dutch possessions in Travancore and seized all the goods they had stored in their factories. The Dutch returned to Cochin in the face of these serious reverses.

After annexing Elayadathu Swaroopam, Marthanda Varma turned against Kayamkulam. Meanwhile the Dutch received reinforcements from Ceylon and they invaded the Travancore territory. Galletti quoting from the Dutch Letters to Batavia gives the following information about the plans of the Dutch. "In January 1741 Colachel in Travancore was occupied with the view of attacking Travancore in his own country. The idea was to seize the whole country from Colachel to Cape Comorin and make a Dutch province of it as it is the most beautiful district in Malabar and all the cloth places are there. It was then still hoped that in spite of the war in Java the Company might be able to send troops from Batavia for the reduction of Travancore. Anji Caimal and Marta were also to be annexed and Bercuncur whose king had been declared a rebel by the Dutch was to be retained." The Dutch landed at Tengapattanam, Kadiapattanam and other places in South Travancore. The Travancore army at

1 Land of the Perumals Day.

2 Land of the Perumals. Day.

3 It is said that the Dutch gave the princess a daily allowance of Rs.2 As 5.

this time was in the north, engaged in 'operations' against Kayamkulam. Therefore the Dutch could easily subjugate almost all the villages in South Travancore between Colachel and Kottar. They were even contemplating an attack on the Raja's palace at Padmanabhapuram. When the Maharaja heard about the advance of the Dutch, he hastened to the South with all the forces at his command. Rama Iyen who was engaged in war with Kayamkulam in the North was ordered to join him at Padmanabhapuram. The Maharaja displayed his conspicuous abilities in tackling a dangerous crisis. He raised a Nair force and strengthened the infantry stationed in South Travancore. Rama Iyen arrived from the North with the whole army. It is said that the Maharaja strongly remonstrated with the Governor of Cochin and even wrote to the Supreme Government at Batavia about the unprovoked invasions of his territories by the Dutch forces. The Maharaja took another precaution to strengthen his position. He sent an embassy to the French Governor at Pondicherry to negotiate a treaty with the French. The Maharaja promised to give them certain commercial privileges in Travancore and also to cede certain lands in Colachel and other places for erecting factories. The French in turn promised to assist the Raja against all his enemies.

The battle of Colachel¹ commenced on the 10th of August 1741. The Maharaja took personal command of the operations. Rama Iyen's troops broke through the Dutch line and threw the

¹ Galletti gives the following account about the battle, basing his accounts on the material furnished by Letters to Batavia

"In August 1741 the Dutch garrison at Colachel was attacked by Travancore and surrendered. On the 7th a red hot ball having fired a barrel of gun powder and caused a conflagration in the stockade in which the whole of the rice supply was consumed.

"In October 1741, I find the Malabar administration reporting that the news of the Company's troubles in Java had been industriously spread throughout Malabar by the Company's European rivals and by the king of Travancore and that the native chiefs thought the time had come to shake off the Company's heavy yoke and drive it from the coast. The Cochin administration had not been able to get reinforcements even from Ceylon to whom they had applied for 200 Europeans and 200 Malays, the Governor in Council of Ceylon not being able to spare any troops, and "what makes the danger even greater is that Travancore has appointed deserter Sergeant Duyvenschot to be General over his troops."

Dutch army into great confusion. The Dutch were compelled to retreat to their fort. About twenty-four of them were taken prisoners and sent to Udayagiri. Immediately the Travancore troops besieged the Dutch fortress. In the course of a few hours the Dutch fort was taken and the Dutch hurriedly sailed to Cochin.

The defeat of the Dutch at Colachel was no doubt due to the superiority of their enemy in strength. The Travancore forces outnumbered the Dutch. The Dutch had another disadvantage. They had no cavalry force to combat the enemy. The Dutch who were taken prisoners enjoyed kind treatment from the Raja. All of them were enlisted as officers in the Travancore army. Among the Dutch captives were two important officers—Eustachius De Lannoy and Donadin. De Lannoy, who later came to be known as Valia Kappithan (Great Captain) was selected for the organisation of a special regiment of sepoys. These two played a very important part in the development of the Travancore army. Their services were extremely valuable to the Maharaja in his subsequent conquests. The strong fort round Udayagiri¹ now stands as the monument of the Dutch Captain's engineering skill. "De Lannoy, commonly known in Travancore as the Valia Kappithan (Great Captain) was in the manner of an experiment entrusted with the organisation and drilling of a special regiment of sepoys; this he did very successfully and to the satisfaction of the Maharaja. Several heroic stories are extant of the achievements of this particular regiment. De Lannoy was next made a captain and entrusted with the construction of forts and the organisation of magazines and arsenals. He reorganised the whole army and disciplined it on European models; gave it a smart appearance and raised its efficiency to a very high order"².

The battle of Colachel is of great political significance both for the Dutch and Travancore. It was the first serious blow sustained by the Dutch in Malabar, and it marked the beginning of their decline. The Dutch had hitherto maintained their predominant position in Malabar unchallenged by any native or foreign power. But for the first time they had to face a powerful prince

1 This fort is famous in Travancore as "De Lannoy Kotta"

2 *Travancore State Manual* Vol. I Nagam Iyya Ch. VI. P. 343

The Travancore forces now marched against Quilon. The Raja resisted for some time. Finally Quilon was annexed to Travancore.

The Maharaja understood that the Rajas of Kottayam and Vadakkumkur had rendered assistance to the Kayamkulam Raja in his war with Travancore. On this pretence he sent an army under the heir-apparent to invade these countries. The prince captured the Kottayam fort and took the Raja prisoner. The Raja of Vadakkumkur, when he heard about the fall of Kottayam, fled to Calicut. Kottayam and Vadakkumkur were annexed to Travancore.

The treaty of Mannar and the rapid expansion of Travancore convinced the Dutch that it was dangerous to continue their hostilities with Marthanda Varma and now they were inclined to make peace. Rama Iyen informed the Dutch through the Kayamkulam Raja that Travancore was fully prepared to march against the Dutch, but the Maharaja had no objection to sign a peace with them provided the terms were reasonable. It was both a threat and a taunt. The Maharaja knew that the Dutch were anxious to come to terms with him, finding that they had no other alternative. The Dutch Governor received this offer with great pleasure and directed the Rajas of Cochin and Thekkumkur to come to a settlement with Travancore. But the conclusion of peace with Travancore and the Dutch was certainly not conducive to the interests of these princes and therefore they delayed these proceedings. The Dutch Governor then directly proposed a friendly settlement with the Maharaja. The Maharaja deputed Rama Iyen and Thalavady Kunju Muthathu Kariakar to negotiate peace on his behalf. The Dutch were represented by Ezekel Rabbi and Silvester Mendes. The conference was held at Mavelikara and after prolonged discussion, a treaty was drafted in 1743. The terms of the treaty were extremely favourable to Travancore, but when they were submitted to Marthanda Varma, he proposed some stringent clauses, restricting the freedom of the Dutch to interfere in the affairs of any of the native princes. The original draft of the treaty was acceptable to the Dutch, but when the proposals of the Maharaja were placed before them, they hesitated to ratify them. Further, Rabbi and Mendes, the Dutch representatives in the peace conference, informed the Cochin Council of their personal impression that Travancore was

not likely to come to any terms. The negotiations were postponed without any definite settlement.

Some time later, the negotiations were renewed when both parties assembled at Parur, a place near Quilon. Two conferences were held at Parur, but as Rama Iyen stuck firmly to the original conditions, they failed.

Meanwhile, the Kayamkulam Raja was intriguing to regain his lost position. The tributes he had promised to pay to Travancore had been in arrears. Marthanda Varma directed Rama Iyen to proceed to Kayamkulam to enforce the conditions of the treaty of Mannar. The Kayamkulam Raja was obstinate in his refusal to pay the tribute as he considered it '*infra dig*' and chose to abandon his country. Kayamkulam was therefore annexed to Travancore.

With the annexation of Kayamkulam the Dutch lost all hopes of gaining any further concessions from Travancore. Pepper was their main concern in Travancore, but they saw to their great dismay, that the English had acquired the monopoly for that article. The Dutch were now prepared to accept all the terms of Travancore and come to a final settlement. They "learnt the lesson from the ruinous war with Travancore that it was not expedient to entangle the Company in another war, the expenses of which were always certain but the issue uncertain". The Dutch always viewed these things from the financial point of view. They were successful to some extent in the beginning stages of the war, but later it proved to be very disastrous. "The Company squandered uselessly an immense sum of money", Moens regrets "and the Signatty² lost everything". The Dutch realised that if the Company's concerns continued to be directed on the old principles, a complete decline was to be expected. It was not at all advisable for the Dutch to continue its war with Travancore. "Travancore, supposing she succumbed, would still not remain idle, but now that she has already become so large would each time recover and so keep the Company continually in travail³". The Dutch understood that "the Company in either case, whether Travancore alone remained in possession of

1 Memoirs of Moens.

2 Signatty refers to the King of Quilon and Kayamkulam.

3 Memoirs of Moens

Malabar, or the Company continued to support the other kings, would equally have no hope of more pepper and 'equally have to bear excessive burdens." Therefore, to make a treaty profitable to both the Company and Travancore would be the best and the most certain plan for the Company. Moens writes: "The native chiefs should be allowed to attack one another although they should ruin each other, rather than we should put on our harness each time on their behalf." The Dutch realised that "by making such a treaty with Travancore they would have to do with only one and not with so many. In any case it was better "to make their authority grow imperceptibly again by means of the new system than by sticking to the old, to see it gradually brought more and more to scorn."

These and other similar considerations induced the Company to accept the proposals of Travancore. The treaty was signed at Mavelikara on the 15th August 1753. The principal provisions of the treaty were:—Travancore and the Dutch should be mutual friends. Travancore should not allow any other European power to acquire a footing in its territories, but should leave undisturbed the English factories at Anjengo, Edava and Vizhinjam, but the English should not be allowed greater advantages than they were entitled to under existing treaties. The Dutch should assist Travancore both by land and sea in case of an attack from a foreign power. The Dutch should not in any way aid the enemies of Travancore or give them refuge; the two contracting powers should apprehend and deliver up deserters to each other. Travancore should restore to the Dutch such goods and men as belonged to them and might have been wrecked on the Travancore coast. Travancore should compel its subjects to fulfil mercantile obligations and contracts with the Dutch and abstain from levying any unusually heavy duty on the goods of the Dutch. The Dutch should renounce all their engagements with the Malabar princes and particularly with those against whom Travancore intended to go to war. The Dutch should supply Travancore with munitions of war annually to the value of 12,000 Rupees at cost price. Travancore should sell every year to the Dutch a stated quantity of pepper at certain fixed rates, from territories then in possession of Travancore and also another stated quantity from those territories which Travancore might conquer thereafter.

It is said that the Dutch tried to include a clause in the treaty safeguarding the interests of Cochin. Day says "At a private interview at Mavelikara between the Cochin Raja and the Dutch on one hand and the Travancore Raja on the other the Dutch unsuccessfully attempted to have a clause inserted that should the Raja of Cochin or the Chettwaye island be attacked by Travancore such was to be considered equivalent to war." The object of this proposal was of course to save Cochin from falling a prey to the aggression of Travancore. The Dutch were naturally interested in Cochin "which was their first and oldest ally and also their nearest neighbour"¹. But their endeavours were in vain. They had to be satisfied with an oral promise that "Travancore would live in friendship with the Raja of Cochin provided he gave no cause to the contrary." As Moens pertinently observed; it only meant that Travancore would remain friendly with Cochin as long as it suited him. The 9th clause of the treaty which stated "that the Company shall renounce all alliances with the other chiefs and nobles of Malabar with whom His Highness might desire to wage war, and shall not thwart him in this matter in any respect, give asylum to any such persons or oppose His Highness's enterprises", was extremely damaging to the Company's prestige. This clause allowed the Travancore Raja to carry out his ambitious schemes to any extent he pleased. By this the Dutch threw over their native allies and pledged themselves to leave them all to the mercy of Travancore. The Raja of Cochin bitterly complained about this to the Supreme Government at Batavia. "The Company has sacrificed an old friend and ally besides other Malabar kings and broken all contracts" he wrote. "When from the very beginning our ancestors tried to bring some kings under their sway and obedience, the Hon'ble Company continuously interfered; by observing this rule this kingdom got divided in so many parts and has therefore become unable to check its enemies. Now that the king of Travancore has become a powerful king, he has been able to coax the Hon'ble Company under promise to observe everything by means of which he bids fair to bring the other kings under his sway"². This was a legitimate ventilation of a strong grievance. The Dutch had

¹ Moens' Memoirs.

² Cochin State Manual.

hitherto effectively prevented all political designs of Cochin and the Zamorin. But when it came to a question of their dealings with a powerful prince, they threw aside their old policy. It is to be doubted whether the Dutch had been driven to this necessity by force of circumstances or whether they had accepted this course for their own personal ends. The other clauses of the treaty prove that pecuniary motives had been at work. The treaty says that the Dutch should supply the Raja with various kinds of arms and ammunition to the value of Rupees 12,000, while they were to receive 1,500,000 pounds of pepper at Rs. 13 for every 100 pounds, and 10,000 pounds more out of the territories, to be conquered at Rs. 11 for every 100 pounds. This shows that the Company was anxious to strike a successful bargain with Travancore by betraying the interests of its old allies. Day writes: "Certainly giving up their former allies to an ancient enemy and providing arms to subdue their former friends for the sake of gaining 4 annas or six pence on every 25 pounds of pepper, was an inglorious act." If the object of the Dutch had been to gain more pepper at a cheap rate, they were defeated in that also as subsequent events clearly showed them. Marthanda Varma never furnished the quantity he promised even though the Dutch used to send many commissioners to Trivandrum to remind him of his treaty obligation. The Dutch offered him a higher price for pepper; even then the Raja was not prepared to favour them. The treaty brought neither credit nor money to the Dutch. The princes of Malabar soon discovered that the Company could no longer maintain any pretensions of political authority.

CHAPTER V.

TRAVANCORE AND THE DUTCH—(Continued)

THE Dutch knew pretty well that the peace of Mavelikara would naturally be an encouragement to Marthanda Varma for further aggressions. Gollennesse wrote "Although a peace should be concluded, one may very reasonably doubt whether it will be lasting; since he strongly insists upon a promise from the Hon'ble Company to remain neutral in case he goes to war with the Malabar chiefs, which sufficiently shows his ambitious intentions, and though it will be some time before his finances

are re-established and besides most of his picked Nairs have fallen, still I do not believe that he has altogether abandoned his high flying designs to make himself master of the whole of Malabar." What Collesse apprehended was perfectly right.

The Raja of Cochin knew that Marthanda Varma's attention would immediately turn against him. He knew that he could not rely on the promise of friendship. In his letter dated 14th October 1753 to the Dutch Government at Batavia, he had expressed all his fears about the Travancore Raja. "He has no compassion on or charity towards neighbours", wrote the Cochin Raja "but plays with big men and small as a cat with mice, seeking nothing else but his own gains and profits." To add to the difficulties of the Cochin Raja, there were bitter factions in the royal family between the Thampans and the Raja. The Thampans belonged to the Chaliyur branch and they put forth a claim to the title of "Perimpatappu Mooppil". The Raja of Cochin refused to recognise the claims of the Thampans and therefore they sought the help of Marthanda Varma. The Thampans hoped that they could compel the Cochin Raja to recognise their titles through the help of a powerful ally. This was too good an opportunity for the ambitious Marthanda Varma to miss. He upheld the claims of the Thampans and informed the Cochin Raja through the Dutch that he was determined to see their claims fulfilled. The Thampans had concluded a marriage alliance with Vadakkumkur and therefore Vadakkumkur also supported their claim. The Travancore Raja led his forces to Alleppey, a place near Shertallay where the Cochin Raja had established his residence. In a small encounter that followed, the Cochin troops were driven back. Marthanda Varma had placed the Thampans at Karappuram under the title of "Perumatappu Mooppil". The Raja of Cochin was in great difficulties and he started negotiations for peace with Marthanda Varma. A peace was concluded at Mavelikara between Cochin and Travancore. The Cochin Raja promised to hand over all the pepper in his territory to Travancore, taking only 500 candies for his use. Thiruvella and Harippad were to be under the Cochin Raja as before, but Karappuram would be under Travancore. The thorny question about the claims of the Thampans was

1 Marthanda Varma had seized the temple at Thiruvella before (Granthavari)

postponed to be decided in a further conference to be held at Vaikom three weeks later¹. The Travancore Raja was not to proceed against the principalities of Vadakkumkur and Chempakasserry as these two were feudatories of Cochin. Cochin was to pay 25,000 rupees as war indemnity to Travancore.

Even though the treaty was drafted, it was not ratified by either party. Marthanda Varma did not pay any heed to this treaty and proceeded straight against the Chempakasserry Raja on the pretence that he had helped Kayamkulam in its war against Travancore. Chempakasserry (Ambalapuzha) was at that time governed by a line of Brahmin chiefs and the Raja at that time was a sagacious prince. His army was commanded by Mathu Panikkar, a Sudra knight of exceptional abilities. It is said that the Ambalapuzha soldiers used a special kind of arrows with poisonous tips. The Travancore army under Rama Iyen met the Ambalapuzha soldiers at Thottapally (an outpost on the southern frontiers of Ambalapuzha) where a deadly battle took place. Rama Iyen's troops could not resist the poisonous arrows of the enemy and he was obliged to retreat. Further, a panic seized his troops based on the rumour that Krishnaswamy, the deity of the Brahmin Raja of Ambalapuzha, was himself leading the troops against Travancore. The Hindu soldiers of Travancore could not be persuaded to fight against Ambalapuzha, and Rama Iyen had to wait till the arrival of De Lannoy with his artillery and Mussalman and Christian soldiers.

Meanwhile, Rama Iyen's intrigues succeeded in winning over Mathu Panikkar and Thekkedathu Bhattathiri, the principal officers of the Ambalapuzha army, to the Travancore side. They signed a truce with Rama Iyen, but the Raja continued to fight. He was easily defeated by the Travancore army and taken prisoner. Liberal presents were given to Mathu Panikkar and the Bhattathiri by Marthanda Varma. The Ambalapuzha Raja was removed to Trivandrum, and from there to Kodamalur, where he was kept as a prisoner.

Rama Iyen had taken possession of Changanassery, the capital of Thekkumkur. He was now ordered to march to the

¹ The peace conference at Mavelikara was held on the 28th Karkadagom 928 M.E. The conference at Vaikom was to meet on Chingom 20th 929 M.E. (Granthavari)

North and settle the northern boundary which had been extended up to the river Periyar. Practically all the countries south of the Dutch possession at Cranganore belonged to Travancore. Thus the Travancore territories surrounded those of Cochin, to whom of course Travancore was not a welcome neighbour.

The Raja of Ambalapuzha who was a prisoner at Kodamalur escaped from there and joined with the Rajas of Thekkumkur and Vadakkumkur. They made busy preparations for recovering their lost possessions and sought the co-operation of Cochin. They secured the support of Paliath Achen and other nobles like Kodacherry Karthav and Koratti Kaimal. They persuaded the Cochin Raja to join sides with them to stop the aggression of Marthanda Varma. Many Nair chiefs from Ambalapuzha, Kayamkulam, Changanassery, Ettumanoor and other places joined this big anti-Travancore league. Marthanda Varma had alienated the vast majority of the Malabar chieftains by his aggressive policy of expansion. And all of them were burning with a spirit of revenge. It was the hostility towards Marthanda Varma that drew all these chieftains together; the Cochin Raja was to become the leader of this formidable combination. They collected a fleet of native boats and made busy preparations gathering rifles, guns and ammunitions. While these preparations were going on, the Dutch Governor at Cochin conveyed private information about this to the Travancore Raja. The conduct of the Dutch in this affair is really unintelligible. Cochin had been their traditional ally, and Travancore their inveterate enemy. The fall of Travancore would have been more advantageous to the Dutch than to Cochin. But the Dutch, after the treaty of Mavelikara, were following a cowardly policy of appeasement with Travancore, anxious to cultivate its friendship. By secretly informing the Travancore Raja about the preparations of his enemy, the Dutch perhaps imagined that they could gain his favour and friendship.

Marthanda Varma made busy preparations and proceeded with his army to Mavelikara. As the Maharaja was slightly indisposed, the prince together with Rama Iyen and De Lannoy was ordered to lead the expedition. The confederates landed at Porakkad and immediately a sanguinary battle followed. The well-disciplined army of Travancore with its strong equipment proved its superiority over its enemies. Many soldiers of the

Cochin army were slain, and Paliath Achen, Kodacherry Karthav and several other nobles were taken prisoners. The Kayamkulam Nairs who took part in the war were severely punished by Rama Iyen.

Rama Iyen proceeded to the north through Ambalapuzha, Alleppey and Ariad. He seized the Cochin Raja's palace at Madathumkara¹ about five miles north of Alleppey. The Madathumkara palace was not occupied by any member of the royal family; but it was guarded by a handful of sepoys. The Dalawa easily captured the palace and proceeded towards Arookutty. The rapid advance of the Travancore forces alarmed the Raja of Cochin. The concerted attempt of the Malabar chieftains had miserably failed and he knew that Rama Iyen would press his victories into the frontiers of Cochin. He immediately sent a messenger to Trivandrum apologising for his past conduct and suing for peace. The Dutch Governor at Cochin also requested the Maharaja to stop the further advance of Rama Iyen. Marthanda Varma accordingly ordered Rama Iyen to return to Mavelikara. Arookutty was made the northern limit of Travancore and it continues to be so even to-day.

It is interesting to examine why the ambitious Marthanda Varma did not venture on a conquest of Cochin. If Rama Iyen had not been ordered to return from Arookutty, he would have easily hoisted the Travancore flag in Cochin. The part played by Cochin in the Ambalapuzha war was sufficient excuse for an invasion of that country. The Dutch would not have interfered on behalf of Cochin even though they knew that "no ruler would do better or be more suitable than the king of Cochin" to strengthen their interests. "He is our oldest ally and sufficiently rooted into us" the Dutch Governor wrote, "his territory lies in view and almost within range of our walls; he even shares with us the taxes of the town, was faithful to the Company when Cochin was taken and exposed himself for our sake to almost total ruin". But in spite of all these, the Dutch would not have supported him in a war with Travancore.

It was the pet ambition of Rama Iyen to carry his victories to the heart of Cochin. It is said that at the time of his death

¹ The original seat of the Cochin Rajas is considered to be Madathumkara. Hence their title "Mada Bhoopathy".

he told the Elaya Raja that his only disappointment in life was that he was not permitted to conquer and annex the whole of the Cochin Raja's territories and add that Raja's name to the Travancore pension list. But it was prudence that advised Marthanda Varma to desist from this project. "Should it be asked why, being so successful in everything, he has not extended his conquests further and completely subjugated the king of Cochin", writes Moens, "the answer is that he would certainly have done this and has it still in his mind; but Travancore is far-seeing and careful; he knows that the conservation of his conquests requires as much prudence as their acquisition; he lies in wait; he looks out for opportunities and seldom lets any chance of obtaining an advantage slip by". As Moens rightly observes, it was to his advantage to keep quiet at that time as there was the legitimate chance of a sweeping invasion of all territories by Hyder Ali. Therefore Marthanda Varma thought it wise to draw the line at Arookutty.

Peace with Cochin was soon broken on the question of a tract of land known as Karappuram. The Cochin Raja pressed his claim on Karappuram and Paliath Achen and Kodacherry. Karthav were collecting an army to defend his claim. Rama Iyen immediately proceeded from Mavelikara with his powerful army and drove the Cochin troops beyond Arookutty. The Cochin Raja finding himself helpless again sued for peace. He agreed to cede Karappuram to Travancore.

As the Maharaja was adding on territories after territories there were violent outbreaks of rebellion in different parts of his dominions. In 1754 there was an organised insurrection by the inhabitants of the northern countries of Ambalapuzha, Changanassery, Kottayam and Ettumanoor. They were instigated by the Zamprin and also by the deposed Rajas of Thekkumkur and Vadakkumkur. Rama Iyen advanced to the north to suppress the rebellion; but his attempts were of no avail. He requested the Maharaja to go over to these places personally to bring the situation under control. The rebellion subsided on the arrival of the Maharaja. But Marthanda Varma took precautionary measures to root out the trouble and sought the help of Hyder Ali of Mysore. Hyder Ali promptly replied that he would send a strong army from Dindigul. But the mere rumour that Hyder was coming to the help of the Maharaja was sufficient to induce the people to give

up their rebellion. The Maharaja, finding that Hyder's help was not necessary, later wrote to him declining his offer. The Maharaja was wise in not availing himself of Hyder's promised help. That would have provided a handle for Hyder to carry out his ambitious designs in Malabar. The Maharaja's reply declining his promised help was not pleasing to the Mysore ruler. He understood the drift of this reply and thus the first seed of enmity between Travancore and Mysore was sown.

The conduct of the Maharaja in inviting foreign mercenaries to suppress the rebellion in his own State has been severely criticised as both impolitic and unpatriotic. His plan of getting the help of Hyder Ali was no doubt imprudent; though the Maharaja soon realised it and did not avail himself of the help. But Hyder was made of the same calibre as Marthanda Varma, and he could not be easily put off by the Maharaja's arts. The remedy which the Maharaja sought was more disastrous than the disease; and once it was sought, it was not easy to be shaken off. It was the beginning of the series of wars in which Travancore was involved in the next decade. It was not the first time that Marthanda Varma was invoking foreign aid for the management of his affairs in Malabar. It was at the root of his policy from beginning to end.

Marthanda Varma was fortunate in securing the able services of Rama Iyen,¹ an unscrupulous general, but a statesman of unparalleled merits. In scheming and intrigue no one was

1 According to the high authority of Mahakavi Ullor S. Parameswara Iyer, Rama Iyen was a native of Rajamanarkoil in Tinnevely District, and his father had settled down in South Travancore. He was brought to the notice of Maharaja Rama Varma, the predecessor of Marthanda Varma, and by dint of his precocious intelligence rose to important places of service in the State, first as Samprathy or Head clerk of the "palace and finally to the post of Dalawa which then combined the functions of prime minister and commander-in-chief. Besides his martial exploits and administrative abilities Rama Iyen was a patron of letters and himself a member of a learned family. He renovated the temple at Aruvikkara in 1745. A Sanskrit poem 'The Chathaka Sandesa' written about 1785 describes the fort at Quilon that he built as being the very incarnation of his valour. His brother Gopala Iyen also worked up his way to the post of Dalawa which he held for a number of years, (1768 - 76)

(Vide article on "Some new facts on Rama Iyen Dalawa, the warrior Statesman of Travancore" by Ulloor S. Parameswara Iyer, in the I. H. R. Commission proceedings, Vol. XIX. 1944, Pages 141 to 42).

a match to Rama Iyen and in carrying out the designs of his master effectively no one could excel him. Visakam Thirunal Rama Varma Maharaja of Travancore (1055 to 1060 M.E.) observed. "He (Marthanda Varma) was served by one of the ablest of ministers. Sully did not serve Henry IV of France more nobly and faithfully than Rama Iyen did. Marthanda Varma. Rama Iyen was unrelenting, unsparing and often unscrupulous to his master's enemies, but his self was merged completely in that of his master. He was as fearless in the council room as he was in the battle field. With such a master as his right hand and with a strong will, abiding patience and indomitable courage, the Raja not only won back what his predecessors had lost but subjugated one after another the neighbouring chiefs who were a perpetual source of trouble."

It was the great ambition of Marthanda Varma to destroy the old feudal nobility of the Nairs and to build up on its debris a powerful and efficient autocracy. This was so deadly against the cherished sentiments of the people of Malabar that it took many years for even Marthanda Varma to establish it on a secure basis. Mr. K. M. Panikar in his "Malabar and the Dutch", severely criticises Marthanda Varma as being entirely devoid of a feeling for "Kerala Dharma." "The basis of his statecraft" says Mr. Panikar, "was the utilisation of foreign help for subduing the chieftains opposed to him. His autocratic state was to be supported by the twin pillars of a mercenary army and an alien bureaucracy, both hostile to the population of Malabar and unsympathetic towards its institutions". The ethics of utilising foreign help for suppressing enemies need not be questioned at all. When once Marthanda Varma was bent upon subduing his enemies, it mattered little whether he depended entirely on his army or hired soldiers from outside. It was open to all princes to secure help from outside and it was not any respect for the feeling of "Kerala Dharma" that prevented them from doing it. The truth is that they had neither the skill nor the courage of Marthanda Varma to venture on such schemes. No doubt the numerous chieftains and princes who were subdued by Marthanda Varma considered his action as a violation of their legitimate rights and liberties. But the presence of innumerable independent principalities, hardly able to

subsidy by their revenues or maintain good rule was certainly not conducive to the happiness of the people. It may be a fact that the people highly resented the high-handed actions of Marthanda Varma. But they could not understand the necessity or advantages of a political unification. It would have been a Herculean task for any prince of the 18th century to induce by peaceful means the different principalities to merge into a common entity. Conquest was the only means for creating a united and strong Travancore and, certainly in this case the end justifies the means. It would be wrong to accuse Marthanda Varma of any violation of "Kerala Dharma". "Kerala Dharma" does not consist in the perpetuation of a highly incompetent and undesirable political system. Perhaps it may be difficult to justify on strict moral grounds the treatment he meted out to the Ettuveetil Pillamars. But Marthanda Varma was a practical statesman. He realised fully well, and rightly too, that the total annihilation of the recalcitrant nobility was the *sin qua non* of an orderly government. And this soldier-king with a "heart to resolve a head to contrive and a hand to execute" set about his task in the most thorough manner possible. And its result was that he raised Travancore from its insignificance to the forefront of Malabar politics. The great achievement of Marthanda Varma was that he carved out a powerful state from out of an agglomeration of weak principalities and made it an effective bulwark against foreign aggression. "Thus ended the the dominion of the petty Malabar sovereigns and princes, thus was humanity avenged and thus were the crimes punished and licentiousness suppressed by which the country had been distracted ever since the 10th century."¹

The greatness of Marthanda Varma lies in the fact that his conquests kept pace with consolidation. After finishing his conquests he brought about extensive reforms in the military and revenue administration of the State. Captain De Lamoignon was appointed as the commander-in-chief of the Travancore forces. He had already in his employ a body of soldiers trained in western methods of warfare. The Maharaja realised that a well equipped and well disciplined army was highly indispensable for the administration of his extensive dominions. The Maharaja's palace at Padmanabhapuram was strongly fortified and

¹ Fra Bartolomeo "A voyage to the East Indies."

Udayagiri was converted into a strong military establishment. Batteries were erected on the sea coast at different places and old forts were renovated and strengthened. Rama Iyen was deputed to organise the revenue administration of the State. A commerce department was established and pandakasalas or store-houses were erected in different parts of the State. The lands annexed by the State were assessed and their administration was established on a sound financial basis. Many public works were undertaken and numerous palaces were constructed. Roads and canals were made to facilitate commerce and communications.

The important role played by Marthanda Varma in deciding the fate of the Dutch in Malabar can hardly be exaggerated. To Marthanda Varma goes the credit of shattering the Dutch East India Company's usurped position as the sovereign authority in Malabar. Marthanda Varma was able to compel the Dutch to discard their old system of Malabar administration and to adopt a new policy whose chief feature was to keep friends with Travancore. Moens wrote, "As long as the Company sticks to its present peaceable policy, friendship with this king is and must remain of utmost necessity." But the Dutch were always apprehensive about the political designs of Marthanda Varma. The letter from the Amsterdam Council to Batavia, dated 13th October 1755, stated "When we reflect on the ambitious designs of this prince and his behaviour from time to time even with regard to the Company, we are more and more strengthened in our belief that not much reliance can be placed upon the aforementioned Raja. For this reason we once more recommend our administrators always to follow carefully the enterprises of the prince, to be on their guard at every turn of events". The Dutch authorities expressed the same fears about Marthanda Varma in another letter dated 4th October 1756. "With reference to the king of Travancore whose progress we cannot behold with indifferent eyes, we are constantly in fear that if the said king should conquer the kings of Cochin, Birkancur and Thekkumkur, he would become a dangerous neighbour to the Company; for this reason it would be desirable that the combined arms of the said three kings may be so prosperous that the one party could be kept in check by the other, and the king of Travancore thwarted in the execution of his ambitious designs, of which he has already given diverse indi-

cations and which therefore require every attention". The Dutch earnestly wished that Travancore had not become so exceedingly large and Cochin so small so that the latter might balance the former. Marthanda Varma had convinced the Dutch that they could no longer play the convenient game of adjusting the balance of power in Malabar to their advantage. And this was no small achievement. Marthanda Varma will ever remain as one of the most outstanding figures in Malabar history.

CHAPTER VI

THE ZAMORIN AND THE DUTCH

THE failure of the Dutch against Travancore had many disastrous consequences. It encouraged all the Malabar chieftains to throw aside the authority of the Dutch. The Malabar princes discovered that their interests had been given up to Travancore by the treaty of 1753, and they were therefore seeking for new alliances to strengthen their position. The Zamorin of Calicut who for long had enjoyed the position of the premier prince of Malabar was not slow to miss this opportunity. When the Dutch first came to Malabar the most powerful prince they found on the coast was the Zamorin. It was with the help of the Zamorin that they established their power in Cochin. But the Dutch were always thwarting the political ambitions of the Zamorin on the plea of protecting their allies. By the treaty of 1717 the Zamorin had been compelled to cede Chettwaye and Pappanivattam to the Dutch and to allow them freedom of trade in his dominions. But ever since the surrender of Chettwaye, the Zamorin had been trying to restore it to his kingdom. Chettwaye was so vital to his communications in the south that he could not afford to lose it. The Zamorin tried peaceful means to win back the lost territories. But the Dutch were not prepared to return what they had gained after so much of fighting. The hostility between the Dutch and the Zamorin was becoming keener. Chettwaye was not the only bone of contention. The Dutch wanted to prevent the establishment of English influence in the Zamorin's territories and they were taking every possible step to achieve this end. The Zamorin was meanwhile trying to strengthen his position by forming alliances. In 1728 he sent Padmanabha Pattar to Kayamkulam, Vaddakkumkur, Thekkumkur and other places to negotiate alli-

ances with them. The main object of this alliance was to bring down the power of the Dutch and conquer Cochin. The Dutch also were not slow in concerting measures for the suppression of the Zamorin's power. in 1735 they occupied Inamakal and fortified it. But they continued to maintain their appearance of friendship with the Zamorin; therefore it did not result in the commencement of hostilities. The Raja of Cochin invaded the lands of Chittoor Namboodiri in 1750, but even this did not result in the outbreak of war. In 1742 a serious dispute arose between the Cochin Raja and the Zamorin about the management of the Triparayar temple and the heir-apparent of Calicut who was an inveterate enemy of the Dutch invaded Cochin. This prince, Gollennessee says, used to boast that he intended 'to live and die as a mortal enemy of the Dutch.' He made a sudden raid upon the kingdom of Cochin without any previous declaration of war and captured the territory known as Mangalam. At that time the prince received information about the arrival of Van Imhoff and suddenly stopped all hostilities. The Zamorin disowned his responsibility for this war and declared that everything had been done without his orders. A peace was concluded on the 3rd December 1742 in the presence of two deputies of the Company. The Dutch "seriously warned the king of Cochin to avoid carefully every occasion of new disturbances and rather to bear and digest a small injustice than bring greater one upon himself".

Even though a temporary peace was signed between Cochin and Calicut in 1742, the Zamorin was making busy preparations for carrying out his great political designs. The Zamorin was watching the progress of Travancore and the steady decline of the Company's power. "He found that he could insult the Dutch with impunity, as although they sent remonstrances, these were unsupported by physical force".

In 1752 the Zamorin attacked Inamakal. The next year they took Pappanivattom and obliged the Dutch to retire to Cranganore with the loss of eight pieces of artillery. The Zamorin had compelled many petty chieftains to recognise him as the overlord of Malabar. The Cochin Raja had always refused

1 Gollennesse. Memoirs.

2 Day. : *Land of the Perumals.*

to acknowledge the Zamorin's suzerainty. The Zamorin ventured on his aggressive scheme of conquest and invaded Cochin with a large army. In the meantime, Marthanda Varma was steadily extending his dominions northwards. Attacked on both sides by powerful enemies, the Cochin Raja looked up to the Dutch for help. He wrote many letters to the Dutch at Cochin and Batavia reminding them of their treaty obligations to protect Cochin from outside attacks. But the Dutch were not inclined to lend active assistance to Cochin. The Cochin Raja realised that his kingdom would be reduced to extinction if he did not make a diplomatic move to secure a powerful ally. An alliance with the Zamorin was clearly impossible and therefore Cochin turned to Travancore for help. The leader of these negotiations was Paliath Komi Achen, a far-seeing diplomat of exceptional abilities. He had been taken prisoner at the battle of Ambalapuzha and taken to Trivandrum. He had realised that an alliance with Travancore would be to the best interests of his country and had cultivated the friendship of Marthanda Varma and the Elaya Raja during his stay at Trivandrum. He knew perfectly well that depending on Dutch help would be extremely foolish and persuaded the Cochin Raja to come to an agreement with Marthanda Varma. The Cochin Raja came to Mavelikara where he had an interview with Marthanda Varma. A peace was signed between the two princes in 1757. The Raja of Cochin declared perpetual alliance with Travancore and voluntarily ceded all the places which the Travancore army had conquered. He relinquished all his claims over the petty principalities of the north with the exception of Alangad and Parur. He promised to render no help to the enemies of Travancore and to refrain from all intercourse with the deposed Rajas of Ambalapuzha, Thekkumkur and Vadakkumkur. The deposed Raja of Ambalapuzha was permitted to stay at Trichur.

The Zamorin was steadily scoring victories at the expense of Cochin and the Dutch. In 1756 the Zamorin invaded the territories round about Cranganore. The Zamorin's troops strengthened themselves at Pappanivattam throwing up earth works at 'Tripoonatty' holding posts at Madilakam. They erected palisades at the river bank closing the passages and preventing supplies from reaching the Dutch garrison at Madilakam. The Zamorin with 5000 Nairs advanced close to the Cranganore fort

and overran Parur. 'The Dutch in Cochin' were greatly alarmed at the progress of the Zamorin. The garrison at Cochin consisted of only 138 Europeans and 75 Topasses.¹ They enlisted some natives and wrote to Ceylon to send immediate reinforcements. But the Ceylon Government could not spare any soldiers at that time. The Dutch then requested the Rajas of Chettwaye, Ayroor and Cranganore to stop the advance of the Zamorin's troops. But these chieftains had already realised the futility of their alliance with the Dutch and they declined to comply with their request. On the other hand they entered into alliances with the Zamorin. "The petty princes perceiving the Dutch no longer protected them against Travancore had recourse to the Zamorin, whom they persuaded to enter into hostilities against the company. The Dutch commander applied to the Raja of Travancore for help; but he replied that "he had told the Zamorin's ambassadors that they ought to advise their sovereign to stop." Perhaps the Travancore Raja did not want to interfere in the war at that stage. He knew that when the Dutch would be hard pressed they would be compelled to beg his assistance and then he would carry out his schemes of conquest as he pleased.

1 *Topasses* A name used in the 17th or 18th century for dark-skinned half-caste Portuguese Christians. It is held that the word is a corruption of the Turkish 'Top-chi', (a gunner). Various other derivations have also been given. Thus Orme and following him Wilson, had derived the word, from 'Topy' 'a hat' and held it to mean 'hatman' or 'Topy-walas'. Still another curious derivation is from the word 'Dubash', i.e., interpreter between the Europeans and the Indians.

Possibly the first derivation is the correct one, because European gunners, Italians, Levantines, or Ottomans, were employed as artillery men and for casting guns, from very early in the 16th century. Portuguese gunners, i.e., Top-chis (Top-khana artillery department) were employed by the Zamorin of Calicut, as is frequently mentioned in the Annals of Correa who went over to India in 1512 and remained in the country as late as 1561. Ref: "Three Voyages of Vas Co da Gama and his Viceroyalty" of Gaspar Correa. Translated by E. J. Stanley.

The term Topaz or Topas was frequently in use from about 1670 in the records of the English factories. Gradually, in course of time it came to be applied to the sons of European men and black woman who affected European dress and wore European hat. According to the high authority of James Mill, it denoted the Indo Portuguese, either the mixed descendants of Portuguese and Indian parents or converts to the Portuguese from the Indian faith. They were also known as Mestizos (literally of mixed blood).

While the Dutch and the Zamorin were carrying on hostilities, peace talks also were indulged in. The main idea of the Zamorin was not to suppress the power of the Dutch. He would have readily welcomed their help for carrying out his designs over others. The Zamorin was also careful to prevent an alliance between Travancore and the Dutch, which he knew would only strengthen the power of Travancore. Further there were frightful rumours about the imminent invasion of Calicut by Hyder Ali. Therefore the Zamorin thought it would be a wise step to negotiate peace with the Dutch. On October 18th 1756 the Zamorin sent a Jew—Ezekiel Rabbi—to the Dutch to arrange terms for peace. He promised to give the Dutch 2,000 candies¹ of pepper yearly if they would join sides with him against Travancore. The Dutch did not want to wage a war with Travancore. They sent a reply that as soon as the lands which the Zamorin had conquered were restored to them, they would consider the offer of peace. They also stated that the new treaty should be on the basis of the old one, i.e., the treaty of 1717. The Dutch did not want to commit themselves to support any party in haste. Before doing that they wanted to ascertain what terms either party would offer. Governor Cunes in his letter to Batavia stated: "Should Travancore refuse to join us, it becomes the more urgent that your Excellencies should furnish sufficient forces to enable us to assume a commanding position, merely to overawe these Malabar chiefs and thus to continue on the terms of most intimate friendship with Travancore, without the slightest room for any misunderstanding." He also added that "should the Zamorin give an opportunity for a renewal of friendship with him, on reasonable and honourable terms, it is advisable to at once close with them." Thus the Dutch were trying to make the best use of these opportunities.

Meanwhile the Zamorin had occupied the major part of Cochin's territories. He could capture Inamakkal without firing a shot. From there he advanced to Trichur which was very poorly defended. The handful of soldiers he found there were driven out and Trichur was made the capital of the Zamorin's territories in Cochin. Many local chieftains voluntarily surrendered before the Zamorin. Chankarakanda Kammal Chittur

¹ 'Cochoy Raja Charitram' says 4,000 candies were offered. Ref. Vol II P. 299.

Nampoothiri and Velos* Nambiar invited the Zamorin to take possession of Oorakam, Arattupuzha and Mapranam.¹ The Zamorin's forces seized the Mullorkara fort belonging to Paliam and compelled many local chiefs to recognise his suzerainty. In 1758 the Zamorin's forces attacked Chennamangalam, the seat of the Paliath Achen and drove away the Paliam troops. Paliath Achen and the members of his family were obliged to leave Chennamangalam and settle in Vypeen. This was the most critical period in the history of Cochin. The Cochin Raja had been deprived of the major part of his territories. The majority of the Raja's feudatories had joined sides with the Zamorin. Even some of the members of the Paliam family were thinking of going over to the Zamorin. But Komi Achen, the Paliam chief, stood loyal to the Raja and tried his best to strengthen the Raja's power in Cochin.

When the Zamorin was thus at the zenith of his power, he concluded a treaty with the Dutch by which he agreed to give up Matilakam, Puttenchira, Chettwaye and Pappunivattam. He also promised to pay a war indemnity of 65,000 Rupees to the Dutch. It seems strange that the Zamorin should sign a treaty of this kind with the Dutch when he was victorious in all his operations. Probably he feared a combined attack of Travancore and the Dutch. Perhaps it was his idea to offset the immediate prospects of a Travancore invasion by a treaty with the Dutch. "The Zamorin had no fear of the Dutch; he knew what their strength was and where their weakness lay. The immediate crisis tided over, and the advance of the Travancoreans stopped, he thought he could at his own convenience recover Chettwaye"²

The Cochin Raja knew that he could not resist the advance of the Zamorin without help from outside. Therefore he retired to Ernakulam with his troops. The only effective help he could hope to secure at that time was from Travancore. In 1758 the great Marthanda Varma died and he was succeeded by his illustrious nephew Rama Varma. Rama Varma had been trained and brought up by Marthanda Varma and he proved himself to be a worthy successor of his great uncle. As heir-apparent he had closely associated himself with matters of state administra-

1 Cochy Rajya Charitram by K. P. P. Menon, Vol II. P. 305.

2 K. V. Krishna Iyer. Zamorins of Calicut.

tion and his policy as king was strictly in accordance with that of his predecessor. His long rule extending over a period of 40 years, characterised by wisdom, justice and kindness, was extremely popular and won him the title of "Dharma Raja". He was endowed with great natural gifts and administrative abilities, which stood him in good stead under trying circumstances.

The Cochin Raja sent Paliath Achen to Travancore to solicit the Maharaja's help for checking the aggression of the Zamorin. A fresh treaty¹ was signed on the 26th December 1761 based on the provisions of the former treaty. The Cochin Raja promised to bear all expenses that will be incurred in connection with war against the Zamorin. He relinquished his claims over the Karappuram territories.

At the time of the signing of the treaty Karappuram was a part of Travancore, but the clause about the surrender of Cochin's claims over that territory was purposely included to prevent all future disputes about it. It is stated that the Travancore Raja hesitated to place full confidence in the Cochin chief and delayed to take action against the Zamorin. Therefore the Cochin Raja sent his nephew to Trivandrum to swear his allegiance to the treaty².

1 " You inform me that the Samoory has entered your country with his troops, expelled your people and taken possession of it and you desire me to assist you by sending my troops at my own expense in order to enable you to recover possession of your country by expelling the Samoory's troops from that part which extends north as far as Poooidah river and east as far as Chitoor river as also the districts you formerly possessed in Vellapanad Karee. If I should assist you and put you in possession of this country you in return agree to make over to me the district Karappuram extending to the south of Pampolly river and north of Alipie and also Paroor and Alangadu with all their rights etc I will send my troops to be paid by me and will use every exertion and render all the assistance in my power to defeat the Samoory's troops and restore your country".

Malabar Manual Vol. III. P. 112.

2 A perpetual alliance was solemnly declared before the deity at Suchindram. It was as follows:—"We, Veera Kerala Varma Raja, born under the star Rohini of Perumpatappu Swaroopam declare in the presence of Sthanu Moorthy, deity of Suchindram, that neither we nor our heirs will do or cause to be done any act against Sree Padmanabhadasa Vanchi Pala Rama Varma Kulasekhara Perumal Raja of the Trippappoor Swaroopam, born under the star of Karthiga or against his heirs. We will not join with those who are his enemies; neither will we correspond with them. Truly resolved and solemnly declared on the feet of Sthanumoorthy."

(Sankun Menon, History of Travancore), Chapter III. P. 189.

According to the terms of this treaty, the Maharaja sent his troops to the north to assist the Cochin Raja. The Travancore forces were under the command of Aiyyappan Marthanda Pillay, the Dalawa, and General De Llanoy. The first thing they undertook was the construction of the famous 'Travancore Lines,'¹ extending from Cranganore to the foot of the ghats. The construction of a northern barrier was found to be imperatively necessary as there was the threat of a Mysorean invasion of Travancore. The fortifications were constructed under the supervision of De Lannoy and the Dalawa who were specially commissioned for this by the Maharaja. The Maharaja had also a conference with the Cochin Raja at Annamanaday. As many parts of the barrier had to pass through Cochin, the Cochin Raja ceded these lands to Travancore.

In 1762 the Travancore troops under the command of De Lannoy formed into three divisions and attacked the Zamorin's possessions at Cranganore Parur and Verapoly. The Zamorin was driven back from Cochin and the Cochin Raja was re-instated in his original possessions. The Dalawa even contemplated an attack of Calicut, the Zamorin's capital. But by that time the Zamorin had sued for peace and the Maharaja ordered his minister to return. The imminent danger of Hyder's invasion had induced

1 "They (Travancore Lines) consisted of an imposing earthen rampart, not very high, extending over thirty miles in length from Pallipport along a great portion of the Cochin State on a strip of land ceded by the Cochin Raja which served as check upon the Zamorin's advances. Just flanking their western extremity were the Dutch forts of Cranganore and Ayakottah. The lines were fronted by a ditch on the North. Flanking towers were placed at intervals and a fort was constructed at the western extremity."

(Travancore State Manual, Vol. I) Ch. VI. P 372.

• Day gives the following accounts about the Travancore Lines:—

"They commenced at Yellingayree to the eastward of which the hills were supposed to afford some defence. They then extended 24 miles to the westward and terminated at Jacotay—a name which was occasionally employed to designate the whole work. The latter consisted of a rather strong embankment and parapet of earth, the whole measuring at the highest part above fifteen feet, but the elevation was not always the same. The ditch was generally speaking about half that depth, and two or three feet broad. An Abattis composed of a bamboo hedge was planted, which in some places where it has been carefully preserved may still be seen flourishing. Along its inner side ran a broad and level road, and scattered along this at irregular intervals were forty two small works."

both the princes to stop their hostilities and seek friendship with one another. Further, the Travancore Raja had no personal reasons for carrying on the war against the Zamorin. His only obligation was to restore the Cochin Raja's territories, and having fulfilled that he was ready for peace. The Zamorin came to Padmanabhapuram to meet the Maharaja and a treaty of alliance was concluded in 1765 (26th Idavom 938 M. E.). The Zamorin promised to maintain perpetual friendship and fidelity with Travancore and to pay a war indemnity of 150,000 Rupees. This treaty protected the interests of Cochin by providing that it should be left unmolested by the Zamorin. Any dispute that might arise between the Zamorin and Cochin was to be settled by the mediation of Travancore. The Zamorin and the Maharaja promised to help each other in case of a foreign attack.

After re-instating the Cochin Raja in his restored dominions, the Travancore Raja opened up Alleppey to foreign trade, an event which was greatly ruinous to the interests of the Dutch. The Dutch had formerly prevented the Raja of Porambo from doing this on the ground that they would not have control over the exportation of cinnamon and pepper. But now the Dutch were not in a position to check the Raja of Travancore. This event made Travancore master of the whole country from Cape Comorin to Cranganore.

In the war between the Zamorin and the Raja of Cochin many of the feudatories and nobles of Cochin had joined sides with the Zamorin. The Zamorin's authority had been recognised by many local chieftains of Cochin and they were actively supporting the Calicut troops in their war with Cochin. In Travancore the power of the Nair nobility had been completely broken by the iron measures of Marthanda Varma and therefore there was no chance of any popular insurrection there. The Cochin Raja also wanted to secure his position on a similar basis and in this respect. The Cochin Raja sought the help of the Travancore Raja in bringing to the principal leaders among the rebellious nobles who swear an oath of fidelity at Thiruvanchikulam and compelled them to be loyal to the Raja of Cochin and Travancore and never to entertain any enemies of these princes in their territories. They undertook to break off all their relations with the Zamorin, and to support the Raja against the Zamorin's aggression. The second chief of Paalam had taken an

active part in the rebellions. He was also compelled to swear an oath of loyalty to Cochin and Travancore. He repented very much for all his youthful misdemeanours and prayed that he should be forgiven and protected by the Rajas. He promised to be obedient to his brother, the first Lord of Paliam who has always been loyal to his master. The properties of the rebellious chieftains were forfeited to the State and all their titles and claims were abolished.

The part played by the Travancore Raja in annihilating the power of Cochin nobility is very significant. He saved the Cochin Raja from the aggression of his hereditary enemy the Zamorin, and also from his own feudal nobles. The Rajas of Cochin were the feudatories of the Zamorins when the Portuguese first came to Malabar. During the Portuguese hegemony in Malabar, Cochin had secured its independence from the domination of Calicut. But ever since, the two States had been in perpetual warfare. The Cochin Raja had never been able to suppress the power of his feudal chiefs. Like the Pillamars and Madampies of Travancore, these nobles had been enjoying more or less sovereign authority in their own villages. The interference of Travancore brought to a close the war with Zamorin which was going on for about 250 years and also destroyed the power and influence of the local nobility.

Even though matters were amicably settled between the three States of Travancore, Cochin and Calicut, a quarrel broke out between the Dutch and Travancore over the question of the possession of the Muthukunnu islands. According to the treaty of 1758 between the Dutch and the Zamorin, the latter had promised to pay a war indemnity of 65,000 Rupees. By the year 1762 more than half the amount had been paid by the Zamorin in different instalments. But there still remained a balance of 30,000 Rupees. As the Zamorin was involved in expensive wars with Cochin and Travancore he could not pay the amount due to the Company. He mortgaged to the Dutch the islands of Muthukunnu which he had previously taken from Cochin as a security for the amount due to the Dutch. The Dutch resolved to take these islands as security on an estimated value of 16,000 Rupees. If the Zamorin failed to pay his arrears within a period of two years, the Dutch were to take possession of the islands. When the stipulated period was over, the Dutch resolved to

appropriate these islands as the Zamorin had failed to fulfil his obligations. But Travancore disapproved of this transaction and laid claim to the island on behalf of the Raja of Cochin. Moens the Dutch Governor, says that before entering into the transaction, the Dutch had consulted the Travancore Raja and obtained his permission in a conference with him at Shertallai. The Travancore Raja pressed his claims on behalf of Cochin and used to issue 'interdicts' preventing sowing and harvest in the islands. Matters went on like this till 1767 when the Dutch sent troops from Changanore to take forcible possession of the islands. Since then no more 'interdicts' were laid on the islands and no other "improper claims" were pressed on by Travancore. But special orders were given by the Dutch authorities about this affair as they were always afraid of the intention of "Travancore who seldom forgets anything but always knows well how to make the best of his chances." They knew that "Travancore will not so easily let this claim slip away from him, but when occasion offers will formulate it again." Both Travancore and Cochin repeatedly sought the permission of the Dutch Governor to build a strong fort there in order to check the Mysorean invasions. The Dutch Governor was aware of the usefulness of the fortifications in these parts for common defence; still he was not prepared to trust the intentions of Travancore in his request for permission to construct a fort in Muthukunnu islands. He was afraid that if the Travancore Raja was allowed to build a fortress there, he may later press his claim for the whole islands because he knew very well that "the Malabaris seldom let slip claims which they have once made, but keep them always in reserve in order to make them serve as often as an opportunity offers."

CHAPTER VII

THE MYSOREAN INVASIONS

THE Mysorean invasion under Hyder Ali was the most significant event which affected the history of Malabar in general and the fortunes of the Dutch in particular. We have already referred to Marthanda Varma's invocation of help from Hyder and its political significance. We have also seen how the Malabar princes and the Dutch were living in great dread of an imminent invasion from Hyder.

Hyder Ali is said to have been a descendant of the tribe to which the Prophet Muhammad belonged. The date of his ancestor's migration from Mecca to India cannot be precisely fixed. Neither is it a historical fact which can be accepted without dispute. But the details about his ancestors' settlement in the Deccan are well known and authentic. Hyder's great grand-father Wali Muhammad, migrated from North India to Gulburga in the Nizam's dominions. His father—Nadim Saheb—joined the service of the Mysore ruler and steadily rising to prominence became the Governor of a province and the captain of ten thousand horses. Hyder commenced his military career as an officer of a corps of sepoy under his father at Devanahalli in 1749. He distinguished himself as an efficient soldier at the siege of Devanahalli and his conspicuous abilities attracted the attention of Nanjaraja, the Sarvadhikari of Mysore, who secured for him a command of fifty cavalry and two hundred infantry.

The government of Mysore was at that time in the hands of the two brothers Devaraj and Nanjaraj. The reigning monarch 'Chick Kissen' was only the nominal head of the administration, while Devaraj the Dalawa and Nanjaraj the Sarvadhikari were the *de facto* rulers.

In 1750 Hyder joined the army of Barakki Venkat Rao that fought side by side with the French. The treasures seized by Hyder in the course of the campaign had enabled him to re-organise his army and equip the soldiers with better weapons of warfare. With the help of some French sepoy Hyder, began to train up his new recruits in novel methods of warfare. He raised a body of 500 sepoy and 200 horses and further distinguished himself at Trichinopoly. "Trichinopoly was Hyder's great training ground. There amidst constant strife and turmoil, his fibre was hardened, his observation quickened; his resourcefulness increased and his character developed". It was at Trichinopoly that Hyder gained his experience in the art of western warfare which stood him in good stead throughout his career. Fighting by the side of the English, Hyder had many opportunities of securing firsthand knowledge of English strategem and skill in siege warfare. In 1755 Hyder was appointed Foujdar of Dindigul. Hyder's brilliant achievement in Dindigul was the subjugation of the rebellious Poligars led by Amminayaka and

Appinayaka. Hyder also accumulated much wealth and increased the strength of his army at Dindigul. He is said to have obtained skilful French engineers to organise a regular corps of artillery and to build up an arsenal and a laboratory.

By 1757 Nanjaraj had made himself the undisputed master of the Mysore kingdom. In 1751 Hyder came to Seringapatam at the request of Nanjaraja to suppress a mutiny there. The Government of Mysore at that time was in a bankrupt condition. The salaries of the soldiers had long been in arrears. The differences of opinion between Nanjaraj and his brother Devaraj only worsened the position. Hyder managed to bring about a reconciliation between Nanjaraj and his brother. He also persuaded Nanjaraj to pay off all the salaries that were in arrears to the soldiers. Hyder further distinguished himself by a brilliant victory over the Marathas who invaded Bangalore. The great reputation he had earned by his military exploits, his popularity with the Mysore soldiers and above all his position as the leader of a well organised and well equipped army had made him *de facto* ruler of the major part of the Mysore territories. From 1751 onwards Hyder ventured on an aggressive scheme of conquests and annexation. He annexed Sira and its dependencies and Hoskote and other forts which had been occupied by the Marathas. The Poligars of Raidurg and the chief of Harpanhalli surrendered without offering resistance. The Chittaldurg Poligar evaded Hyder's summons to surrender and therefore his country was forcibly annexed. His outstanding achievement during this period was the conquest of Bednur. The Rani of Bednur is said to have offered 18 lakhs of pagodas as ransom to Hyder. But Hyder marched against the city which he found almost undefended. The Rani had fled to Bellalraydurg and the soldiers could offer little resistance. Hyder seized Basavarajdurg, Honave, Mangalore and also Bellalraydurg. Hyder improved the fortifications of Bednur which was renamed Hydernagar. It is specially noteworthy that Hyder proclaimed himself as the real master of these dominions, while in the other parts of the kingdom, Hyder was carrying on the administration in the name of the Mysore king. It was at Bednur that Hyder for the first time asserted his right of striking coins in his own name: he considered Bednur as his 'Swarajya'¹.

Practically the whole of Canara was conquered by Hyder. He also made himself strong on the sea by building a fleet¹, the expenses of which were met by the forcible loans he extracted from the conquered people. The Portuguese were anxious to win his friendship and assisted him by allowing their soldiers and officers to enter his service.

The Dutch at this time had factories at Basrur and Mangalore, but Hyder did not interfere with them. He tried to get the help of the Dutch for securing some equipments for his soldiers and applied to Wayerman, the Dutch Governor at Cochin, for one thousand muskets. The Governor wrote to the Supreme Government at Batavia recommending that it might be "worthwhile to have him complimented on behalf of the Company and to enter into negotiation with him". But the Supreme Government at Batavia "understanding at once that he was not a man with whom the Company could work, recommended that endeavours should be made to keep him in that disposition which he professed towards the Company and that his demands for war material should be refused in the most suitable manner". It was not in the Company's interest to set up any further establishment between Surat and Cochin. They knew that they could not depend on Hyder's friendship for long; therefore their main policy was to observe neutrality.

Hyder had aggressive designs on Malabar from the very beginning. The complicated political situation in Malabar offered him a very good opportunity.

"North Malabar was at that time in a state of anarchy, a sea of intrigues, conflicting interests and mutual jealousies," says N. K. Sinha². "The Kolathiri's sway was now confined to the town of Chirakkal. The Mohomedan chief Ali Raja was master of Canannore. The Kadathanad chief ruled between the Mahe and the Kotta rivers. There was an offshoot of the Kilattanad family north of the Kavvyi river. The Kottayam

¹ Peixoto says that Hyder's fleet consisted of 80 vessels, 13 topsail vessels, several manchooes of war, besides a great many skybars and small craft for the transport of war materials and provisions for the passage of the army across the rivers. According to the Dutch accounts the fleet had 2 ships, 7 smaller vessels and 40 gallivats, besides more than 50 other vessels laden with provisions.

² *Hyder Ali*, by N. K. Sinha, P. 252, 253.

Taluka was partly in possession of Iruvalinaḍ Nambiars and partly of the Puranad or Kottayam Rajas".

The first opportunity for Hyder to interfere in the affairs of Malabar was provided by the Raja of Palghat. The Zamorin of Calicut was expanding his territories at the expense of his weak neighbours. He attacked the dominions of the Palghat Raja in 1756 and carved out a country for him in the midst of Palghat territories, to which he gave the name Naduvattam. The Palghat Raja in great despair appealed to Hyder for help. Hyder promptly sent his brother-in-law Mukhadam Sahib (Makhḍum Ali Khan) with 2,000 horses, 5,000 infantry and 5 guns to assist the Raja. The Mysore troops aided by the Palghat Nairs drove the Zamorin's troops out of the Raja's dominions. The Zamorin's troops retreated and finding that they could not resist the Mysoreans, the Zamorin sued for peace. The Zamorin promised to restore his Palghat conquests to the Raja and to pay a war indemnity of 12 lakhs of Rupees to Mysore. The Zamorin then opened negotiations with Devaraj to whom he promised to remit the money in different instalments. Hyder relinquished his claim in favour of Devaraj who sent a Rajput corps under Hari Singh to collect the money. But before Hari Singh could collect any money from the Zamorin he heard about the death of Devraj and returned to Coimbatore. Hari Singh was murdered at Coimbatore by a band of Hyder's soldiers sent there under the leadership of Mukhadam Sahib. Thus Hyder established his claim on the 12 lakhs of Rupees which the Zamorin had promised to pay him. This was a convenient pretext for Hyder to invade the territories of the Zamorin.

In 1764, Breeport was appointed Governor of Cochin. He received a letter from Hyder Ali in which he expressed his hopes that he and the Dutch would continue as friends. Hyder proposed that the Dutch should send a resident factor to Basrur to establish trade relations and promised all help to the Company in this respect. Breeport sent a polite reply saying that the Dutch had no idea of extending their trade at that time, but that they would gladly avail themselves of his friendly offer as soon as they had resolved on doing so.

The Dutch authorities at Batavia had ordered the destruction of their fort at Cannanore. But as the fort was in a sound condition and as it was advantageously situated for their trade,

the work of demolition was not carried out. They had reduced their establishments at Canannore and some ammunitions and goods had been transferred to Cochin. The Dutch were prepared to sell the fort to Hyder Ali if he would offer a good sum for it. But it was to be on condition that a Dutch President should be allowed to live there to carry on trade. The Dutch Government at Batavia seems to have given similar instructions for destroying their fortresses at Chettwaye, Quilon and Cranganore. Breeport's predecessor, Wayerman, had refused to obey the order for destroying the Dutch fort at Chettwaye as he believed that it was "a most impolitic order". Breeport also realised the folly in destroying the forts; he therefore merely reduced the establishment there.

When Hyder had made himself master of Mangalore and other places, the Ali Raja¹, the Mahomedan chief of Cannanore went over to his court promising him his loyal help for his Malabar expedition. The Mahomedans of North Malabar, commonly known as 'maplas' were having a virtual monopoly of the commerce and industries of the coast. These rich merchants used to lend money to the Malabar chieftains and princes at exorbitant rates of interest, sometimes upon pawns and sometimes in advance upon the harvests of pepper, cardamoms and rice. Ali Raja, the chief of the Moplas of Malabar, was making attempts to strengthen his position by acquiring political power. When he heard about Hyder's proposed scheme of a Malabar invasion, he led a 'deputation' to Hyder at Mangalore placing himself under the protection of Hyder. Hyder received the Mopla 'deputation' with great courtesy and loaded them with magnificent presents, assuring them of his protection and goodwill. Ali Raja had a powerful fleet at his command which he

1 There is a local tradition that Ali Raja had obtained possession of Canannore by virtue of his marriage with daughter of the Nair chief of Canannore. M.M.D L T., in his 'History of Hyder Shah alias Hyder Ali Khan and of his son Tipoo Sultan', gives the same story "This Ali, son of one of the most rich and powerful Mapelehs had the good fortune in his youth to be beloved by the daughter of the Raja of Canannore, a Nair prince. The father in spite of the diversity of religion and the prejudice of his nation, which forbids all alliance with a different caste and much more with strangers of another religion, consented to the marriage of his daughter with Ali and dying, left him his principalities or the small kingdom of Canannore".

placed at the disposal of Hyder. Peixoto says that the Ali Raja convinced Hyder that he could subjugate Malabar with ease if only he started the expedition and that Hyder was greatly encouraged by this welcome offer of help from one of the Malabar chieftains. According to M.M.D.L.T., (author of "History of Hyder Shah and Tipoo Sultan") Hyder appointed Ali Raja as his High Admiral and Ali Raja's brother Sheik Ali as the 'intendant' of the marine, of the ports and of the maritime commerce of his ports. Hyder also gave Ali Raja a considerable sum of money for purchasing or building new vessels.

Before undertaking his expedition to Malabar, Hyder had made extensive preparations to strengthen his army. He kept a corps of observation consisting of 3,000 cavalry, 4,000 infantry and 10,000 peons at Baswapatna in order to watch the Marathas. The army which Hyder took for his southern expedition consisted of 40,000 soldiers among whom were 450 Europeans.

In 1764 Hyder sent his emissary Ananta Rao with a letter to the English chief at Tellicherry to announce his intentions of conquering Malabar. He expected the English not to oppose him in his conquests of the Kolathri, the Zamorin Cochin and other Rajas of Malabar. The English at Tellicherry sent two representatives to Hyder Ali's camp "to point out to him what powers were in alliance with the Company and should not be molested". But in their treaty with Hyder they did not demand from him any promise for not molesting the powers which were in alliance with them. The English had undertaken to protect the Kolathiri from all his enemies by a previous treaty. But in the face of a formidable enemy like Hyder, the Kolathiri was forsaken by the English and left to protect himself. In February 1766 the Mysore troops took possession of the temple at Kunniangalam and laid siege to Matai. The Kolathiri's palace at

1. *Peixoto*. "The authenticity of the record is generally reliable since the events narrated find support from other sources for the history of Hyder and since also it is apparent that the author has written with a healthy frankness and in a language quite in accord with his European nativity. While chronicling the events he has in no way exaggerated and where he has given his opinion, he has been judicious. An account of Hyder from a pen of such an unbiassed person as the author of this Mss. would set at naught the writings of English critics and Indian enlogists who have made much of their own and too little of their enemies' activities or achievements".

Chirakkal was seized by the Ali Raja and his troops. He fled to Tellicherry with the members of his family, but the English refused to give him refuge. The Kolathri escaped to Travancore and his kingdom was entrusted to the Ali Raja of Canannore,

Hyder after overthrowing the Kolathiri arrived near the Dutch fort at Canannore. He gave orders to put to death all Nairs and Hindus who wore 'kudumi', but he issued special instructions to spare the Company's servants. The Dutch commandant at Cannanore reported to Cochin that Hyder "had been so civil to their possessions and dependants that not a cocoanut had been picked from one of their trees, nor even a leaf abstracted". On March 15th, Hyder visited the Dutch commandant, H. Kroonenberg, at Cannanore and invited him most courteously to his camp at Chirakkal. The Dutch commandant was consigned to the care of Ali Raza Khan who told him that Hyder preferred the Dutch to all other European powers and would grant them special favours. Ali Raza Khan informed him of Hyder's great anxiety at the rapid expansion of the English in the different parts of India. The English were already masters of Bengal and the greater part of the Coromandel Coast, and they were trying to bring Malabar under their sway. If things were to develop at this rate, unless a change did take place within two years there was every possibility of the English becoming the masters of the whole of India. Hyder Ali was determined to check the progress of the English, but he wanted the able assistance of the Dutch and others in his attempt.

The object of this conversation was no doubt to compel the Dutch to seek his friendship. Hyder thought of securing the help of the Dutch by emphasising the danger of an English invasion. Hyder knew perfectly well that the assistance of the Dutch would be extremely valuable to him for his conquest of Malabar. What he expected from the Dutch was only neutrality when he conquered the Malabar states.

After conquering the kingdom of the Kolathri, Hyder marched against the Zamorin. He sent envoys to the Zamorin to demand the sum due to him by the treaty of 1756¹. But the Zamorin was not in a position to pay the amount as his treasury had

¹ The Zamorin had promised to pay a war indemnity of 12 lakhs of Rupees to Hyder by the treaty of 1756.

been completely exhausted by his disastrous war with Travancore and Cochin. He asked for time, but Hyder was not prepared to grant any. In 1766 he invaded the Zamorin's territories with an army of 12,000 picked troops.

Hyder encamped on the side of the river which separated the Kolathiri's kingdom from the Zamorin's. The Zamorin and the Kolathiri princes pitched their camps on the other side of the river in order to prevent Hyder crossing it. But the Zamorin's attempts were in vain. Hyder crossed the river and marched straight through the Zamorin's troops slaughtering the Nairs in large numbers. Hyder's task was made easy by the help he received from the Muhammadans of Calicut. The Ali Raja appeared before the Zamorin's capital at the head of 1000 soldiers and summoned him to surrender, but the Zamorin refused. He tried to make peace with Hyder by a personal appeal. He offered all his treasures and properties but Hyder demanded a crore of gold mohurs as the price of peace. Obviously the Zamorin could not satisfy this demand. Hyder arrived at Calicut and established his camp at Palayam on the 20th April. The Mysore troops laid siege to the Zamorin's palace where he was taken prisoner. The Zamorin sent the princesses and the Eralpad to Ponnani and put an end to his own life by setting fire to the powder magazine in the palace where he was imprisoned. The Eralpad who had retired to Ponnani with the princesses became the Zamorin. He ordered his Nairs to harass Hyder as best as they could and to carry on a guerrilla war against him. Several skirmishes took place, but Hyder destroyed all the Nair rebels in Calicut with his powerful army. Hyder pursued a policy of iron repression in Malabar. The Nairs were not allowed to bear arms; his soldiers were ordered to kill all the Nairs who violated his orders. Many were taken slaves and transported to Mysore. Meanwhile, Hyder's Mysore dominions were attacked by the Marathas and the Nizam and he was obliged to return to his capital immediately. Hyder restored the conquered dominions to the new Zamorin who agreed to pay him an annual tribute.

The Dutch were watching with anxious eyes the steady progress of Hyder. They were afraid that Hyder would extend his conquests to the south. Therefore, they resolved to compliment him on his conquests by special commissioners and to understand

the extent of his intentions. The Dutch sent their commissioners to Calicut where they were received politely by Hyder Ali. The chief object of this commission was to inform him of the rights and privileges they had enjoyed in the Zamorin's territories. They also informed him that the Rajas of Cochin and Travancore were their allies and therefore these kings should be left unmolested. Hyder's replies were made in the form of seven propositions as follows :—

(1) He was prepared to make a perpetual alliance with the Company and to supply them with the products of his country, but he also should be accommodated whenever he stood in need of anything.

(2) If the Dutch required assistance he was willing to furnish them 30,000 land forces and his fleet, but he might expect the same from the Company.

(3) If he should advance further south, the Company should provide him with 1000 European soldiers, whose pay and expenses he would defray.

(4) If he passed through the territory of Chettwaye he would not molest the *Vassals* and subjects of the Company and would not disturb the possessions of the king of Cochin, out of respect for the Company.

(5) He was prepared to cede more territories to the Company.

(6) He would allow the Company the freedom to trade so far as his territory stretched to the north, or in course of time might stretch.

(7) The Dutch might restore their residency at Basrur and build a new residency at Ponnani or at Calicut.

Commenting on the fourth proposition Moens observes that it is striking that Hyder did not mention Travancore, but only Cochin. This goes to prove that Hyder had his eye on Travancore and its pepper. It is also significant to note that Hyder did not promise to refrain from marching through the Company's territories. His only promise was that he would do no harm to the inhabitants there. This was conclusive proof that his intentions were not to respect the Company's territories. What Hyder

wanted was, says Moens, a *defensive and offensive* alliance with the Company. Hyder also wrote to the Dutch Government at Batavia about his proposals. The Cochin authorities replied with the greatest politeness that they were unable to give an answer to his 'most important proposals' as they were beyond their jurisdiction, but they would address the Batavian Government about it and get their reply without delay. But Hyder could not be put off with their elusive reply. He modified his promises regarding the Raja of Cochin. He wanted it to be made conditional as he expected the Cochin Raja to contribute towards the expenses of his wars. He also offered to enter into a similar agreement with Travancore and the Company was to prevail upon these two Rajas to fulfil his demands. Hyder's demands were four lakhs of Rupees and eight elephants from the Cochin Raja and fifteen lakhs of rupees and and thirty elephants from Travancore Raja. He also added that if the Rajas were not inclined to pay, he would "pay a visit" to these countries!

The Dutch Governor informed both the princes about Hyder's proposals. The Travancore Raja replied that "he was unaware that Hyder went to war to please him or in accordance with his advice and was consequently unable to see the justice of his contributing towards his expenses". Further, he was a tributary to Muhammad Ali, Nawab of the Carnatic and therefore he could not afford to be a vassal to two powers at the same time. Still he was prepared to send envoys with a present to Hyder Ali, but Hyder Ali should re-instate the Kolathiri and the Zamorin in their dominions. He said that the dispossessed princes were prepared to pay large amounts to Hyder Ali, but he should then leave Malabar and return to the north. The Raja also added that the Dutch should send their envoys along with his to Hyder to represent these matters before him. The Cochin Raja replied that "he left his affairs in the hands of the Company and trusted that whatever conclusions were arrived at, the Kolathiri and the Zamorin should be restored to their dominions."

The Dutch Governor was afraid to send these replies to Hyder. They knew that nothing could come out of such negotiations except that they would get themselves into a difficult situation. Therefore they resolved not to send their envoys along with the envoys of the Rajas. They wanted to leave things as

they were and wait for instructions from Batavia. They informed Cochin and Travancore about their attitude and they also declined to send envoys to Hyder. The Cochin Governor then wrote to Hyder that he "had communicated his terms to Batavia, Travancore and Cochin and trusted all would be arranged in a satisfactory manner".

Meanwhile the Travancore Raja was taking defensive measures to meet Hyder's invasion which he knew was unavoidable. He informed the Nawab of Carnatic and the English Governor at Madras about the intentions of Hyder. DeLainoy and the Dalawa were ordered to fortify and strengthen the northern barriers. The Travancore lines were extended to the neighbourhood of the Cranganore fort. The Dutch fearing that the extension of these lines would offend Hyder Ali, sent notice to the Travancore Raja that he must stop his work. They also informed him that no armed Nairs belonging to his fort could be permitted within the territories of the Dutch. The Dutch were anxious not to offend Hyder Ali in any respect. They had already rebuked the Cranganore Raja for giving refuge to the Zamorin and his family. The Dutch Governor told the Cranganore Raja that "according to a lawful contract between him and the Hon'ble Company, all the land from Chetwaye to Cranganore was under the overseership of the Company and also that His Highness and his whole country were under the protection of the Company; that therefore his request to send away the Zamorin was not unreasonable, and that hereafter His Highness must abide implicitly by the good advice given him by the Company". The Raja of Cranganore immediately obeyed and desired that the Zamorin should leave his country. These acts of the Dutch authorities show how much they stood in mortal fear of Hyder. They were afraid to inform Hyder of the unpleasant replies the Rajas of Travancore and Cochin had given them. They were not prepared to allow the Travancore Raja to extend his fortifications to Cranganore. Now they were not prepared even to allow the exiled Zamorin to live in the territories of one of their dependants. This policy they called 'strict neutrality'. But it was a neutrality which was imposed upon them by their helplessness.

1 Official report to the Governor of Cochin, quoted by Day.

In October 1766 there was a strong rumour that Hyder was going to attack Travancore and Cochin; but Hyder heard news of an attack of his country by the Marathas and the Nizam and therefore he hastened to Mysore. Hyder managed to avert a crisis by winning over the Nizam to his side. In February 1767 Hyder's fleet, consisting of 28 vessels appeared in Cochin. Two envoys from the fleet came on shore and informed the Dutch authorities that their fleet had come in search of the Marathas and to protect the Malabar coast. But they left for the north the next day itself.

Hyder was now engaged in a serious war with the English in the north (First Mysore War, 1768—1769). Hyder and the Nizam were defeated by the English at the battles of Changama and Tiruvannamalai. These reverses compelled the Nizam to abandon his alliance with Hyder and join sides with the English. The English captured Mangalore and other places on the west coast. But Hyder soon re-established his position there. He now took the offensive and invaded the Carnatic and marched against Madras. A peace was concluded at Madras between Hyder and the English in 1769. One of the clauses of this treaty was that Travancore should not be attacked by Hyder as it was under the protection of the Nawab of Carnatic. The Travancore Raja was no doubt greatly relieved to hear this good news from the English at Madras. But he knew that Hyder's promises would be easily broken, and therefore did not desist from his preparations for defence. The Travancore Raja deputed an officer to the Mysore court to watch the further movements of Hyder Ali.¹

The Travancore Raja had sent his Dalawa to Cochin to have an interview with the Commander as soon as he heard about Hyder's plans to invade Travancore. The Raja wanted to ascertain how far the Dutch would help him in his attempts to check the progress of Hyder. The following terms were agreed upon as a result of the interview² :—

1 *History of Travancore* by Sankunny Menon.

2 A free translation from the Malayalam document.

*Facts represented by the
Dalawa before the Commander.*

1. Some evil minded parties may try to bring about a rupture in the friendly relations between the Company and Travancore by telling all sorts of falsehoods to the Commander. The Maharaja requests that the Commander should not believe any of these.

2. It is rumoured that Hyder Ali proposes to lead his invasions on four sides through Manappuram, through Trichur, through the hill sides in the south and through the sea. The Maharaja wishes to strengthen his position after consulting the Commander.

3. The Maharaja requests the Commander to send some rifles, guns and ammunition.

4. The Maharaja would like to receive some money for his pepper.

*The Commander's reply
to the Dalawa.*

1. The Commander will not take into account any of these falsehoods spread by interested parties. The Company will always be friendly towards the Rajas of Malabar as they are to the Company.

2. The Commander has also heard about Hyder's intentions to proceed to the south. But he does not know anything as to the truth of it. He will try to prevent Hyder's invasion by way of Manappuram and the sea. He was at that time expecting orders from the authorities from Batavia. Meanwhile, he will try to effect an understanding between Hyder and the Malabar princes.

3. The Commander will send a few, which he has received from Batavia.

4. Rs. 25,000 will be given if the agreed quota of pepper is submitted.

By this interview between the Dalawa and the Commander nothing definite was settled. But there was a mutual understanding that they will not betray each other in case of a Mysorean invasion. When Hyder's fleet sailed off to the north after visiting Cochin, the Dutch Commander informed the Rajas of Cochin and Travancore that he had persuaded them to leave the fort. The Rajas of Cochin and Travancore sent their ministers to the Dutch Commander to discuss about their future

plan of action. The following is the text of the discussions that took place in the conference between the Commander and the two ministers:—

"The Dalawa said that the Maharaja was very pleased with the Commander for persuading Hyder's fleet to leave Cochin. The Commander replied that the Company would do nothing on its part which might hinder its good relations with Travancore. But Travancore has not paid to the Company the 3,000 candies of pepper which had been promised in the treaty. The Company has received only 2,300 candies from Travancore. The Dalawa replied that it was because of the unexpected failure of crops. The Maharaja was too willing to give all the pepper in his territory to the Company. He wanted to enter into a new agreement with the Company concerning pepper transactions. The Commander replied that he could not do this without the permission of the authorities at Batavia. He would be pleased to see the terms of the existing treaty being fulfilled. Then the Dalawa told the Commander about Hyder's activities. The Nawab's troops had settled in Malabar for a long time. They have dishonoured the Brahmin priests and the Malabar princes who have now sought refuge in the Maharaja's territories. Their maintenance has cost the Maharaja very heavy expenditure. The Malabar chieftains were of opinion that it was the best opportunity for re-instating the Kolathri and the Zamorin in their lost dominions. The Dalawa wanted to know what attitude the Company would take in such a move as this. The Commander replied that he was not permitted to get involved in the wars of the Malabar princes. His instructions were to settle the affairs relating to Travancore and Cochin only. Therefore it was not possible for him to interfere in the affairs of the northern States. The prospects of a war are always uncertain. Any way Travancore is bearing heavy expenses for these northern princes for which act of kindness, they are always indebted to Travancore. Then the Dalawa asked the Commander what attitude the Company would take if Travancore and Cochin were to be attacked by Hyder. The Commander said that the Company would see that the Nawab takes no such aggressive steps. The

1 A Translation from the Malayalam document This document is published in Malayalam in K. P. P. Menon's "Cochy Raja Charitram" Vol. II, pp. 365—370.

Commander believes that the Nawab would pay heed to the orders of the Company as has already been proved by the withdrawal of the fleet from Cochin. The Dalawa asked him what he would do if the Nawab refused to comply with his request. The Commander replied that he was sure that the Nawab would not attack any one unless he was attacked first. If the Nawab proves to be imprudent he will, of course, suffer the consequences. The Dalawa sought the advice of the Commander about the question of re-instating the Kolathiri in his dominions. The Commander replied that the Maharaja should decide such questions using his own discretion. But he was afraid that it may precipitate a conflict with the Nawab. The Dalawa asked the Commander whether it would not be possible for him to persuade the Nawab to restore the conquered dominions to the Kolathri and the Zamorin. But the Commander replied that nothing could be done at present as the Nawab was away in the north. Any way, he promised to correspond with the Nawab on this question, but he was afraid it might take some time. The Commander would inform the Maharaja about the results of his attempts some time later. The Dalawa then asked whether the Company would extend its support to the Maharaja if he were to start the war on behalf of the Kolathri and the Zamorin. The Commander advised that the Maharaja should not take such a step. If he does so, he will have to suffer its consequences by himself. The Company would never come to the help of the Maharaja on this account....."

This document shows the real attitude of the Dutch with regard to the Mysorean invasion. The maximum help that the Dutch could promise was to try peaceful methods of persuading Hyder Ali to drop the idea of extending his invasions to the South.

The relations between the Dutch and the Raja of Cochin were not very friendly during the period. There was a dispute between the Company and the Raja over the ownership of a strip of territory known as 'Pathinettarayalam'. The trouble over this territory had started as early as 1719 when it was appropriated by the Dutch. The Dutch were in possession of this territory till 1740 during which period the Raja had been persistently complaining to the Batavian Government about the great injustice done to him. In 1740 when Van Gollennesse was

the Governor of Cochin, this territory was ceded back to the Raja. But in 1757 it was captured by the Zamorin who later transferred it to the Dutch Company. After the Zamorin had been driven out of the Cochin territory, the Raja pressed his claim over Pathinettarayalam and demanded that it should be restored to him. When the Cochin authorities wrote to Batavia about the claims of the Raja, they instructed the Governor to try his best to persuade the Raja to give up his claims. In their secret despatch dated 17th September 1763, the Governor was asked to refute the claim of the Raja. If the Raja was found to be persistent in his claims the Dutch Governor was to offer some other territory as a compensation. But the Raja seemed to be adamant in his claims and he could not be persuaded to give them up. Finally in February 1769 the Dutch ceded the territory to the Raja.

The Tripoonithurai Granthavari relates an instance when a war was averted between the Dutch and Travancore by the mediation of Cochin. In 1770 (Vrischigom 7, 945 M.E.) some Dutch soldiers attacked the Travancore Fort at Kuriapilly without any provocation from Travancore and the latter made preparations for a war. But the Cochin Raja interfered in the affair and brought about a reconciliation between the two by arranging a conference of representatives from both sides.

The unfriendly relations between the Raja and the Dutch became worse over a dispute on their respective jurisdictions in Cochin. In 1770 the Dutch claimed jurisdiction over Amaravathy, Mattancherry and Chellaye. All the Konkanyes in Cochin were claimed to be under the special protection of the Company. The Dutch Governor proclaimed that the Raja had no right to collect taxes from the aforesaid territories and therefore the inhabitants should not make any remittances to the Raja's officers.

The Cochin Raja complained before the Raja of Travancore about the hostile attitude of the Dutch. The Travancore Raja wrote to the Dutch Governor that he should not do any injustice to Cochin. He also offered to be the mediator between Cochin and the Dutch to bring about a reconciliation. The Travancore Raja sent one thousand five hundred soldiers for the protection of the Cochin Raja. The Raja of Cochin built a new fort at Anchikaimal to which place he later retired.

The Dutch created further troubles for Cochin when they posted Kalika Prabhu, a bitter enemy of the Cochin Raja as their trade agent in two important settlements in the Cochin territory. The Cochin chiefs could not suffer these outrages. Paliath Achen attacked the settlements of the Prabhu, killed him and captured his followers as prisoners. The Dutch Governor was thoroughly infuriated at this action and demanded an explanation from the Raja. The Governor demanded that the Raja should apologise for his past conduct and give an undertaking to be loyal to the Company in future. He was to destroy the newly constructed fort at Anchikaimal and to send back the soldiers that he had taken from Travancore. All prisoners taken by Paliath Achen were to be immediately restored; and the Raja was to bear all the expences. The Raja was prepared to abide by all these injunctions, and he promised to settle the matter with the Governor. But the Governor was determined to wreak vengeance on the Paliam chief. Paliath Achen was proclaimed to be a rebel and his properties were seized by the Company.

The Raja tried his best to pacify the Dutch authorities in Cochin. He was fully prepared to comply with all their demands. But the Governor took up a very hostile attitude towards the Raja. The Raja wrote to the Governor General at Batavia relating all his grievances. (Letter dated Thulam 946 M.E.) The Travancore Raja also wrote to Batavia complaining about the outrages of the Dutch authorities in Cochin. He informed them about the Dutch raid of his fortress at Kuriapilly and also championed the rights of the Cochin Raja in Mattancherry, Chellaye and other places. He pointed out that all these would affect the pepper trade between the Rajas and the Company and would be ruinous to the interests of both. He requested the Governor General to send two representatives to Malabar to settle these disputes. The Batavian Government recalled the Governor of Cochin and appointed Adrian Moens in his place. Before Moens took charge as Governor he received two letters from the Cochin and the Travancore Rajas explaining the causes of the trouble once again. The Cochin Raja informed him of the troubles he had taken in bringing about a reconciliation between Travancore and the Dutch in connection with the Kuriapilly raid. He complained that in spite of all his efforts to maintain friendly relations with the Company, the Dutch authorities in Cochin had

been giving him ceaseless trouble by seizing his territories and appropriating all the customs and duties due to him. He earnestly hoped that the new Governor would see the justice of his cause and redress all his grievances. The Travancore Raja also complained about the hostile activities of the Dutch towards his State and Cochin. He too expressed his hope that the new Governor would restore the friendly relations between the Company and the two Swaroopams.

The Governor General of Batavia in his reply to the Travancore Raja (dated 1st October 1771) expressed his great desire to maintain amicable relations with Travancore. He said that he had instructed the new Governor of Cochin to settle all matters of dispute. But he could not entirely approve of the claims of the Cochin Raja as they were against the previous agreements entered into with Cochin. In his reply dated 1st October 1771, to the Cochin Raja, the Governor General reminded him of the previous agreements by which the Raja had relinquished his claims over the Konkannies and other foreign merchants in his territories. Still he expressed his hope that everything would be settled in a friendly way with the arrival of the new Governor whom he was sending to Cochin.

Moens, the new Governor as soon as he arrived in Cochin, enquired into the points of dispute between the Company and the Raja. He was of opinion that the Raja's claims over Mattancherry, Chellayee and other places could not be justified on the ground of previous agreements. He also insisted that the Raja could exercise no jurisdiction over the Konkannies and other merchants as his claims were definitely against all the former undertakings he had entered into with the Dutch. Moens pointed out¹ that the Raja was then in possession of more territories than those stipulated in the treaty of 1663 which his great ancestor had signed with the Dutch immediately after the expulsion of the Portuguese from Cochin. According to clause (13) of that treaty, the Raja had promised not to appropriate any of the waste lands surrounding the Cochin fort without the permission of the Company. But now all these waste lands had been seized by the Raja and his territories had extended as near as a stone-throw from the fort. The Company should at least have a gun range of

1 Letter dated 10th February 1771

waste lands round about the fort. The Governor asked the Raja on what authority he had planted cocoanut trees in these waste lands. "Could the Raja produce any documents authorising him to do so? Everything would go to prove that the Raja's actions were illegal." Moens, refuting the Raja's claims on Mattancherry, said that the whole trouble arose out of the Raja's excessive demands of customs and duties from the merchants at Mattancherry. He asserted that the Company's territories extended as far as Chellaye and that he won't yield even a single plot of land to the Raja. All those who were resident in these territories must necessarily be under the protection of the Company. The Konkannies had been imported into Cochin by the Portuguese from Goa and they had always remained under the protection of the Portuguese. By the treaty of 1663 it had been specially laid down that the Toapasses and Konkannies should be under the jurisdiction of the Dutch. The Dutch had always asserted this right and the Konkannies themselves were not prepared to accept the domination of any power except that of the Company. Therefore, the Raja's claims were thoroughly unjustifiable.

After a series of correspondence like this between the Raja and the Company a final settlement was arrived at in 1772. The Dutch Governor made the following declaration on behalf of the Company:—"From this day forward, as long as the Government of Cochin exists, I do cede and transfer unto you and your descendants the right of collecting the income from Mattancherry and Chellaye, to collect the farms and customs of Amaravathi and to conduct the affairs of Mattancherry, Chellaye and of the Konkannies and their temple" "But the Raja shall impose no new demands upon the Konkannies; they shall have full liberty to complain to the Dutch Governor if aggrieved; the Raja shall not interfere in any matters of the temple without the knowledge and consent of the Company¹". The Dutch no doubt ceded these rights very grudgingly. As Day observes:—"Giving up these rights must have been a great trial to the Dutch as they had guarded them most jealously ever since 1663".

¹ Dutch Government Records. Mss. Quoted by Day.

CHAPTER VIII

THE MYSTICIAN INVASION—(Continued)

AFTER the first Mysore War, Hyder was engaged in a war with the Marathas. The Zamorin, thinking that Hyder would not get clear of his enemies, had not cared to pay the annual tribute which he had promised in the treaty of 1668. But Hyder made peace with his enemies in Mysore and turned his attention towards the south again. He sent his general Sreenivasa Rao to Rajahmundry in order to march into the Zamorin's territories. The Zamorin appealed to the French at Malé to help him and he concluded a treaty with Governor Duprat on the 12th January 1774, "submitting himself, his country and subjects to the King of France". The French undertook to protect him from his enemies and Duprat took possession of the Zamorin's territories and hoisted the French flag in the Calicut Fort. Duprat informed Hyder Ali's general that the Zamorin had been taken under the protection of the King of France and therefore he should not be attacked. But Hyder's troops could not be persuaded to desist from their object and they marched against Calicut. When they entered Calicut, Duprat left the fort and hurriedly returned to Malé. Deserted by the French, the Zamorin also left Calicut. He attempted to take refuge with the Cranganore Raja, but the Dutch were afraid to give him protection. Therefore he retired with his family to Travancore in a native boat by sea.

Hyder demanded from the Cochin Raja two lakhs of rupees and a few elephants. The Raja of Cochin consulted the Travancore Raja who advised him it was better to satisfy Hyder's demands. The Travancore Raja himself lent the money to Cochin so that Hyder might be persuaded to drop his ideas of a southern conquest. The Tiruppunithurai Granthavari says that when Hyder pressed his demands on Cochin the Raja requested the Company to send its captains to Hyder to tell him that he should be lenient to Cochin. But the Dutch were not prepared to undertake any such responsibilities on behalf of Cochin and therefore the Raja had no other alternative but to satisfy Hyder's demands.

Hyder now demanded two lakhs of rupees and two elephants from the Cranganore Raja. The Dutch Governor tried his best to save the Cranganore Raja as the latter was under the Company's protection. But the Nawab's general sent his troops to Cranganore to compel the Raja to make the payment. The Raja agreed to pay 50,000 rupees to Hyder in two instalments.

The Dutch were trying their best not to displease Hyder Ali. But the latter was making use of these opportunities to press his demands further and further. In order to pick up a quarrel with the Company, Hyder complained that the Dutch had allowed the Zamorin to traverse their territories and that the Zamorin had concealed his treasures with the inhabitants in different places in the Dutch possessions. The Dutch Governor asked him to point them out to him and assured him that he would make a search in these places in the presence of the Nawab's representative. The Governor used all his wits to maintain friendly relations with Hyder, but the latter was very cold in his attitude towards the Dutch. The Governor thought that Hyder's unfriendly attitude was due to the fact that he had not received any presents in return for those he had sent to Batavia in 1766. The Governor feared that Hyder might have taken it as an insult and wanted to rectify the mistake. The return presents had actually arrived from Batavia, but they could not be sent to Hyder as he was at that time engaged in war with the Marathas. On the 23rd February 1775 the Governor sent two envoys with presents to Hyder who received them with great courtesy. The envoys returned with letters and presents from Hyder which were sent to Batavia by the ship 'Princess of Orange.' Meanwhile the Governor was trying to keep Hyder Ali in good humour and induce him to make a treaty of friendship with the Company. The 'Princess of Orange' had an unusually long voyage because of adverse monsoons, therefore there was considerable delay in getting the reply from Batavia to Hyder's letters. The Dutch Governor explained the cause for the delay to Hyder; but Hyder was not in a friendly mood to receive these explanations. Hyder seemed to have been under the impression that Moens, the Dutch Governor, had actually received instructions from Batavia to make an offensive and defensive alliance with Hyder, but that he was deliberately keeping them away from Hyder as he did not like these proposals.

Hyder now demanded from the kings of Cochin and Cranganore a new instalment of subsidies. But the Dutch Governor succeeded in persuading Hyder to refrain from further requisitions of money. Hyder yielded to this as he was engaged in a war with the Marathas at that time. But soon he revived his demands on Cochin and Cranganore. Cochin was asked to pay 8 lakhs of rupees and Cranganore one lakh. In order to enforce his demands he sent his general Sardar Khan to seize some of the territories of the Cochin Raja. The Raja sent his envoys to Hyder at Seringapatam. They tried their best to escape from the obligation of the payment of this amount. But Hyder was very stubborn in his demands. Finally a compromise was arrived at by which Cochin promised to give four lakhs of rupees and four elephants immediately and in future an annual tribute of one lakh and twenty thousand rupees. The Cranganore Raja had to pay one lakh and twenty thousand Rupees immediately and in future an annual tribute of twenty thousand rupees. The Dutch would have very much liked to save Cranganore from this obligation. Cranganore had been a vassal of the Dutch ever since 1717 and the Dutch knew that its acknowledgment of Hyder's suzerainty would involve the loss of their own. But, as Moens frankly admits, he could not prevent this and therefore 'he had to shut his eyes to it'.

In October 1775, the Dutch tried to placate Hyder by supplying him with elephants and fire arms. The Dutch factor at Calicut wrote a coaxing letter to Hyder in which he apologised for the fire arms being of an inferior quality. He promised to send better weapons as soon as he could get them from Europe. The elephants, he said, were the best procurable, and "hoped that they would answer the purpose for which they were intended". He complained about the extortions of Hyder's agents at Calicut. But, he tried to please Hyder by writing to him that he had sent carpenters and iron smiths to assist in the construction of the Mysore fleet. He wished Hyder health, long life and success in his undertakings.

In 1766 Hyder demanded a safe passage through the territories of the Dutch Company for attacking Travancore. Moens evaded a reply as he had no definite instructions from Batavia. But Hyder was highly incensed by the conduct of the Dutch and

threatened a forcible march through the Dutch territories. Sirdar Khan was ordered to proceed against Travancore with 10,000 soldiers.

Hyder now demanded from the Dutch a full account concerning the administration of Chettwaye. He pressed his claims on Chettwaye as it formed a part of the Zamorin's dominions, whose suzerainty he had assumed. The Dutch sent a regular account to the Nawab, but he was bent upon taking possession of these territories. On October 9, Sirdar Khan crossed the Chettwaye river near Pulicarra and seized the customs house arresting a writer of the Company. The general demanded twenty years' revenues from the Dutch officials at Chettwaye. The Dutch protested in vain against the activities of Hyder's general. The Mysore forces were divided into two bodies, one of which proceeded south towards Paponetty while the other took possession of Chettwaye. Paponetty was burnt, pillaged and plundered; and the Dutch retreated to Cranganore. Sirdar Khan took up his quarters in the residency at Paponetty from where he sent a letter to the Dutch Governor explaining the causes that had led to the hostilities. He stated that his master had been insulted by Moens' silence in replying to his letters and that he had received orders to invade the Company's territories. At the same time his master desired to live in friendship with the Company. Any way he insisted on getting a free passage through the Company's territories towards Travancore. The prospects of friendship, he said, would depend on the Company's attitude with regard to this demand. Moens replied that he was glad to understand that Hyder wished his friendship; but he could not but observe that Hyder's conduct had been very strange. He trusted that Hyder would put a stop to all hostilities and respect the Company's territories. He also offered his mediation between Hyder and Travancore. But before this letter reached Hyder, Sirdar Khan led his troops against Cranganore in order to take it by surprise. But his attempts proved a failure. Sirdar Khan now wrote another letter to Moens stating that he had taken possession of Chettwaye and demanding twenty years' revenue from the lands which he had seized: "he actually demanded a tribute from the Company".

The Dutch Governor found himself in a very difficult position. He did not have sufficient troops to resist the invasion of

Hyder. Therefore, he thought it wise to get the assistance of Cochin and Travancore and proposed to these Rajas a plan of joint action against Hyder. The Travancore Raja replied that he had entered into an alliance with the Nawab of Arcot and the English East India Company by which he was to act only on the defensive. He had been promised help by his allies only if the Mysore troops took the initiative of attacking his territories. His allies had definitely stated that they would send no help if he were to be the aggressor. Therefore he regretted his inability to join sides with the Dutch.

However, busy preparations were made by the Dutch and Travancore to meet the invasion. The Dutch received re-inforcements from Ceylon and fortified Ayacottah near the northern boundary of the island of Vypeen. It was rumoured that Hyder would first launch his attack on Ayacottah. The Travancore Raja sent some soldiers to Ayacottah, but they were strictly following a defensive policy. Hyder attacked the Chettwaye fort, and the Dutch resident informed Moens that he could not hold the fort without immediate help from outside. Moens decided to send an expedition by sea for the relief of Chettwaye. But Hyder's troops prevented the Dutch from landing. The Dutch were compelled to surrender the fort on the 13th November and the garrison withdrew to Cranganore. Hyder had promised to allow the Dutch to withdraw safely to Cranganore, but contrary to his pledge Hyder's general took the whole garrison as prisoners.

The fall of Chettwaye was a great blow to the Dutch. The Zamorin decided to keep his forces at Cranganore and to launch a joint action with the help of Travancore and Cochin for recovering Chettwaye. Moens wrote to the ministers of Travancore and Cochin about his plans and asked them whether they were prepared to join in the operations. The ministers replied that they had no orders to take any offensive. They added that any such step should be taken after mature consideration as their failure would mean the subjugation of the whole of Malabar by Hyder. Moens believed that their offers and boasted readiness were nothing but big talk and decided to march against Hyder without waiting for their help. At that time the Travancore Raja informed Moens that he intended to pay a visit to discuss with him the steps to be taken and therefore he should delay his

attack for some more time. But later, the Raja informed Moens that he could not pay the promised visit as he was engaged in some domestic affairs. However, it was the Raja's wish that the Dutch should not launch an offensive as he feared that the defeat of the Dutch would soon lead to his own.

Meanwhile the reply to Hyder's letters arrived from Batavia (January 9, 1777). It was forwarded to Hyder with some customary presents and also an apologetic letter from Moens. On the 25th February Hyder's commandant and resident of the Chettwaye fort came to Moens. They told Moens that some of the Dutch soldiers who were taken prisoners had joined the services of Hyder and others had been set at liberty. They informed him that Hyder was still anxious to enter into a treaty of friendship with the Company. Hyder's letter to Moens disowned Sirdar Khan's proceedings and stated that his instructions were only to enquire into the administration of some of the Zamorin's territories in Chettwaye. He said he had no "unfriendly feelings towards the Dutch and trusted all matters of dispute would be rapidly and amicably settled."

Moens clearly understood that his troubles with Hyder would finally lead to the strengthening of the English Company's power in India. The English were no doubt interested in preventing Hyder Ali becoming too powerful. But they were "laughing in their sleeves" when they found the disorders in Malabar and "trying to fish in troubled waters." They were prepared to allow Hyder to capture Cochin and other forts from the Dutch as they were sure they could capture them from Hyder's hands before long. Moens anticipated all these events. Left to himself, Moens would have joined with Hyder Ali in his attempt to subjugate Travancore. Day¹ observes: "Had this ambitious capable Dutch Governor of Cochin been at this period possessed of sufficient troops at his own disposal, untrammelled by Batavian orders, there can be little doubt, he would have joined the Mysoreans. Had he done so, Travancore must have fallen and the Cochin State would have become a desert. Then who could have foretold what course events on the western coast would have taken?"

¹ Starovinus "Voyages to East Indies. P : 255-56."

Moens got a convenient opportunity for launching his attack on Chettwaye. The Zamorin's Nairs in Calicut were carrying on a desultory warfare against Hyder's troops. The Nairs were joined by Hydros Kutty, a Mohomedan chieftain of Chavakkad, who had been appointed by Hyder as his Governor there. Hyder had demanded from him an exorbitant sum as annual tribute; and unable to satisfy the excessive demands of Hyder, he joined sides with the rebellious Nairs. Hyder's troops were engaged in putting down the rebellion in Calicut and everything appeared favourable to the Dutch to attempt a recovery of the Chettwaye fort.

The expedition was launched on the 8th of January 1778. The Dutch stormed the Cranganore Raja's palace which had a garrison of 400 men. They pursued the enemy to Paponetty and from there to Valappattam. They reached Chettwaye on the 11th evening. The fort was heavily bombarded, but the Nawab's forces held out valiantly. The siege lasted for seven days, but finding their attempts useless, the Dutch retreated to Cranganore. But Hyder attacked the palace of the Cranganore Raja which the Dutch had seized and compelled them to retire to the Cranganore fort.

The minister of the Travancore Raja paid a visit to Moens who urged upon him the necessity of defending Cranganore. Moens "pointed out to him that on the preservation of Cranganore and Ayacottah depended his master's safety or ruin; that his master should meet part of the expenditure for otherwise they could not maintain a large force; that without this his master would be exposed to the greatest danger of losing everything". But Moens says that his arguments were addressed to deaf ears.

Hyder's attentions were now turned to Mysore where he had to wage a war with the English and the Nawab of Arcot. The Travancore Raja had informed the English and the Arcot Nawab about the aggressive policy of Hyder in Malabar. Moens made another attempt to win the friendship of Hyder. He was prepared to sign an offensive and defensive alliance with Hyder; but the latter refused to listen to any of Moens' overtures. On his way north, Hyder plundered the Dutch store-house at Porto Novo and made the Dutch Resident there a prisoner.

In 1781 Van Angelbeck became the Governor of Cochin. The Cochin Raja had allowed the Travancore Raja to strengthen the fortress at Palliport as a measure of common defence. Van Angelbeck could not approve of the extension of Travancore influence in Cochin territories and wrote bitterly about this to the Cochin Raja.¹ He asked the Raja to put a stop to all measures of fortifications which he feared would lead to disastrous consequences. But the Cochin Raja was not prepared to abide by the instructions of the Dutch.

In the Second Mysore War between Hyder and the English the Travancore Raja assisted the latter by sending a large army. Hyder Ali died in the course of the war (December 1732) and he was succeeded by his son Tippu. Tippu a worthy son of his warlike father, continued the war. The English sent a strong army under Colonel Fullerton to Malabar. He was to be assisted by the Malabar Nairs and the troops of the Travancore Raja. The commandant of the English army at Calicut, Major Abington, informed the Travancore Raja that "the only safe way was to exert every means to shut the door against the enemy and it could not be effected while the passes of Canom were left open and Palghatcherry remained in their possession." The Raja accordingly sent a strong force to fight side by side with the English who managed to seize the fortress at Palghat. At this time the Zamorin of Calicut, who was spending his time as an exile, placed himself under the protection of the English and invoked their help for recovering his lost possessions. The Zamorin was placed in charge of Palghat, but he was so dreadfully afraid of Tippu's soldiers, that as soon as he heard about their advance, left the fort and escaped. The British seized Tippu's fortress at Canannore engaging the Mysore soldiers in many pitched battles. The war came to a close by the treaty of Mangalore² which recognised Tippu's suzerainty over the territories of Northern Malabar. The Raja of Travancore was specially mentioned as an ally of the English and guaranteed protection.

1 Letters dated Nov. 10, 1782 and Nov. 14, 1782

2 Treaty of Mangalore. March 14, 1784

Tippu's administration of the Malabar provinces was severe in its extremity. The ancient system of Government was completely set aside and was substituted by unrestrained autocracy. Tippu's fanatic attempts to convert the people of Malabar to Islam made matters worse. Tippu wanted to "improve the morals" of the Malayalees who he believed, "were more shameless in their immorality than the beasts of the field". Tippu wanted "to honour them with Islam" and started a regular policy of forcible conversion. His religious persecutions led to a large-scale rebellion in Malabar. The movement was led by Ravi Varman of the Zamorin's house. Supported by the rebellious Nairs, Ravi Varman made himself master of some territories and attempted to seize Calicut. Tippu immediately sent Lally and Mir Asir Ali Khan to suppress the revolt. The Zamorin was driven out of Calicut. Large numbers of Hindus left Malabar and sought refuge in Travancore. The Travancore Raja afforded them protection and all the expenditure for their maintenance was borne by the State. The Zamorin also fled to Travancore and sought refuge there.

In April and May of 1788 there was a strong rumour that Tippu was marching against Cranganore with a huge army. But the Dutch seemed to have entered into an understanding with Tippu in that year².

1 Day describes the atrocities of Tippu thus : "Many of his victims were hung, even mothers with their children around their necks, others were dragged to death by elephants. No mode of execution was too terrible, no torture too great, to satiate his fiendish vengeance. Churches were plundered, and the roofs of all place of worship blown off whilst Hindu and Christian women were compelled to accept Mohomedan husbands. No Hindu was allowed to wear the lock of hair on his head. The rack and starvation were used as instruments of conversion and those obstinate unbelievers who refused to be convinced by these persuasive arguments were put to death" This description of Tippu's activities is no doubt exaggerated. But the consternation he created in Malabar was by no means small. Tippu's name could strike terror in every part of the country. Even to-day he is remembered as "Mysore Kaduva".

2 Day says :—"Some correspondence occurred between Tippu Sultan and the Dutch with reference to Hydr's old wish of entering into an offensive and defensive alliance with them. But many of the letters appear to be missing. There is one dated September 1788 in which it is stated that Tippu's envoys will shortly be at Cranganore to assist the Dutch against Travancore and the writer who is at Calicut ends by saying time will show if he (Tippu) really wishes to assist us or is merely serving his own interests."

In 1789 Tippu was planning for buying the Cochin fort from the Dutch. The Dutch had expressed a wish to sell their fortresses in Cochin, Cranganore and Ayacottah. Tippu had deputed the Cochin Raja to negotiate on his behalf, but before anything could be finally settled the war with Travancore was precipitated.

The conquest of Travancore was a long cherished ambition of the Mysoreans. Tippu was only waiting for an excuse to lead his armies against Travancore. When the Travancore Raja gave asylum to the Brahman refugees of Malabar—about 30,000 families—Tippu was highly incensed and demanded their surrender. But the Travancore Raja politely replied that that would be against the traditional principles of hospitality which his family had observed and as such he could not oblige him. Tippu decided to take his vengeance on Travancore even though he had promised to recognise the independence of Travancore in the treaty of Mangalore. Tippu encouraged the Zamorin to put forward his claims on Travancore and promised him all support. But the Zamorin did not join in this scheme. Tippu then induced the Raja of Cochin to put forward his claims on Parur and Alangad which were the part of the Travancore State. Tippu advised the Cochin Raja to meet the Travancore Raja to see whether peace could be concluded between Travancore and Tippu. The two Rajas met at Anna-nada, north-east of Cranganore. The Travancore Raja said he could not do anything without consulting the English and the Nawab of Arcot.

Tippu sent his envoys to Travancore with valuable presents to the king. The Raja received Tippu's envoys in the presence of Major Bannerman, the representative of the English Government at Trivandrum. Tippu wrote to the Raja in a coaxing way how an alliance with Mysore would be to the great advantage of Travancore. The Raja politely replied that he could not enter into any alliance without the permission of the English Company. Tippu was highly offended at this reply and made busy preparations for his invasion. The English Governor wrote to Tippu that an invasion of Travancore would be considered as a declaration of war against the English. He promised to send two or three battalions of the Company's troops to the help of Travancore. At the same time he informed the Raja that he should always be on the defensive and never appear as the aggressor.

In 1789 Tippu marched from Coimbatore with 20,000 infantry, 10,000 spearmen, 5,000 cavalry and 20 field guns. Tippu had already expressed his desire to buy the fortress of Cranganore and Ayacottah which the Dutch were prepared to sell. He opened negotiations with the Dutch at Palghat about the purchase of these forts. The Travancore Raja knew that the fall of Cranganore and Ayacottah into the hands of Tippu would be highly dangerous to his interests. Therefore, he started negotiations with the Dutch for purchasing these forts for Travancore. He sent his minister Kesava Pillay to negotiate with the Dutch. The Dutch decided to sell their forts to Travancore as they thought that Travancore would be able to check Tippu's progress to the south. The bargain was struck in July 1789. The Dutch possessions were sold for three lakhs of Rupees to be paid in several instalments¹.

Even though Cranganore and Ayacottah were sold to Travancore, the Dutch retained their right over the Christians in these places and also over certain buildings and churches there. Special provisions were made in the agreement by which the "Lepers House" at Pallipport, "the Romish Church" at Cranganore and Ayacottah, and "the Parson's house" at Pallipport were to remain in the possession of the Dutch. Also "the Christians were to remain vassals of the Company and they were not to be burdened with any new tax."

It need not look strange that the Dutch sold these forts for three lakhs of Rupees to Travancore. This transaction was made after mature consideration by the authorities in Cochin and Batavia. From the very beginning the Malabar settlements have been a matter of considerable anxiety to the East India Company as the income derived from the Malabar trade was never commensurate with the expenses of Government. The Company's authorities in Batavia and Holland were always regretting that they had staked so much of their interest in Malabar. Governor General Mossel in great disgust wrote to Gollennesse, (who maintained that Malabar was one of the most important possessions of the Company,) that he "would rather wish that the ocean had swallowed up the coast of Malabar a hundred years ago". As early as 1696 the Dutch authorities had decided to

¹ See Appendix 3.

reduce their fortifications in Cochin, Cranganore, Canannore and Quilon. The Batavia Government had passed a resolution on the 19th of August 1697 recommending to the Cochin Government the reduction of all their fortifications to the minimum level necessary for the interests of the Company. The sale of these fortresses was always welcomed by the authorities as an advantageous and necessary step.

The transactions concerning the Dutch forts were carried out in the presence of the English agent Powney. When the Madras Governor heard about the transaction, he disapproved of it under the wrong impression that these forts belonged to the Cochin Raja. He wrote to the Raja of Travancore as follows¹:—

“I lament that you have taken the indiscreet step which may possibly involve you in much embarrassment if Tippu should be disposed to wrest from you these late acquisitions. I cannot approve of your having entered into a treaty with the Dutch for the extension of territory without the consent of this Government. This very impolite conduct makes you liable to the forfeiture of the Company’s protection. . . . I therefore think it necessary you should immediately give back to the Dutch the places you have thus indiscreetly received from them and thereby establish your affairs precisely upon their former footing. I again recommend to you the greatest caution in your conduct towards Tippu.” The Maharaja immediately explained to the English authorities at Madras, Bombay and Calcutta the propriety of his conduct. He pointed out to them that the Dutch were the real owners of these forts and as such the transaction should be valid. He explained to them that Cochin had no right whatsoever over these forts and therefore the Governor’s assumptions were not right. He refuted the allegation that the transactions were made without the knowledge of the English as it was arranged in the presence of Powney, the English agent. Further, Major Bannerman had personally inspected these forts before the transaction was made. He also explained that his object in purchasing these territories was not mere extension of territories, but only the security of his dominions.

When Tippu heard about the attitude taken by the Madras Governor, he put forward his claims to the two forts on the ground

¹ Letter dated 30 Aug. 1789.

The correspondence between Tippu and the Dutch Governor shows that Tippu treated the Dutch as no better than ordinary merchants and the latter were not at all prepared to offend him¹.

In December 1739, Tippu commenced his march against Travancore. He established his camp six miles to the north of the main entrance of the Travancore lines where he erected many batteriés. Tippu marched with 14,000 infantry and 500 pioneers by a circuitous route guided by a native of the country towards the Travancore. He succeeded in taking possession of a considerable extent of the ramparts while the Travancore troops

1 Tippu's letter to the Dutch in Cochin.

நாலு திக்கிலும் கல்பன நடத்துவரான ஆருடே நாவாலும் ஸ்துதிக்கப்பட்டவரான எல்லாவார்க்கும் கல்பன நடத்துவரான நாளுக்கு நாள் ஜெயம் வர்த்திச்சு வருகிறவரான டிப்பு சுல்தான் பாதாஷா உம்மால் ராஜிக்கப்பட்டவராக கொச்சிக் கோட்டையில் இருக்கும் லெந்தச்சு வடக்காரரு அறியவேண்டியதாவது. இப்பால் நீர் சர்க்காரோடே சிநேகமாக பகுநாளாக கொச்சி ராஜா சீமையில் கொடுங்கல்லூர் கோட்டையில் கோழிக்கோட்டில் நம்முடைய குடியானவன் மாரப் போல நீரும் கொடுங்கல்லூரில் உம்முடே ஆளுளும் ஆர் இருந்தார்கள். இப்போது அந்த இடத்தில் நீர் ராமராயருட்கே ஆளுங்குடல் இடம் கொடுத்து அவர் கோழிக்கோட்டில் உள்ள கள்ளர்க்கு ஆசான கொடுத்து சர்க்கார் சீமையில் கண்டப்தனம் செய்து வித்துக்கொண்டு இருக்கீர். அதுனாலே உம்முடைய சிநேகத்துக்கும் சேம விருத்திக்கும் விக்னம், வந்துபோச்சுது, கொச்சிராஜா காலாரப்யமாக சர்க்காரே ஆசான செய்து வருகிறவருடேய சீமையில் நீரும் இருப்பதால் சர்க்காருடே குடியானவனுச்சுதே, ஆகையால் நீர் சர்க்காருககு செய்து வருகிற சேவகயிருத்தியில் சந்தோஷம் வருத்தி வருத்தி வச்சிக்கொள்ளும்படியாக நடந்துகொள்ளவும். அது உம்முக்கு நன்மையாக இருக்கவும் செய்யும். இப்போது அப்தர் காதரே அழ்விடத்துக்கு அனுப்பிவைக்க இருக்கிறோம். அவனுடைய முகவசனத்தால் சகலமும் விசிதம் ஆகுமே. ஆனபடியினாலே கொடுங்கல்லூர் கோட்டையில் இருக்கும் ராமராஜா ரானுக்கலே புரத்தாக்கிவிச்சு உம்முடே ஆளுளே மாணார்படிக்க லைத்து நடத்திக்கொண்டு சர்க்கார் சீமையில் இருந்து ஒளிச்சு வருகிற பேருக்கு இடம் கொடுக்காத நடந்துகொண்டால் நம்முடேய தயாவு உமக்கு உண்டாகவும் செய்யும். இது அறியவும், கர்னஜின் மாசம் பதினேந்தாம் தேதி சராஹாக்கா வர்ஷம் 1217ல் எழுதியது. ஸ்ரீனிவாய நாயரு முன்சி.

retreated. Soon the Travancoreans made their stand in a small square enclosure and vigorously attacked the Mysore troops. Tippu brought re-inforcements to put pressure on the Travancore forces. But in the course of this encounter the officer commanding the Mysore army was killed and his whole army was thrown into confusion. The confusion became so great that the Sultan himself was thrown down into the crowd from his palanquin. He was only saved by the exertions of some steady and active "Chelas who raised him on their shoulders and enabled him to ascend the counter scrap, after having twice fallen back in the attempt to clamber up; the lameness which occasionally continued until his death was occasioned by the severe contusions

1 The reply of the Dutch.

இப்பால் தாங்கள் வரகாட்டின பரமானுவும் வாலிருந்துகாண்மதால் விசிறம் ஆச்சு. தங்களுடைய சினேகம் எப்போதும் நடப்பிவிச்சக் கொள்ளுகுறதற்கு உத்தம உலந்த கொம்பறசியும் பிரபுட்டிருக்கிறார்கள். தங்களுடைய பரமானுத்திலும் அதுபோல காண்மதனால் நமக்கு மிகுதியும் சந்தோஷமாச்சது. இந்த சினேகம் வளர்ந்து எறிவருகிற தரம் நாமும் வேலை செய்வீக்கிறதில் குறைவருகிறதில்லை என்று நிச்சயிக்கவேண்டியது. கொடுங்கல்லூர் கோட்டை யூடே கார்யம் கொண்டு எழுதி வந்தது சரியே. அந்த இடம் ராமராஜா அவர்களுக்கு கிரயப் படுத்தி போச்சது. அவ்விடத்திலே துஷ்டர்க்கு இடம் கொடுக்காவிடும் சர்க்கார் சீமையில் டுந்து தண்டத்தலம் செலுத்தி விக்காதிக்காவிடும் அவர்கள் சம்மதிக்கமாட்டார்கள். ஆகிலும் இதுகார்யத்தில் நம்மாலயது மட்டும் தங்களுக்கு சந்தோஷம் அருந்தி விக்கரதற்கு தங்களுடே * * * ராமராஜா அவர்களுக்கு எழுதி அனுப்பிவிச்ச இருக்கிறோம். கொச்சி ராஜா உத்தம கும்பஞ்சியுடைய தற்கார சகாயம் பெட்டுவருகிற சமாச்சாரங்களுக்கெல்லாம் அவர்கள் தங்களுக்கு எழுதி அனுப்பிவிச்சி விசிறப்படுத்தி வைப்பார்கள் என்று நாம் நிச்சயித்திருக்கிறோம். இவர்கள் கார்யத்தில் சாகாயிக்க தக்கதாக தங்களுடே பரமானுத்தல் தயவிருத்தி எழுதி வருவதால் இவர்கள் நம்முடைய கும்பஞ்சி அவர்களுக்கு காலாரப்பயமாக உள்ள பந்துவானதிலும் எந்த வேலைக்கும் ஏதும் ஒத்தாசை வைத்து நடத்திவிச்ச கொள்ளுகிறதற்கு நம்மே துணி பிரிபிக்கையும் சை ஆ இவ்விடத்தில் நம்மால் வேண்டிய கார்யங்களுக்கும் எழுதிவிச்ச அனுப்பும் படி சைவ இவண்டியது. வேணம் சலாம் கொச்சிக் கோட்டையில் நவம்பர் மாசம் பத்தாம் தேதி 1789 ஆண்டு எழுத்து.

he received on this occasion".¹ Tippu lost his state sword, signet ring and many other personal ornaments which were taken to Trivandrum by Dewan Kesava Pillay as trophies of victory.²

The Travancore Raja informed the English and the Nawab of Arcot everything that had taken place. But the Madras Governor was very lukewarm in his support to Travancore. He wrote to Tippu on the 1st of January 1790 assuring him that if his claims on Cranganore and Ayacottah were to be found equitable, 'the English would cause those forts to be returned to the Dutch and placed on the same footing on which they were previous to the late purchase of them by the Raja of Travancore.' But he also warned Tippu that any aggression on Travancore would be considered as a breach of friendly relations between the Company and Mysore. "It is our firm intention to do you justice on this occasion," he wrote "and it is scarcely necessary for us to say that we are equally determined to do justice to our own reputation and honour and it will be wise for you to wait the issue of a fair enquiry. If you are desirous of settling the points in contest by the investigation of commissioners, we will appoint one or more to meet such persons as may be appointed by you at any convenient place on the borders of our respective countries and you will then judge whether our intentions are fair." Tippu received this letter soon after his dismal defeat at Travancore. But he wrote to the Governor an ante-dated letter pretending to have written it before he received the Governor's letter³. In this letter Tippu stated that his troops while searching the fugitives were attacked by the Travancore forces; but as soon as Tippu heard about the war between the two troops he ordered his soldiers to return. He requested the Governor to advise the Raja to maintain friendly relations with him.

The attitude of the Madras Governor was in no way helpful to Travancore. But the Maharaja's appeal to the Governor

1 History of Mysore. Wilks Vol. II P 145.

2 History of Travancore Sankuning Menon P. 228

3 Travancore State Manual Vol. I Ch VI P 396.

General had its desired effect. When the news of Tippu's attack on Travancore reached Cornwallis, he sent an urgent despatch to the Madras Governor instructing him to consider it as a declaration of war against the Company. He accused the Madras Governor of "a most criminal disobedience of the clear and explicit orders of the Government by not considering themselves to be at war with Tippu from the moment they heard of his attack on the Travancore lines." In his despatch to the Madras Government dated the 30th of March 1790 Cornwallis stated ".....I sincerely lament the disgraceful sacrifice, which you have made by that delay of the honour of your country by tamely suffering an insolent and cruel enemy to overwhelm the dominions of the Raja of Travancore; which we were bound by the most sacred ties of friendship and good faith to defend". Cornwallis sent two battalions of sepoy and one company of artillery under the command of Colonel Hartley to assist the Travancore army,

Tippu commenced his second attack on Travancore early in March 1790. He was 'deeply mortified and enraged' at the disastrous failure of his first attempt and he had taken a vow that he would not rest until he had rased to the ground the Travancore lines, "that contemptible wall". He had been strengthening his army by getting down re-inforcements from Seringapatam and Bangalore. Hostilities started with a skirmish between the Travancore and Mysore soldiers outside the walls on the 2nd of March. The Travancore army could not defend the fort in the face of the fierce artillery attacks of the Mysoreans. The English battalions did not give any help to the Travancore soldiers on the ground that they had no instructions to join the war. Therefore they were compelled to retreat. Tippu then turned against the Dutch fort of Cranganore. Cranganore was defended by the Travancore soldiers under the command of Captain Flory, But finding resistance fruitless they abandoned the fort and retreated to Travancore. Tippu's army under the leadership of Lally turned against the fort of Kuriappilli which was also abandoned by the Travancoreans. Tippu fulfilled his vow by demolishing the fortifications as soon as he captured these forts. Tippu him-

self took a pick-axe and inaugurated the destruction of that "contemptible wall".

Cochin fell an easy prey to the aggression of Tippu. Tippu established his head quarters at Trichur and carried on his work of devastation "desecrating the Hindu places of worship as well as both the public and private schools inside which cows were slaughtered to pollute them, the bodies of some of them being afterwards flung into the tanks, behind the bathing house of the Raja of Cochin." The Mysoreans seized the monastery at verapoly and plundered the religious establishments there.² The Cochin Raja, frightened at this course of events sent the women and children of his family to the Travancore Raja entrusting them to his hands.

Tippu marched into the Travancore territories and encamped on the northern side of the river Periyar, in Alwaye. But his march to the south was prevented by the floods in Periyar consequent on the outbreak of the South West Monsoons. Tippu waited for the flood to subside, but it only increased causing great inconvenience to Tippu and his soldiers. "His army had no shelter, no dry place for parade; all their ammunitions, accoutrements, etc., got wet. Even the very necessities of life were washed away by the impetuous current of the flooded river³". To add to his troubles Tippu heard about the advance of Lord Cornwallis against Seringapatam. Tippu thought it wise to collect all his forces and retreat so that he could save his own

1 "He (Tippu) took a pick-axe himself and set an example which was followed by everyone present and the demolition of the wall was completed by his army without much delay. After this, the lawless force was let loose in the villages. They committed various atrocities and the country was laid waste with fire and sword. Some of the inhabitants fled for shelter to the wild hills of Kunnathnadu while many were taken captives. Hindu temples and Christian churches were equally desecrated by the followers of Mohomet. Towers of Pagodas, the houses of the rich and the huts of the poor all were burnt to ashes and the scenes throughout the districts of Alangad and Paravoor were heart rending. The ruins which may be seen up to the present date testify to the ferocity of the invaders. Records of antiquity secured in the archives of Pagodas, Palaces, Churches and the houses of the nobles were all committed to the flames".

Sankunni Menon. History of Travancore P. 232, 233.

2 Bartholomeo. A Voyage to the East Indies P. (141—42.).

3 History of Travancore. Sankunni Menon. P. 234.

capital.' In the course of his hasty retreat, his army suffered many heavy losses. Like Napoleon retreating from Moscow, Tippu had to leave Travancore without realising his cherished dream.

The war between the English and Tippu came to a close in February 1792 by the treaty of Seringapatam. Tippu was compelled to cede one half of his dominions to the English. Among the districts he promised to cede he had included Alangad, Paroor and Kunnathunadu also which really belonged to Travancore. The Travancore Dewan Kesava Pillai made a representation to the English Government asserting the rights of Travancore over these districts. It was supported by Powney, the English Resident at Travancore who explicitly condemned the cession as "altogether unwarrantable". Lord Cornwallis also realised that it would be an act of great injustice on the part of the Company to deprive the Raja of these districts. Two commissioners were deputed to enquire into the disputes about the ownership of these territories. Meanwhile, the Cochin Raja also had put forward his claim on these taluqs. But, finally the Cochin Raja made a frank declaration acknowledging the legitimate claims of Travancore and the territories were recognised by the English as part of the Travancore State.

After the retreat of Tippu from Travancore the Malabar princes and Chiefs¹ were restored to their original places. Dewan Kesava Pillai was deputed by the Travancore Raja to execute this grave task. He entered into special treaties with these princes that they should each supply a fixed quota of grain to Travancore and the English.

The Cochin Raja entered into a treaty with the English on the 6th January 1791. The Raja recognised the sovereignty of the English East India Company renouncing his allegiance to Mysore. The Company undertook to restore to the Raja the territories seized by Tippu, but the Raja was to administer these provinces as the vassals of the English. The Raja was to pay a

1 The list of Rajas and Chiefs who took refuge in Travancore : —

Rajas 1. Zamorin. 2. Cherakkal. 3. Kottayam 4. Kurumbanad.
5. Vettathunadu. 6. Beypore. 7. Tanniore 8. Palghat
Chiefs of 1. Koulaparay 2. Koringote 3. Kowghat 4. Elathary
5. Mannore.

tribute of 70,000 Rupees in the first year, 80,000 rupees in the second year, 90,000 Rupees in the third year and 100,000 rupees in the fourth. He was to pay 100,000 rupees in all the subsequent years in equal quarterly instalments. The sixth clause¹ of the treaty dealt with the Raja's relations with the Dutch. The English expressed their wish not to disturb the amicable relations of the Raja with the Dutch East India Company and expressly stated that their sovereignty was to be recognised only on those territories with which the Dutch had no concern. Before concluding the transactions with the Raja the English had requested the Dutch Council at Cochin to let them know the existing engagements between Cochin and the Dutch so that they could "avoid doing anything which might subsequently interfere with the good understanding that existed between the two Companies". The English deputed Powney to ascertain the details of the engagements of the Dutch in Cochin; but the Dutch Governor does not seem to have submitted the necessary particulars. However the English expressed their wish to maintain friendly relations with Dutch in Cochin. The Dutch Governor in Cochin was very anxious to prevent the extension of English influence in Malabar; but as circumstances did not allow the Dutch to take up a strong attitude against the English, he had to wink his eyes at these new developments. The Dutch realised perfectly well that "if the English were allowed to insert their little finger into the affairs of these regions, they would not rest until they had managed to thrust in the whole arm²". The English had already thrust in their arm and it was only a question of time for them to thrust out the Dutch from Malabar. Anglebeck gives many glaring instances of the interference of the English in the affairs of Cochin. The Raja of Cochin was asked to submit all the documents dealing with the treaties he had entered into with Travancore

¹ Clause 6 of the treaty :—

"That owing to a treaty which exists between the Dutch Company and Rama Varma Raja of Cochin the Governor in Council of Madras, not wishing to enter into any engagements between these parties. resolved that Rama Varma Raja shall become tributary to the English East India Company, only in respect to such districts or places as are above enumerated and are at present in possession of Tippu Sultan and with which the Dutch East India Company have no concern".

² Memoirs of Angelbeck.

and the Dutch. The Raja replied that he had no objection to produce them if he could get the Dutch Governor's consent. The Raja produced all the documents in a locked box and told the English agent that he could get the key from the Dutch Governor. The English agent Duncan approached the Dutch Governor and said in a very ironic way: "Well, sir; the Raja places much confidence in your great kindness, but it occurs to me that he in this instance misuses it, by forcing upon you the trouble of unlocking a box". The Dutch had to suffer many such insults. They were perfectly conscious of the rapid decline of their power in Malabar.

CHAPTER IX

THE DESTRUCTION OF DUTCH POWER IN MALABAR

THE Mysorean invasion brought about radical changes in the political system of Malabar. The most important of all was the transfer of sovereignty from the hands of the Dutch to the English. We have seen how the English managed to thrust 'their little finger' in Cochin which was the headquarters of the Dutch in Malabar. The Dutch lost practically all their influence in northern Malabar as the princes and chiefs there including the Zamorin had entered into new alliances with Travancore and the English. The northern princes clearly saw how helpless the Dutch themselves were in Malabar and naturally sought the protection of the stronger powers. Travancore also understood the value of a friendly alliance with the English and a treaty of perpetual friendship was signed on the 17th November 1795. The treaty stated "if any power or States nearer or remote, by sea or land shall, without aggression on the part of the Raja of Travancore, attempt or begin hostility and war upon the country of the said Raja or of his successors under such circumstances the expulsion of and the protection of the country against such enemies rest with the Company's Government." The sixth clause of the treaty stated:—"The reigning Raja of Travancore for the time being shall not keep in his service in any civil or military capacity nor allow to remain within his dominions as merchants or under any other plea or pretext the

subjects or citizens of any nation being at war with Great Britain or with the East India Company nor under any circumstances of peace or war allow any European nation to obtain settlements within the same nor enter into any new engagements with any European or Indian States without the previous concurrence of the British Government in India." This treaty clearly meant the establishment of the English sovereignty in Travancore and the destruction of the Dutch influence there.

The Dutch were following an entirely selfish policy in Malabar at that time. Their main policy was to keep friends with the most powerful state or prince and they did not care at all for previous treaty obligation or undertakings. It was this policy that alienated the support of all the princes of Malabar. When the power of Marthanda Varma was in the ascendancy, the Dutch sought his friendship and betrayed the interests of other Malabar States. When Tippu's power was dominant, they tried to cultivate his friendship by a meek policy of submission. But when they found Tippu thwarting all their overtures for friendship they turned to the English for help. The English were their greatest rivals in Malabar, still the exigencies of the situation compelled them to seek their help. The Dutch wrote to the Bengal Government saying that they were prepared to join sides with the English against Tippu. But the English did not take serious notice of this offer of help. The Dutch volunteered to give help to the Travancore Raja, the ally of the English and sent two commissioners Cellarius and Everydyck to the Raja's court. In August 1792, the Dutch Governor sought the assistance of the English again. Colonel Hartley who commanded the English army at Chettwaye informed the Dutch Governor Anglebeck that he would send help if the Dutch would bear all the expenses. Anglebeck replied that he only required two regiments—one of Europeans and another of native sepoys—to protect the coasts and he was prepared to share half the expenses in that connection. He pointed out to the English that even though these soldiers were required for the protection of Cochin, their presence would be helpful to the English also and as such it was but proper that the English should bear part of the expenses. Colonel Hartley replied that the troops had been already sent and the Dutch should bear the whole expense. Anglebeck gave no reply to this

and evaded the question of meeting the expenses. He even instructed his successor in Cochin to evade the question of bearing the expenses by following the tactics he had followed, *viz.*, writing to the English frequently without committing to any decision.

The relations between Cochin and the Dutch were, by no means cordial. The chief cause of dissension at this time was the claim of the Dutch over the Christians especially the Roman Catholics in Cochin. The Roman Catholics were carrying on a large scale policy of conversion among the "heathen vagabonds" who had consented to this course to escape the punishments which their crimes deserved". When they became Christians they claimed immunity from punishment and thus the Raja realised the grave error of recognising the Company's authorities over all Christians. The Raja examined the original text of the treaty between Cochin and the Dutch and understood that there was a serious mistake in the Dutch version of the treaty. The treaty had recognised the rights of the Dutch over the 'Mundukars' or the Roman Catholics. But the Dutch version of the treaty contained in it a clause interpreting "Mundukars" to mean all the Christians. The Raja held that that interpretation was wrong and it was not contained in the Malayalam text of the treaty. The Raja was supported by Mr. Powney in this claim, but Anglebeck refused to yield. Finally the question was settled in favour of the Dutch through the mediation of Mr. Powney.

Another cause of dispute between the Dutch and the Raja was about the slaughter of cows by the Christians in Cochin. The Raja wanted to prevent the slaughter of cows in his territories and wrote to Governor Anglebeck how the Christians were violating his orders. Anglebeck promised to give suitable punishments to the offenders.

The dispute between Cochin and the Dutch over the question of the Konkannies was a long standing one. The Konkannies had a sacred idol at Thirumala Devaswom. The Raja demanded from the Devaswom a substantial contribution for the celebration of the festival at Thripoonithurai. When the Konkannies refused to comply with the Raja's demands, the Raja ordered them to be punished. Captain Pannikkar and two soldiers seized Deva-

resekini a chief of the Devasthanom and beheaded him. The Raja's soldiers plundered the 'Konkanies' possessions and seized all the treasuries of the Devaswom. The temple priests managed to send their sacred idol to the Dutch fort to be kept in their custody. The Dutch were infuriated at the conduct of the Cochin soldiers against the Konkanies who were in their protection and demanded an explanation from the Raja. The Raja boldly replied that all the Hindus in his territory were under his authority and the Dutch should mind their own business and not interfere in the affairs of his administration. In October 1791, the Dutch marched against the Cochin Raja's palace at Mattancherry. There was a skirmish between the Raja's troops and the Company's soldiers. The Raja was planning to attack the Dutch fort at Cochin. But the English agent Powney interfered and brought about a reconciliation, avoiding an open conflict.

Van Anglebeck was succeeded by Van Spall as Governor of Cochin in 1794. He was the last Dutch Governor of Cochin. The power of the Dutch in the east was steadily declining while their home country itself was subjected to foreign invasion. On January 8th the French Republican army invaded Holland and the Stadtholder fled to England. The English and the Dutch were allies in Europe fighting against the common foe the French Republican Government. When Holland was invaded by the French, the English took measures to prevent the Dutch settlements from falling into the hands of the French. On February 7, 1795 the following proclamation was issued by the Dutch authorities to all their Governors and Commandants in Oversea possessions:—"We have thought it necessary to write to you that His Britannic Majesty's troops shall be admitted and take possession of the forts in our colonies, and that they are to be considered as the troops of a kingdom in friendship and alliance with their Mightinesses, in case the colonies should be summoned by the French". But the danger to the Dutch in Malabar was not from the French, but from the English. The Dutch Governor was making busy preparations in Cochin anticipating an invasion of the English. The English also made no secret of their intentions. They warned the Cochin Raja that he should in no way assist the Dutch, but on the contrary should prevent their domination in his territories. The Raja, being a tributary of the English, promised to do as directed.

of English influence in North Malabar. When the exiled chieftains of North Malabar and the Zamorin of Calicut returned to their respective countries, they understood that the Dutch no longer held any pretence of suzerainty in Malabar.¹ The Zamorin realised that he owed his position entirely to the English and Travancore and that the former were destined to be his masters. Lord Cornwallis sent General Abercromby, the Governor of Bombay, to settle the affairs in Malabar. Abercromby sent two commissioners to enter into agreements with the Malabar chieftains on behalf of the English. The commissioners allowed the chieftains of Chirakkal, Kottayam and Kadathanad to be in charge of their own territories, but signed special agreements with them which recognised the rights and privileges of the English. The Zamorin of Calicut, the most prominent of the Rajas in northern Malabar, had enthroned himself "without the concurrence or assent of any officer of the Company's Government." The Zamorin had assumed authority claiming all his ancient rights and privileges. But the English entered into a treaty with the Zamorin on August 18, 1792 which practically placed

¹ With Cochin, there also passed into the hands of the British the Dutch (formerly Portuguese) settlements of Tangasseri on the point of land lying west of Quilon Bay and the following petty places :—

1. Thumboli Pattam
 2. Kattur Pattam
 3. Attalakkad Pattam
 4. Manakodat Pattam
 5. Antony Fernandez Pattam
 6. Thekke Purupunkara Pattam
 7. Mundenvelli Pattam
 8. Domingo Fernandez Palakkal Pattam
 9. Santiago Pattam
 10. Taiveppu Pattam
 11. Blich Rodriguez Pattam
 12. Saint Loius Pattam
 13. Durat Lemos Pattam
 14. Ramanthuruthi Pattam
 15. Seodikalguvankurie Silva Pattam
 16. Pallipport Hospital Paramba
- Malabar Manual. Logan. P 717

Calicut at the disposal of the English Company. The Zamorin was to administer his territories as a lease holder of the English. Even in the matter of appointment of his ministers, the Zamorin was to obtain the previous consent of the English. In 1795 the English signed a new treaty with the Zamorin, which further placed the Zamorin at the mercy of the English. In 1798, the Zamorin practically relinquished his sovereign rights ; in July 1800 his territories were transferred to the Madras Presidency.

CHAPTER X

THE DUTCH AND THEIR EUROPEAN RIVALS IN MALABAR.

THE Dutch settlement in Malabar was only one among the many they had in the East. They had established their headquarters in the Malaya Archipelago and strengthened their position in Ceylon before they had ventured on an attack on Malabar. But their European rivals in the East had concentrated their attention mainly on their settlements in India. To the Dutch, the loss of their Indian settlements did not mean the loss of their Empire in the East. They continued their suzerain authority in other parts of the Oriental World. But, that was not the case with the Portuguese. When the Portuguese were driven out of Malabar, they were driven out of India. And when they lost their possessions in India, they held no more in the East. The two important European rivals for the Dutch in the East were the Portuguese and the English. The Dutch gained the mastery of Malabar by seizing it from the Portuguese ; they lost it when the English seized it from their hands. Even though the French had political designs over Malabar, they could not achieve their objects as their ingenious plans came to no good.

When Holland liberated herself from the shackles of Spain, the decline of the Portuguese power in the East commenced. The Dutch, flushed with a new enthusiasm and consciousness of their independence turned their attention towards the East,

determined to oust the Portuguese from their territories. The Portuguese—the pioneers of European colonisation of the East—had been enjoying a position of undisputed sovereignty in India for a period of one hundred years. The profligate wealth the Portuguese had amassed in India and the great ease with which they could carry on their administration had fostered degeneracy. “The Portuguese policy of conquest, conversion and commerce had its halcyon days. Now, elements of deterioration and decay had begun to eat into the vitals of the Portuguese Empire in the East. The sudden acquisition of illgotten wealth and easy subjugation of vast tracts had turned the heads of the proud Portuguese officials. The race of heroes such as Albuquerque and Pachecos had given place to a base set of captains and administrators whose only thought was ‘money.’”¹ But as Hunter² observes if the system produced bitter fruits in Asia, it had its roots in Portugal itself. The Portuguese Empire was ill-managed both at home and abroad. This was the condition of the Portuguese power in the East when it was challenged by its powerful rival Holland. The Portuguese “who aimed at an Empire in India both spritual and temperal, at wholesale conversion effected by conviction, bribery and fraud or violence, who considered no expenditure too large to effect their object, whose self-love had alienated all friends, and injustice created many enemies, were now on the eve of resigning their authority to others. Another power was now to become predominant in the East, another race was to try their hand at supremacy and another religion to be introduced³.”

When the Portuguese saw the appearance of a powerful rival in their undisputed domains, they knew that they should strengthen themselves for self-protection. In the early years they seem to have been confident of keeping their own position. The Portuguese Viceroy wrote to his king in 1635 that he would easily get the better of the Dutch as “the Dutch were every where cordially hated and only succeeded in carrying on trade by means of the forces at their disposal.” But the Dutch were more confident of

1. K. P. P. Menon. History of Kerala Vol: I. P. 183.

2. Hunter. History of Br. India, Vol: I. P. 183.

3. Day. Land of the Perumal. P. 114—115.

securing the supremacy in India. Dee Weert had very early clearly foreseen that when the Portuguese were turned out of Cochin they would be out of India. As early as 1658 Van Goens was making busy preparations for ousting the Portuguese from Malabar. He wrote to the Governor General for re-inforcements and assured him of easy victory over the Portuguese. "We could make an attempt on Cochin where the Portuguese could collect their strongest naval forces," wrote Goens, "and if we are so lucky as to defeat them, the whole coast of Malabar and the pepper trade will be ours." When the Portuguese realised their dangerous position, they wrote to the king of Portugal for further reinforcements. They clearly acquainted the king of the real state of affairs in India and informed him that unless they were properly assisted, the whole of their possessions would be lost.¹ "We earnestly impløre Your Majesty," the Portuguese Governors wrote, "to send us by next year adequate re-inforcements, otherwise, we shall not be able to resist the enemy at all." But the re-inforcements which the Portuguese received were not of much avail in their attempts to maintain their possessions in Malabar. We have seen how the Portuguese were compelled to surrender the "town of Cochin with all its jurisdictions, income and lands with all documents and papers referring to the same and whatever else that may be there held in the name of the king of Portugal²." The Dutch allowed all unmarried true born Portuguese to be sent back to Europe. The married Portuguese and Mestizoes were to be sent to Goa. After the surrender of the Cochin fort the Portuguese did not make any serious attempt to assert their power in Malabar. The Dutch were left almost undisputed masters of the territories they had acquired by conquest.

The Dutch, however, seem to have been carefully watching the plans of the Portuguese. They knew that if they were to quit Cochin, the Portuguese would endeavour to obtain possession of it. Visscher³ says in this connection, "They already affect to have claims upon it, and say arrogantly enough that the 'Company are keeping it for their king.'" Moens also in his

1. Letter dated 18th December 1658.

2. Treaty dated 7th January 1663

3. Visscher letter No. 3.

memoirs says that there were various rumours regarding the preparations the Portuguese were making for re-instating themselves in India. The Portuguese were really making some preparations by strengthening their army in Goa. But whether it was for an attempt to regain their lost possessions or only for defensive purposes, is not certain.¹

The Danes were comparatively insignificant rivals for the Dutch in Malabar. The Danes had some trade settlements in the Malabar Coast, but their interests in Malabar were purely commercial. Sometimes they supplied the local Rajas with arms in return for which they received pepper as is evident from the following letter by an English chief at Anjengo (1757):—"As the Dutch on one side supplied him (Travancore) with arms, etc., and the Danes and other Europeans at times did the same at Coletchy (Kolachel) for which they got pepper, he withheld pepper from us under the pretence that we showed ourselves less friendly to him than others²". The Danes had only two factories in Malabar—one at Edava and another at Colachel. Hamilton describes the Dane settlement at Edava as follows:—"The Danes have a small factory here standing on the sea-side. It is a thatched house of a very mean aspect and their trade answers every way to the figure their factory makes".³ Their Kolachel factory also was nothing more than a small store house. Still the Dutch were complaining about the 'jealousy' of the Danes at Calicut who were furnishing the Zamorin, the enemy of the Dutch, with arms and ammunition.

1 "Volume 13 of *Vadulandsche D. Historie*. Page 378 says that in the year 1669 it was agreed between Portugal and Holland that Cochin and Cannanore would remain Dutch as a pledge for arrears which were still due to the States by Portugal. Why so, is a puzzle to which I can suggest no solution. The history does not say whether these arrears have ever been paid or whether any fresh settlement effected. But it is said that the Portuguese would have got the town if they were willing to make compensation for the expenses incurred by the Dutch; but this amount was so large that they could not pay".

Quoted by Mr. K. P. P. Menon in *History of Kerala*.

2. Fort St George Records. Quoted by Galletti in his introduction to "Dutch in Malabar".

3. Pinkerton "Collection of voyages and Travels" Vol. VIII p. 383.

The greatest of European rivals for the Dutch in Malabar, as we have seen, were the English. The main reason for the rivalry between the Dutch and the English was of course the ambition of both to secure the monopoly of eastern trade. The large profits made by the Dutch had excited the jealousy of the English and induced them to try a hand for the monopoly of trade. Visscher¹ writes "The trade of the East India Company, so famous throughout the world, one of the main stays of our country, and the resource of thousands of poor creatures who make their livelihood by the employment it affords them, has been greatly undermined by the English. At Cochin we see at least thirty English vessels, large and small, in the course of the year which perform the transit between the neighbouring regions and put in here chiefly for the sake of provisions". Visscher also observes that the English trade at that time was not so vigorous as the Dutch. The Dutch Company had the complete support of the home Government, while the English East India Company was a purely private concern. "The English Company was the weakling child of the old age of Elizabeth and of the shifty policy of King James", observes Hunter, "while, the Dutch Company was the strong outgrowth of the life and death struggle of a new nation with its new Spanish oppressors." The patronage of the Netherlands Government strengthened the Company's position in India and the Dutch were able to maintain their supremacy unchallenged throughout the 17th century. But soon, the "weakling child" of England grew up into a sturdy youth and the position of the Dutch was seriously endangered. Even though England and Holland were at peace with one another in Europe, their Companies in the East were making use of every opportunity to ruin each other's prospects. Both Companies resorted to all methods—fair or foul—to achieve their objects in the East.

The Comparative position of the two companies in India in the 18th century may be understood from the following facts gathered from an article in the Madras Mail dated 18th February 1902 :—"An illustration of the relative position of the two rivals at the beginning of the 18th century is afforded by a few

1. Visscher's Letters VII.

unpublished manuscripts in the British museum that possesses some claim on the attention of your readers. It appears that on the 23rd November 1709, two Dutch ships, one of 30 guns and the other of 20 and the Dutch brigantine arrived off Calicut and anchored opposite the British factory there. On the 24th they approached nearer the shore, dropped anchor and promptly fired about 300 shots at the town, but did no damage beyond killing 'one Muckwa' boy and one goldsmith's boy and wounding a moor woman. The Dutch Commodore now called upon the masters of three native vessels in the roads and the Portuguese master of a British Ketch to proceed on board his ship. The master of the British Ketch obeyed the order and was then directed to land and warn the British factory to take care of themselves, for the Dutch were resolved to burn, sink and destroy all they could and that if the factory wanted goods, they might go with the ships to Cochin, but the Dutch could suffer none to be shipped at Calicut. The factory sent an English representative to the Dutch Commodore to state that no notice could be taken of his verbal message and to desire that if he had anything to say he would communicate it in writing and in English too as they were unacquainted with Dutch. But the Commodore replied that he was unacquainted with English, so he again sent a verbal message and warned the factory to be careful for "powder and balls had no eye" . . . The Dutch sailed away from Calicut to Chittoa where they encountered no opposition as the Zamorin had been unable to raise a force to protect the place. They landed, raised palisades and laid the foundations of a fort on a spot of ground formerly granted to the English East India Company. They pulled down the house wherein the Company had been wont to store its purchases of pepper after sifting it of all that was in it, while they threatened the servants of the company whom they found there, that if they did not leave immediately they would be put in irons and shipped off as prisoners to Batavia. Then the Dutch returned to their ships and set sail for Anjengo where the English company had another factory . . . The Bombay Government found it difficult to believe that, during the maintenance of a strict alliance between England and the Netherlands the Dutch would venture to publicly aid the 'King of Alleng' in his designs

on the English factories at Anjengo 'although by underhand dealings they have created a difference which they strove to torment into an open rupture.'¹

The following accounts given by Mr. Grose who had an extensive travel in the Malabar coasts, give an idea about the rivalry of the Dutch and the English in the 18th century. "As mere traders, the English would never have got the footing they had, if they had not added to that character the profession of arms both at land and sea.... The Dutch especially insult us in their insinuations to the country Governments of our inferiority in that we are not possessed of a head place of arms, such as Batavia is to them, from whence our operations might be more timely and more effectually applied to any exigence than as there now exists a necessity for waiting for orders and aids from Europe. They do not consider or at least do not add a candid confession of the treacherous and cruel supplantment of us in a time of full peace in the Spice Islands which are the mines, from whence they draw the means of supporting the extraordinary charges of that their boasted capital place in India, a competition with which our trade, circumstanced as it has been since that fatal epoch could never well afford.... One of the reasons that the Dutch East India Company flourishes and is become more rich and powerful than all the others is, its being absolute and invested with a kind of sovereignty and dominion more especially over the many ports, provinces and colonies it possesses in those parts. For it appoints magistrates, admirals, generals and governors, sends and receives embassies from kings and sovereign princes; makes peace and war at pleasure; and by its own authority administers justice to all. The power of the Dutch by sea and land is very great in the East Indies, where by force, address and alliance they raised themselves and still support a great superiority in spite of the English Portuguese and other Europeans that have some trade there; but so inconsiderable are those that all of them together do not enjoy what the Hollanders enjoy. The Hollanders gave law to the very English, in 1662,

1. Ref Article entitled "Dutch Ascendancy in India. Its enforcement in Malabar in 1709" Published in the Madras Mail of the 18th Feb. 1902 quoted by K. P. P. Menon in History of Kerala Vol. I. P. 385—390.

obliging them to a peace very advantageous to Holland and their East India Company in particular after a bloody and expensive war that arose from jealousy and the rivalry in commerce.”¹

Even though the Dutch and the English did not openly come to a conflict in the early stages, there was a bitter competition between the two for the establishment of trade and political prerogatives. The Dutch suspected the English to be intriguing with their enemies and inciting the local chieftains to rebellions. Visscher speaks of Mr. Adams the head of the English in Malabar as an “enemy” of the Dutch Company, “Being an enemy to our company”, Visscher² writes, “he incited the Zamorin to the late war, himself lending in order to promote it 100,000 rix dollars with which that prince defrayed the expenses of the war. We have no reason to doubt this story, since he even sent English Officers to assist the Zamorin to defend fort Paponetty against our arms. Nay, more, when Chettwaye was conquered by the Zamorin and our people expelled the English immediately erected a factory there in order to secure the pepper trade” Visscher concludes from all these that the Dutch “have but little good to expect from the English”. “The English cannot but look with envious eyes upon the great influence our company possesses in India and the confidence they inspire among the nations with whom they trade. It would be better if our neighbours would examine more closely into their own behaviour and see whether their arrogance is not the cause of the mistrust and dislike with which they are regarded”. Visscher’s allegations against Mr. Adams are further substantiated by the accounts of Hamilton and others. Hamilton clearly asserts that part of the money spent by the Zamorin in his war with the Dutch was borrowed from the English. The Tellicherry records also prove that loans were given by Mr. Adams to the Zamorin, the Punnathur Raja and the Kolathiri prince.

Even though the Dutch and their European rivals were “intriguing against one another, with native princes, supplying one another’s enemies and harbouring one another’s deserters”, there was general peace between them. The Dutch at Cochin

1. Ref. Grose “Voyage” East Indies. Vol. II P 256--258.

2. Visschers letter No. 3.

were very polite and courteous in their relations with their European rivals. Foreign ships could visit their port at Cochin and they used to receive foreigners in their fort with great courtesy. Galletti in this connection makes reference to one James Forbes a servant of the English East India Company who wrote in his Oriental Memoirs that during his visits to Cochin on his company's business he always received the kindest attention from the Governor and the principal inhabitants. The English and the Dutch seem to have joined in a combined expedition against the pirates in 1750. When the English at Tellicherry were attacked by Hyder Ali, the Dutch Governor wrote courteous letters to the English and even complied with their requisitions for supplies. This may be because of the fact that Hyder was the common enemy of both the English and the Dutch. Later when Tippu invaded the Travancore lines and threatened an invasion of the Cochin Fort, we find the Dutch applying to the English for help. The Dutch proposed a joint action against the Mysoreans. But, the English gave only an evasive reply to the overtures of the Dutch. Before the final expulsion of the Dutch from Cochin, the English had gained a depot there. Galletti quotes a letter from Col, Hartley which states "having a greater quantity of stores and ammunition than is immediately wanted to the field, I have made a depot at Cochin, the Governor Mynheer Anglebeck readily offering every assistance."¹

The Dutch and the English in Malabar blamed each other for misgovernment and tyranny. Visscher's letters contain descriptive details of the high handed policy of the English in Malabar especially in Anjengo and Attingal. Visscher also tries to bring out details about the oppressive administration of Tellicherry and other parts by the English. The English also were laying special emphasis on the unpopularity of the Dutch in the west coast. We find the Governor of Fort Marlborough writing to the Governor of Fort St. George that the Dutch Government was everywhere abhorred by the country people and that the appearance of ships alone at some settlements would occasion a revolt. The fact is that the Malabar people liked

1. Military consultations. Vol. 133 in the Fort St. George Records

neither the English nor the Dutch even though both claimed the support of the people.

The Dutch had very little to do with the French in India. The settlements of the French in India were too weak to be counted as rivals for the Dutch. Their factory as Dr. Fryer says was better stored with *monsieurs* than with cash. The French had established a temporary settlement at Tellicherry before the English had established theirs. But their business in Tellicherry was very insignificant. Occasionally we find the Dutch Governors complaining of the supplies of arms given by the French to the native chieftains. But the French attempted to contest for supremacy in Malabar only after the Dutch had left it.

CHAPTER XI.

POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS OF MALABAR IN THE DUTCH PERIOD.

VISSCHER'S letters contain interesting details about the political and social conditions of Malabar in the 18th century. Even though most of his observations are correct he showed a tendency to stress those facts which he thought would provide interesting reading to his countrymen in Holland. In this respect his accounts suffer from the usual defects as are characteristic of the records of all foreign writers.

Malabar has never been a single political unit, if we ignore the traditional account of Cheraman Perumal's sovereignty. Foreign travellers in Malabar in the 14th century note that the country was divided among twelve kings. Ibn Batuta observes "In this country of Malabar are twelve kings, the greatest of whom has 50,000 troops at his command." The reference here to the greatest of the Malabar kings is probably the Zamorin. When the Portuguese visited Malabar, they found the country divided among a multiplicity of princes and chieftains. Gollenne in his memoirs mentions about more than forty five chieftains in Malabar. Moens notes that the chief princes of Malabar were the Zamorin of Calicut, the Rajas of Cochin and Travancore and the Kolathiri. He also makes mention of the

large number of local chieftains and nobles in Malabar who enjoyed a partial degree of sovereign authority. But these chieftains were subordinate to the four principal Swaroopams of Nediirippu (Calicut), Perimbatappu (Cochin), Thrippappil (Travancore) and Kolathunadu (Kolathiri).

We have seen how these different princes were in frequent wars with one another. The accounts of Fra. Bartomomeo relating to the political situation in Malabar are worth quoting. "The princes who were not unanimous among themselves attacked each other's territories; carried away their subjects as captives, excited the chief men against one another, deprived several families of their property and as they were too weak to subdue an opulent and high spirited people gave to some private individuals full freedom to revenge the injuries which they had suffered". In some respects the political condition of Malabar in the beginning of the 18th century bears resemblance to that of Italy before it was united under the house of Savoy. But Malabar had no Cavour with lofty schemes of political unification or no Garibaldi with a daring zeal of selfless patriotism. The military activities of Marthanda Varma were the outcome of an inordinate personal ambition. He was never inspired by any sentiment of national unification or patriotism. His great achievements were the annihilation of the feudal nobility and the creation of the powerful State of Travancore. The Raja of Cochin no doubt had to concede some territories to Marthanda Varma. The Zamorin of Calicut had to give up his political designs over southern Malabar. Towards the end of the Dutch period we find the powerful State of Travancore in the south with extensive territories, Cochin shorn of her possessions in the south, and the Zamorin confined to his territories in the north. The Kolathiri ceased to be a ruling power. It was only a question of time for the Zamorin to bear the fate of the Kolathiri.

The Dutch period in Malabar is significant as it witnessed the fall of the Nair nobility. The Nair chiefs of Malabar even though they recognised the authority of the Kshatriya princes, were de-facto sovereigns in their own estates. Logan says that the position which was occupied by the Nairs in the civil and

military organisation of Malabar was the central point of interest in any descriptive and historical account of the Malayalee race. "It was a position" he says "so unique and so lasting that but for foreign intervention there seems no reason why it should not have continued for centuries to come. Their functions in the body politic have been wisely described in their own traditions as "the eye", "the hand" and "the order." Logan also refers to the martial spirit and traditions of the Nairs. This martial spirit was kept up by their frequent wars with one another. They had also their own systems of duels and 'kutippaka.' The latter was a custom by which the chieftains took revenge for any murder in the family. There were institutions known as 'kalaris' to give training for the people in the art of warfare. The Kalari was a gymnasium where practical instruction in fighting was given by an 'asan' or experienced veteran teacher. The Malabar princes had large numbers of trained Nair warriors in their services. The strength of a prince depended mainly upon his Nair force. We have already seen the great part played by the Nair forces in the wars of Malabar. The Nair soldiers were directly under their Nadu Vazhis whose services were requisitioned by the princes. "The Nadu Vazhi was the military chief of the district and was bound to attend the Raja on the field, or march wherever he was directed with all the fighting men of his district, under the Desavazhis or heads of their respective villages. It was also his duty in times of peace to assemble the Nairs of his district every two or three years in order to exhibit in the presence of the Raja, a mock or rather real flight with the Nairs of another district.....These combats were instituted with a view of keeping up the martial spirit of the Nairs."

With the destruction of the power of the Nair nobles, their martial spirit also declined. We have seen how Marthanda Varma succeeded in stamping out Nair predominance in his country. The destruction of the Ettu Veetil Pillamars marked the end of Nair hegemony in Malabar. This policy was followed by the Cochin Raja also and we have seen how in his country too the power of the Nairs came to an end. The destruction of

the power of the Nairs in Calicut was not the work of its kin. It was carried out by the Mysorean invaders. By a vigorous policy of persecution, Tippu broke the backbone of the Nair nobility in North Malabar. The destruction of the power of the feudal nobles brought about a complete change in the social and political system of Malabar. Its direct result was the centralisation of the political power. It strengthened the tyrannical position of the ruling chieftains. As Logan observes the Nair nobles had formed the bulwark against the tyranny and oppression of their own rulers. Now this bulwark was destroyed.

Even though the Nairs were the predominant people in Malabar, the Namboodiries too were fairly prominent. Visscher notes that the Namboodiries were 'exercising secular authority.' They were "the possessors of certain domains with Nairs or soldiers in their service over whom they had the power of capital punishment."¹ "They had also the patronage of all offices and dignities within their territories. . . . they were also sometimes lords over certain territories exercising the right of making war." The Namboodiries were generally rich land lords and as such they commanded great influence in the country. Some Namboodiri brahmins were sovereign kings, for example the Namboodiri Rajas of Etappalli, Porakkad, Paroor, etc.

Besides the Namboodiries there were the 'Caimals'² and 'Rasidoors.' The Caimals, were temporal potentates, possessing the right of making war. Some of them were subject to the princes in whose territories they are situated, but others were independent; the difference depended on the privilege they received in ancient times. Visscher says there

1. Visscher letter No. XIII.

2. The tradition of Malabar is that the country was given to the Namboodiries by Parasurama. The Namboodiries ruled over the country for some time. Later with the rise of monarchical system the Namboodiries had to give up much of their secular authority. There were however a few sovereign rulers among them eg: the Rajas of Edappalli, Porakad & Parur.

3. The Caimals were the principal nobles of the country. Some petty rulers were also known as 'Caimals' and 'Karthavus' eg. 'Kodaser Karthavu' "Mangattu Kaimal."

were about fifty Caimals in Cochin alone. "Rasidoors were lords who have been raised by the Raja's to certain commands over the army or country. In many places they were appointed to govern a district or town in the name of the prince." Besides these chieftains there was another class of Menons whose chief work was to write the letters of their Raja.¹ Menon was the title conferred by the Rajas on the Nairs. 'Visscher says there were higher titles than Menon like 'Menon Mare'² and 'Goerype' (Kurup).

Special mention has been made about the Syrian Christians of Malabar by all the Dutch writers. Visscher writes that all Christians in Malabar were divisible into three classes—"the Europeans, the principal of whom were the Portuguese, the English and the Dutch; the Topasses, who sprang from mixed races of whites and Indians and the native Christians of unmixed race." The native Christians were divided into two groups, viz., new Christians and St. Thomas Christians. The new Christians were mostly converts from low castes. The St. Thomas Christians or Syrian Christians believe that they have been

1. The Malabar Raja's used to employ large number of scribes to look after their secretarial work. Palmyra leaves were used for writing purposes. These royal scribes were hereditary dignitaries having special rights and privileges traditionally attached to their office. Barbosa gives the following account about the royal scribes at Calicut:—

"The King of Calicut keeps many clerks constantly in his place; they are all in one room, separate and far from the King, sitting on benches and they write all the affairs of the Kings' revenue and his alms and that which is given at all and the complaints which are presented to the King and at the same time the account of the collectors of taxes. All this is on broad stiff leaves of the palm tree, without ink, with pens of iron."

Ref. Barbosa "Description of the coasts of Africa and Malabar in the beginning of the 16th century" P 110.

2. 'Menon Mare' "This is no higher dignity being simply the plural form of the singular Menon, meaning scribe. The title of Menon is conferred by the Raja on Nairs. The applicant presents himself before the Raja and pays a small sum of money, not exceeding Rs 6 and the Raja if the application is accepted, calls him by his name with the term 'Menon' added three times over, and he is thenceforward styled Menon by all."

Ref. K. P. P Menon, History of Kerala Vol. II P. 425—26.

originally converted by the Apostle St. Thomas himself—a tale in Visscher's¹ opinion, not to be scoffed at. They are called Syrians because their churches were under the supervision of Syrian Bishops and they followed the Syrian language for their church rites. Among the Syrian Christians there were Roman Catholics also. The Syrians had suffered many persecutions from the papists and Visscher notes that many of their churches have been seized by the Roman Catholics in the time of the Portuguese.

Moens makes some observations about the history of the Syrian Christians in Malabar. In 1751 three Syrian bishops were sent to Malabar by the patriarch of Antioch. When they first arrived at 'bassora in Persia' they were kindly received by the officers of the Dutch Company there. They were brought to Malabar in one of the Company's ships. "During their stay in Cochin they were assigned suitable lodgings by the Dutch Commander and shown every courtesy, Mar Thome, the local Syrian bishop, refused to pay respects to the visitors. The Dutch commander was going to have him brought to Cochin by force, but he came to hear of it and fled inland and they could not lay hands on him". In 1753 on the occasion of a meeting between the king of Travancore and the Dutch Commander, the three Syrian bishops were introduced to the king and recommended for his special protection. The Syrian Christians in the Dutch period were always engaged in party quarrels and fights.

The Roman Catholics were numerically superior to the Syrian Christians. Visscher notes that in his time they had two Bishops and one Archbishop. The Archbishop had his residence at "Ambekatt a few leagues from Cochin." The Dutch Commander used to show great respect to the Romish Bishops "saluting them with a display of arms and firing of cannon, showing to them the same honour as to Kings." There was a Roman Bishop at Cranganore who was under the protection of the Company. There was no fear for the Dutch that the Romish priests would intrigue with the Portuguese against them as the Portuguese and these priests were always at variance with one another.

1. Visscher's letters 16.

Among the Roman Christians was included the class of Topasses.¹ Moens notes that a great number of these Topasses were to be found near the forts of the Company. They were proselytes of the Portuguese. "They were so much attached to their religion that nothing would induce them to give it up. Their superstitions out did even those of the Portuguese and the Spaniards." Topasses were the off-springs of Portuguese marrying natives.¹

There were many Jews in Malabar especially at Cochin. The Chief Jew settlements were at "Cranganore, Parur, Maday and Paluthi." The Jews had always found protection at the hands of the Malabar princes. During the period of Dutch supremacy, the Jews at Cochin were under the leadership of a chief-tain called the 'Mudaliar.' When Cochin was captured by the Dutch, the Jews came under their protection. The Jews had assisted² the Dutch when they were carrying on their siege of Cochin.

The Jews had always been persecuted by the Portuguese and that was the main reason that induced them to side with the Dutch in their attempts to capture the fort of Cochin. The Jews in Malabar were distinguished into two classes, white and black

1. Moen makes the following observations about them :—"On the taking of Cochin there were many Topasses here and along the coast who were the descendants of the Portuguese. Some were slaves who had been given their freedom, others were the off-springs of native women with whom their masters had formed temporary alliances. After the Portuguese left the place they assumed the surnames of their masters. Prior to 1663 they had a Bishop of their own, and a cathedral within the town of Cochin. When the company took the place they came under their protection and were allowed the exercise of their religion. They were placed under a captain and four ensigns as well as other subordinates."

2. Moens observes as follows :—"They furnished the troops of the Dutch company with victuals and all other assistance hoping that they would enjoy under this company the greatest civil and religious liberty. But when our troops were compelled before the end of the good monsoon to leave this coast without having been able to take Cochin, the Portuguese did not fail to make the Jews feel the terrible consequences of their revenge. For no sooner had the Dutch retreated than a detachment of soldiers was sent to the Jewish quarters and pillaged it and set it on fire. The inhabitants then fled to the high-lands and only returned after Cochin was taken by the Dutch."

jeews. The white Jews claim to be the original settlers in Malabar. They were mainly foreign immigrants into Cochin from Europe, Arabia and Persia. The black Jews, larger in number than the white Jews, were mostly natives or of a mixed Jewish-native origin.¹

The Dutch writers make special mention of the 'Moor' or the Mohomedans in Malabar.² The Moors were the chief foes the Portuguese had to encounter in Malabar. The arrival of the Portuguese in Malabar roused the jealousy of the Mohomedans who had the monopoly of trade. The Mohomedans³ were therefore vigorously attacking the attempts of the Portuguese in establishing domination in Malabar. They were very influential at Calicut and "indeed were almost masters of the place."⁴ The Dutch company used to enter into an agreement with the chief Mohamedan chieftain every year for the supply of turmeric.

1. Visscher makes the following observation about the White and Black Jews in Malabar :— 'The black and white Jews inhabit the same District, the latter occupying the banks of the river. The white are much richer and more powerful than the black who are mostly of the slave race and amount, I have been told, to 2,000 souls in Malabar. The number of white Jews who have of late come here from Europe, Bagdad and Cairo is small ; but there are some also who have been settled here for many centuries. They try as much as possible to prevent inter-marriages with the black Jews, although these sometimes take place.' Ref. Visscher's letter No. 18.

2. A very good authority for the origin and early history of the Muslims in Malabar is 'Tufat-Al-Mujahidin' of Shaiykh Zaynud Din, translated from Arabic into English by Lt. M. J. Rowlandson of the Madras Army in 1833 and published for the Oriental Translation Fund of Great Britain ; a revised and annotated translation was recently published by the Madras University, the translator being Dr. Mohamed Husayn Nainar.

3. Day makes the following observations about the Malabar Muslims (who are called Mappilas), "At the end of the last century when Malabar was distracted by wars and desolated both by those who called themselves its friends as well as its avowed enemies, the Mappilas were divided into two distinct classes, those residing along the sea coast who were traders or large farmers ; and those inland called 'Jungle Mappilas' who lived by rapine, murder and kidnapping children some of whom they sold as slaves to the supper-cargoes of vessels, but to the greater part to the French at 'Mahe and the Dutch in Cochin.'"

The most powerful of the Moors was the Ali Raja of Cannanore with whom the Dutch had entered into many treaties.

Moens observes that there were many "foreign heathens in Malabar" during the Dutch period of hegemony. "They were divided into four classes," he writes—"Pandits Canarians (Konkanies), Baniyas and silver-smiths." There were about 25 Pandits in Malabar according to Moens. They were Tamil or Telugu Brahmins proficient in some branch of Sanskrit learning. They were acting as priests to the other three classes. About the Canarians, Moens makes the following observations:—"They get their living chiefly by trade; for most of them are traders. But there are also many who apply themselves to agriculture. Some of the trading Canarians are prominent wholesale merchants trading with foreign nations, others native traders, others are retailers and supply everything domestic except live stock. For this purpose they have their stalls or little shops underneath the houses in the town, which they rent from the residents. For the use of these stalls they have besides the rent to pay certain taxes annually to the poor house. They keep in stock all kinds of fruits, vegetables, flowers, betel leaves, areca, rice, clothes and Chinese goods and articles which they have exchanged with the Maco¹ traders for other goods or brought from them." The Canarians or Konkanies were under the protection of the Dutch and subject to their jurisdiction. (We have referred to the frequent quarrels between Cochin and the Dutch over the question of this jurisdiction). The Banyas were a trading caste in Malabar, not so numerous as the Konkanies. They were also under the special jurisdiction of the Company. Moens also makes reference to the silversmiths, dyers and shoe makers.

Visscher² gives an interesting account about the mode of Government prevalent in Malabar at that time. "The Raja is supreme in those dominions which were subject to him, but not in the free inheritance which belonged to the minor Rajas and Caimals.....They know little of assemblies, councils and parliaments. The Raja chooses his favourites at his pleasure consulting them in particular cases, but generally being guided

1. Portuguese town in China.

2. Visscher letter No. XI

solely by his own will, unless that will should entirely counter to the customs of the country." No doubt the Rajas were arbitrary in the exercise of their powers. But the arbitrary authority of the Raja was only a later development. The Malabar Rajas originally were mere feudal chieftains depending for their power on the allegiance of their feudal nobles. The nobles held lands on feudal tenure and undertook to support the Rajas with men and money in times of war. It was the arrival of the Europeans that brought about the radical change in the political system of Malabar. The foreign merchants assisted the Rajas by supplying them with arms and ammunition and soldiers trained in new methods of warfare. This strengthened the position of the Rajas as against their feudal nobles whose support they required no more. The Rajas realised that they could carry out their designs with the support of foreigners and launched on a new policy of suppressing the power of their feudal nobility. The foreign merchants helped them in this task as they found that the power of the feudal barons was not conducive to the advancement of their commercial enterprise. In 1723 the English at Anjengo "resolved in spite of money expenses to put down the enemies and subject the country to the King." The foreign merchants "preferred to have on the throne a despotic sovereign unaided by council or clergy who could of his own accord assign them monopolies of the produce they come in quest of and enforce the same with a strong arm." As we have already seen, Marthanda Varma was the first prince of Malabar who struck the fatal blow at the power of the feudal barons. When he organised a powerful standing army and trained the soldiers in novel methods of warfare under the supervision of western generals, the power of the local barons ceased to exist. His policy was successfully followed in other parts of Malabar.

Before this scheme of centralisation of power was carried out, the national assemblies were playing a prominent part in State administration. The system of village republics existed in Malabar from very ancient times. "Socially and politically they exercised considerable influence on the community. They formed centres of local self government. They managed all local affairs, possessed common funds, levied cesses to meet certain local expenses and acted as arbitrators or judges in matters of

dispute arising between persons living within the limits of their local jurisdiction."¹ The National assemblies form a peculiar feature in the early political organisation of Malabar. They were in existence from pre-historic days and had always acted as a curb on the despotic tendencies of the administrators. The power of these assemblies was so great that the Rajas were bound to consult them for all important matters. Dr. Fryer (17th century) describes the States of Malabar as "having a government most like aristocracy of any in the east, each State having a representative and he to act according to the votes of the Nair gentry in full assembly." But the power of these assemblies had generally declined during Visscher's time; they were "never held except in cases of emergency." Visscher notes that there were two kinds of assemblies—one assembling under orders of the Raja and another by the spontaneous will of the people. But the Rajas were doing everything in their power to put down the influence of these assemblies. The arrival of Europeans, the assistance they rendered to the Rajas, the invasion of the Mysoreans—all these resulted in the annihilation of the old feudal system in Malabar and its replacement by a powerful monarchical despotism. The observations of Mr. Murdoch Brown to Dr. Buchanan are worth quoting in this connection. "By this new order of things the Rajas were vested with despotic authority over the other inhabitants, instead of the very limited prerogatives that they had enjoyed by the feudal system under which they would neither extract revenue from the lands of their vassals nor exercise any direct authority in their districts. Thus the ancient constitution of Government was in a great measure destroyed without any other being substituted in its room. The Raja was no longer what he had been, the head of a feudal aristocracy with limited authority, but the all powerful deputy of a despotic prince, whose military force was always at his command to curb or chastise any of the chieftains who were inclined to dispute or disobey his mandates."²

1. History of Kerala by K. P. P. Menon, Vol. I, P. 259.

2. Canara & Malabar by Dr. Clandius Buchanan, Vol. II—P. 190.

which might in some measure extend the jurisdiction of trade by sea but they could not do so against private rights."

People used to assert their rights not only in cases of contracts and treaties, but in matters of taxation also. A notable instance of this kind may be seen in the resolutions passed by the 'nattars' of Nanjanadu protesting against the illegal impositions of the Travancore Raja. A resolution passed by the Nattars in December 1713 says "...Hereafter we should in accordance with the Royal commands of our sovereign Kulasekharaperumal continue to pay 'Anjili' and 'Melvaram' alone, but not any 'Kottappanam' and unusual taxes and should protest against such attempts by unitedly making a bold stand and (if necessary) by emigrating. We should honourably keep up all the privileges or rights which our ancestors enjoyed in old days.....In thus asserting our rights if any Pidagai or village or any single individual is subjected to loss by acts of Government, we should support them by re-imbursing such loss from our common funds. If at such times any one should get into the secrets of Government and impair the privileges or rights of the country, he should be subjected to public inquiry by the 'Nattars.'¹ Flight to the mountains abandoning cultivation seems to have been the retaliating step taken up by the people against excessive taxes. A resolution passed in a meeting of ryots at Nanjanad dated 16th Karkatakam 898 M. E. (1722) says "On account of the heavy taxes imposed on us and the cruel treatment we were subjected to till the Kumbhom harvest of 895 M. E., we were forced to leave our fields uncultivated during the whole of the year 896 and retreat to the mountains." The following resolutions passed by the ryots of Nanjanad will prove their great zeal for popular rights:—"We will be prepared to make a bold stand and resist by force if any meanness be taken to enforce the unjust imports and even be willing to migrate into another country, leaving our Kumbhom crop behind." "If anybody were to betray the proceedings of this assembly being bribed by the Government Officers or consent to pay the unjust

1. Quoted by Nagam Aiyya from the edicts found among the records of the Periaivittu Mudaliar.

taxes he shall be liable to pay with his person and property the penalty for such gross treachery." "If any person from Nanjanad north and south serve as an accountant under the Government or betray our affairs, he shall pay the penalty by forfeiting his property." The ryots of Nanjanad concluded their resolutions by swearing by their deities "Thammalaya Perumal and Bhoothalingam" that they would preserve the rights of their assemblies.

The spirit and enthusiasm shown by the ryots of Nanjanad were characteristic of the people of Malabar in the 17th century and the early half of the 18th century. We have already described the circumstances by which popular rights had to give place to royal authority.

The system of administration in the countries of Malabar was essentially of an orthodox Hindu pattern. According to the traditions of Malabar, the country was originally entrusted by Parasurama to the Brahmin Namboodiries. They followed the typical traditions of the Hindu polity.

The joint family was the unit of the social system. A number of joint families constituted a village. Villages were administered by autonomous republics or village assemblies.

The country was divided into Nadus which were sub-divided into Desams. The village headman was known as Desa Vzshi or Madambi. The Desa Vzshi was in charge of the administration of the village temple and its properties. He had the general superintendence of all the affairs of the Desam or village. Sometimes two or three villages were under the jurisdiction of one Desa Vazhi. He assisted the Government in the collection of revenues and other dues. He had to supply a fixed quota of soldiers to the king in times of war. He exercised certain police and judicial authority in the village with the help of the 'Pramanis' or leading citizens. The 'Pramanis' had no hereditary rights. "Any respectable man in the village who was considered as more intelligent than his neighbours and who was on that account resorted to by the inhabitants for the adjustments of their little differences gradually acquired among them the title of Pramani."¹ If a village had no Pramanis to settle

1. K. P. P. Menon. History of Kerala. Vol. II. P. 378.

disputes, the inhabitants used to carry their complaints to the Pramanis of the neighbouring village. The Desa Vazhis and Pramanis were paid by the litigants for the settlement of their disputes. The Desa Vazhi had other sources of income. He was entitled to the produce of one plantain tree and one cocoanut tree from every landlord besides contribution for ghee, sugar, etc.

The Nadu Vazhi was an officer superior to the Desa Vazhi. He was the chief of a Nadu or district and exercised jurisdiction over all the villages in his Nadu. He had a share in the royal revenue besides numerous other sources of income. He was the chief police, judicial and military officer of the district.

The Nadu Vazhi was subject to the jurisdiction of the Raja to whom he supplied soldiers in times of war. The Rajas were assisted by their prime ministers in all matters of administration. Prime Ministers in Cochin and Calicut were hereditary officers; the Paliath Achens were the hereditary prime ministers of Cochin while Mangat Achens were the hereditary prime ministers of Calicut. In Travancore, however, the office was not hereditary.

Concerning the administrative system of Calicut, Buchanan says that the business of the State was conducted by the Zamorin, with the help of four hereditary officers called 'Sarvadhikariakars.' They were (1) Mangat Achen (2) Tinancherry Ellayatu (3) Dharmothu Panikker (4) Paranambi. There were inferior Kariakars appointed by the king for the collection of revenues and customs. The defence of the country rested entirely on such of the Nairs as received arms from the Zamorin. In cases of emergency certain tributary chiefs were summoned to supply the king with soldiers.

Mangat Achen, the Zamorin's hereditary prime minister, had his original seat at Chattodathu Idom in Vattoli where he enjoyed the title of 'Valunnavar' under the Rajas of Kottayam. His services were permanently transferred to the Zamorin by one of the Rajas of Kottayam.

Dharmoth Panikker or Tamme Panikker was the commander-in-chief of the Zamorin's army. He was in charge of the Zamorin's kalari where instructions in warfare were given to Nair youths. Tinayanchery Elayadu and Paranampi were Brahmin ministers of the Zamorin. "A distinction was observed

between the ministers and the Nadu Vazhis, though both held their offices by hereditary right. While the ministers like the Nadu Vazhis had to obtain the recognition of the Zamorin in the form of a writ or *samud* before they could succeed to their predecessor's place, in theory their appointments ceased with the death of the Zamorin, as being attached to his person, and therefore had to be renewed at the Ariyitta Vazcha by his successor."

The administrative system of Travancore was different from that of Cochin or Calicut. The Raja appointed his Dewan or Dalawa and there was no hereditary rule of succession. Social distinctions or rank were never the qualification for the appointment of the Dalawas in Travancore. The greatest ministers of Travancore—Rama Iyen and Kesava Pillai—were persons who rose from low official ranks to high positions of eminence by virtue of their conspicuous abilities. The following accounts abouts the administrative system of Travancore are taken from the Report of Lieutenant Arthur.¹ "Under the Dalawa or Dewan there is a chain of officers all dependant on each other in regular gradation for the management of the revenue and all other affairs of Government; thus the whole country is parcelled out into a certain number of grand divisions over each of which a principal officer termed Valia Sarvadhikariakar presides and his authority extends to all matters of a revenue, commercial and judicial nature. These great portions of the country are again divided into a certain number of parts each under the secondary controlling management of a Sarvadhikariakar and these again are subdivided into districts under the management of a kariakar who has a residency in certain principal places in his district. Other officers termed Proverthiars are the last in gradation among the managing officers of respectability, but under them again there are several inferior officers called Chaudrakers, Toracars and Villakkars or peons who have each a distinct and separate office. Besides the above there is an officer appointed in each of the three great divisions who is entitled the Melu Vicharippuker and the nature of his office is partly judicial."

Visscher's letters contain descriptive details about the administrative system of Cochin. "The Raja chooses his

1. Lt. Arthur's Report—Selections from the Records of Tra P. 16.

favourites at his pleasure, consulting them in particular cases, but generally being guided solely by his own will, unless that will should run entirely counter to the customs of the country. Many keep near them a Brahmin to instruct them in the fundamental and long established laws and customs."¹ The Raja appointed royal guards to safeguard his possessions. "These guards were bound to defend such places at risk of their lives and to attack the assailants for whose death they were not held responsible."

The administrative system in Cochin was essentially different from that of the other countries, as the Raja had placed himself by treaty obligations under the protection of the Dutch Company. Even though the Dutch did not directly interfere in internal administration, the Raja used to take their advice in all important matters. The administration of Cochin was carried out by a body of ministers consisting of Paliath Achen, Thalachennoor, Manakkotta Achen and a captain appointed by the Dutch Company.² Paliath Achen was the hereditary prime minister and commander-in-chief of Cochin. The ministers, however, had no jurisdiction over the foreigners and the Christians who were under the special protection of the Company. Besides these ministers, there were other administrative officers like Sarvadhikariakar, Kariakar, Menon, Mudalpidi, Niyogaganmar, etc. The Dutch and the Raja jointly exercised the right of removing these officers in all cases of misconduct.³ The heir-apparent was strictly forbidden to interfere in the administration.

REVENUE ADMINISTRATION

Visscheer⁴ gives the following account concerning the revenue administration in Malabar in general and Cochin in particular:—
 "The Malabar States in common with all others in the world possess certain fixed revenues and funds for replenishing the treasury and maintaining royal form and the welfare of the State, though here the Raja's incomes are not very large or out of the common. Their chief profits are derived from their private estates and the inferior princes are often richer than the reigning

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1. Visscher's letters No. XI.
 2. Refer treaties of 1674 and 1682.
 3. Refer to the treaty of 1684.
 4. Visschers letter No. XI.

sovereign being possessed of larger free and hereditary properties." Commerce was a source of great income to the Rajas, especially to those who had forts in their possession. In Cochin, a ten per cent duty was levied on all goods imported into the kingdom and six per cent on all exports. All goods imported by the Dutch Company were free from duties. The Dutch had also a share of the duties imposed on goods brought into Cochin, the ratio with Cochin being 4 : 6. Visscher¹ mentions many other sources of revenue for the Cochin Raja. All merchandise conveyed by inland navigation pay a Jenmakara or toll of one per cent to the Raja. The Raja is entitled to the duties on Tobacco. All gardens situated in Karappuram pay a tenth of their fruits to the Raja. On all debts discharged under sentence from the Raja he receives twenty per cent. Mothers present an off-spring on the birth of their children. He is the inheritor of the property of all, who die without heirs and sometimes when there are blood relations living. He receives an acknowledgment in money for every office or dignity he confers. Apart from this he is entitled to certain customary presents from his subjects. If he sent his guards to the assistance of any one, he could expect a valuable present in return. The punishment for criminal offences was often in the form of heavy fines which also formed a source of income for the Raja. Also, the Raja received a fee for the execution of all legal documents.

The following were some of the important sources of income for the Rajas of Malabar.²

- (1) 'Amkam'—or battle wager.
- (2) 'Chumkam'—or customs duties. The Rajas levied customs duties on imports and exports and also on transports both by land and sea.
- (3) 'Ezha'—It was often in the form of a fine or penalty.
- (4) 'Kozha'—This was a forcible contribution in cases of emergency.
- (5) 'Tappu'—It was a fine imposed by the Raja upon those who were convicted of unintentional offences.

1. Visschers' letter No. XI.

2. Manual of the Malabar District. Appendix XIII. Also, History of Kerala. Vol. II, P. 324—336

(6) 'Pizha'—It was a fine imposed on criminals according to the magnitude of the crime and the circumstances of the criminal. It sometimes extended to the total confiscation of property.

(7) 'Purushāntaram' or succession duty. Whenever an heir succeeded to an eminent position as Nadu Vazhi, Desa Vazhi or land lord, he was expected to pay a stipulated amount as revenue to the Raja.

(8) 'Pulayāthu Pennu'—The Raja had the right to dispose of the women who were convicted of offences like adultery. The Rajas used to exact large amounts of money from their families for their protection. He could also sell them to whomsoever he pleased.

(9) 'Kazhcha'—It consisted of presents made by the people to the Raja on ceremonial occasions,

(10) 'Dathu Kazhcha'—It was a fee imposed on persons who wanted legal sanction to make adoptions.

(11) 'Ponnarippu'—This was the share given to the Raja for the sifting of gold.

(12) 'Attatakkam'—or escheat.

(13) 'Atimappanam'—It was the yearly payment made by the Raja's slaves.

(14) 'Chērikkal'—These were the Raja's private dominions acquired by lapse or escheat.

(15) 'Aimula'—Cows with five dugs belonged to the Raja.

(16) 'Kumula'—Cows with three dugs belonged to the Raja.

(17) 'Cehnkompū'—Cattle that were employed for bull fights, etc., were the Raja's property.

(18) 'Pūvālu'—Cattle with a marked tail.

(19) 'Kannata Pully'—Beeves born with a peculiar white spot near the eye.

(20) 'Anapiti'—Wild elephants caught from jungles.

(21) 'Utanja Urukkal'—This meant ship-wrecked vessels.

(22) 'Kinattil Panni'—Wild animals that had fallen into wells or pits.

127. "Kappal" }
 128. "Kappal" } The above are the names to be made to the
 129. "Kappal" } the Government of Malabar.
 130. "Kappal" }

131. "Kappal" is a name of a certain occasion, *etc.*

132. "Kappal" is a name of a certain occasion.

133. "Kappal" is a name of a certain occasion, *etc.*

134. "Kappal" is a name of a certain occasion.

135. "Kappal" is a name of a certain occasion, *etc.*

136. "Kappal" is a name of a certain occasion.

Apart from the above, it is stated that the Raja was entitled to
 land tax, i.e., to take a certain amount of the produce of the land.
 Whether or not the Malabar Raja exacted a land tax in addition
 to the various other revenues is a question of dispute. It
 appears that he did not exact a land tax before the Mysorean
 invasion. Justice Kunhi Raman Nair observes:—"Land taxes
 were unknown in Kerala in ancient days. The ruler derived
 his income from other sources than land tax. The Rajas
 and Porams of old do not appear to have exacted regular land
 tax until a period when necessity for warlike preparations
 rendered them powerful enough, they levied forced contri-
 butions from land holders in case of emergency." Buchanan
 says: "Under the Government of the Rajas there was no land tax
 but the conqueror (Hyder) soon found the necessity of imposing
 one as the expenses of his military establishment greatly exceeded
 the usual revenues." Most authors agree that the land tax was
 introduced by Hyder for the first time in Malabar. Even though
 Vaneer noticed that there were certain estates in Malabar
 whose owners were obliged to pay an annual tribute to the Raja,
 he makes special mention of the fact that it was regarded as a
 free-will offering rather than a tax.

1. Memorandum on the land tenures of Travancore by Justice Kunhi Raman Nair (Quoted in the History of Kerala, Vol. II, P. 341.)

2. Buchanan—Canara & Malabar P. 65.

JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION

Visscher¹ gives the following account about the administration of justice in Malabar. "Their legal suits are tried according to old customs *viva voce*. No lengthy proceedings are required to obtain the decision of the causes which are concluded within a few days by the fiat of the Raja who in obscure cases consults with his Brahmins."

The warrant of a magistrate was not necessary for laying the property of a person in arrest. Any private individual could do it. The Raja listened to all important cases in his country in return for which he received a fee from the litigants. All dubious cases, where no positive proofs could be found, were decided by solemn oaths by both parties before the temple deity. There was also the system of trial by ordeal. There were ordeals² like boiling oil, poisonous snakes, crocodiles, etc. Trials by ordeal were generally resorted to in heinous criminal cases, like murder and adultery. It is evident that there were no written laws in the country having a universal application. Van Rheede noted that the people were not bound to obey the orders of the king if they were beyond the limits of "law." By this law, he only meant the customs and traditions of the country. Logan says "If it were necessary to sum up in one word the law of the country as it stood before the Mahomedan invasion and British occupation, that word would undoubtedly be the word 'Custom.' In Malayalam it would be 'maryāda' 'Mārgam' and 'Acharam' all signifying established rule and custom and all of them Sanskrit words."³

The Raja was the highest authority in the administration of justice. He listened to original cases as well as appeals from Desa Vazhis and Nadu Vazhis. The village republics had their own system of dispensing justice. We have referred to the part played by Pramanis in Villages who settled minor disputes.

1. Visscher's letter No. X.

2. The existence of the system of ordeals in ancient Malabar is attested to by the writings of Fra Batolomeo, (Ref: voyage to the East-Indies) Walter Hamilton (Re: Hindustain) Barbosa (Description of the coasts of Africa and Malabar in the 16th cent.) Grose (voyage to East-Indies). There is evidence to prove that the system was prevalent even in second half of the 19th cent.

3. Manual of the Malabar District P. P. 110—111.

caste, religion and public morality. The Pramanis had no written rules of procedure, but they followed the conventions and traditions of the village. They sought the help of learned Brahmins for complicated cases. The decisions of the Pramanis and Karnavars were generally accepted by the litigants without any murmur. Repudiating the authority of the Karnavars was considered a grave offence against society, and it could even lead to social ostracism. For the settlement of civil disputes, there was a special civil tribunal consisting of the elders of the village. The Nadu Vazir was the chief judge in his district. He also could get the assistance of learned Brahmins in the settlement of cases. The kings used to appoint judicial officers for hearing important cases. It was the sovereign's duty to uphold the 'Dharma' and preserve the 'Maryāda' of his country.

In Calicut there was an officer called 'Thalachennavar' to administer justice. There seem to have been special courts for Hindus, Mohamedans, Jews and Christians. The method followed for realising debts was very simple. A creditor could effect an arrest on the debtor by a very simple procedure. The token of this embargo or arrest was the leaf of a cashew nut or other tree which was tied on the article thus arrested; if it was land it was stuck upon a stick, the party exercising this privilege announcing 'this is the 'Rama' or the arrest of the Raja.' The 'Rama' was the sacred symbol of justice recognised by the people. Hamilton also refers to this method of realising debts. He says "They have a good way of arresting people for debt, viz., there is a proper person and with a small stick from the judge who is generally a Brahmin, and when that person finds the debtor he draws a circle around him with a stick and charges him in the king and judge's name, not to stir out of it till the creditor is satisfied either by payment or surety and it is no less than death to the debtor to break prison by going out of the circle." This simple method of issuing an interdict to the debtor's person or property was widely followed in all parts of Malabar.¹

1 "A tuft of three green twigs tied to a doorway precluded persons from crossing the threshold of a house and a similar tuft tied to the end of a staff stuck in the ground was, and still is, in some parts a sign that there is an interdict on the crops there growing."

The institution of slavery was prevalent in Malabar from very ancient times. There was a special class of slaves called 'Pulayās' who were confined to the task of tilling the soil for their lords. The land lords were bound to feed their slaves throughout the year. As the slaves¹ were employed in the estates of their masters all through the year, the wages they received were sufficient for their maintenance. Wages were often in kind. By the ancient laws of Malabar the lord was the sole owner of the slave, answerable to nobody for the slave's life. He could inflict punishment on his slave which might even extend to death. Slaves could be sold by their masters at their pleasure. The Dutch used to buy slaves in large numbers. This system of selling slaves was abolished when the English took charge of the administration of Malabar. Articles (3) of the Dutch terms of capitulation at Cochin demanded that "the Dutch officers and soldiers should be allowed to take with them all their effects without their being liable to any search, their servants and slaves whilst those that are married would likewise be at liberty to take their families with them." To this the English replied that 'slave' was a name unknown in the British dominions. After the surrender of Cochin, the English Government wrote to the Dutch requesting them to abolish the practice of buying children as slaves. But they declined saying that they realised large sums of money by it. Day says that when Cochin was taken almost every servant in the place was found to be a slave.

1 The institution of slavery is attributed to Parasu Rama who is said to have organised a separate caste of slaves for tilling the soil. The historical explanation of this slave caste is that they were the original inhabitants of the country who were conquered and subdued by the northern invaders. There were three classes of slaves (1) by birth (2) by punishment (3) by purchase. The Pulaya, Paraya, Veta and other such tribes are condemned to be slave by birth. People accused of crimes against caste and society were condemned to be slaves. There was regular trade in slaves and many slaves were carried away by the European merchants, to be employed as workmen in their estates. Day observes "Report says that the Church (in Cochin) was occupied as a slave godown on special emergencies and that in the week day, when the sacred edifice was not required for religious purposes, it was employed to keep those unfortunate creatures in, who had usually been carried off by the Moplas and sold to the Dutch who shipped them to Ceylon, Batavia, the Cape and other places."

Day. Land of the Perumals. P. P. 183—84,

It is worth noting in this connection that the 'Pulaya' system of slavery continues in many parts of Malabar even to-day. Of course, notable changes have come about in the relationship between the master and the slave. Still in many backward parts of Malabar the 'Pulaya' is confined to the tilling of his master's soil. The Pulayas live in the lands of their masters who exercise over them some sort of a proprietary right. Formerly social degradation was a penalty imposed by judicial tribunals for civil and criminal offences. This practice of course, prevails no longer. But the Pulaya system of slavery still continues as a relic of the past.

CHAPTER XIII

THE DUTCH POSSESSIONS IN MALABAR.

MALABAR was only one among the many possessions the Dutch had in the East. The Dutch were concentrating their attentions mainly on the Spice Islands which were the main sources of their income and centres of their trade. To the Dutch Government at home Malabar was comparatively an insignificant acquisition. From the list of the numerous Dutch possessions given below, we will get an idea as to the insignificant status of Malabar as a trade settlement :—

- (1) Moluccas, under a Governor.
- (2) Amboina and 10 other islands, under a Governor.
- (3) Banda and 9 other islands, under a Governor.
- (4) Macassar, under a Governor.
- (5) Solar and Timor, under a chief.
- (6) Malacca with various subordinate factories in the Malay Peninsula and on the East Coast of Sumatra, under a Governor.
- (7) West Coast of Sumatra, under a Chief.
- (8) Jambi, under a Chief.
- (9) Palembang, under a Chief.

- (10) *Malabar, under a Commander.*
- (11) *Surat, under a Director.*
- (12) *Mocha, under a Chief,*
- (13) *Persia (Gombroon), under a Director.*
- (14) *Ceylon, under a Governor, with subordinate Commanders at Jaffna and Galle.*
- (15) *Japan (Island Desima off Nagasaki), under a Chief.*
- (16) *Coromandel, under a Governor.*
- (17) *Bengal, under a Director.*
- (18) *Batavia, under a Governor General.*
- (19) *Samarang or North east Coast of Java, under a Commander.*
- (20) *Bantam (Java), under a Chief.*
- (21) *Cheribon (Java), under a Chief.*
- (22) *Cape of Good hope, under a Governor.*

This list consisting of about 22 important trade settlements shows the Company's possessions in 1725. In the territories under a Governor or Commander the Dutch were maintaining forts and garrisons. They had also certain sovereign rights in these territories. But in those under a Chief or Director, the Dutch had only commercial interests and rights. In Malabar as we have seen already, the Dutch had many important forts and certain sovereign rights.

The possessions of the Company on the Malabar Coast, consisted of "forts, the buildings within them and lands either taken from the Portuguese or conquered since." The most important fortresses of the Dutch in Malabar were Quilon, Kayamkulam, Porakkad, Cranganore, Palliport, Chettwaye and Cochin. The Dutch had a fortress at Cannanore and also a small settlement at Calicut.

Speaking about Quilon, Gollennesse observes:—"This State is small and produces nothing of importance except a little pepper; and although considerable consignments of this grain are some times supplied, most of it is imported from Peritally and other places. The fortress of the Hon'ble Company likewise

called Quilon lies within the lines of the Signatty which were so manfully defended last year by the brave Nairs, under the gallant old Rajadore Achuda Barrier against the entire forces of the Raja of Travancore that the latter had to raise the siege with great loss and shame. The residential town of the king is also within these lines and the Travancore works lie within a stone throw and could be bombarded from fort Quilon."¹

Captain Neuhoff was the Chief Director of Dutch East India Company at Quilon. The Dutch had occupied Quilon even before they had established their Government at Cochin. They remained in possession of the fort for nearly a century. Nicuhoff's accounts about Quilon are interesting. "The city is fortified with a stone wall of 18-20 feet high and 8 bastions; its suburbs which are very large and stately are by the Portuguese called Colang China..... The harbour is very convenient for small vessels but not for great ones because the south wind blows directly upon the shore and forces the waves with great violence thither." Even though Quilon was not very strong, it provided ample facilities for defence. The inhabitants of the Dutch settlement at Quilon were mostly Christians. Van Anglebeck says that Christians in Quilon had been the subjects of the Company from 1663 onwards and that they were governed without the least interference of the Raja of Travancore. But there seems to have been some dispute between the Travancore Raja and the Dutch over the rights claimed by the former to collect taxes from the fishermen. The dispute was settled in 1788 by the Peace Conference at Mavelikara. The Dutch agreed that they would collect the tax from the fishermen and remit it to the

1. Visscher describes the usefulness of the Quilon fort as follows:— (Ref Visscher's Letter No. IV.) "This fort is of use in investing the power of the Rajas of Travancore and of Signatti in whose dominions it is situated and as an outpost against foreigners especially the English, whose fort at Anjengo is at no great distance. The fortress of Quilon commands the bay of the same name; tolls are levied from the native traders and licenses issued to them. It possesses little territory inland besides the plain. On the sea side the boundary is marked by a gate with four stone pillars. There are certain stations in this province such as Tengapatnam in the south near Cape Comorin which serve principally as places of despatch of letters, and for cutting mill-stones and other stones used in the service of the East India Company. A good deal of linen is also woven here though the trade belongs to Tutacorin."

Raja's treasury. In turn the Raja promised not to interfere in the affairs of Dutch Quilon. After the surrender of the Cochin fort its dependencies also passed into the hands of the English. The Dutch fortress of Quilon (Tangacherry) became a part of the British Dominions by the Paris Convention of 1841.

Kayamkulam was the first of the factories which the Dutch had acquired in Malabar. But the Raja of Kayamkulam allowed the Dutch only certain trade privileges. He refused to comply with their request for building a fort there. Kayamkulam had a good bazaar or market place where all kinds of wares were sold. The Company had a factory in the interior. At the mouth of the river they had a "preventive station."

The Dutch had an important factory at Porakkad. The Company received about 400,000 lbs. of pepper from Porakkad. Porakkad produced large quantities of rice also.

The Dutch fort at Cranganore¹ was small but strong. The fort served as an outpost against the Raja of Cranganore and still more against the Raja of Porakkad. "It was also of use as a preventive station and against the smuggling trade and the transit of prohibited goods as well as in levying certain tolls for the East India Company."² The Raja's strength at Cranganore was comparatively insignificant and as such the Company had great influence there. Moens writing about the usefulness of the Cranganore fort says that it was the fort that checked the progress of Hyder Ali. "If this small fortress had not been there, and the hook of Ayakotta had not been fortified—since they are the only two places outside the lines of defence of Travancore where a passage is possible—the Nawab would have broken through for good; and the utility of this little fort was clearly proved." The Dutch had always asserted sovereign

1 Nieuhoft gives the following description about Cranganore:—"It was very famous among the Indians by reason of its antiquity; being situated upon the bank of a river about a league from the sea shore defended by a wall of earth and a stone breakwork; which had seven bastions and the wall of earth three more. At the point near the river is remaining to this day a strong stone tower for the defence of the river which served instead of a bulwark on that side. On the other point was a small fort which commanded the river and all ships going out or in "

2 Visscher letter No. IV.

authority over Cranganore. Cranganore never seems to have been an independent country. Formerly it was an appendage of the Zamorin. Later, by the treaty of 1717 between the Dutch and the Zamorin, Cranganore was placed under the jurisdiction of the Company. The Rajas of Cranganore had traditional marriage relationship with the Zamorin's family. We find the Dutch Governor, rebuking the Raja of Cranganore for giving protection to the Zamorin and his family who were driven out of the country by Hyder. The Dutch Governor asserted that "according to a lawful contract between him and the Hon'ble Company all the land from Chettwaye to Cranganore was under the ownership of the Company and also that His Highness and his whole country were under the protection of the Company; that therefore his request to send away the Zamorin's family and followers was not unreasonable." The Dutch Governor warned the Raja that he must thereafter abide implicitly by the "good advice" given by the Company.

The Dutch had from the very beginning considered their fort of Cranganore an expensive one. As early as 1680 they had decided to reduce, if not to destroy, their forts at Cranganore and Quilon. They had even offered to sell it to the Portuguese from whom they had conquered it. In 1697 they reduced their garrison at Cranganore to a small force of twenty Europeans. In 1767 the Batavian Government issued strict orders to the Cochin Governor Breekport to destroy the fortress. But, he refrained from doing so as there was threat of a Mysorean invasion. We have already described the Mysorean invasion of Cranganore and the subsequent prospects of the fort there. In August 1789 the Dutch sold the fort to the Travancore Raja.

The Dutch had a small fort at Palliport. It was situated on the island of Vypeen between Ayakotta and Cochin. The Dutch had captured the fort from the Portuguese. But they sold it along with Cranganore to Travancore.

The fort at Chettwaye was a fairly important one. Visscher speaks of it as the strongest fortress in Malabar in his time. It served partly to protect their commerce and partly as a defence against the Zamorin. The Dutch had surrendered this fortress to the Zamorin in 1691, but ever since it had been a bone of

contention between the Dutch and the Zamorin. Finally after a severe war in 1717 the Dutch regained their possession at Chettwaye.

The Dutch fortress at Cannanore was captured from the Portuguese immediately after the conquest of Cochin. The Portuguese Commander at Cannanore surrendered the fort to the Dutch without offering any resistance in February 1663. The Portuguese used to assert their claim on Cannanore on the ground that the Dutch had gained possession of it after the signing of the treaty between Portugal and Holland in Europe. The treaty was signed on the 6th of August 1661. But it was brought into force only on the 14th of March 1663. On that ground the Dutch refused to surrender the fort to the Portuguese. The Dutch were on friendly terms with the Ali Raja of Cannanore. According to the instructions of the home Government, the Cannanore fortress was ceded to the Ali Raja in 1771.

Cochin was the strongest fortress the Dutch had in Malabar. It was a town of considerable importance even before it came into the hands of the Dutch. The Portuguese had a sufficiently strong fortress there, but the Dutch reduced its size considerably. Visscher notes that the fortifications in Cochin were sufficient to protect the town against the natives, who were ignorant of the science of besieging and the methods of bombarding. But they were not strong enough to resist a large European force.¹ Moens in his memoirs gives instructions to his successors to keep the fort always in repairs. It was Moens who was mainly responsible for the repairing of the Dutch fortifications at Cochin. In the time of his predecessors the fort had been in a very ruinous

1. Visscher gives the following description about the town:—"The circumference of the town is tolerably extensive. It would take a man a good half hour walk round the walls. But the space enclosed by them contains several unoccupied portions. The streets are regular enough but the houses are quaint and built after the old Portuguese fashion . . . The town of Cochin is inhabited by Christians for the heathens are not allowed by their own laws to dwell in it. The inhabitants comprise however different classes. There are the native Christians, the Topasses and the Europeans; the last who from the most considerable portion of them comprising also the mixed race sprung from European fathers and native mothers.....There is a very commodious roadstead in which several ships from all parts of the world annually cast anchor."

condition. Speaking about the defences of the fort, Stavorinus¹ observes "Although it cannot be said that the greatest part of these fortifications are constructed according to the exact rules of art, yet the place is sufficiently fortified to withstand a *coup-de-main*, and it would require a regular siege to take it. Approches cannot even be made from any other quarter than from the south, where there is a dry and level plain; for to the eastward as well as to the river there are several morasses which would render an attack on that side extremely difficult, besides the place is fortified the strongest on that side and is weakest by the sea side."

Apart from the fortresses we have described above, the Dutch had many costly buildings and landed properties. In the time of Moens the buildings of the Company were all in fairly good condition. He was mainly responsible for the renovation of many buildings. The important buildings at Cochin were the Government House and the Church. When the Dutch captured Cochin from the Portuguese, they found there many religious establishments. There were monasteries of the order of St. Paul and St. Augustine. The Jesuits too had their establishments within the walls of the town. The Dutch however did not devote much of their attention to construct buildings or monuments. The Dutch had residencies in almost all their settlements. The Dutch Residency at Thengappattanam, says Gollennesse, was a small mud building worth nothing which had been broken down by the enemy. They had a Residency at Ponnani made of mud which was also in ruins. Gollennesse speaks of the necessity of re-thatching it every year. The Dutch Governor wanted to tile the building, but the Zamorin had never consented to this proposal thinking that it would mean a permanent establishment of Dutch influence in his country. The Dutch had 'Lodges' at Kayamkulam and Porakkad. They were unfortified factories or ware-houses, mostly thatched buildings of mud. The Dutch Governor at Cochin had no authority to erect wooden buildings without the consent of the Batavian Government. Gollennesse gives the following instruction to his successor:—"Of repairs which require undertaking you will find plenty every where with so many fortifications, lodges and buildings. Still in my opinion

1. (Stavorinus. Dutch Admiral 1775-1778.)

twenty four carpenters and ten brick layers will be sufficient in future in the town here. This number can always be increased if necessary from among Topass workmen, who may be had here in large number for one schelling a day. Yachts, sloops and smaller vessels for the use of this commandery and for other settlements are constructed here firm and strong."

The Dutch had extensive landed properties in Malabar. But they were scattered in different places both in Travancore and in Cochin. This was a cause of frequent friction between the Company and the Rajas. Near their fortress at Cranganore, the Dutch had many fields and gardens which they used to lease out to the natives. They also possessed the islands of Muthukunnoo in the neighbourhood of Cranganore. In an appendix to the memoirs of Moens we find an exhaustive list of all the landed properties they had. The Dutch had on the whole nine islands and sixty nine gardens and lands. In their landed properties they had 42,089 fruit bearing cocoanut and other trees. They had about 4,500 paras of cultivated land and 19,716 salt pans. The Dutch Governor earnestly wished that he could possess one "fine bit of land" in the same place instead of having landed properties scattered in different parts. Moens' suggestion was to exchange the Dutch properties in the Travancore territory with Raja of Travancore for his territories which lay bordering on the Dutch possessions. But he knew perfectly well that the Travancore Raja would not part with 'even a span of his territory.' Therefore he was thinking of selling them to Travancore for a sum proportional to the annual revenue they had from them.

The military establishments of the Dutch in Malabar were rather too costly for them. The Dutch realised pretty well that their commercial interests should be backed up by military power. But they had always shown a reluctance in having elaborate military establishments in Malabar. After the capture of Cochin the Dutch authorities were seriously considering whether they should retain all the fortifications of the Portuguese. It was decided on the 24th January 1663 that a large part of the town should be pulled down and the fortifications should be reduced to such an extent that it could be managed by a small garrison. Accordingly the Dutch destroyed many houses and public buildings at Cochin. But fortifications were highly indispensable

in Malabar so long as the Dutch did not have any settled Government there. Therefore they decided to keep a small garrison at Cochin and Quilon, Chettwaye, Cranganore and Cannanore. The Batavian Government decided that in times of peace Cochin should have only 300 soldiers, Quilon 99, Chettwaye 144, Cranganore 56 and Cannanore 79. But these garrisons were hardly sufficient for even defensive purposes. Therefore we find the Dutch authorities at Cochin frequently writing to Ceylon and Batavia for reinforcements. In their campaign of 1740 the Dutch received reinforcements from Ceylon to the extent of 158 Europeans and 191 Malayas. In 1741 the whole Dutch garrison consisted of only 350 Europeans and 400 Malayas. This was too weak for defence against Travancore. Therefore the Dutch wrote to Ceylon for a reinforcement of 200 Europeans and 200 Malayas. But the Ceylon Government was not in a position at that time to spare any soldiers. The Dutch were planning for enlisting some 1,000 men from the Pandyan country. The Dutch Government at Cochin asked for 2,000 soldiers from Batavia in order to wage the Travancore war. If the Zamorin was also to attack them they wanted some 3000 more. These frequent demands for large numbers of soldiers from Ceylon and Batavia show how weak their military position was. Moens the ablest of the Dutch Governors at Cochin, had pointed out to the Batavian Government on many occasions the dangers of having no strong garrisons in Malabar. He was of opinion that Hyder would not have dared an invasion of their possessions if they had a strong military force in Malabar. Moens was trying to keep up the prestige of the company among the native princes by dexterity rather than by strength. But as the Council of Seventeen observed in a general letter of the 30th October 1776 "the deep decline in which these forces were, had been observed even by the native princes and had made an impression on their mind." The Dutch at Cochin had to depend upon the services of native troops whenever there was an emergency and this involved considerable expenditure for them. Moens was of opinion that it was better to keep in their service native Christians and 'Chegos' (Chovas or Ezhavas) as they were more faithful than the sepoys. From the writings of Moens it is clear that the Dutch at Cochin were occasionally sending soldiers to Batavia. In 1779 about 190 men were sent to Batavia. In the

next year the Batavian Government asked for about 300 more of which 180 were sent.

The Dutch garrisons in Malabar, though small in number were well equipped. At Quilon the Dutch had a big store house for gun powder. From the writings of Gollennesse it appears that the Dutch were formerly sending "spoilt gun powder to Ceylon to be made up again." But during his time the Jews of Cochin were doing that work. Gollennesse says that in his time about 3,100 lbs. of spoilt gun powder had been imported to Cochin to be made useful again by some methods known to the Jews. The gun powder store house at Quilon seems to have been a worn out one, and there were frequent suggestions to construct a new one there. The artillery equipment of the Dutch was not very weak. At Cochin they had 150 guns, at Ayakotta 10 guns, on the island of Muthukunnu 3 guns, at Cranganore 22 guns and at Quilon 14 guns. Besides these, they had guns on board the ships and in reserve field artillery, mortars, etc.¹

The marine force of the Dutch was comparatively insignificant. Moens writes in 1781 "We have only a two-masted and one-masted sloop and a quick sailing native vessel besides seven gamels and three little couts which are used for wading and discharging cargo and for fetching water daily from higher up the river for the garrison, besides a row boat for towing and for taking people to and from ships. Three of the gamels are equipped for war so that use can be made of them in the river." The Dutch were employing native Mukhavas (fishermen) to man their vessels and to work in the dock-yard. They had a few European soldiers in their service and some experienced linesmen and gunners.

1. Appendix VII to the Memoirs of Moens.

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1. Appendix VII to the Memoirs of Moens,

CHAPTER XIV

THE POLICY OF THE DUTCH IN MALABAR

A. ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY.

IT is easy to discover that the Dutch were following no steady policy in Malabar. Their policy changed with the changes in circumstances. They had also different policies with the different princes of Malabar. We always find the Dutch making frequent adjustments in their general policy towards the Rajas of Malabar—adjustments always dictated by prudence and necessity. We may, however, note in general that their policy falls into two distinct periods. They were following one general policy from the capture of Cochin to the treaty of Mavelikara. From the treaty of Mavelikara onwards, they were following, rather they were compelled to follow, an essentially different policy.

The principal object of the Dutch in driving the Portuguese out of Malabar was to possess the monopoly of the pepper trade. But, this was not so easy a task as the Dutch thought in the beginning. Soon, they realised that in order to enforce the monopoly, they must have an armed force in the country. When they maintained an armed force it was inevitable that they would get themselves entangled in the local politics. When once they took an interest in the Governmental affairs of the Malabar princes, they could not but take an interest in seeing their sovereign rights recognised in the country. Thus, they tried to carry on trade with the backing of political power. It was too late when the Dutch realised the mistake in their policy. By that time they had lost both their trade and political power.

The political condition in Malabar was, no doubt, responsible for inducing the Dutch to appear as a sovereign power. The merchants who captured the Cochin fort in 1663 found that they could very easily bring the whole of Cochin under their influence. The destruction of the Portuguese power in Cochin had thrown the entire State into confusion and in the absence of a powerful ruler, anarchy prevailed there. The throne was keenly contested by rival parties and soon opportunities presented themselves for

the Dutch to appear as king-makers in Cochin. When the Cochin Raja was crowned by the Dutch Governor under the insignia of the Company, the Dutch Company ceased to be a pure trading corporation; it became a sovereign power with the onerous responsibility of protecting a prince on the throne. The Dutch made the best use of the helplessness of the Cochin Raja and cleverly pushed on their commercial designs. We have already seen that the relations between the Raja of Cochin and the Dutch were not always cordial. The Raja was frequently complaining about the high handedness of the Dutch authorities, while the Dutch were feeling disconcerted about the disloyalty of the Raja. However, the Dutch always took care to see that the Raja gave them the fixed quota of pepper.

When the Dutch found that they could very easily establish their supremacy in Cochin, they were tempted to extend it to other parts of Malabar. The frequent disputes among the native princes gave them convenient opportunities. They posed themselves as arbitrators to settle these disputes. Meanwhile, they had humbled the Zamorin of Calicut and extended their trade influence to many parts of northern Malabar. Their fortifications at Cochin, Cranganore, Cannanore, Ayakotta and other places had made them a power to be feared by the weak princes and nobles of Malabar.

It is probable that if the Dutch had confined their attentions to the north instead of interfering in the politics of Travancore, they could have succeeded in maintaining their possessions at least in the north. But, they took the unwise policy of appearing as the supporters of rival factions in Travancore—a policy which led to their final ruin. We may say in fairness to the Dutch that they were dragged into the politics of the South by the force of new circumstances. They could not have remained as silent spectators of the new and rapid turn of events in the South, even though that was actually what their policy finally came to. The rise of Marthanda Varma foiled all their schemes and placed them in a completely altered position. Marthanda Varma's military activities radically altered the political system of Malabar and in that revolutionary process of change the Dutch found their position also upset. It was no doubt foolish on the part of the Dutch to have appeared on the scene as the champions

of the smaller princes against Marthanda Varma. The Dutch were trying to play the role of arbitrators between the princes of the South. But, unlike as in the north, there was a Marthanda Varma in the South who was never prepared to accept the mediation of the Dutch. When the Raja of Kayamkulam applied to the Dutch Governor for help against Marthanda Varma, the Dutch were not prepared to commit themselves to any undertakings. Even though the Dutch did not send help to Kayamkulam, they warned the Travancore Raja to desist from violating the territories of other princes. But, the warnings of the Dutch as we have already seen, had very little effect on Marthanda Varma. He went ahead with his scheme of annexation. When he quietly dispossessed the Rani of Elayadathu Swaroopam of her territories, the Dutch thought it was time they took strong steps. This brought the Company into a most disastrous war with Travancore—a war which taught the Dutch a most valuable lesson of experience in the East. Finally the Dutch had to bow to the inevitable. And with their characteristic knack of making the best of every thing, they accepted the terms of Marthanda Varma at Mavelikara. The treaty of Mavelikara was the injurious end of the ambitious phase of the Company's career in Malabar. This treaty which neither brought credit nor money stripped the Dutch of all their pretences to sovereign authority and placed them again in the position of merchants. The Dutch were to follow a new policy thereafter.

The Dutch Governor Moens realised more than any body else that new circumstances had set in and that a new policy to suit the circumstances should be followed. A valuable lesson which the Dutch learned from the ruinous war with Travancore was that it was not expedient to entangle the Company in another war. The Dutch realised that if the Company's concerns continued to be directed on the old principles, a complete decline was to be expected. The following were some of the weighty considerations¹ for the Dutch at that time for giving up their old policy and adopting a new one:—

“Even if we are completely successful (against Travancore), it would not be of an advantage to us commensurate with the cost of war, because the other chiefs having obtained elbow

rooms would go their old ways again on account of their well known and proved ingratitude without for this reason supplying more pepper than they used to ;

“That wars have rather served on the one hand to reveal the impotence of Europeans against the natives of the country, if they have to be brought to reason by force of arms, on the other hand to impose a great and unbearable burden on us than to bring to the Company something substantial proportioned to the great hazards, inconveniences, burdens and losses which it has brought on itself on this coast more than once by wars ;

“That each time the war ends, all the expenses of maintenance of a garrison cannot be reduced all at once and so according as anything happens from time to time the expenses gradually and imperceptibly grew.”

Finally the Dutch decided that in the future, affairs ought to be looked upon from another point of view, and native chiefs should be allowed to attack one another although they should ruin each other. It was this policy that compelled them to make peace with Travancore. By making peace with Travancore the Dutch were ignoring all their former treaty obligations with the Malabar Rajas and chieftains. They were fully conscious of the fact that a treaty with Travancore would endanger their prestige and fair name in Malabar. But, they were not prepared to follow the alternative policy of allying with the Malabar princes against the Travancore Raja. If they had pursued that policy their sovereign position in Malabar would have been rightly vindicated. But, the Dutch thought “it was in any case better to make their authority grow imperceptibly again by means of the new system than by sticking to the old to see it gradually brought more and more to scorn.”

But, we have already seen the disastrous consequences of this new policy. To put in a nut-shell, it resulted in the annihilation of Dutch influence in Malabar.

The treaty the Dutch had signed with Travancore did not in any way solve their pressing problems. On the contrary, it only worsened them. The Amsterdam Government wrote to the Dutch authorities at Batavia (letters dated 13th October, 1755 and 4th October, 1756) that they should be watching the progress

of the Travancore prince and be "on their guard at every turn of events." They were afraid that Travancore would be "a dangerous neighbour to the Company," and therefore the Dutch in Malabar were to see that "one party was kept in check by the other." But it was no longer in the power of the Dutch to play the role of the keepers of the political balance of Malabar; they themselves were in grave danger of extinction. When the Dutch Commandant tried to persuade the Travancore Raja from desisting from his aggressive designs on the neighbouring countries, the Raja plainly told him that it would be better to mind his own business.

We have already noticed that the Dutch were following in Cochin a policy entirely different from what they were following in other parts of Malabar. This was because of the fact that they had assumed the protectorate of the kingdom of Cochin. By their treaty with the Cochin Raja, they had committed themselves to the task of protecting the integrity of his State at all costs. The Dutch had some important and "weighty reasons" for the retention of their power in Cochin. Vißcher¹ gives three 'weighty' reasons for its retention. The first was that it was highly necessary for the promotion of their pepper trade in Malabar. The main object of the Dutch, as we have often stressed, was to obtain the monopoly of the pepper trade and this could be made possible only by keeping their territorial supremacy in Cochin. The Dutch knew perfectly well that if they were to give up their sovereign position in Cochin, the Portuguese would regain their lost power. Further, the English also were having an eye on Cochin. The second consideration was that it was very useful as a provisioning station for vessels sailing from Batavia to Mocha, or returning from Surat and Persia to Batavia. They could obtain at Cochin plenty of victuals like poultry, pigs, cattle, fish and fruits at a very cheap rate. The third 'weighty reason' for the retention of Cochin was that it served as an outpost to protect Ceylon from the attacks of other European nations. The Dutch were aware of the designs of the English on Ceylon. And they understood the value of the Cochin fort for all measures of defence.

1. Vißcher letter No VI.

Visscher¹ gives some useful hints to the Dutch Commandants of Cochin to be followed in their relations with the local Rajas. He says that the Commandant should be very ready—witted when he converses with the Rajas. He must also cultivate “a figurative and metaphorical mode of expression which, besides being considered a proof of wisdom, would enable him to throw a cloak over subjects which were disagreeable to them and to carry out measures which they would not take so easily if they were expressed in plain words.”

Visscher suggests five important rules to be followed by the Commandant for the successful management of the country.

(1) “The Commandant must effectually defend the kingdom of Cochin against the future attacks of its enemies to which end the Company have declared themselves the protector of that kingdom. If this were not done, the Zamorin would weaken the power of the Raja of Cochin and would allow the other nations to establish themselves in the territories he might gain.”

(2) “The Commandant must especially endeavour to prevent the Raja of Cochin from making aggressions on the Zamorin or others or provoking them to war; which he would be very ready to do relying on the Company’s arms and hoping by their assistance to regain some lands which he lays claim.”

(3) “He must enquire narrowly into the justice of the claims the Rajas make mutually on each other as he is often called on to arbitrate between them. This is the more necessary as their claims are very obscure and are seldom settled, so that they have continual pretexts for the wars which perpetually arise between them. A wise Commandant will take care not to involve himself in these disputes unless they immediately affect the interests of the Company.”

(4) “He must be thoroughly acquainted with the laws and customs of the natives who cling very much to them making a part of their religion. They carry these feelings to such an extent that if a Commandant were unwillingly to infringe their laws in passing sentence it would arouse a general spirit of murmuring and dissatisfaction.”

1. Visscher letter No. VI.

(5) "He must undertake no wars without great deliberation and with a good prospect of success as the Company might otherwise be placed in danger."

Summing up all these advices of Visschér we may say that the key-note of the policy he recommended was to keep the Company away from local wars. In posing as the protectors of Cochin, the Dutch knew they could not evade wars entirely. But they wanted to see that the Cochin Raja did not misuse the Company's pledge of assistance for his own private ends. Commandant Johannes Hertenberg had exacted a stipulation from the Raja of Cochin that he would not undertake any hostilities against the Zamorin or any other prince without the previous knowledge and consent of the Company.

It is interesting to examine how far the Dutch were able to keep up their pledge of protecting Cochin from its enemies. The Zamorin was the traditional enemy of Cochin and the Dutch had given ample warning to Cochin not to give any provocation for war to the Zamorin. From 1701 to 1710 the Dutch had however to take up sides with Cochin against Calicut. But soon they realised that it was a mistake on their part to spend the Company's resources for a war for the protection of Cochin. In 1721 the Batavian Government passed a resolution that the Cochin Raja was no longer to be assisted in his wars with the Zamorin. The Dutch Government at Cochin was scrupulously following a policy of "masterly inactivity." Even when the aggressive activities of Marthanda Varma threatened the integrity of Cochin, the Dutch were not prepared to lend active assistance to the Raja. The Raja of Cochin continued to remonstrate before the Dutch authorities at Cochin and Batavia. He used to complain before the Dutch Commandant about the great injustice that had been done to him. When he found the Cochin Government indifferent, he wrote bitter letters of complaint to Batavia. But the Dutch were in no mood to help him. Even if they wanted to help him, they were not in a position to do so. The maximum concession they could exact from Marthanda Varma was that he would live in friendship with the Raja of Cochin provided the latter would give no cause to the contrary! But Marthanda Varma was to be the judge of the Cochin Raja's conduct. It was open to him to turn against Cochin at any

moment on the ground that Cochin had given reasons for a war. We have already seen how Cochin was compelled to enter into a treaty with Travancore by which Cochin relieved herself of all obligations to the Dutch.

If the new policy of the Dutch proved disastrous to their interests with the rise of Marthanda Varma, it proved all the more so with the invasion of the Mysoreans. In the course of the Mysorean invasions, the Dutch displayed a genius for 'timid diplomacy' which made them appear ridiculous before the Malabar princes. They first tried to court the friendship of Hyder Ali. But Hyder treated all their overtures with studied contempt. The Dutch took all precautions to give no room for offence to Tippu Sultan. But, Tippu also had realised the powerlessness of the Dutch in Malabar. The policy of the Dutch in this period was quite characteristic of a merchant association. They viewed every thing from a selfish angle and adjusted their policies accordingly. But political power had slipped off their hands long before, and therefore, they had ceased to matter in settling the affairs of Malabar in the latter half of the 18th century.

We may say in conclusion about the Dutch policy in Malabar that commercial interests governed their administrative policy and their administrative policy ruined their commercial interests.

B. ECONOMIC POLICY

The pathetic declaration of Governor General Mossel that he wished the ocean had swallowed up the coast of Malabar is a good commentary on the achievements of the Dutch in this country. It was for the promotion of their pepper trade that the Dutch tried to obtain political rights in the country. It was for this purpose alone that they waged their expensive wars with the Malabar chieftains. The selling of pepper to other nations was stigmatised as contraband trade and in order to prevent this the Dutch had very often to use force. But they were disillusioned in their objects even at the very beginning of their relations with the Malabar princes. Even if they could compel the Rajas to sell their pepper to the Company, they could not prevent the people from 'carrying on their trade with other nations. Soon the Dutch realised that Malabar was a very

expensive settlement. Visscher¹ writes "Malabar is considered by the East India Company as an expensive settlement for the profits obtained on the goods which are sold here are far from defraying the expenses required for its support." The same view was expressed by Stavorinus. He observes: "Amongst the several conquests and settlements which the Dutch Company have made or established in the Indies, that of Malabar is not one of the most advantageous or important to the Dutch. It costs the Company much money, on account of the destructive wars in which they have in consequence engaged the rivalry in trade of numerous competitors and through last not least the infidelity and speculation of their servants."

The greatest regret of the Dutch in Malabar was that their trade profits and territorial revenues did not commensurate with their expenditure. Malabar was an unimportant settlement for the Dutch from the point of view of revenue.² Even though Malabar was always described as an expensive settlement it should not be taken to mean that the administration of Malabar was always running on a deficit basis. There were many periods when the revenues exceeded the expenses. The administrative reforms of Moens helped a great deal in the augmentation of the

1. Visschers letter No. VI.

2. FINANCES OF DIFFERENT POSSESSIONS:—1760—68.

(In Guilders at about 11 to an English sovereign)

(N. B.—The figures are in thousands)

Possessions.	Territorial revenues.	Trade profits.	Total revenue.	Charges
1. Surat	19	6,050	6,069	1,928
2. Coromandel	511	6,407	6,918	6,111
3. Bengal	653	2,909	3,562	7,967
4. Ceylon	6,453	3,055	9,507	23,101
5. Cape of Good Hope	1,409	324	1,733	4,125
6. Samarang (East coast of Java)	2,315	988	3,303	3,068
7. Batavia	9,318	22,000	31,318	31,373
8. Malabar	938	2,455	3,393	3,471

(Taken from Gallett's Introduction to Dutch in Malabar)

From this list the comparative insignificance of Malabar as a source of income for the Dutch can be known clearly. Malabar was a poor settlement when compared with the Spice Islands or Ceylon.

Company's resources and the curtailment of unnecessary expenses. In 1770-1771 the expenses of the Company amounted to only £. 205,570 while the income was £. 325,687. The following were the items of general revenues and tolls levied by the Company in the time of Moens :—

- (1) On imports and exports of Cochin.
- (2) " " of Quilon
- (3) " " of Cranganore.
- (4) On export of slaves.
- (5) Beer-measure.
- (6) The town inn.
- (7) Sury (toddy) and arrack within the town.
- (8) Sury and arrack outside the town.
- (9) Sury and arrack on the island of Vypeen.
- (10) Tobacco revenue within and without town.
- (11) " on the island of Bendurty.
- (12) " at Cranganore.
- (13) The tolls of the ferry at Vypeen.
- (14) The tolls of the ferry at Anji Caimal.

In Moens' time the gardens and fields were leased out for Rs. 13,674 for a fixed period of twenty years. This system of more or less a permanent revenue settlement was followed as an inducement to cultivators to improve the lands by intensive cultivation. Their tenure for twenty years would be an encouragement for planting more cocoanut trees which were the main sources of income in these lands. Most of the items of revenue were given on a contract basis to local merchants. In the time of Moens the total revenue of the Company (excluding the duty on the export of slaves) amounted to 41,750 Rupees a year.

The revenue administration of the Company was thoroughly reorganised in the time of Moens. His watch word was 'Economy' but he insisted that one must "practise a 'right' and not a 'wrong' economy for the latter was just as injurious, as the former was in the highest degree useful and necessary." The Commandant believed that entrusting the work of building and fortifications to contractors was advantageous from the point of view of cheapness. The Company used to have a close supervision over the work of the contractors. At times the

Company would advance money to the contractors or supply them with materials. Moens gives five rules which according to him constituted the right kind of economy. They were (1) To see that everything was maintained in good condition by means of daily supervision and precautions. (2) When defects or decays were discovered they were to be set right as soon as possible. (3) Works of repairs and fortifications were to be given to contractors who were to be under the direct supervision of the Company's commissioners. In order to secure efficiency of work the Commandant should inspect such works personally. (4) Closest supervision was to be given for works which were not given on contract but which were executed at the expense of the Company. The Commandant must carefully check every bill that was submitted for approval by the Company's servants and find out for himself the correctness or otherwise of the facts contained in the bill. (5) No expenditure whatever was to be incurred on behalf of the Company except such as was highly necessary and unavoidable.

The great importance Moens again and again attached to economy shows how weak the finances of the Company in Malabar were. The Dutch showed a miser's thrift and anxiety in all their activities in Malabar. They viewed their whole enterprise in Malabar purely from a merchant's point of view and were always anxious to see that Malabar caused no unnecessary burden on their resources at Batavia. From the very beginning the Dutch authorities were advising their Commandants in Cochin to follow the strictest economy possible. The maintenance of the fortifications at Cochin, Cranganore and Cannanore was always considered as too expensive by the Dutch and orders had been issued as early as 1686 to reduce the garrisons there. In 1697 the Supreme Government at Batavia passed certain very important resolutions concerning their fortifications and possessions in Malabar. They were as follows:—

(1) "That the fortifications of the city of Cochin which by the large garrison it required and the continual reparations to be made in consequence of the great extent of the walls, were too expensive for the Company to maintain, should be reduced by one half."

(2) "That of the present fortifications of Cannanore, the Portuguese tower should only be preserved with a garrison of twenty or at the most twenty five European soldiers, to which number the present garrison should be reduced.

(3) "That at Cranganore the ancient interior works should only be preserved with a garrison of twenty Europeans, which is judged a sufficient number for the purposes of the Company here."

(4) "That it is likewise judged advisable at Quilon no more should be retained than the old Portuguese tower or as much of the present works as may be thought necessary for the interest of the Company with fifteen or twenty men to which number the establishment should be reduced and that the remainder of the fortifications of the three last mentioned places should be removed or demolished. It was further thereby determined that all military outposts should be withdrawn except that of Paponetty; Porakkad and Kayamkulam should be retained as Residencies or factories in order to keep an eye over what may be going forward all along the coast and to avail of such opportunities of trade as might occur."

"Vessels of all descriptions were to be reduced to one small yacht, two sloops and three row boats."

"The number of pieces of artillery which should be henceforth employed upon the fortifications should be fixed at 95 pieces of iron and six pieces of brass, ordinance with two mortars; and about 530 Europeans and 37 natives were judged sufficient for the service of the Company."¹

We have already observed how the successive Dutch Commandants at Cochin were unwilling to carry out these instructions *in toto*. Of course, they realised the great necessity for economy, but many of them stoutly maintained that if these instructions were carried out, the Company would lose its hold in Malabar. The influence of the Dutch in Malabar mainly depended on their military strength. If they were to give up their fortifications, they would have to give up their trade also. Further

1. Quoted from Stavorinus. Voyage to the East Indies P. 236 et seq.

the Dutch in Malabar, frequently engaged as they were in warfare, could not afford to reduce their fortifications. However much they tried to keep themselves off from their costly wars, they always found themselves involved in them. Some of the Dutch Commandants at Cechin maintained that the question of reducing the garrisons and demolishing fortresses should be left mainly to their discretion. The Batavian Government, being not in direct contact with the affairs in Malabar, was guided by only one motive—viz., economy. But the Dutch Governors who were thoroughly acquainted with the affairs of Malabar held that this measure of economy would be suicidal to their own interests. Moens says "Economy does not exclude doing what is necessary and I am of opinion it would be wrong to practise blind obedience in this matter. For we are supposed to possess a special and local knowledge of the circumstances of the places in which we are stationed. If therefore we receive certain instructions from higher authority with regard to something in the interests of economy, but we are convinced in our own minds that it would not really answer or would have had consequences and should yet obey (if this can be called obedience) then we should be obeying blindly and even liable to punishment, or at least responsible for the consequences." Moens was of opinion that in such cases the Commandants should point out to the Supreme Government the reasons why the instructions should not be carried out. He was confident that the Supreme Government would respect the opinion of the Commandants.

But the Dutch displayed the haste of a shop-keeper who was winding up his business in a certain locality as it was unpromising. The Dutch realised that their expensive settlements in Malabar would serve them no desirable purpose. As Stavorinus remarks "The ostentation of a great power which cost the Company such large sums of money had not the effect of producing in Native Princes that degree of awe and apprehension which was indispensably necessary for carrying out an exclusive trade." Therefore they decided to wind up their business by selling their important fortresses to the native Rajas and by sending back large number of their servants and soldiers to Batavia. What they did not sell was forcibly captured from them by the English.

C. RELIGIOUS POLICY

The history of the Dutch in Malabar is not stained by any heinous acts of forcible conversion or religious persecution. It must be said to the credit of the Dutch that they have left behind an unblemished record of religious activities. In this respect the Dutch stand in striking contrast to the Portuguese. The Portuguese with their sectarian fanaticism placed conversion above commerce in their programme of activities on the Malabar coast. Their policy of conversion was not quite pleasing to the Malabar princes. The Raja of Cochin had strictly forbidden his subjects under pain of very heavy penalties to embrace Roman Catholicism. But, when the Portuguese power became dominant in Malabar, this prohibition was withdrawn. The Portuguese followed an active policy of religious propaganda and even introduced a system of inquisition in order to suppress the anti-Catholic activities of the Jews. The Portuguese carried on their policy of conversion not only among the Hindus but among the Syrian Christians also. Syrian Christians of Malabar, following the tradition that they were converted by the Apostle St. Thomas himself owed allegiance to the see of Antioch in spiritual affairs. They had always stood loyal by their kings in Malabar, and as such had enjoyed many rights and privileges. But their church was not well organised. Neither were the finances of the church sound enough to take up any missionary activities. The Portuguese backed up by their sovereign rights in Malabar, could easily convert many ancient Syrians to Roman Catholicism—a policy which led to bitter hostility between the followers of the two faiths. The Syrian Christians, persecuted by the Portuguese, had taken a solemn pledge in an assembly at Mattancherry never to obey Roman Bishops or follow the rites introduced by the Portuguese. When the Dutch obtained domination in Malabar, the Syrian Christians looked up to them for protection from religious persecution. By the treaty of 1663 between Cochin and the Dutch all the Christians were placed under the protection of the Company. The Dutch fort of Cochin was mainly inhabited by Christians and they were all under the jurisdiction of the Company. It has always been a matter of controversy between the Cochin Raja and the Dutch whether the Christians in Cochin were under the

complete jurisdiction of the Company or not. By the treaty of 1664 it was stipulated that "those Christians who reside in the Raja's territory should obey and perform their obligations to that Government as the heathens do." Moens observes in his Memoirs that the Christians in Malabar had always been relying upon the protection of the Dutch Company. Probably they thought that by placing themselves under the Company's protection, they could escape the payment of taxes to the king. Moens says, "They are no doubt under the protection of the Company, but are in reality subjects of the king, at least those who reside in this territory (Cochin) because there are so many Christians who live in the territory of the Company and are therefore as a matter of fact subjects of the Company. It is the same with the native Christians who are now under the king of Travancore in so far as they inhabit the territory which formerly belonged to the king of Cochin but has since been conquered by the king of Travancore. The Company retains its protection over them." The Company's protection did not mean immunity from punishments. If the Christians were offenders of the Raja's laws they had to suffer the same penalty as the non-Christians. But the ancient Christians enjoyed one important privilege, and that was, they had to pay to the king only half the tax the Hindus had to pay. This privilege, however, was not extended to the new converts. The new converts had to pay the same amount of tax as the Hindus were paying. The Company usually extended its protection only in cases where Christians were harassed by the Rajas or the Hindus in the observance of their religious rites and ceremonies. Even in such cases, the Company would not blindly assist the Christians. It was always the policy of the Dutch to bring moral pressure on the Rajas to see that justice was done to their Christian subjects.

There were frequent disputes between the Cochin Raja and the Dutch concerning the jurisdiction over the native Christians. The treaty of 1663 stated "All free persons and those belonging to the church if subjects of the king of Portugal and those who might be wandering through the country should be included in this treaty." It was clearly stated in this treaty that "All Christians who had been formerly subject to the Government of this fort (Cochin) were to be under the protection of the Dutch Company."

In short, the Dutch claimed protection over the Roman Catholics of Cochin who were formerly under the jurisdiction of the Portuguese. But later, when serious disputes arose between the Raja and the Dutch over this question, it was pointed out by Mr. Powney, the English Commissioner that there was a significant difference in the wording of the treaty as it appeared in the Malayalam copy and the Dutch copy. In the Malayalam copy the Dutch were stated to be having jurisdiction only over the 'Mundukars.' In the Dutch copy, however, the word 'Mundukars' was further explained as referring to all Christians. The Raja held that 'Mundukars' only meant the fishermen of the coast. But Van Anglebeck, the Dutch Commandant at that time, maintained that it included all those who followed the latin ritual.

The Syrian Christians however were not under the complete jurisdiction of the Company. Moens states this fact very clearly. "The Company has never had any authority nor could have over the St. Thomas Christians who were always subjects of the country princes. Not even the Portuguese exercised any jurisdiction over them although they did their utmost with the consent of the king of Cochin to make these Christians accept the doctrines of Rome and acknowledge the hierarchy of the Pope." But the Dutch were taking a keen interest in the affairs of the Syrian Christians also. Probably that might have been due to the fact that the Syrian Christians stoutly opposed the Papal see and the Romish Church. When the three Antiochan Bishops arrived at Malabar, we find the Dutch Commander giving them a very hospitable welcome. They were taken in a Dutch ship from Persia to Malabar. At Cochin the Dutch Commander took special care for their accommodation. We also find the Dutch Commander recommending them to the Travancore Raja's special protection when they were introduced to the Raja at Mavelikara in 1753. The Dutch took great interest in the protection of their rights. Moens says, "The administrators of this coast and the preachers of the reformed community have not only kept up a correspondence with the St. Thomas Christians about maintaining, and advised them to maintain steadfastly the rights of the Eastern Church against the bishops of the Roman Catholics, but have also displayed much zeal in attempting to unite them with

the Protestant Church." It was the great ambition of Moens to effect a union between the Syrian and the Protestant churches. He firmly believed that there was a greater possibility of a union between the Syrians and the Protestants than between the Syrians and the Catholics. The Dutch Commander had invited many learned Syrian priests to his house at Cochin to discuss the possibilities of such a union. The Dutch authorities at Amsterdam too had this object in view and had given special instructions to their officers in Malabar to pursue this policy.

Van Angelbeck mentions two important rights exercised by the Dutch in Cochin over the Christians. (1) All the Christians in Cochin were to be tried by the Dutch. (2) The Raja was not to impose new taxes on the Christians without the knowledge of the Company. But when the Cochin Rajas saw that the power of the Dutch was steadily declining in Malabar, they pressed their rights further over the Christians. By the treaty of 1785 the latin converts "were to pay a tax to the Raja which was to be collected by their own headmen but, should they fail to realise the same, the Dutch Government was obliged to collect it and pay it over to the Raja." The treaty also said "Should Christians purchase or rent lands from the heathens, they were liable to imposter which the purely Christian lands were exempt from."

We have already noticed how the fresh enthusiasm of the Protestant religion had been a powerful stimulus for the political and commercial progress of Holland. When Holland was liberated from the shackles of Catholic Spain, she commenced her new career as a political power in Europe contesting the supremacy of Spain and Portugal beyond the seas. Holland appeared as the rival of Spain and Portugal in religious as well as commercial activities. But even though the Dutch were able to supplant the Portuguese and the Spaniards in the commercial field, they were not quite successful in the realm of religion. This was mainly due to the fact that their programme of religious activities was not so vigorous as that of their rivals. Speaking about the influence of the Protestant religion in Malabar, Gollennesse says, "To my sincere regret I must confess that the Reformed Doctrine has made little progress in spite of all careful forethought and the regulations concerning schools and education of children and

the instructions regarding the penetration of Popish superstitions." Gollennesse bitterly regrets that he could not effectively counteract the propaganda of the Catholics in Malabar. Almost all the children of the European employees married to Catholic women were in his time brought up in the Catholic faith. The Commander made some earnest efforts to teach them the new Protestant faith, but his chief difficulty was that the Dutch language was thoroughly unfamiliar to the people. Portuguese missionaries could carry on their propaganda in their own language which was fairly popular in Malabar. They were also acquainted with Malayalam which placed them on a position of distinct advantage. "What can the zeal of a reformed preacher, whom nobody can understand" observes Gollennesse "do to combat the bustle of the thousand Romish priests in this coast who are perfectly equipped with the necessary knowledge of the languages?" But it is doubtful whether the Dutch in general showed the necessary zeal of a reformed preacher. If they had shown that zeal, certainly they could have combated the "bustle" of the Jesuit priests who were hated by the bulk of the native population at that time.

Moens' exhaustive Memoirs deal with every branch of the activities of the Dutch in Malabar. Speaking about the importance of propagating the Protestant religion in Malabar, he gives certain advices to be followed by the Dutch Commandants.

(1) The Commandant must set a good example to the community by himself attending public worship regularly.

(2) He must stand up for the good cause publicly and show his partiality for those that excel in learning and virtue.

(3) He should give a fairfield to the Teachers and even encourage them always to have recourse confidently with him. He must listen to them kindly when they want assistance for the purposes of religion, or the church and show friendliness to them and hold them in due respect.

(4) He must take care that "the sailors, infantry and gunners are marched to church in an orderly manner every Sunday, and that when the military are in barracks or in the field a psalm is sung and night prayers are said every evening."

(5) Finally the Commandant must take care that "the Sunday should not be disecrated but that on that day, which is set apart from a general to a particular use, all public trades and crafts are suspended—necessary cases and extra-ordinary circumstances exempted—so that everywhere in and outside the town you may see it is Sunday."

These instructions of Moens are characteristic of an enthusiastic reformer of the 18th century. But how far the other Dutch Commandants followed these rules, is a doubtful question.

The Dutch in Malabar had only one church and that was at Cochín. When the Portuguese maintained their domination in Malabar they had established numerous churches and monasteries in all parts of the country. There was a church in almost every factory and attached to most of the churches were the monasteries of Jesuit monks and other missionaries. There were also important Portuguese churches at Mattancherry and Perimani (behind the island of Vendurtti). Besides these, there were forty seven Syrian churches following Catholic doctrines. When the Dutch replaced the Portuguese, the Latin Christians and their churches came under their special protection.¹

1. The following is a list of the important Latin churches which were under the protection of the Dutch Company in the time of Moens:—

- (1) Vypeen
- (2) Miraculous Cross in Vypeen
- (3) Valarparam
- (4) Palport in Vypeen
- (5) Cranganore
- (6) Paponetty
- (7) Chettwaye
- (8) Vendurtti
- (9) Anji Caimal (Ernakulam)
- (10) Mattancherry
- (11) Senhora de Saude and the Chapel of St. Jauquebrado which belongs to it
- (12) St. Louis with its chapel of St. Jago
- (13) Castello (Eda Cochil)
- (14) St. Abdre with the chapels of Tangie (Edatinkal) 'Tombolie, Caturty' and Mani corde (Manacorom)

In the time of Gollennesse, there were eleven Roman parishes under the jurisdiction of the Dutch. They were (1) Saint Louis (2) Sr. Saude (3) Mattanchery (4) Vypeen (5) Cruz de Milagre (6) Palport (7) Cranganore (8) Valarparam (9) Anji Caimal (10) Vendurtti (11) Palurty

Even though these churches were under the control of the Dutch they made no attempts to demolish them or convert them into Protestant institutions

The Protestant church at Cochin was administered by a Church Council consisting of the Preacher, two Elders and four Deacons. The church council was to report to the Commandant whatever had been decided at its meetings. The Dutch had some charitable institutions in the country, the most important of them being the Orphanage and the Leper Asylum. The Orphanage was for taking care of the poor children who had lost their parents. They were given free education by the Deacons. Only Orphans of European parentage were admitted to this institution. Preference was shown for orphans of Protestant faith. Children of Catholic parents also could be admitted to the orphanage and they were at liberty to choose their own religion when they came of age. If they chose to become Catholics the cost of their education and upbringing had to be demanded from the Catholic priests. The boys in the Orphanage were under the direct supervision of the Deacons. After their education in the Orphanage they were put to some profession suitable to their tastes.

The Leper Asylum was at Palliport on the island of Vypeen. There were many patients suffering from leprosy and the Dutch had always taken elaborate care to prevent the wide spread of this disease by segregating the lepers from others. The Company had a special commission of inspection which was responsible for reporting all cases of leprosy in the locality. The leper house had a special fund of its own, administered by special trustees. But later this was placed under the management of the Deacons.

The liberal policy of religious toleration and the charitable activities of the Dutch deserve real praise. Even though the Dutch at first showed some antagonism towards the Catholics, they were later treated with great toleration and courtesy. The Jesuits who were asked to leave Cochin when the fort was captured were allowed to return and settle down within the territories of the Company. The toleration extended by the Dutch towards the Catholics was greatly appreciated even by the Pope. The following is a letter addressed by the Pope Clement XIV to the Vicar Apostolic of Malabar :—

“Greetings to our Reverened Brother : Our beloved son Stephen Boyd, Secretary to the Congregation for the propagation

of Christians had communicated to us in detail the attention paid and the trouble taken by the Dutch Governor for the safety of the Christians who are there yonder. And as such Christian acts of kindness undoubtedly concern us greatly and as on their account we are indebted to him, so it is our earnest desire that at least our feelings of gratitude for the same be made known and clear to this man. Therefore to show our gratitude we have hereby to recommend to Your Reverence to assure him of our grateful sentiments in the most forcible and the most striking manner and at the same time to testify that we feel ourselves so much more indebted to him for what he has done as we flatter ourselves that he will continue in this way to lay the Christians and us under further obligation."

"Given at Rome the 23rd July 1772 in the 4th year of our Papal reign. Stephen Borgia."

The Dutch policy towards the Hindus was even more generous. They always respected Hindu temples and other places of worship. Even in the question of slaughter of cows, we find the Dutch promising the Cochin Raja to lend all their help in punishing the offenders. In the long history of their relations with the Hindu princes and people of Malabar we can scarcely get an instance when the Dutch deviated from their traditional policy of toleration. Even when engaged in warfare they never indulged in foolish acts of iconoclastic vandalism. Perhaps, the only instance when the Dutch wounded the religious susceptibilities of the Hindus was when some of their soldiers desecrated the temple of Punnathu Nambidi in the course of the war with the Zamorin. But even this was done without the knowledge of the Commander.

CHAPTER XV

THE DUTCH TRADE IN MALABAR

THE policy of the Dutch in Malabar has been described as "maximum pepper trade with minimum expense." Pepper was the main attraction for the Dutch in Malabar, and as Gollennesse clearly states "it was for the sake of this grain that the Company maintained its expensive establishments on the coast." As we have very often stated, the principal object of the Dutch in Malabar was to possess the monopoly of pepper trade. But they were disillusioned in this even at the very beginning. In all their contracts with the native princes they had stipulated that all the pepper should be sold to them without fixing the price definitely. The rivalry of the other European merchants soon made it impossible for them to secure the monopoly in trade. Other merchants were offering higher prices for the pepper and naturally the people would sell their pepper only to those who would offer higher prices. Discussing this question, Stavorinus says: "They however early met with much disappointment on this head, (viz., securing the monopoly of pepper trade) both by the bad faith of the Malabar princes and by the constantly increasing competition of European rivals who adopted a surer mode of obtaining as much pepper as they wanted by always following the market price or even paying something above it, while our Company continually insisted upon the performance of the contracts that no pepper should be furnished to any others although a fixed price was never stated in them and they only speak of the market price as the rule go by." The Dutch stigmatised selling of pepper to foreign nations as contraband trade, but they had no power to stop it.¹

1. The Abbe Raynal makes the following observations on the trade of the Dutch in 1760:—"The Company have not succeeded in their hope of excluding other European nations from this coast. They procure no kind of merchandise here but what they are furnished with from their other settlements and being rivalled in their trade they are obliged to give a higher price here than in the markets where they enjoy an exclusive privilege "

Quoted by K. P. P. Menon, History of Kerala, Vol. I. P. 364.

Gollennesse was of opinion that there were only two ways of restoring the pepper trade of the Dutch. The first was to follow the market as the other merchants would do. The second was to adopt extreme measures by which they could compel the Rajas to observe the contracts. But if they were to follow the first policy, they need not have wasted so much blood and money in order to secure exclusive contracts. They need not have waged expensive wars for the maintenance of their political power. Having committed themselves to so much of heavy expenditure in Malabar, they could not afford to appear as ordinary competitors with the other European powers. As Gollennesse said "to follow the market was well nigh impossible because an ordinary merchant who had to defray no expenses of any importance was better off with 25% profit on pepper than the Hon'ble Company with 100% in as much as the latter had to bear the considerable burdens of so many establishments on the coast." The second alternative was even more hazardous. In compelling the Malabar kings to observe the contracts the Company was only getting itself involved in further wars and more expenditure. Even if they could defeat these princes in war there was no guarantee that they would keep the contract. Even if they could compel the princes, they could not coerce the people to submission on a question which involved definite financial loss for them. The system of pepper collection was two-fold—contract collection and collection through private persons. The Travancore Raja had entered into a contract with the Company in 1753 by which he promised to sell 3,000 candies out of his hereditary territories at the rate of Rs. 65 a candy and 2,000 candies out of his conquered territories at the rate of Rs. 55 per candy. The Company maintained that the Raja had the obligation to observe the contract as he had received "great favour and advantages" from the Company. "The Company did not stand in his way when he was making himself master of so many kings and fertile pepper lands" contends Moens, "from which he is now drawing great revenues not to speak of the expenses of a garrison and fortifications which we have to bear here in time of peace for the safety of His Highness." But none of these was a weighty consideration for the Raja to keep the contract. He never fulfilled his obligation and was carrying on his trade with the English and other merchants.

When Hendrick Zwaardercroon was the Commander, he issued an order that the pepper in Malabar should be sold at a premium of 25%. His object was to prevent the smuggling trade. As the buyers could get pepper at a low price from the Company there would be no profit in the smuggling trade. But the Dutch authorities in Holland considered this too low and therefore fixed the premium as 50% in 1725. In 1733 it was raised to 100%. But the result of this increase in the premium was an increase in the smuggling trade. "The greater the premium of pepper, the greater were the profits of smuggling." However much the Dutch tried to prevent this "contraband trade" it only increased as years went by. Usually this trade was carried through sea, but when the Dutch fortified and garrisoned their outposts in the sea, the "contraband" trade was carried through land.

Before the arrival of the Dutch in Malabar there was no such practice as a "monopoly of trade" in this country. In the time of the Portuguese, trade was carried on between the Company and the people and the Rajas were only the mediators between the two. But the Dutch introduced the ingenious system of trade monopoly and the Rajas became parties to it. But as we have already observed, even though the Rajas were parties to the contract they never fulfilled the contract.

The important articles of trade next to pepper mentioned by Gollennesse are piece-goods, cardamoms, cotton, areca, sandal, cowries, chanks, curcuma (saffron), indigo, timber, lime and bricks, rice, coir, fuses, hides, cocoanut oil, salt, charcoal and fire wood. He also includes slaves as objects of trade. Kottar in Travancore was an important place for piece-goods. Cardamom was mainly produced at Kottayam in the kingdom of the Kolastiri and this trade had been mainly carried on by the English in those parts. Sandalwood was purchased at Canara and sent to Batavia for the China trade. Cowries were brought from the vessels which came from the Maldives and they were sold mainly at Calicut. The Dutch were planning for an exhaustive indigo cultivation in the Mangat country and the land of the Anji Caimals. Special seedlings were brought from Ceylon, Surat and other parts. The main centres of timber trade were Porakkad and Kayamkulam. The supply of rice in Malabar

was too meagre and therefore the Dutch were importing rice from Canara. Coir was mainly brought from Parur and Cochin. Fuses were prepared at Kayamkulam. But after Kayamkulam was captured by the Travancore Raja, fuses were made at Cochin. Malabar was a great export centre of hides. Hides were generally exported to Ceylon. Cocoon oil was mainly supplied by Cochin. Salt was manufactured at Vendurthi in large quantities. Charcoal was burnt at Papanetty.

Most of the Dutch trade was done with the 'bombaras' which came from Sind, Cutch and other northern regions. Besides the 'bombaras' there were native vessels which came from Basrur and Mangalore and other ports. There were native vessels trading with Cochin from countries of the south like Quilon, Anjengo, Tengapatnam and Colachel. Native vessels also came from Manapar, Tuticorin, Kilkare, Coilpatnam, Jaffnapatnam and Negapatnam. Ships, even from China, visited the Cochin port. All these vessels brought to Cochin the things which the places they come from produced.

The Muscat bombaras brought dates, sulphur, incense, asafoetida, puvata, Manjalcana, or gall-nuts, sticks of liquorice, shark-fins, fish-gut, kismis, almonds, pastasjes (pistachios?) rose water, glass beads, small alcatives (persian carpets or table cloths) ormus-salt, saleb (a medicinal timber), mirragomma, alwe, aurom, pigmentum, tutia (a kind of medicine for eye complaint), small pearls, chalies, blue stone, gum arabic and salt petre.

The other bombaras brought capoe, cotton thread, canvas, coarse spreads, coarse chintzes, wollen clothes, combars, gessiapats, niquniasses, ulwa seed, coriander seed, cummin seed, mustard seed, catjang, grain, cardels (a kind of edible small bean), borax, ajuvan or onion seed, putjack root, jerselin seed, and jerselin oil, amenica oil, mustard oil, paparcar, fennel seed, urida beans, assasalie or garden cress seed, sal armoniac, addividigam root, trivetty or tricolpaconna, ammekoron root, kargorony root, aretta root, wheat, ani seed, corkeljan (a medicine for horses), covy or sandal earth, gall nuts, coffee of the Mocha kind, soap and chanks.

The imports from Rajpur were catu, raw lac, wood, salt, coriander, covy or sandal earth, urida, onion and salt petre.

The imports from Barssalore, Mangalore and Nanjeswaram were rice, atjang, horse beans, jertzelin seed, urida beans, sandalwood, white dry areca, fresh areca, chelas, roomals, canjau leaves and Jager kana.

The imports from Cannanore, Tellicherry, Vatakara, Tanur and Ponnany were cardamoms, country-iron, sappan wood, pulenjica beans, iris root, garlic, aretta root, tobacco, javely, white and black root, raw wax, chikney areca and fresh areca.

Piece goods, tamarind, jager sugar and coir fibre were the principal products from Quilon, Anjengo, Tengapatnam and Colachel.

From Maniapar, Tuticorin, Kilcare and Coilpatnam were imported diverse cotton goods as spreads, chintzes, frocks, stockings, cambays, handkerchiefs, catjes, tuppatties, chelas, roomals and also tobacco, salt, onions, writing olas, and carpetty or native sugar.

The imports from Acheen were Dividar wood, sappan wood, benzoin, patjapat, camphor, unworked aguil wood, white dried areca, gatte gamber, sago and rattans.

From China were imported silk of diverse colours, raw silk, silk stuffs, lanquin sugar, spiaulter, quick silver, camphor, alum, radix China, cantjore root, porcelain, tea, boeyans, iron pans, anise flower, castor, arsenic pitch, copper articles, silk and cotton stockings, preserved ginger, quipersols, different kinds of paper and pedermany (a kind of medicine for eye complaints.)

The principal exports to Muscat were sugar, spices, spiaulter, iron, steel, lead, tin, pepper, sandalwood, cardamoms, wooden articles, dry ginger, curcuma, nerbale beans, castor, porcelain, rice, cocoanuts with and without husks, agel wood, benzoin, camphor, clove-pepper, patjapat, palcacherry piece goods, cowries, coir fibre and ropes.

The exports to other parts were sugar, spices, Japanese copper, spiaulter, lead, tin, quick silver, camphor, raw chinese silk, sappan wood, alum, pepper cardamoms, Bengal silk stuffs. Palcacherry chialauw, Bengal long pepper and roots of the same, triatroot, porcelain, clove pepper, pitch, dry ginger, curcuma, cocoanuts with and without husks, wooden articles, cuva root

and flour, marmanjel, nerbale beans, coir fibre and ropes janaparil or little whet-stones, fruta-canjara, fruta-mattapes, sollenjan or wild ginger, calliatour wood and dry areña.

The exports to Rajpur were spices, sugar, alum, spiaulter cuva, cocoanuts with and without the husk.

The exports to Barssalore and Mangalore were spices, sugar, Japanese copper, tin and lead, steel, spiaulter, Bengal long pepper and roots thereof, Bengal silk clothes, Colletje and Manapur blue salempuries and white caatjes, Malacca pitch, Dividar wood, colliatour wood, benzoin, camphor, Chinese silk stuffs, quick-silver, vermilion, Chinese iron pans, cantjore root, radix China, raw silk, alum, copera, oil, tamarind, honey, dry ginger and cammelmas.

The exports to Cannanore, Tellicherry, Vadacara, Calicut, Tanur, and Ponnai were spices, sugar, Japanese copper, lead, tin, spiaulter, camphor, benzoin, dividar wood, Malacca pitch, calliatour wood, Manapar and Colachel piece goods, tamarind, Manapar onions, writing olas, jager kana, raw lac, 'armozines, Batavia arrack, Ceylon arrack, Cochin arrack, corcapully fruit, sole and upper leather, magadotties, Bengal salt petre, clove pepper, Malacca long pepper, cocoanut oil, commelmas, atty and tripilly fruit.

To Quilon, Anjengo, Tengapatnam and Colachel were exported spices, sugar, Japanese copper, iron, lead, tin, spiaulter, steel and cotton.

The principal exports to Manapar, Tuticorin, Kilkare, Coilpatnam and Jaffnapatanam, Negapatam and Aacheen were chikney areca, coir fibre, copra and cocoanuts, nerbale, sandalwood, pulenjica, dry ginger, curcuma, fruta canjara and angelica boards.

The exports to China were sandal, pepper, cotton, putjuc root, gummamira, alwe, olibanum gum, sulphur, salt petre, timber, catu, asafoetida, fish teeth, elephant tusks, shark fins; fish gut, abada horn, arabian gum, Surat cambay, gingham coverlets, combars, lead and tin.

The trade was mostly carried on on the exchange system. The Company used to buy these articles and keep them in large

stock. There were local merchants in the service of the Company to arrange for the purchase and sale of these articles. The Dutch had to battle with many difficulties for a smooth trade in Malabar. The havoc done by pirates on the sea was always causing them anxiety. The scarcity of money among the merchants also interrupted their trade. Formerly the Company's trade had suffered very much because of the private trade carried on by the Commanders and chiefs of the settlement. The Commanders used to carry on their private trade either in person or through private agents and they were making enormous profits out of it. But the Batavian Government issued orders strictly forbidding private trade by the Commanders. As a compensation for their loss they were given 3% brokerage on the Company's merchandise. C. L. Senfi, Moens' predecessor in Malabar, complained that the compensation was too poor and therefore he should be allowed to carry on private trade. When Moens became the Commander a new arrangement was devised by which the brokerage was raised from 3% to 5%. It was left to Moens' option to have private trade or this commission. But Moens realised that "if an administrator was allowed to do for himself what he was bound to do for the Company, viz., to trade, self-interest might at times so lead him astray, that he would see first to his own interests and to the Company's only afterwards."

Even though private trade for personal profits was given up, Moens tried a system of private trade on behalf of the Company which was to enjoy the profits thereof. This was found to be highly profitable. Moens was encouraged to take up this system of private trade on behalf of the Company by the report of Mr. Schrender, an ex-councillor of Cochin. Schrender stated in his secret considerations: "The Honourable Company cannot only do everything that private persons can do, but even much more, if it is served faithfully and a man applied to its affairs the same amount of judgment of reflection as he would to his own." Moens wanted to bring this suggestion into practice by "serving the Company faithfully applying to its affairs the same amount of judgment and reflection as he would to his own." Moens takes great pride in having carried on this trade very profitably. A profit of Rs. 54,722-9-0 was made on powder and candy sugar alone. The total profits amounts to Rs. 126,342-5-0.

We may notice one general rule about the prospects of the Company's trade in Malabar. It was prosperous when the Company's influence among the Malabar princes was strong; it declined when the Company's power declined.

CHAPTER XVI

ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM OF THE DUTCH EAST INDIA COMPANY

THE Dutch who stepped into the shoes of the Portuguese in Malabar excelled their predecessors in many respects. We have already referred to the liberal policy of religious toleration followed by the Dutch as contrasted with the rigorous policy of conversion pursued by the Portuguese. It was in the field of administration that the Dutch showed their definite superiority. The Portuguese Company was ill-organised and thoroughly inefficient. It was organised on the worst pattern of medieval feudalism and proved to be a colossal failure in the East. The Dutch East India Company, on the other hand, had in it all the marks of a modernised democratic State. "Government by Councils", the characteristic feature of European Government, was the main principle of the Dutch administration in the East also. Unlike the Portuguese Company, there was no unnecessary interference and no arbitrary restrictions from the home Government. The Dutch Company in the East was practically a sovereign body, devising its own rules and policies suiting the circumstances of the country and age. Grose in his voyage to the East Indies observes: "One of the reasons why the Dutch East India Company flourishes and is become more rich and powerful than all the others is its being absolute and invested with a kind of sovereignty and dominion more especially over the many ports, provinces and colonies it possesses." Even though the Company enjoyed the patronage of the State, it was never hampered in any of its activities by the authorities of the

State. The main strength of the Dutch East India Company was that it had a very sound system of organisation, a system which deserved the admiration of all western commercial concerns. The organisation of the Dutch Company was considered the model for the English East India Company and we can find the close resemblance between the two in almost every detail. The English publicly acknowledged the superiority and merit of the Dutch administrative system and deliberately copied its principles. Dutch officers were taken into the services of the Company so that their system of administration could be more effectively practised. In 1687 Governor Yale of Madras sent the Directors of the English Company "a book containing the Dutch "methods" and commenting on the book the directors made the following observation :—"As there appears in this (the book) great wisdom and policy we recommend to you the frequent reading and consideration of what is contained in these papers, which the oftener you read, the more you will discover the wisdom of these persons who contrived those methods. Our design in the whole is to get up the Dutch Government among the English in the Indies (than which a better cannot be invented) for the good of posterity and to put us upon an equal footing of power with them to offend or defend or enlarge the English dominions and unite the strength of our nation under one entire and absolute command subject to us, as we are and ever shall be most dutifully to our own sovereign." The only distinction the English wanted to make was that of nomenclature. They wanted to have their English terms, viz., Attorney General instead of Fiscal, Alderman instead of sepin, Burgesses instead of Burghers, serjeants instead of Baillies, President and Agent instead of Commander, Director or Commissary.

The organisation of the Company in Holland was in the form of a loose confederation. The different 'chambers' at the various posts formed the units of this confederation. There were "chambers" at Amsterdam, Middleburg, Rotterdam, Delft, Hoorn and Enkhuizen and each of these chambers had its own ships for trade with the East. The chambers kept their own accounts of the ships they were sending to the East. The governing body of the Dutch East India Company was a board of directors consisting of 60 members. Amsterdam had the largest representation in the board; one third of the directors

were chosen by the Amsterdam chamber. Middleburg select one fifth of the total number of Directors. Rotterdam, del Hoorn, and Enkhuizen chose seven members each to the board. The supreme administrative body was the Council of Seventeen—usually known as the “Seventeen.” Eight out of the seventeen members were appointed by the Amsterdam chamber which was the predominant unit. The Council had its sessions for six years at Amsterdam and for two years at Middleburg. (The council of Seventeen was often referred to as the Amsterdam Council). The Council arranged for the sail of ships fixing the number each chamber had to send and also fixing the dates for their sail. The council met only three times a year, but there were special committees of the council for carrying on the routine business of administration.

The chief officer in charge of the administration of the Company's Eastern possessions was the Governor General. He was assisted by a council of nine members, each one to be in charge of a separate department. For example, there was one commercial expert, one naval expert, one chief army officer, one advocate general and jurist and one director general for the factories. The Governors of Moluccas, Amboyna, Banda and Coromandel were the other members of the Council. The Governor General enjoyed almost sovereign powers in the Council. The Director General was the officer next in importance to the Governor General. All questions relating to the eastern trade were decided by the Governor General's Council without being influenced by the instructions from the Home Government. The Home Government not being in direct acquaintance with the circumstances of the East usually allowed sovereign authority to the Governor General and Council for all affairs relating to the Company's administration in these parts. The membership of the Governor General's council was not fixed as nine. In some years there were only eight members, four of whom would be with the Governor General at Batavia. The Governor General had always a casting vote.

Calletti treats the different services of the Dutch East India Company under six headings political, ecclesiastical, military, naval, medical and artisan.

There were various grades in the polical services. e. g., apprentice, junior assistant, assistant book keeper, under

merchant, merchant, upper merchant. In each settlement there was a Governor or a Commander or a Director as the head of this hierarchy of officers. These officers were entitled to certain commissions and allowances besides their regular salary. Their salaries per month were as follows :—

Governor	200	Guilders
Malabar Cammander	150—180	„
Upper merchant	80—100	„
Merchant	60— 70	„
Under merchant	40	
Book keeper	30	
Assistant	24— 26	„
Junior Assistant	16— 20	„
Apprentice	9— 10	„

The officers received allowances for lodging and provisions, which almost amounted to their respective salaries. In Malabar there was a Commander¹ incharge of the settlements on the coast. From the writings of Moens, we know how the Commanders before his time were making enormous profits by private trade. But that system was disallowed and the Commanders were given 5% commission on the profits of the Company. The salary of the Commander was no doubt not very attractive. But his total income including all his commissions and allowances amounted to nearly 3,000 pounds a year.

The different fortresses, military settlements and factories in Malabar were under the supreme control of the Commander at Cochin. At Cochin, the head quarters of the Dutch in Malabar, there was a second-in-council to assist the Commander. In the time of Gollennesse there were six under-merchants, 15 book keepers, 24 assistants, and 19 apprentices. Thus there were 66 members in Cochin belonging to the Political service. At Quilon there were 9 members of the political service and at Cannanore four. There were residents at Porakkad, Ponnani and other places. But many of these establishments were reduced considerably and in the time of Moens there were only 43 officers of the Political service at Cochin, two at Quilon and one each at Cranganore, Kayamkulam and Porakkad.

1. Moens was given the title of "Governor" being an extra-ordinary member of the Council of India.

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The constitution of the political service in Malabar closely resembled that of Batavia. The Commander was assisted by a council of nine. Here also, the membership of the council was not strictly fixed. Sometimes there were nine members in the council, some times only seven. The main departments under the charge of the councillors were the warehouses and store house, the treasury, the post office, the trade office and the political secretariat. The members of the council were styled as "Honourable." There were subordinate officers in the political service called "administrators." In the factories also there were political committees to assist the chief officer. Many of the Dutch settlements were under officers who had the rank of "under merchants."

In the ecclesiastical service of the Company the 'Preacher' was the highest officer. The Preacher was also the head of the educational department as education and religion were not separated in those days. There were many deacons under the preacher and they were expected to carry on some missionary activity. The Preachers were generally proficient in the vernacular and Portuguese, as a knowledge of these was highly necessary for religious instruction. The Preacher's salary was 90—120 guilders, the deacon's 24—36 guilders and the school master's 7—15. All these officers received allowances for house rent, fire wood and food besides their salaries. In Cochin there were one preacher¹ and two deacons.

The chief officers of the military service were a serjeant major and a chief engineer with their head quarters at Batavia. Below them there were captains, captains-lieutenant, lieutenants, ensigns, serjeants, corporals and privates. There were superior officers in the army like Brigadier, Colonel, Lieutenant-Colonel and Major. Their salaries were as follows:—

Brigadier	..	350	guilders.
Colonel	..	250	"
Lt. Colonel	..	200	"
Major	..	150	"
Serjeant Major	..	120	"
Captain	..	80—100	guilders.

1. Visscher was a preacher of the Dutch in Cochin during the years 1717—1723.

Captain Lieutenant	..	70	guilders.
Lieutenant	..	50— 60	„
Ensign	.	40	„
Serjeant	..	20	„
Corporal	..	14	„
Private	..	9	„

The salary for the Chief Engineer was 140 guilders a month.

The Chief Military Officer for the Dutch garrisons in Malabar had usually the rank of a Captain. There were under the Captain one Captain-Lieutenant, four Lieutenants and six Ensigns. These officers were in charge of the European armies in Malabar. There was one Captain assisted by two Lieutenants and one Ensign for the other armies of the Dutch in Malabar (Malayan, Eurasian and native troops.) There were also one Captain and one Lieutenant in charge of the artillery.

The Chief Officers of the naval department were Commander, Captain-at-sea, Captain-Lieutenant-at-sea, Skipper and Lieutenant. Their salaries were as follows :—

Commander	120	guilders.
Captain-at-sea	100	„
Captain Lieutenant-at-sea	80	„
Skipper	60	„
Lieutenant	48	„

There were other naval officers like chief maritime officer, port officer and master attendant who were in charge of the ports. At Cochin there was only one maritime officer who had the command of the port and the sea.

The Surgeon General with his headquarters at Batavia was the Chief Medical Officer. He was assisted by upper surgeons, sergeons and under surgeons. The salaries were as follows :—

Surgeon General	80	guilders.
Upper surgeons	45—63	„
Surgeons and under surgeons	14—30	„

In Malabar the Chief Medical Officer had the rank of an upper surgeon. There were many surgeons and under surgeons also in Malabar. In Cochin there were about 8—11 surgeons.

The chief officers of the Artisan service were the inspector of fortifications and superintendent of the press. There were many

subordinate officers of this department in Malabar employed to ship-building and fortification. There were also many smiths carpenters, masons, etc., in the service of the Company.

The distinctive feature of the administration of the Dutch East India Company was "efficiency." The Dutch realised that "good management was of great importance to the Company and that good servants of greater importance." Moens wrote: "Good service and good servants are bound up with one another as effect and cause. Hence, it is time beyond dispute that where the best servants are, there things are done best." Therefore the Dutch always took care to secure efficient officers for the service of their Company. Liberal salaries were given to their servants in order to ensure efficiency of work. Still there seem to have been many "deserters" from the company's service. Moens speaks with great regret about the desertions of De Lannoy and Duyvenschot. While he does not appreciate their action, he deplores the circumstances that led to it. Even though they were men of real merit, no recognition was given to their services in the Company and it was their discontent that persuaded them to remain in the services of Travancore. Gollennesse knew that it was impossible "to make all the crooked sticks straight." Still he advised his successor to "remember the deserving when opportunity offered and to recommend them to the Right Worshipfuls." Moens also pleaded for giving attractive encouragements to the servants of the Company lest the Company should miss the benefits of their talents. But he believed that much depended on the chief of the settlements. "For if he sets a good example in everything," says Moens, "and himself does nothing which the whole world may not know and so need not be afraid of any one, is conscientious in his work, treats everyone severely or kindly according to his merits, and before all has a head on his shoulders, then those who would like to commit malpractices will think twice before doing so."

Besides Europeans, the Company had in its services large numbers of Topasses, Lascorins and Mukhavas. The Topasses were formerly in the services of the Portuguese. After the arrival of the Dutch the majority of them had taken up services with them. Most of the gardens and fields of the Company were rented out to the Topasses. They were also employed in the ship-building yard and in the smithy. Some served as

carpenters, some as soldiers and some as interpreters. The service of interpreters was highly necessary for the Dutch especially when they were dealing with criminal cases in the courts. The great defect about the native interpreters was that they could not understand the Dutch language clearly and distinctly. When a native witness was to be examined in a court of law, it was necessary that the clerk of the court should understand the evidence without any mistake. But often many grave mistakes were committed by the native interpreters who translated the vernacular into Dutch. The Dutch Commanders were always complaining about the want of efficient interpreters who should have not only an "idea clara" but also an "idea distincta." Moens keenly felt the difficulty in employing incompetent native interpreters and suggested that Europeans should take pains to learn the vernacular tongue. He suggested that the small European boys who came to Malabar along with their parents should be taught the Vernacular and Dutch languages throughly with a view to making them interpreters.

The Topasses had certain exclusive privileges as servants of the Company, e. g., they alone could sell refreshments to the Company's ships. Gollennesse was frequently complaining about the disloyalty of the Topasses who were regularly deserting the Company's service. By the regulation of September 26, 1739 the Dutch authorities were persuading the deserters to come back to the Company's services. A general pardon was assured to the deserters; still it was not sufficient inducement for their return.

The Lascorins who were employed in the services of the Company were Christians who accepted the Romish faith in the days of the Portuguese. They served the Company mainly as soldiers. Gollennesse says that about 300 Lascorins deserted the Company's service and took with them their muskets also.

The Mukhavas (Christian fishermen) were largely employed as coolies by the Dutch for the construction of fortresses and buildings. Some of them were recruited as soldiers also.

JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION

The Dutch aimed at the establishment of a high standard of justice in their possessions. There was a court of justice at Cochin presided by the Second-in-Council and Chief Administrator. Most of the members of the political council were members of the

Bench and they settled all civil and criminal cases. There was also a subordinate court at Cochin dealing with small cases. It was presided over by a member of the political council.

Formerly the Chief of the settlement—the Commander—used to be the president of the court of justice also. But later the judicial functions were vested in the Second-in-Council. This change was brought about after the trial and punishment of the Ceylon Governor Perter Vyvst in 1732. The Commanders were strictly forbidden from interfering in the affairs of judicial administration. They were to approve of the decisions of the Court in criminal cases with the advice of their Council. If they could not approve of the sentence they could stay its execution till the final decision of the case came from Batavia. But even though the Commander was formally forbidden from interfering in the affairs of the court, it was his duty as chief of the settlement to see that the administration of justice was properly done. Moens gives nine important suggestions for the consideration of the Commander in this respect.

(1) "When appointing judges of the court of justice, he should take special care and pay much attention to selecting the best men available at the station.

(2) He should make the members of this court understand the delicacy, importance and responsibility of their office..... that a judge must exercise neither excessive severity nor misplaced leniency, but be nothing more than an executor of the laws which he must weigh with the acts done or the facts of the suit according to the circumstances of each particular case.

(3) The Chief should not listen to the complaints of litigants who have lost their case in the civil court. That would only encourage people to show disrespect to the court of law.

(4) The Chief can be considerate towards the loser in a civil case by helping him to file an appeal to the proper judicial authorities.

(5) If the judge for some reason refuses the loser permission to appeal, the Chief may then make the loser understand that a way of appeal is still left him, namely, by making application to the judge (*ad quem*) for permission to appeal.

(6) The Chief may advise the judge to clarify his judgment if it is unintelligible without prejudicing the former judgment.

(7) The Chief may recommend prompt hearing and disposal of cases for avoiding delay.

(8) The Chief should not grant any 'committimus' except in cases which the Supreme authority has reserved to itself.

(9) In criminal cases he should take care to make a distinction between crimes which directly concern the Company's own interests and all other crimes."

Usually the Commanders did not interfere in the regular course of judicial administration. But the formal consent of the Commander was necessary for the execution of the sentences. If the Commander disagreed with the judgment in any particular case, he could stay the execution of the sentence and refer the matter for the final decision of the Batavian Council which was the supreme authority in everything. But there were no occasions for such interference from the Batavian Council. Like the other branches of administration, the judicial administration of the Dutch was also perfect and sound.

CONCLUSION

The Dutch period covering more than a century and a quarter was of great political importance as it witnessed certain fundamental changes in the political system of the country. Even though the Dutch interfered frequently in the internal politics of the country, their history is not stained by any acts of cruelty or barbarism. Comparing the Portuguese and the Dutch administrations of Malabar, Mr. Panikker says.¹ "Unlike the Portuguese, the Dutch never claimed that they had conquered India or any portion of it. As their pretensions were less and their desire to do profitable trade evident, they caused less friction and created less trouble than the Portuguese.....Calculating, matter-of-fact, and well-trained in the doubtful art of diplomacy, the Dutch presented a striking contrast to the arrogant and incompetent Portuguese whose finances were always on the brink of bankruptcy, but whose pretensions were never

1 Malabar and the Dutch, K. M. Panikkar, P. 167—168.

less than those of universal dominion and Empire." The haughty and thoroughly selfish policy of the Portuguese had made them extremely unpopular with the princes and people of Malabar. It must be said to the credit of the Dutch that they were not hated by any section of the people of Malabar in any period of their stay in the country. The Dutch had always viewed with disapproval the high-handed policy of the Portuguese in Malabar. We find in the writings of all the Dutch administrators severe criticism of the Portuguese methods and policy. The Dutch always took pride in considering themselves better civilized than the Portuguese who, according to them, were no better than barbarians. The name of the Portuguese had become a by-word for cruelty and even to-day the word 'Paranki' is used in Malayalam to refer to barbarism. The Dutch rule appeared as a relieving substitute for the harsh reign of the Portuguese. The scorn and contempt the Dutch had for the Portuguese policy is clearly evident from the writings of Nieuhoff and others. When Nieuhoff was sent to Quilon, Travancore and other parts to arrange for trade agreements with the native rulers, the ministers of Travancore accused him for the harsh treatment the Dutch had accorded to the Queen of Quilon. He asked Nieuhoff "whether the Dutch would do less than the Portuguese had done." Nieuhoff replied: "If we should follow the foot-steps of the Portuguese we must be guilty likewise of the same enormities, in murdering, plundering, etc., things not customary with us, the intention of our Company being to maintain every one in his right, and establish a free commerce without interruption." As we have already stated, the Dutch came to Malabar as merchants and wanted only to remain as merchants. The role the Company played as a sovereign authority was only an accident in its history. But the Portuguese came to Malabar as merchants, masters and missionaries. They wanted to be all the three at the same time and deliberately sought to achieve this object.

The Dutch rule in Malabar did not leave any permanent marks as the Portuguese did. The Portuguese language is even to-day known to some parts of Malabar and many Portuguese words have crept into the Vernacular. The religion of the Portuguese continues in all vigour and force on the Malabar coast and the converts to their faith remain faithful to their religion.

The most indelible mark of the Portuguese rule in Malabar is the mixed caste of Topasses who even to-day follow the old Portuguese traditions. But viewed from the standpoint of leaving permanent results, the Dutch rule was very unimportant. It was only a passing cloud. The Dutch language is nowhere spoken, the Dutch traditions are nowhere in vogue, and even the Dutch religion has disappeared from the country. But the Dutch are remembered by the Malayalees for their liberal and large-hearted policy. The Dutch in general upheld the cause of honesty and justice. They never allowed their servants to commit any malpractices in the country or to be cruel towards the local inhabitants. They always paid due respect to the Malabar princes and chieftains and were very polite in their relations with them. Even though they were zealous champions of the Protestant faith, they never allowed religious fanaticism to override their sense of duty. They showed great respect to the traditional ceremonies and religious observances of the Malayalees. They even considered it their duty to protect the religious rights of the local inhabitants. We have referred to the strong attitude taken by Governor Angelbeck against the slaughter of cows. This is sufficient indication of their concern and respect for the religion and beliefs of the natives. In all these things the Dutch offer a brilliant contrast to the Portuguese. Once a Dutch man asked a Portuguese priest at Goa, "When do you imagine the sway of my countrymen will melt like that of yours in India?" Promptly came the reply: "As soon as the wickedness of your nation shall exceed that of my people." But students of Dutch history in Malabar know perfectly well that the wickedness of the Dutch was never the reason for their disappearance.

We have referred to some of the humanitarian activities of the Dutch in Malabar like the Orphanage and the Leper Asylum. The Dutch spent liberal sums for the hospital, and many of the Company's officers and their wives took keen interest in these charitable institutions. Some Commanders had made themselves very popular with the local inhabitants during their stay in the country. Some of them could converse in Malayalam without difficulty and took a keen interest in the local traditions and history of the country. The Dutch administrators, even though mainly interested in commerce, were keen observers of things and men and critical students of history. The Memoirs of Moens

and the letters of Visscher are priceless treasure—houses of information about Malabar and its history. Van Rhee'de's 'Hortus Malabaricus' has immortalised the memory of the Dutch relations with Malabar. Van Rhee'de made an extensive study of the vegetable products of the country. Special agents were sent to the different highlands and forests of the country to collect all available specimens of plants. He classified them into different groups and gave their distinctive names in the Sanskrit, Malayalam and Latin languages. A comprehensive report about the distinctive usefulness of these plants and also their sketches were included in his valuable book. It took many years for the book to be completed and edited. The first volume was printed in 1686 at Amsterdam and the twelfth (last) volume in 1703. Van Rhee'de had the able assistance of many Malayalee and Portuguese scholars in the production of this comprehensive book. The names of the plants in Malayalam were given by the Konkani's like Ranka bhattan, Vinayaka Pandithor and Appu bhattan and an Ezhava by name Itty Achuthan. The sketches of these plants were rendered in the Portuguese language drawn by the Carmelite Priest, Mathaeus at Cochín. The details about these plants were rendered in the Portuguese language by Emmanuel Carnerio and they were translated into latin by Herman Van Douep the Government Secretary. The name of the plant is given below every sketch in Malayalam and Latin. Probably Malayalam types were for the first time made in Europe for this purpose.

The Dutch rule in general was conducive to the development of trade and industries. The Dutch gave a fillip to the pepper trade of Malabar and gave wide advertisement to Malabar pepper in the world markets. Commanders like Gollennessee and Moens introduced new methods for the improvement of cotton fabrics. New systems of dyeing and printing were introduced into the country by these Commanders. The Dutch also rendered valuable service to the Malabar princes in giving training to their soldiers in new methods of warfare. The Dutch popularised western weapons of warfare and their example was followed by many local princes. Some of the Dutch officers were taken into the services of the Native States. We have seen how the services of De Lannoy were useful for the training up of the Travancore army and the construction of the fortifications. The

engineering skill of the Dutch was made use of by the local Rajas on many occasions.

One important point that should be remembered about the Dutch rule of Malabar is that, their power declined not because of the decay of their administration but because of the rise of certain circumstances over which they had no control. Usually the influence of a particular power disappears when it declines of its own accord. But that was not the case of the Dutch in Malabar. The Dutch administration was efficient and sound from beginning till end. There was no deterioration in the system of the management of the Company's affairs. On the other hand, it is worth while to note that the Dutch took special care and attention for securing efficiency of administration towards the latter part of their reign in Malabar. But, their disappearance was due to certain outside factors. The first factor was the rise of Marthanda Varma and the consequent progress of Travancore as a powerful State. The next was the invasion of the Mysoreans. The last was the strong rivalry of the English. Marthanda Varma dealt the death blow to the Dutch Company, the Mysoreans hastened its death, the English effected it.



APPENDIX I

LIST OF DUTCH COMMANDERS AT COCHIN

Hustaart	..	Captured Cochin in 1663.
Peter de Bitter	..	} Commissioners in charge of the fort.
Charles Valkenburg	..	
Ludolff Colster	..	First Governor.
Hendrick Adriaan Van Rheede		1673—1677
Jacob Lobo	..	1677—1678
Martin Huysman	..	1680—1681
Gulmer Vorsbury	..	1684—1686
Isaac Van Dielen	..	1687—1693
Swaardekroon	.	1693—1698
Peter Cocsaart (acting)	..	1698
Magnes Wickelman	..	1698—1701
W. Moerman	..	1705—1709
Barent Ketel	..	1709—1716
J. Hertenberg	..	1717—1724
De. Jong	.	1724—1731
A. Maten	..	1731—1735
J. S. Van Gollennesse	..	1735—1743
Siersma	..	1743—1748
C. Stevens	..	1748—1750
Le Haye	..	1750—1751
C. Cunes	..	1751—1757
C. De Jong	..	1757—1761
G. Wayerman	..	1761—1764
C. Breekpot	..	1764—1769
C. L. Snett	..	1769—1771
Adrian Moens	..	1771—1781
Van Angelbeck	..	1781—1793
Van Spall	..	1793—1795

APPENDIX II

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS RELATING TO THE HISTORY OF THE
DUTCH IN MALABAR

Year.	Month.	Event.
1594		Houtman organised a sail to the East.
1595	April 2	A fleet of four vessels under Houtman sailed to the east.
1601		Sixteen Dutch ships sailed to the East.
1602	Mar. 20	Formation of the Dutch East India Company.
1608	Oct. 13	Dutch signed a treaty with the Zamorin for "the ruin and destruction of the Portuguese."
1610		Arrival of the Dutch in Ceylon.
1619		Establishment of Dutch power in Batavia.
1658	Dec. 20	Seized the Portuguese fortress at Quilon.
1661	Feb. 10	Arrival of the Dutch at Ayakotta.
1661	Mar. 12	Paliath Achen entered into an agreement with the Dutch on Board the 'Muscaat boom.'
1661		The Dutch made an unsuccessful attack on Cochin. Dutch captured Quilon and Cranganore.
1662	Feb.	The Dutch took the palace of the Ranee of Cochin and made her prisoner.
1662	Oct. 25	The Dutch forces returned to Cochin under General Hustaart.
1662	Nov.	Van Goens joined the Dutch at Cochin.

Year.	Month.	Event.
1663	Jan. 8	Cochin capitulated to the Dutch.
1663	Mar. 20	The Dutch concluded a treaty with the Raja of Cochin who consented to become their vassal.
1667		The Dutch possessions in Malabar and on the western coast were placed under the Cochin command.
1680		Negotiations with the Portuguese for the exchange or sale of the Catholic institutions.
1689		Adoption into the Cochin Raja's family.
1691	Sep. 10	Chettwaye given to the Zamorin by the Dutch.
1697		Reduced the fortifications at Cochin, Cranganore, Cannanore and Quilon.
1701 to 1710		War between the Dutch and the Zamorin.
1710	Jan.	Raja of Cranganore reinstated in his original possessions.
1714		Dispute between the Dutch and Zamorin over Chettwaye.
1715		Zamorin invaded Cochin.
1717		Peace concluded between the Dutch and the Zamorin.
1739		Raja of Quilon died and his territories amalgamated with Kayamkulam.
1742		Dutch fort at Quilon attacked by Travancore forces—Travancore troops beaten off.
1753	Oct. 15	Cochin Raja met the Dutch ambassador at Mavelikara where they attempted to negotiate a peace with Travancore.

Year.	Month,	Event.
1753	Aug. 15	Treaty of Mavelikara between Travancore and the Dutch.
1757		300 European and 17,000 coloured troops arrived at Cochin from Batavia.
1757 to 1758		Raja of Cochin and the Dutch formed an alliance to drive out the Zamorin.
1758		The Dutch relieved the Chettwaye fort. The Travancore lines constructed.
1762		The Raja of Travancore defeated the Zamorin and restored to the Cochin Raja his lost possessions.
1766		Hyder invaded Malabar.
1766	April	Dutch Commissioners met Hyder at Calicut to assert their rights and privileges.
1775		Travancore purchased from the Dutch certain territories.
1776		Tippu took Cranganore and Ayroor.
1776	Nov. 13	The Dutch fort at Chettwaye was compelled to surrender to the Mysoreans.
1778	Jan. 8	The Dutch took the palace of the Cranganore Raja.
1778	Mar. 3	The Mysoreans attacked the Cranganore Palace and compelled the Dutch to retire to their fort.
1789		The Dutch sold the fort of Cranganore to the Travancore Raja.
1789	Aug.	Cranganore and Palliport sold to Travancore.
1790	April	Tippu seized the Travancore

Year.	Month.	Event.
1790	Mar. 7	Tippu seized the Cranganore fort.
1790		Treaty between the Cochin Raja and the English.
1791		Disputes between the Dutch and the Cochin Raja over the Konkarnies.
1791		The Dutch handed over Chettwaye to the Zamorin.
1795	Feb. 24	The Dutch at Cochin ordered Stadtholder to admit the British to their possessions.
1795	Sep. 6	Conference at Cochin between Major Petrie, Mr. Stevenon and Van Spall.
1795	Oct 19	The fortress of Cochin surrendered to the English.

APPENDIX III

Translation of the Agreement between Travancore and the Dutch for the purchase of the fort of Cranganore and the outpost of Ayakotta :—

“The enlightened and powerful king of Travancore, Wanji Bala Marthanda Rama Varma has sent his first State Minister and Dewan the respectable Kesava Pillai to the Most Worshipful John Gerrard Van Angelbeck, Governor of the Netherlands India and Commander of the forces of the Enlightened and Powerful Netherlands Company in the Malabar coast with the intention of purchasing from the Company the fort of Cranganore and the post of Ayakotta with the gardens and lands belonging thereto, having consulted and negotiated upon this it was adjusted upon the following conditions :—

“The Dewan Kesava Pillay has bought for his master and Hon. Governor Van Angelbeck on the part of the Company has sold to the king of Travancore for the just sum of three hundred thousand Surat Rupees, the fort of Cranganore and the post of

Ayakotta with the cannon and ordinance belonging to them as they now stand together with the Powder magazine though no small arms or any other effects and further the following lands and gardens :—

The Muskaton island now leased for Rupees 390.

The garden of Kilo Barki now leased for Rupees 115.

The garden of Ascencio de Rosa leased for Rupees 190.

The garden of Nagachetty leased for Rupees 164.

The garden of Hendrick Meyer leased for Rupees 230.

Garden of Babo Probo leased for Rupees 64.

The garden of Alewyn leased for Rupees 310.

The garden of Dama Moona leased for Rupees 1220.

The garden of Arekel Ittooppoo leased for Rupees 199.

The garden of Konoto Barki leased for Rupees 115.

“The purchase and sale is agreed to upon this condition that the King of Travancore shall not hinder the navigation of the river past the fort either to the Company’s vessels or in the vessels of the King of Cochin or their subjects whether the same be empty or loaded with rice, paddy or goods of any description as also all floats of wood and bamboos, etc., in a word all goods whatever without exception shall pass and repass free and without hindrance, nor shall there be any new tax put upon them.

“The King promises solemnly that the fire wood which must be brought from above Cranganore shall not be prevented on any pretext or taxed with any duty whatever, but on the contrary that he will assist all in his power to forward the firewood to Cochin by every possible means.

“The Lepers’ House at Palliport with the buildings, gardens and further ground belonging to it to remain in the full and free possession of the Company.

“The Romish Church at Cranganore and Ayakotta stand from ancient times under the Company and must remain under them. The King shall not interfere with the same or with the parsons. The Christians are to remain vassals of the Company and must not be burdened with any new tax.

“The Parson’s house at Palliport which the Governor erected and gave as a present to the church shall remain with the Church and no new burdens be permitted.

"The inhabitants shall keep their gardens and lands that they now possess as private property. Such as are Christians remain the same as the Catholic Christian vassals of the Company and must not thus under any pretence be burdened with additional taxes, only paying to the king the sum they formerly paid to the Company.

"The King promises before the delivery of the aforesaid fort and lands to make a payment in ready money of Rupees Fifty thousand and the four following years in equal instalments by furnishing an account of pepper annually to the amount of Rupees Sixty two thousand five hundred, for the better security of which and as lawful debtors the merchants David Rahaby, Ephraim Cohem and Ananda Setty bound themselves.

"All this negotiated in the fort of Cochin in the year Koilang nine hundred and seventy four and on the nineteenth of the month of Karkadagom or the thirty first July Seventeen eighty nine."

APPENDIX IV

THE TEXT OF THE TREATY BETWEEN THE DUTCH AND THE ENGLISH

Propositions of the Dutch.

The Governor in Council of Cochin proposes to Major Petrie of the 77th Regiment Commanding the detachments of the King's and E. I. C's. troops, to surrender this place on the 20th of this month and requests at the same time that all hostilities may cease.

Article I

The officers of the garrison and the military that have defended Cochin will with all the honours

Answers of the English.

The garrison of Cochin will be prisoners and the fort given over to His Great Britannic Majesty tomorrow noon at twelve O'clock at which time the Bay gate and the New gate shall be delivered over to such detachments as Major Petrie will order to take possession of them.

Article I

The garrison will march out as requested and lay down their arms on the Esplanade

of war march out from the Bay with their baggage, flying colours, drums and lighted matches as also two canoes with their appointments.

Article 2

All officers and men which are of the arms and colours will with a little delay be transported either to Batavia or Ceylon at the request of the English Government in European vessels.

Article 3

The civil officers and men will take with them their effects without their being liable to any search. The women and slaves; whilst those that are married will have leave to go to take their families with them.

Article 4

The Governor, the members of Council and all servants of Police and Trade, Churchmen, Military and Naval, and other servants on the pay of the Dutch Company as also all the inhabitants of Cochin either Europeans, or natives will be at liberty to hold their persons and property movable and immovable merchandize and other effects without being therein molested or obstructed on any account whatsoever.

Article 5

Among the foregoing is also understood, regarding the liberty of the Factor and Resident of Porca, J. A. Scheits, who is now

when they must retire back as prisoners of war.

Article 2

Canoe be transported; about the same time it will be disposed of by the Company may be seen.

Article 3

Allowed exception with respect to the vessels, a name may be given in the British dominions.

Article 4

All private properties will be secured.

2

Article 5

A reasonable time will be allowed him to settle his affairs, but he must be considered as a prisoner of war.

employed here in keeping the Company's mercantile books and he must be allowed to return to his station to receive his office.

Article 6

The Governor, the members of the Council and all servants of Police and Trade, the Churchmen and further servants in pay, will be at liberty to take their families, male and female, slaves, and also their possessions either to Batavia or Ceylon and they will be granted there to at the expense of the British Government the necessary ships and transports.

Article 7

The funds belonging to the Orphan College and the poor House will not be confiscated or seized upon, they being money of orphans and the poor.

Article 8

All officers and servants, civil and political, of the Company who may wish to remain at this place as private individuals shall be granted the protection of the British flag.

Article 9

All marcantile articles, ammunitions, artillery goods, arms, provisions and other articles which belong to the Company and are found at this place will faithfully be made over according to a specific statement to the commissaries that will be appoin-

Article 6

This is replied to in the second article.

Article 7

The funds mentioned in this article will belong to His Great Britannic Majesty in so far that he will appoint persons over them for their management.

Article 8

All the inhabitants who are willing to remain and to take the oath of allegiance to His Great Britannic Majesty will in every respect be treated as British subjects.

Article 9

Everything mentioned in this article will be faithfully delivered over to such persons as Major Petrie will appoint hereafter to dispose there about agreeably to the direction of His Great Britannic Majesty.

ted to receive them and the specified list will in duplicate be duly delivered to Major Peter.

Article 10

The fortifications, the Government houses, all magazines, and other public buildings belonging to the Company will be kept as they are at present and not be demolished.

Article 11

The free exercise of the reformed religion, as used in the Dutch Church, where divine service is performed, will be permitted.

Article 12

The convent at Verapoly and all other Roman churches, as also the Heathen temples will receive the protection, that they have hitherto enjoyed, under the Dutch Company.

Article 13

All Europeans (half-castes) and inland Christians as also the Banyans, silversmiths, painters, washers and shoe-makers who are subjects and vassals of the Dutch Company will retain their property and also all privileges and protections which they always had enjoyed of the said Company.

Article 14

All documents, charters, resolutions and other papers belonging to this Government will without any search being made of them be delivered over to the Gover-

Article 15

Regarding the fort of Coshin and all other public buildings that will be disposed of as the Commandeur in Chief or the Commanding Officer will think proper at the time.

Article 16

Allowed

Article 17

The British Government everywhere protects religious exercises.

Article 18

Answered in the fourth and eighth articles.

Article 19

All Public Documents and papers must be delivered over to persons appointed to receive them, but Mr. Van Spall will have authenticated vouchers,

employed here in keeping the Company's mercantile books and he must be allowed to return to his station to receive his office.

Article 6

The Governor, the members of the Council and all servants of Police and Trade, the Churchmen and further servants in pay, will be at liberty to take their families, male and female, slaves, and also their possessions either to Batavia or Ceylon and they will be granted there to at the expense of the British Government the necessary ships and transports.

Article 7

The funds belonging to the Orphan College and the poor House will not be confiscated or seized upon, they being money of orphans and the poor.

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Article 8

All the inhabitants who are willing to remain and to take the oath of allegiance to His Great Britannic Majesty will in every respect be treated as British subjects.

Article 9

Everything mentioned in this article will be faithfully delivered over to such persons as Major Petrie will appoint hereafter to dispose thereof agreeably to the direction of His Great Britannic Majesty.

next day all the gates will be taken possession of by the English troops and the garrison of Cochin will retire to a certain place and remain there, until their departure for Batavia or Ceylon laying down their arms as usual with the exception of the officers Commanding them who will retain their swords.

Article 20

All servants of the Company the Police the Military, the Navy and others in pay will be supported by the English Government until they are taken in English vessels to the place of their destination, either Batavia or Colombo.

Article 21

All sick and wounded now in the hospital are to be treated and maintained by the English Government.

The fulfilment of all the above stated articles and the manner of capitulation agreed to are to be faithfully observed and signed respectively by Major Petrie, the Governor Van Spall and the Council of this place.

19th October 1795.

(Signed) J. L. Van Spall.

„ P. J. De Can.

„ I. A. Cellarius.

„ I. H. Scheids.

„ A. Lunel.

„ C. Van Spall.

article. The officers may retain their swords.

Article 20

Major Petrie is of opinion that he has not the power to enter into such an Agreement on account of the Hon'ble Company. The last part of this article has been answered in article 2nd.

Article 21

Allowed.

Major Patrie consents to a cessation of arms, until 4 o'clock in the morning at which time Mr. Van Spall should declare whether or not he will accept the afore-mentioned articles of capitulation.

11-30 P.M. 19th October 1795.

(Signed) G. Petrie,

Major, 77th Regiment,

Commanding

nor, Mr. Van Spall in order to be carried with him wherever he may be removed to. of those which may concern himself during his management of Cochin.

Article 15

No one will occupy the Government House during (his) Mr. Van Spall's stay at Cochin, but he will remain in it, unmolested.

Article 15

Answered in the second article.

Article 16

In case of any English deserters being found in the garrison of Cochin, they will be pardoned.

Article 16

All deserters will absolutely be given over.

Article 17

All public papers, Notarial or Secretariat deeds which may in the least be to the security of the possessions, belonging to the inhabitants of this place will be respected and preserved in the hands of those who hold that office in order to be made use of whenever required.

Article 17

Answered in the fourteenth article.

Article 18

The Auctioneer of the town the Sequester and the Curator (Trustees) will be supported in the recovering of all outstanding money and be therein protected by the usual officers of justice.

Article 18

All inhabitants who remain in Cochin will be subject to British Laws.

Article 19

After this capitulation shall have been signed, the new gate shall be made over to an English detachment of 50 men to which an equal number of Dutch soldiers shall be added, to whom it will be charged that no Dutch soldier may get out and no English one may rush in. and

Article 19

The gate of the fort of Cochin will be taken possession of by a detachment of British troops tomorrow noon at 12 O'clock. The garrison will be lodged as conveniently as the circumstances will allow until it can be disposed of there about agreeably to the second

next day all the gates will be taken possession of by the English troops and the garrison of Cochin will retire to a certain place and remain there, until their departure for Batavia or Ceylon laying down their arms as usual with the exception of the officers Commanding them who will retain their swords.

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Major, 77th Regiment,
Commanding.

Achen, Paliath

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the most prominent place among them. This varied collection was carried on by Sir D. M. Wallace in connexion with his lifelong study of modern politics and history and his services from 1891 to 1898 as Director of the Foreign Department of *The Times*. It is obvious that, as the lines on which Sir D. M. Wallace's contemplated History would have been constructed differed from those followed by the present work, so our references to his MSS., could not but be, in the main, incidental. As such, should any particular use be made of his MSS., it will be duly acknowledged in the course of these volumes; but, in the meantime, the Editors are desirous on behalf of the Syndics and of themselves of acknowledging the obligation under which they have been generously laid by his Executors.

The Editors have to thank the officials and staff of the University Press for the care they have bestowed upon the production of the present volume, and Miss M. Pate for her indefatigable assistance in preparing its contents for the Press. They are also much obliged to Miss A. D. Greenwood for undertaking, at an inevitably short notice, to supply the *Index*.

A. W. W.

G. P. G.

December, 1921.

Since the above Preface was in print, Lord Bryce, whose interest in our scheme is noted there, has died—seemingly in the very midst of his long and unwearied labours. In him has passed away a scholar, who, just sixty years ago, by a University prize essay illuminated a path of historical enquiry hitherto rarely trodden among ourselves, and whose contributions to political history as a whole cover a uniquely wide range of observation, research and deduction in the fields successively surveyed by him. And there has also passed away a statesman whose services, especially in the sphere of foreign policy and diplomatic action, have found their consummation in helping, more directly than those of any of his contemporaries, to draw closer the bonds of friendship, based on mutual understanding, between a great kindred nation and our own. The relations thus established, largely through his insight and influence, will we believe constitute one of the firmest foundations of a world's union of peace, and will, in any event, transcend in their intrinsic strength any of the alliances, compacts and concerts discussed in these pages.

February, 1922.

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CORRIGENDA

VOLUME I

- p. vi, l. 4. *For* "whole" *read* "earlier part."
- p. ix, l. 15. *For* "Junto" *read* "Junta."
- p. x, l. 5. *Insert:* Book I. From the Peace of Versailles to the Second Peace of Paris, 1783-1815.
- p. 25, l. 8 from bottom. *For* "Vera Cruz" *read* "Santa Cruz."
- p. 33, l. 8. After "at Cologne," *read* "(1673), in which, till its collapse, an English Embassy took part. In the meantime, while."
- p. 107, l. 16. *For* "Corsica" *read* "Minorca."
- p. 278, ll. 18 and 19. *For* "Talleyrand as Plenipotentiary," *read* "Talleyrand; no change occurred."
- p. 279, l. 13. *For* "Talleyrand" *read* "Le Tourneur."
- Ib.* l. 14. *For* "Talleyrand becoming Foreign Minister" *read* "representatives of the extremists."
- p. 280, l. 16 from bottom. *For* "12th" *read* "11th."
- p. 353, l. 6. *For* "12th" *read* "17th."
- p. 354, n. 2. *Delete* last four words and *add*: "Limits of space preclude notice of the expeditions to South America in 1806-7."
- p. 358, l. 12. *For* "James" *read* "John."
- p. 361, l. 3 from bottom, and p. 364, l. 9 from bottom. *For* "15" *read* "18."
- p. 452, l. 9. *After* "Mauritius" *read* "; she also acquired."
- p. 527, l. 5 from bottom and p. 528, l. 1. *For* "Democrats" *read* "Republicans."

of her historical life—making her exceptionally strong in unity before the seas engirdling her carried her into the world of life and assigned to her a controlling place in it.

Meanwhile, William the Conqueror had not only pr-
throughout his reign maintained and developed, his great ~

INTRODUCTION

I

THIS work proposes to treat, within definite chronological limits, the history of British Foreign Policy—in other words, to discuss the relations in that period of the British Empire to Foreign Powers, the conditions at home and abroad which governed the conduct of those relations, the principles more or less consistently followed in the conduct of them, and the personal influence of the principal British agents responsible for it. However interesting, it cannot be imperative, in setting forth upon such an undertaking, to go back at length into a past which, as a matter of course, contained in it innumerable germs of the future, but which differed essentially from the period marked out for present treatment in many of the conditions of its public as well as of its private life.

A brief sketch indicating some at least of the threads connecting earlier with later epochs of our Foreign Policy as a State and as an Empire is, therefore, all that can be attempted here by way of introduction to the narrative that is to follow.

Whether or not a people is only to be held happy when its rulers are without a foreign policy, none can assuredly afford to dispense with such unless it has no foreign affairs. In our own records, an era of the kind could hardly be found from the time onwards when, under Egbert, the English nation first achieved political unity, and the kingdom, as a polity moulded by its great monarchs Alfred and Edgar, after in turn resisting and accepting Danish sway, became the prize of what was no longer a dynastic, but a national struggle, to be apparently settled by the Norman Conquest in its own favour. But England still remained merely the extreme Western home of civilisation—an *ultima Thule*, it has been grandly said, as of old; and her insularity was a chief determining element in the early course of her historical life—making her exceptionally strong in unity—long before the seas engirdling her carried her into the world of modern life and assigned to her a controlling place in it.

Meanwhile, William the Conqueror had not only prepared, but throughout his reign maintained and developed, his great achievement

by a system of foreign alliances, of which the most signally important was that with the Papacy—in the Hildebrandine age in particular. With his active and efficient diplomacy began that long chapter of medieval history which is concerned with the political and military relations to France of England and her ruling dynasty. Little more than a century after the Conquest, Henry II (the first conqueror of Ireland) might be described as a greater potentate in France than his French suzerain; but his power was feudal, and, even of this, most was lost in the reign of John. Yet this unhappy King, too, followed a foreign policy of his own. His quarrel with Pope Innocent III, though not especially of the King's making, rendered *Magna Carta* possible; but the victory of the Barons did not suffice to overthrow his Throne. Soon after his death, Lewis of France was driven from England; and, after John's successor had come of age, he and his dynasty, encouraged by a continuous growth of national consciousness, showed every desire to revive the aggressive foreign policy of their predecessors. Henry III accepted the Crown of Sicily for his son Edmund, and his brother Richard of Cornwall was elected German King. The interests of the Papacy, together with those of the dynasty, lay heavy upon all classes of the subjects of the Crown; and, while Pope Alexander IV duly declared the Provisions of Oxford void, their immediate sequel was the expulsion of foreigners from the realm. Notwithstanding the catastrophe of Simon de Montfort, England's first great Protector, a memorable constitutional change—borough representation—was finally established under Edward I, reflecting what, like all sound reforms, was already a historical fact—viz. the importance of the towns (from London downwards) in the public life of the nation. English foreign policy, moreover, had ceased to be absorbed in dynastic enterprises or designs, or satisfied with the advantages to be gained by the landed magnates, no longer isolated as these were by their nationality from the rest of the population. On the other hand, a different kind of foreign connexion had steadily advanced. Flemish and Low-German towns—not sea-ports only, but towns in the interior of the Empire also—had maintained trade relations with this country already before the Norman Conquest. Henry II had confirmed the privileges of the Cologne “factory” in London, before its parent association had been outrivalled by a body of Lower-Saxon towns, headed by Lübeck, which, in the course of the thirteenth century, appropriated to itself the once generic name of the Hansa. The progress of this intercourse, and of

that with the Flemish towns, which reached its height at a later date, could not otherwise than directly affect the continental relations of England and her Government and shape the beginnings of a commercial, which became an integral element in her foreign, policy.

But as yet the sword was the determining factor. The great reign of Edward I, who came out of the midst of a crusade to enter upon the mighty task awaiting him nearer home, was one of widespread foreign conquest, though at the same time of the firm planting of domestic reforms. He mastered both Wales and Scotland, though the principality was not incorporated in the English State till the reign of the second Tudor King, while Scotland retained her recovered autonomy even after the personal union under our first Stewart. Edward I's relations with France had become embittered before he entered upon his first conquest of Scotland, and had led to his conclusion of a futile alliance with the German King Adolphus; on the other hand, the defensive alliance concluded with France by John Balliol before his deposition, established the tradition of a Scoto-French league, which beset English foreign policy almost continuously down to the days of Elizabeth. But, if it was Scotland herself which at Bannockburn undid the English Conquest, that Conquest itself and the whole of Edward I's overbearing policy could not have been carried out by the King without a nation at his back, or without the widespread resources of a singularly active commercial diplomacy¹. When, under his grandson Edward III, after an unstable settlement with Scotland, the country resumed warlike action against France, which now remained, for a hundred years, its dominant passion, diplomatic transactions of a directly political kind were an inevitable necessity. The chain of foreign alliances concluded by Edward III with the German Princes along the Lower Rhine, and thence even with the potentates of the Palatinate, Würtemberg and Savoy, forms an early example of the series of subsidy treaties which is, perhaps, the most long-lived feature of British foreign policy; and (in 1337) the "system" was extended so as to include the Emperor, Lewis the Bavarian, himself. But the Peace of Brétigny (1360), which, by a drastic partition, was to have at last ended the struggle for the throne of France, held good for less than nine years; and the renewed War speedily led to disastrous

¹ When his supply of money fell short in consequence of his banishment of the Jews, Parliament came temporarily to the rescue, and he was able, with advantage to the Crown, to fall back upon the banking guilds in the North Italian cities.

results for the English dominion in France. Thus, in the tragic reign of Richard II, the efforts against France, following on that of England's Flemish ally, broke down in their turn, as did the attempted invasion of Scotland; and failure abroad, coupled with the effects of the social catastrophe at home, brought the national life to the state of despair which precedes dissolution. In the end, the unfortunate King, lured back to England from an expedition to Ireland, lost his English Crown. The kinsman who took it from him was a prince of wide foreign experience acquired by travel, and would have willingly entered into the inheritance of the foreign policy of Edward I. But the insecurity of his tenure at home deprived him of the power of action in France, though the distracted internal condition of that kingdom offered so favourable an opportunity for intervention in its affairs.

The renewal of the French policy of Edward III, and the assertion of claims at once wider and weaker, fell to Henry V, in whose settlement, as after Agincourt it found expression in the Treaty of Troyes, the Alliance with Burgundy was a necessary factor. But it was not written in the book of fate that England should be permanently burdened by the inheritance of a great foreign dominion, which, had she retained possession of it, must have strained beyond bearing the powers of the nation in the satisfaction of an unnatural ambition. The Wars of the Roses, while they went far towards destroying the ascendancy of the great Houses, left the economic condition of the people largely untouched; so that, at the close of the struggle, the country stood face to face with the intelligent despotism (a phrase to which the Eighteenth Century has no prerogative claim) of the Tudors. At the same time (since foreign policy is a branch of government to which public opinion, accustomed as it is to judge mainly by results, is not wont to apply logical reasoning), there can be no doubt that the dissatisfaction caused by the loss of France sensibly contributed to the downfall of the rule of Henry VI; or that his rival, after seating himself on the Throne, had actually to seek a momentary refuge against French intrigue in the Netherlands. With their master, Charles the Bold, Edward IV was on friendly terms, though he could not depend on him as an ally against France, and death overtook him on the eve of a struggle with an adversary whose equal he had never proved himself.

This counterplay of foreign rivalry and domestic plot still continued, when, after the brief and bloody epilogue of the reign of

Richard III, the long dynastic and baronial conflict had come to an end with the accession of our first Tudor Sovereign. By far the most dangerous of the Pretenders who tried to oust Henry VII from the Throne of which he had, at the time of Buckingham's rebellion, sought to possess himself, was Perkin Warbeck, an adventurous Fleming whose first attempt was "financed" by the Roman King Maximilian. He was afterwards made welcome as the true heir to the English throne by King James IV of Scotland, whose goodwill King Henry VII more effectively secured by bestowing on him the hand of his daughter Margaret—a step which ultimately led to the Union of the two kingdoms.

The foreign policy of Henry VII—for, in this age marriages were coming to constitute a very notable feature in the foreign policy of the European dynasties—was a combination of circumspection, if not of foresight, with caution. Naturally enough, its beginnings display more of the latter, and its subsequent developments more of the former, characteristic; but they rarely fail to be blended with each other. The monarchical rule of the Tudors transmuted the land—which had been the battle-field of a turbulent Baronage—into a State peacefully united in itself and thus gradually grown fit to find its place in the group of rival European nations. And, so early as the beginning of the sixteenth century, England began, likewise, to pursue an economical policy of her own in lieu of one which merely suited itself, as best it might, to the interest of her customers. It took a century, more or less, to break the domination of the Hansa over English trade, and for English trade to assert itself in the Northern Seas; and the Tudor age was approaching its close, when England began to enter into the maritime life of the Atlantic, and thus at last to realise the true value of her insular position and to face the gradual unfolding of the possibilities of her imperial future.

But the process was both slow and full of interruptions, and refuses to be detailed even in a chronological sequence of reigns. Before mounting the English Throne, the future King Henry VII had found a refuge in Brittany; and, soon after his accession, he assisted its ducal House in its struggle against the French Crown, though he could not prevent the incorporation, in the end, of the duchy in the monarchy. But he went out of his way in safeguarding the position of England in the event of future troubles between France and the Spanish monarchy, as is shown by his extreme caution in the method of the successive marriages of his sons Arthur and Henry to the

Infanta Catharine. While it seems questionable whether Henry VII actually contemplated a decided resumption of the anti-French policy of the Plantagenets, he was certainly alive to the chances opening for a relatively weak country like England in the age of Discovery, and was, in different ways, interested in both Columbus and the Cabots, though unequal, afterwards, to the thought of disputing the Spanish-Portuguese control of the New World sanctioned by Papal Bulls. Before England could claim her place in the sun, the mercantile marine had to be fostered, and rendered capable of service to the royal navy, of which a beginning was once more made.

With Henry VIII, the foreign policy of the English Crown once more, but under new conditions, enters into the main current of European affairs, and thus contributes to the beginning of a new period—the Habsburg period, as it has been appropriately called, though this subdivides itself into several chapters of the international history of Europe. By acknowledging the Spanish Infanta as his legitimate consort, Henry seemed to have declared that he had definitively ranged himself on the side which had not yet come to be the “monstrous aggregate” of Spanish-Austrian power; and, in 1512–14, he took part in a war with France which brought him no profit. The vagueness of his own political ambitions is illustrated by his posing, on the death of Maximilian I in 1519, as a candidate for the succession to the Imperial Throne. But, in the great contest which ensued between the Emperor Charles and King Francis, he again chose his side, and proposed to his victorious ally a further enterprise which should restore to himself the French Crown worn by his predecessors. He was disappointed in his designs, and in the Emperor; and, by the advice of Cardinal Wolsey, he thereupon brought to pass one of the most notable *renversements des alliances* recorded in European diplomatic history. In general English history, this political episode is above all noticeable as forming part of the transactions which ended in Henry’s divorce from Catharine, followed though it was by a very different marriage from that originally contemplated by Wolsey. In the history of our foreign policy in particular, the significance of this episode lies in its having been the first application, in a critical connexion, of a conception which was afterwards to become, and to remain longer than is always allowed, the guiding principle of English, and subsequently, of British foreign policy. This principle was that of the Balance of Power.

The Balance of Power is, as has been well pointed out, an idea

practically inseparable from all policy properly so called—nor in the domain of international relations or “foreign affairs” only. But, in this domain—to pass by whatever precedent Italy, the mother of modern diplomacy, may have to offer in her sixteenth century history—the action or conduct of the English Government after the first great self-assertion of the united Habsburg Power may be described as the beginning of a new “system.” To this system the political world of Europe was not to cease to have recourse in the succession of crises undergone by it from the times in question onward to those of the Thirty Years’ War, of the War of the Spanish Succession, of the Napoleonic rule, and of the German design of overwhelming the world. So far as England is concerned, the English archer’s motto *Cui adhaereo praeest* might seem to denote sufficiently the way in which this country has, by prescribing its remedy, been wont to apply the doctrine of the Balance of Power; and, for our present purpose, it is needless to enquire in what measure the changes in the attitude of the Papacy towards King Henry’s divorce proposal was a cause, and in what a consequence, of the change in his general foreign policy.

In any case, the English Reformation was long left by Charles V to proceed on its way, nor was it till after the critical dates of 1544 and 1547—Crépy and Mühlberg—that the head of the House of Habsburg brought the whole weight of his designs, political and religious, to bear on our national future. This was now that of a monarchy whose unity and independence seemed both to have been consolidated, like those of no other European kingdom, with the final aid of the Reformation. But the two reigns which followed brought with them the extreme of vicissitudes. Under Edward VI, Somerset planned the achievement of a union between England and Scotland—this design, also, taking the form of a marriage-scheme, between the young King Edward and the still younger Queen Mary Stewart, which was to result in the hegemony of the united realms over Protestant Europe (whose refugees had already found a welcome on English soil). The plan came to nothing; nor was it even possible to maintain the good understanding with France which was a necessary preliminary condition for such an enterprise. Mary Tudor’s religious creed combined with the traditions of her descent in bringing about the return of England to the Spanish Alliance; though it may savour of the Castilian style to magnify as “the Habsburg invasion of England” her marriage to the master of Spain and the

champion of Rome, followed by the persecution of heresy and the humiliation inflicted on Queen and country by the loss of its naval outpost of more than two hundred years' standing. Under Elizabeth, English foreign policy slowly shook itself free, and thus gradually recovered an influence upon the political relations of the European States which Henry VII had tentatively striven to acquire by means of foreign alliances, and Henry VIII had exercised in action within restricted limits. As the aggressive strength of Spain and Rome combined—we are now in the age of the so-called Counter-reformation—the goodwill of European Protestantism (from which in form, and largely in spirit, the ecclesiastical system of England remained aloof) was a sure support against them. A special advantage, which might almost be called adventitious, was derived by Elizabeth from her encouragement of the Reformation in Scotland. For, as the deeply rooted contention between herself and the Scottish Mary merged into the European religious conflict at large (so early as 1562, English aid was promised by Treaty to the French Huguenots, but the price demanded was not obtained), Elizabeth was at last driven by Spanish machinations and Roman arrogance into an attitude of consistent opposition, and the English Throne and its policy became identified with the resistance of Europe to the general undoing of her Peace.

The English goodwill, at first permissive only, towards the Revolt of the Netherlands, and the daring piracies of Drake, provoked the final despatch of the Armada—the combined effort of Spanish southern Europe, undertaken with no less a design than that of securing to Philip Mary Stewart's bequest of the English Throne. The effort was, necessarily, made by sea, and by sea it was scattered. This one great victory—comparable only to Salamis—had at the same time placed England in the position of a Great Power, and shown that, unapproachable herself by sea, it was by sea that her national destinies were to be accomplished. But, both before and after the critical years 1586–8, the safety of England and that of her Sovereign depended on a resolute vigilance which, alike in the observation of European (more especially Spanish) policy in all its windings and in the use of an incomparable spy-intelligence system, called for the single-minded devotion of diplomatic statesmanship. This was the period of the Cecils, of whom the elder (Burleigh) served the Crown as Secretary of State (with a five years' interval) and Lord Treasurer for nearly half a century of indefatigable and unflinching labours.

At the height of these, he had the assistance of Sir Francis Walsingham as Secretary of State (less fortunate than Burleigh in the requital of his zeal), and, later, that of his second son. Sir Robert Cecil, afterwards Earl of Salisbury, was sworn Principal Secretary to the Queen in 1597, in which year he returned to England after a futile mission to Henry IV of France, in time to take his father's place in the conduct of foreign (and not a few other) affairs. He gave the most unequivocal proofs of his staunchness in the unhappy Essex episode, which followed soon after Burleigh's death in 1598, and remained in authority till his own decease. This took place in 1612, the year before the arrival in King James's Court of the most notable of Spanish diplomatists, Gondomar, under whose influence English policy once more swerved from its course, and began to lie low without really competent guidance.

To go back, for a moment, to the beginning of James I's reign. By land, the settlement of the English Crown and the consequent Personal Union with the northern kingdom, were effected without resistance. Great Britain was henceforth, as Lord Acton expresses it, politically as well as geographically an island, and no apprehensions of the designs of a warlike neighbour any longer entered into the foreign policy of its larger half. Moreover, the age into which King James was born was one of limitless conceptions of monarchical authority. These conceptions, as adopted by James I, included not only questions of religion (treated by him after a fashion which failed to commend itself to his subjects, Protestant or Catholic) but also questions, often mixed up with these, of foreign policy. He began as a peacemaker, proclaiming the blessedness of this task to the Spanish grandee who came over to conclude peace with him immediately after his accession¹. And it was as a peacemaker that, though "on all hands he heard the call of battle," the younger of the Cecils, in the words of his descendant and biographer, carried on "the traditions of peace he had learnt from his father." But the forces at work against James I's persistent desire to remain on friendly terms with Spain were too strong for him; so that, before he died, the two countries were again to all intents and purposes at war with one another, and an immediate French marriage was arranged for his successor. As for the Dutch, it is worth noticing that what in much later times was

¹ *Beati Pacifici* (the phrase put into King James's mouth by Scott) was the inscription in the apartment in Somerset House occupied by the Constable of Castile, who negotiated the Peace with Spain of 1604.

to become an accepted maxim of British policy—a strong and, in a wider sense, United Netherlands, both Protestant and Catholic—only very slowly became even so much as a pious wish. While Salisbury, a true Conservative like his father before him, directed the foreign policy of James I, there was no fear of extravagances or paradoxes. After that (from 1612), the King reckoned altogether amiss when, though no longer guided by proved principle and matured experience, he credited himself with the power of adjusting the scales swinging in the political atmosphere around him. The marriage of his daughter to the leader of German Calvinism, in other words of the actual opposition to the Habsburg designs for the future of the Empire and Western Europe, brought him a strong breeze of popularity at home; but the match was incompatible with the repeated proofs given by him of his desire to cement his friendship with Spain, who was still planning a revival of the Habsburg monarchy of Charles V¹. Meanwhile, the fierce disillusionment experienced by James early in his reign as to Catholic goodwill towards himself at home by no means remained without effect, but led to no decisive move in the game. He seized the opportunity of a quarrel between Pope Paul V and the Signory of Venice (which culminated in 1606) to instruct his willing Ambassador there (Sir Henry Wotton) to denounce Pope and Papacy as “the chief authors of all the mischiefs of Christendom.” And after, ten years later, the great Religious War had already begun in Bohemia, the same diplomatist was chosen (though Lord Doncaster was ultimately appointed in his place) to conduct the negotiations as to the acceptance of the Bohemian Crown by the King’s son-in-law, in which the King himself played a part which it would be a euphemism to describe as ambiguous. So early as 1619, Wotton had entered into negotiations with the heads of the Protestant Union, which turned a deaf ear to his inglorious proposals for an anti-Papal propaganda, and while the star of the Emperor Ferdinand soon rose triumphant over that of the unfortunate Winter-king, the foreign policy of his father-in-law had to concentrate itself upon the attempted recovery of the Palatinate for the Elector and his family, who had “lost it in Bohemia.” But the efforts of English volunteers under Sir Horace Vere, Mansfeld and Christian of Brunswick were futile, and before, quite at the end of James’s reign, Mansfeld’s plan of

¹ Bourgeois (vol. 1. p. 19) dwells on the successive attempts of Philip III to secure the Imperial Succession for himself or his son. The various Spanish marriage projects of King James for his children are well known.

settling the claim with an imposing English force had, in the midst of Anglo-French misunderstandings, miserably collapsed (1625), James had fallen back upon the last and most ill-starred of his futile Spanish marriage schemes. But Charles, Prince of Wales, who, to bring it to an issue, had travelled to Spain with Buckingham, had come home free (1623); and, when he actually mounted his father's Throne, England was once more, in conjunction with the Dutch Republic, at war with Spain, and the alliance with France was confirmed by the marriage of Charles to Henrietta Maria, the daughter of Henry IV.

Meanwhile, and largely in consequence of the altered conditions of the relations between England and Spain under which Queen Elizabeth's reign had drawn to its close, the island Kingdom had definitively entered into the paths of overseas colonisation. The power of Spain, the dreaded adversary of rival transatlantic adventure, was shaken, though not annihilated; and her acquisition of Portugal (1580), without adding to her political strength in Europe, had diverted enterprise to the Portuguese settlements in Brazil and the East Indies, inevitably leading to angry jealousy between the English and the Dutch. The English attempts, in Elizabeth's days, upon Spanish possessions on land and sea, however conspicuously supported (on occasions by the Queen herself), cannot properly be described as measures of colonial policy, but are simply evidence of desire for gain, stimulated by jealousy and hatred; just as the charge of a broken promise to which Raleigh was (so late as 1617) sacrificed was a signal demonstration of accumulated Spanish wrath. But the early course of English Colonial history was consistently attended by the rivalry of other Powers. The English East India Company (more strictly, the East India Company of London) received its original Charter in 1600, nearly two years before the Dutch, and within the following decade the two were at open war. But the first settlement directly controlled by the English Crown, and therefore the actual beginning of our colonial system, dates from the grant to "Virginia" of her earliest Royal Charter in 1606, followed by the second in 1609, and later by the Charters secured by the several new English Colonies. The early history of these shows their safety in constant danger from Dutch, and more particularly from French, enterprise or ambition; while, to the north, France, after a struggle terminating, in 1632, with the Peace of St Germain, maintained her power in her province of Acadia (Nova Scotia). Hence, too, the

earliest suggestions of a scheme of federation among the English North American Colonies, which might very possibly have earlier taken lasting shape, but for the Civil War at home. The action of the Crown towards the beginnings of our Colonial system cannot safely be criticised as closely connected with the turns and changes of our foreign policy; but the time was not far off when the two currents were effectively to unite.

Under Charles I, so long as his Government was able to carry on any foreign policy at all, it may be regarded as having been chiefly actuated by the motive of gaining for the King and Buckingham some of the popularity which their method of government at home was rapidly forfeiting. The French marriage of Charles I had seemed likely to bring about friendly relations with the French Court and Government, and to favour an anti-Habsburg Alliance, as to which negotiations were in progress with both Sweden and Denmark so early as August 1624. Apart from other friction, Buckingham's failure at Cadiz (1625) promised ill for the Spanish War; and the French Government would have nothing to say to the agreement into which the English Government had actually entered with the States-General for the recovery of the Palatinate by a force under the command of Christian IV of Denmark, Mansfeld cooperating. But the English supplies failed; and the defeat of Christian IV at Lutter (1626) put an end to the whole design, as it did to England's futile participation in the Great War. Before long (1627), the tension between France and England had ended in the outbreak of hostilities; and Buckingham, who two years earlier had been fain to lend English ships to Richelieu for the suppression of the Huguenots of Rochelle, now threw his French policy to the winds, taking command of the expedition for their relief. The attempt, the success of which was to have rejoiced the hearts of Protestant Englishmen, broke down; and, like an unlucky gambler, its author at once entered upon a vaster design against the adversaries of Protestantism, in which the relief of Rochelle was to be but the initial step. The assassin's dagger, however, settled his account with an angry Parliament; the last refuge of the Huguenots soon fell; and the failure in France had been as complete as that in Germany (1628). The time was at hand when the domestic strife in which the second Stewart reign had opened was to end in the Civil War.

II

The eminent historian of European Foreign Policy¹ may seem to go too far in saying that England, at the end of a half-century during which hardly more weight had attached to her in European politics than to Venice or Saxony, suddenly became the first Power of the world. But it is true, that few, if any, later generations have witnessed a transformation at once so astonishing in itself, and one so full of the promise of endurance. The period in question covered the Thirty Years' War, the great European struggle in which England interfered only after the fitful and insignificant fashion to which reference has been made; while the late but decisive intervention of France finally shaped the close of the War and the Pacification which ended it, thus, as has been well said, preparing her hegemony in Europe during the half-century that was to follow. In settling that Pacification, neither England nor Poland, nor the Grand-duke of Muscovy, had taken any part; but they were named in the Peace as Allies of the Allies of the Emperor and Sweden (the Grand-duke, of Sweden only), and thus became parties to the Peace, so that it bore the character of a fundamental act and international procedure of Christian Europe. And it is in this sense that the conditions of the Peace of Westphalia, as a whole, served to recast the State-system (*societas gentium*) of which England (or Great Britain) formed part, and essentially affected or modified, in accordance with their respective circumstances and interests, the foreign policy of the several States (England with the rest) included in it. In the first place, from the Peace of Westphalia onwards, the Empire was no longer, as such, an organic factor in the European State-system in question, notwithstanding its own formal endurance and the glamour of tradition which still attached a lingering weight to its occasional self-assertion². For the Estates of the Empire were now in possession of the rights of sovereignty expressly recognised in the Peace as theirs. Moreover, the Empire could now no longer lay claim to control, in any way, the foreign relations of the United Provinces or of Switzerland. The independence of the former, which specially interests us here, was recognised in the Peace by Spain herself, who retained her direct or (since 1598) indirect control over the Belgic Provinces, till, in the Peace of Rastatt (1714), they became the Austrian, instead of the

¹ M. Émile Bourgeois.

² More especially, as the leader of Christendom in its resistance to the Turks.

Spanish, Netherlands. Again, however absolutely the Vatican might, for this very reason, denounce the Westphalian Treaties, the religious affairs of the Empire were henceforth definitely regulated by a recognition of the rights of the three Confessions—for none besides these three were taken into account; and this provision took away (though, as it proved, not altogether) future occasions for religious conflicts within the Empire in which foreign Powers might seek to interfere¹.

Such were the chief general changes to which the European State-system was subjected by the Peace of Westphalia—changes of high importance, but not such as to mark any signal advance towards international relations favourable to an enduring Peace of the World. So far as England in particular was concerned, the War had brought about, and the Peace established, relations between the Continental Powers which she could not possibly ignore and which, in one way or another, must, for a time at all events, greatly affect her foreign policy. The long-sustained military enterprise of Sweden, and the well-timed intervention of France, had enabled them to obtain, in the Peace, compensations (“satisfactions”) which gave to the former a strong footing in northern, and provided France with continuous opportunities for action in western, Germany; while Sweden had acquired the command of the mouths of Oder, Elbe and Weser, and was placed in antagonism to Brandenburg, whose Elector held Ducal (Western) Poland as a fief of the Polish Crown. France had, by acquiring Breisach and the right of garrisoning Philippsburg, secured direct access to the German South-west, had taken the place of Austria in Alsace, and had secured sure opportunities for future intervention in the affairs of the Empire and its Estates at large. The acquisition of the Belgic Provinces themselves remained an unachieved project of French political ambition, as it had under Richelieu, and the “natural frontiers” of France were proclaimed by him in his last will (now accepted as genuine) as a legitimate claim of the France of the future². As for the sea, though at the close of the Great War (which did not include peace between France and Spain) Mazarin’s

¹ It is true that, although the idea of a United Christendom was thus, in Church as well as in State, abandoned, an attempt was made at Münster to provide the settled system of States now adopted with a tentative guarantee, in the form of a “wish” that, in case of any dispute, three years would be allowed for securing a solution sanctioned by all the States not parties to that dispute. But the guarantee included no appeal to arms; and no instance seems to be on record of its having ever been called into operation.

² Cf. Hanotaux, *Mélanges Historiques*, vol. III. (1880), pp. 705 ff.

Italian policy had not achieved complete success, there was now every prospect that the Mediterranean would henceforth be under French rather than Spanish control. The command of the Baltic, on the other hand, ultimately a matter of far more importance to Great Britain than it was to the United Netherlands, the Suedo-French Alliance had assured to Sweden for the period immediately following on the conclusion of the Peace; whether it could be retained by her depended in the first instance on her relations with her neighbour and ancient rival, Denmark.

From the settlement or discussion of all these questions, the English Government and people, which, in the early stages of the Thirty Years' War, had shown so keen an interest in its progress, held aloof at its close. The country was on the very eve of the termination of the long struggle between Crown and Parliament, by the transfer of supreme authority to a section of the House of Commons. The foreign policy of the Commonwealth was at first out of touch with either of the belligerents still in arms against each other (France and Spain); nor was it even clear what line the new Government would pursue towards the Power which was at the time in command of the carrying-trade of Europe at large. Would mercantile jealousy prevail, in this latter day, over the religious sympathies which, in Elizabeth's time, had induced England to take the side of the now Free Netherlands in their long struggle with Spain?

Meanwhile, soon after Europe, as a whole, had accepted the Westphalian settlement designed to govern the future relations between her States, England signified, as it were once for all, what was the part she proposed to play among them. This she accomplished by the assertion of her sea-power; which not only made possible the great Victory (Dunbar), but put an end to such resistance as was offered by Continental Europe to her new Commonwealth. French piracy was suppressed, and Lisbon was blockaded (1650)—the capital of a nation which, a decade earlier, had secured its independence and had, without loss of time, concluded Treaties with France and the United Provinces, and another with the English Government (1642). The last of these was the precursor of the still more important Treaty with Portugal, negotiated in 1654 by the Rump and signed by Cromwell, and may thus be regarded as having laid the foundation of the most long-lived, as well as the oldest, of all European Alliances¹. Its

¹ Cf. Guernsey Jones, *Beginnings of the Oldest European Alliance* (Washington, 1919).

beginnings were, however, interrupted by the catastrophe of the Stewart Throne, of which, among contemporary Sovereigns, King John IV of Portugal alone took note by acts of overt hostility, though his Government was, also, the earliest to enter into diplomatic relations with that of "the Parliament of the Commonwealth of England." Before long, King John's cherished design of the marriage of the Prince of Wales to a Portuguese Infanta was to be resumed, and the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance to enter into a new stage of its long-protracted course. But, for the present, Prince Rupert, the stormy petrel of the Restoration, had fluttered away into Mediterranean waters, and English foreign policy had been revolutionised.

In order to achieve these results, Blake, one of the greatest of our naval heroes, had found it necessary to complete the creation of a permanent English navy of war and to secure its requisite bases of action. When, therefore, an English fleet entered the Mediterranean in 1651, it could not do so without the goodwill of some Power possessed of harbours where English vessels could be refitted or re-victualled; and this Power could be no other than Spain (by means of the Spanish ports in the Two Sicilies and Sardinia), so long the foe of England and sure to become such again. For the moment, political advantage had drawn the two nations nearer together; how could the Government of Philip IV remain on unfriendly terms with a Power which had swept the seas clear of French and Portuguese ships? Thus, so early as May 1650, the Spanish Government had recognised that of the Commonwealth; and a resident diplomatic agent had been sent to Madrid. But the murder of that agent (Ascham), on the day after his arrival, could not but lead to friction with Spain; and the effect of this was a friendly turn in the relations between the Commonwealth and the French Government, more especially as the Huguenot interest for a time made head in France against the sway of Mazarin. French commerce, however, continued to suffer from English naval activity, and the Commonwealth was now strong enough to pass an Act prohibiting trade with such of the American and West India Colonies as adhered to the Royalist cause (1650). By sea and land, the Commonwealth had resolved to be master where the Crown had been.

As for the relations at this time between England and the Free Netherlands, they passed with most notable suddenness from extreme to extreme. At first, the States-General, under Orange influence, refused to enter into other than commercial negotiations with the

Commonwealth. But the death (October, 1650) of the Stadholder William II (before the birth of his son, the future William III) led to a complete change in the conduct of the affairs of the Dutch Republic, which now, with the exception of the two Provinces acknowledging the Orange Stadholdership, fell under the control of the Province of Holland. This change caused the Government of the Commonwealth to form the design of concluding as close as possible an Alliance with the United Provinces, and even to entertain, as a possible result of negotiations to this end, the notion of converting the Alliance into a political union between the two countries. But the Commonwealth leaders and their envoys (Chief Justice St John and Strickland) insufficiently understood the political organisation of the body politic with which they had to deal, and they made no allowance for the violent Orange predilections of the populace. Thus, after a protracted negotiation, at an early stage of which the Dutch had proposed as the basis of a treaty the *Intercursus Magnus* (agreed upon in 1495, at the time of the Perkin Warbeck scare), this far-reaching design was allowed to drop—chiefly on the narrow ground that the English negotiators insisted on the strict exclusion of the English Royalists from the Netherlands. The immediate result of the attempt and its failure was a growth of illwill between the two communities—stimulated, on the part of England, by the consciousness that her sea-power was no longer inferior to the Dutch, and by the acceptance of the Commonwealth Government (notwithstanding Prince Rupert) in the greater part of the English New World.

Hereupon, the Parliament carried on, with increased determination, the restrictive policy on which it had fallen back after the collapse of the Dutch Alliance or "Union" project, and of which the main end was to advance English commerce at the expense of that of the Provinces. Their legislation and diplomacy had been long, and at times unscrupulously, directed to the maintenance of their commercial ascendancy, north and east as well as west, at a height dangerously near to monopoly; and the first *Navigation Act*, of October, 1651, which practically annihilated Dutch trade with the English West Indies, though not intended to provoke war with the United Provinces, was very intelligibly looked upon as conceived in the spirit of retaliation¹. Thus, when, in 1652, the first of the Wars between

¹ It was, at the same time, in thorough agreement with the economic ideas of the age. Gardiner points out that this was the one legislative achievement of the Commonwealth which not only found favour in the eyes of the Convention Parliament, but was reenacted by it in a more stringent form (1660).

England and the Dutch Republic broke out, though not occasioned by the Navigation Act, it was largely due to the commercial tension which culminated in this memorable piece of legislation.

Meanwhile, the turn taken by domestic affairs in France had inevitably reacted upon the party in the Long Parliament by which that Parliament was itself to be overthrown, and of which Cromwell himself stood at the head. The rally round Condé of the Huguenot nobles of the South, supported by Bordeaux and other southern towns, had aroused Cromwell's interest. He had dreamt of a Protestant and republican France; but, of course, it was only a dream, and the notion of persuading the French radical organisation called the *Ormée* to construct a Constitution on the Fifth Monarchy model (though the precursor of later political fancies) proved equally futile. On the other hand, Condé had taken the paradoxical step of applying for aid to both Spain and England; and, for a time, Cromwell and his following, while desirous for the preservation, if possible, of peace, hesitated between two possible alliances. They were drawn to Spain by her recognition of the Commonwealth, which France had hitherto persistently refused, and to France by the possibility of her transfer of Dunkirk to England, as well as by the further possibility of her being induced to put an end to the persecution of the Huguenots. Early in 1652, Mazarin was once more at the helm, and though a proclamation of the young King Lewis XIV confirmed the Edict of Nantes and paid a tribute to the loyalty of his Huguenot subjects, the French recognition of the Commonwealth was still distant, and the transfer of Dunkirk quite out of the question. When, therefore, in the same year (against Cromwell's wish), hostilities began between the English and the Dutch, there was no little danger of a speedy declaration of war by England against France, and Blake lost no time in inflicting reprisals on French ships. But, the fall of Gravelines and the surrender of Dunkirk into Spanish hands notwithstanding, Mazarin was unwilling to hasten an open conflict with England; where there was a corresponding wish not to break with France, unless an understanding should have been reached with Spain. Neither Power was, or could be, welcome as an ally to the Commonwealth, although, near the end of 1652, it had been (at first with a doubtful grace) recognised by the King of France. The Dutch War, which opened in 1652, at first, notwithstanding several well-contested battles, remained unattended by any decisive result. A period of uncertainty seemed to have befallen the foreign policy of England, and one which even

the most expert diplomacy would have found it difficult to bring to a satisfactory close. Meanwhile, it was not to any question of foreign affairs that the dissolution of the Long Parliament was due; and the day of the Lord-General was not yet quite at hand. When it came, the moving spirit in every branch of foreign as well as of home affairs was the same militant Protestantism that had, in turn, remodelled the army and succeeded in transforming the State; and that was, also, more and more potently impressing itself upon the beginnings of English Colonial life. Thus, far more distinctly than the tentative efforts of Elizabeth's later years, Oliver's conduct of our foreign policy in the middle of the seventeenth century, while advancing the material interests of England, put her in the van of the process of reconstituting Europe. The problem of effecting this by securing her the command of the sea, and, incidentally, depressing the Papacy to a thing, or at least a Power, of the past, was not one for which even the genius of Oliver Cromwell could find an enduring solution; but the attempt lit up the scene of the world for a brief and brilliant period of national action. After these years—fewer even than those which sufficed Bismarck for establishing the new Germany as a dominating European Power—English foreign policy soon sank back into a restricted sphere, but not without retaining the consciousness of impulses and traditions which it could not easily resist or lightly abandon.

But Oliver's was a political genius, and as such dealt with political realities. The consummation was, therefore, not achieved suddenly or at once. In 1653, while the control of English government had been committed to a *doctrinaire* assembly, but when the public mind was already looking to the Lord-General for the direction of its foreign affairs, he continued for some time to lean towards the paradoxical combination which would have allied England with Spain and the French Dissidents. Although, in July, 1653, the city of Bordeaux surrendered to the King, and the Huguenot outlook darkened, Cromwell continued in this mood even beyond the beginning of the Protectorate, irritated by the plots hatched in France against the English Government, and notwithstanding the overtures of Mazarin early in 1654.

He had, in fact, made up his mind that, before choosing between France and Spain, England must be at peace with the United Netherlands. In carrying out this resolution he showed his greatness as a politician; but in the several stages of the process he displayed that other

quality of his mind—its imaginative impetus—which was in a different way, an essential element in his greatness. The Dutch War, after a series of grandly contested naval battles, had, by Tromp's defeat off Portland in February, 1653, left the command of the Channel in English hands, and the battle of the Gabbard (June) had proved the inability of the Dutch to recover it. The peace negotiations hitherto carried on between the belligerents had broken down through the severity of the terms demanded by the English Council of State, and the new negotiation proposed by the States-General at the instance of de Witt (before he was named Pensionary of Holland) had been rejected by the new Council. But now, de Witt's insistence upon the necessities of the case, and the despair of the Dutch population, led to the appointment of four Dutch Peace Commissioners to England (June), and the moment had arrived for Cromwell's intervention. Whether or not (and it seems more than doubtful) he had been in favour of the War, he was now certainly in favour of peace, and the advantages of an intimate alliance in his mind outbalanced those of the abasement of England's chief mercantile naval and mercantile rival. As for the United Provinces, they must make their choice between a territorial sacrifice to France, and joining hands with England—though not precisely falling into her arms. Peace must be made, but on a generous basis—not of jealousy, but of amity, between two great Protestant nations. Thus, Cromwell first informally proposed, as the security of peace, the appointment of a small number of Dutchmen and Englishmen respectively to the English and Dutch Councils of State (or States-General). And, when the Dutch Commissioners were unable to see their way to this, or to a fresh suggestion by Cromwell of a religious and commercial union only, to which the Council of State had added the demand of a complete political blending of political power and policy under one Supreme Head, Cromwell made one more effort—the most astonishing, as it was the most characteristic, of all. There was no longer—and with Cromwell there cannot be said to have been during the whole of this crisis—any thought of a revival of St John's grandiose but impracticable idea of a political union between the two peoples, which had broken down on a previous occasion. What was now informally asked for was at once less and more than this. Instead of political amalgamation a Perpetual Alliance was to be established between the two nations. This Alliance was, together with them, to include Denmark, Sweden, the Protestant Princes of the Empire and France—but the last-

named on condition that her Government should grant full liberty to the Huguenots. It was to be directed against all Princes and States who employed the services of the Inquisition and acknowledged the authority of the Pope. To this sufficiently vast scheme was added a particular plan for the partition of the New World—England to be assigned America, with the exception of Brazil, and to be assisted by the United Provinces in accomplishing the necessary conquest. Each of the two Allies was to establish a Commission consisting of four representatives of each. Finally, the Christian purpose of this strange League of Nations was to be attested by the sending of missionaries to any people willing to receive them.

Cromwell's design—for, though not of his drafting, it seems certainly to have commended itself to him as a basis for future action—is invaluable as indicating the present state of his mind and the bent of his future policy. It is possible that the bitter hostility to Spain which marks the document may have been partly due to the refusal of the Spanish Government (at the dictation of the Inquisition) to entertain any proposal for the toleration of Protestants in its dominions, and by its natural efforts to obstruct the Anglo-Dutch Peace which Cromwell and his followers had at heart. In any case, the States-General deferred consideration of it, either in its first (both wider and cruder) or in a subsequently modified (narrower and less aggressive) form. Hereupon, after his installation as Protector, Cromwell suggested to the Dutch Commissioners, once more in London, a far less comprehensive scheme as a basis of peace. A Defensive League was to be concluded between the two Powers, binding each side alike to enter into no treaty without the consent of the other, and proclaiming freedom of trade between them, but leaving their existing laws (the Navigation Act, of course, included) untouched. After not a few hitches, the Treaty of Peace was signed and ratified in April, 1654, and the Act of Exclusion which barred the admission of any member of the House of Orange to civil or military office was, thanks to the management of de Witt, passed by the States-General in the same month.

What Cromwell had obtained could hardly be considered as a diplomatic victory; but the success of the War had not been used by him in vain; for the eyes of France were once more bent on Flanders. As for the Protector's wider views, nothing might seem left of them but words; yet his ideas were not dead, and inspired fresh efforts on behalf of the combined interests which he had at heart.

Whitelocke, on leaving for his Swedish embassy (at the end of 1653), had been charged by Oliver himself to "bring us back a Protestant Alliance." This he was not likely to obtain from Queen Christina; but he brought back with him a Commercial Treaty, which, together with one concluded with Denmark (now at peace with Sweden), placed English commerce on the same footing as Dutch in the Baltic. While thus at least a good understanding was effected with the Protestant Powers of the North, the Protectorate had entered into similar relations with certain Protestant Princes and Cities of the Empire, and with the Swiss Protestant Cantons, aided no doubt by the negotiations of John Dury throughout Europe on behalf of Christian unity. And it may be added, in the same twofold connexion, that, about the same time (1657), a Treaty with Portugal secured to English trade with that country and its dependencies the intimate commercial relations which were to be consummated by the Treaty of 1661 between the two monarchies. The free intercourse, and the immunity from interference by the Inquisition, were the very concessions which it had been sought in vain to secure from Spain.

In the meantime, the great changes effected by the Thirty Years' War in the general condition of European politics, together with the continuance of the contest between France and Spain in particular, favoured the realisation of, at least, part of the Protector's plans. Though his vision of a new European conflict on a religious basis seemed unlikely to take shape, yet England was rapidly assuming a position of decisive influence among the States of Europe. For different reasons, neither France nor, even more manifestly, Spain was strong enough to assert an undisputed predominance; while they were alike anxious to add to their respective weight in the scales by securing the alliance of England. For a time, as has been seen, Oliver inclined to a Spanish combination, and asked for Dunkirk as an eventual pledge for Calais. But secret preparations were, meanwhile, made for assailing the Spanish Power in the remote, but attractive quarter of the West Indies; and, moved as he always was, in the last resort, by religious convictions, Oliver, as he settled down firmly in the seat of supreme authority at home, proceeded to find his bearings in the sea of foreign policy. Thus, once more, the ship of State consciously and decisively pursued the course which it had followed in Elizabeth's forgotten days.

To weaken, if not to put an end to, Spain's hold upon the New

World was, now as then, but under conditions already different from those obtaining when Drake singed King Philip's beard, a fundamental part of the Protestant policy which England found herself carrying out. But the Protector had rated too low the difficulty of a West Indian conquest, when he deluded himself into the belief that he could make war upon Spain in America while remaining at peace with her in Europe. The attack on Hispaniola (San Domingo) was abandoned; but Jamaica, little esteemed in comparison by its first conquerors, was occupied (1655). Spanish pride, however, took fire; and Philip IV, who had more than countenanced the damage inflicted by Blake upon French Mediterranean commerce, now laid an embargo upon all English vessels and goods in his dominions. By the end of October, 1655, the breach was complete; and Oliver was left to defend in high-sounding words, which may have convinced himself, a course of action irreconcilable with good faith, but seeming to be imposed on him by resistless forces.

The effect of England's breach with Spain upon France was impeded by the indignation aroused in the Protector, and assiduously spread by him through the country at large; at the news of the Duke of Savoy's persecution of the Vaudois Protestants. Neither in the remonstrance to the Duke (composed by Milton) nor in the appeal to the good offices of the King of France (erroneously rumoured to have taken part in the outrage) was there anything in the nature of a threat. But so far were these efforts from being mere demonstrations of sympathy, that the other Protestant Powers of Europe were called upon to join in seeking redress. The tone of Mazarin's reply reveals his anxiety that the incident should not thwart the conclusion of the expected Anglo-French Alliance; and, before the memorable agitation in England on the subject had subsided, Duke Charles had promised an amnesty to his insurgent subjects, as a concession to England. The concession was mainly due to the policy of Mazarin, and to some fear of Swiss armed intervention; but the main credit of the whole transaction rested with "the World's Protector."

The Treaty hereupon concluded with France was, as yet, only concerned with the establishment of friendly relations: the question of an Alliance could not be treated while England was ostensibly at peace with Spain. In the final negotiations preceding the conclusion of the compact, the prohibition of the assistance of "rebels" to either party was limited to the case of rebels "now declared"; but a secret agreement was added banishing the Stewarts and their

adherents from France and excluding Condé and his House from England. On October 21, 1655, the Treaty was at last signed. The mixture of motives which impelled Cromwell to conclude it lay at the root of a foreign policy in which a personal element cannot for a moment be ignored. Nevertheless, together with the actual Treaty of Alliance which followed a year later, it marks the beginning of an epoch of the utmost significance in the history of English foreign policy—the epoch of a cooperation between English and French interests, which, though with certain interruptions, may be said to have lasted for the better part of a quarter of a century—till the European Coalition of 1674 and the change in English policy consequent upon it.

Now that Cromwell had declared for a policy which meant war with Spain—whom he was soon to denounce (to his second Parliament) as England's "natural enemy"—he found himself involved in foreign complications hardly less difficult to meet than the designs of Royalists and Levellers at home. A war with Spain, as a naval war on many coasts, necessitated the constant use of the right of search against the Dutch, with whom it was most desirable to avoid a renewal of hostilities. Fortunately for England, the Dutch navy was at this time actively employed in the Baltic. When, in this year 1655, the new King Charles Gustavus had taken up arms against Poland, he was, in accordance with the political canon now obtaining at Whitehall, regarded as a militant champion of Protestantism against Popery. (He was, in truth, anxious to add to the territorial gains of Sweden in the Peace of Westphalia, and to lower the ascendancy of the Dutch trade in the Baltic, where it then quadrupled that of the rest of the world.)

In the face of Sweden's designs, and of the Counter-alliance of the Powers threatened by her advance, Oliver hesitated about responding to the overtures made to him on either the one or the other side. He would have rejoiced to see Charles X's war against Poland extended into a general Protestant League against the supposed designs of the Emperor Ferdinand III and their supposed originator, Pope Alexander VII; yet he could not but perceive that the ambition of the Swedish King constituted a serious menace to English as well as to Dutch trade in the Baltic. Thus (partly in consequence of the financial embarrassments of the Protectorate Government, and partly because, with the unprofitable war with Spain and the effort to hold Jamaica, it already had enough on its hands and must have left

operations against the House of Austria mainly in those of its Allies) the sole result of the negotiations between the English and Swedish Governments amounted not even to a political alliance. The Treaty between them (July, 1656) merely permitted Charles X to levy a certain number of volunteers in England and placed this country on the footing of the most favoured nation with regard to Baltic ports actually in Swedish hands. Much the same terms as to duties were shortly afterwards secured for themselves and other nations by the Dutch, though at the cost of a naval demonstration, which England's good understanding with Sweden had saved her. But, if so far satisfactory, this was a tame ending of the whole of this episode in the foreign policy of the Protector; and the design of a League against Pope and Emperor had once more vanished into thin air.

But the War with Spain and the definitive Alliance with France had to be pressed on. Mazarin had again wavered in the direction of peace, and there were rumours of a Papal mediation between the belligerents. Oliver's manifesto justifying the breach with Spain was published on the day after the earlier agreement with France, and Spain was (in accordance with diplomatic precedent) declared to have begun the War. In April, 1656, Charles II made his contribution to the conflict by concluding a compact with Spain; and the War now ran its course, at first indecisive. In November, the Treaty of Alliance between France and England against Spain was concluded, though not put into its final form till five months later (March, 1657). Mazarin had succeeded in preventing the extension of the Treaty into a general league of the Powers adverse to the House of Austria; and Cromwell had obtained the substantial pledge of a transfer to England of Dunkirk, after it should have been jointly retaken by the French and English forces. Then, at the time when the Protector seemed to have reached the height of his power at home, there came the news of Blake's great victory over the Spanish fleet at Vera Cruz (April, 1657) which crippled the resources of Spain, put a stop to her invasion of Portugal and seriously shook her general position. The fall of Dunkirk, however, did not take place till more than a year later (June, 1658); and before Cromwell could thus feel assured of the pledge he had exacted from France, his foreign policy had to face new difficulties.

Though he could not call into being the Protestant League to which from religious motives he aspired, he persistently clung to the

supreme necessity of maintaining peace between the Protestant Powers. Notwithstanding the seductive efforts of Sweden, which actually made him an offer of the duchy of Bremen as the price of his cooperation (November, 1657), he declined to join her in crushing Denmark, with whom she was now at war, into utter inferiority; but neither could he see his way to the demand for a settlement by a Congress brought forward by Denmark under Dutch instigation. The process of Cromwell's attempted mediation between the Scandinavian Powers thus depended, with much else, upon the relations between England and the United Provinces. These relations were growing more and more strained—mainly in consequence of the long-standing contention as to the right of search, heightened by the many occasions for friction offered by the Anglo-Spanish War, in whose aspect as a Protestant crusade the Dutch showed scant interest. (Moreover, they had picked a quarrel with England's ally Portugal about Brazil.) But, when Dutch goodwill to the Danes seemed not unlikely to take the form of actual naval aid against the Swedes, the Protector held to the way of peace. He determined to utilise the French alliance in this direction, and suggested to Mazarin joint diplomatic action on the part of England and France for the settlement of the Suedo-Danish, as well as the Portuguese-Spanish question. The Cardinal (without paying any formal attention to the accompanying, as it were indispensable, proposal of an offensive and defensive alliance against the House of Austria) entered into the suggestion, and the result was that the Danes found themselves able to accept the terms imposed by the victorious Charles X in the Peace of Roeskilde (February, 1658). The Treaty, by which each of the two Northern Powers renounced any alliance hostile to the other and closed the Sound to any fleet hostile to both, was a diplomatic victory for Cromwell and his agent Meadowe, though followed neither by a Suedo-English treaty of alliance nor by any other approach to the idea of a Protestant League. The Dutch, who could not but regard it in the light of a discomfiture, and notwithstanding the efforts of de Witt, drew back from the conclusion of a defensive alliance with England and France (though they nominally accepted English mediation with Portugal about Brazil).

When at last (June, 1658) after the brilliant victory on the Dunes, in which Cromwell's soldiery took part, Dunkirk capitulated and was placed by Mazarin in English hands, his policy was seen to have, at last, with England's aid prevailed over Spain. This was made mani-

fest by the Elective Capitulation signed by the Head of the German Habsburgs before he assumed the Imperial Crown as Leopold I—a Capitulation which marked the isolation of Spain. It was followed by the League of the Rhine (August, 1658), which, though, in the end, redounding to the advantage of France (against whom nearly all national feeling had died out), closed any prospect of a participation of the German Princes in a Protestant league against the House of Austria.

Before the success of Mazarin's designs thus encouraged France and her King to look forward hopefully to the developments of the future, Oliver Cromwell died (September 2nd, 1658), with the high hopes and aspirations unfulfilled, of which his foreign policy at no time lost sight—sometimes almost suddenly recurring to them. With the Dutch he had, largely owing to de Witt's single-minded efforts, kept the peace; but his patience was sorely tried, not only from first to last by the old trade grievances, but in the end also by the violent action of Charles X of Sweden, who had broken through the Treaty of Roeskilde and was manifestly intent on incorporating the Danish dominions into one great Scandinavian monarchy. The Dutch, hereupon, determined on the relief of Copenhagen; and it was widely believed in Europe that Cromwell was an accomplice in the present designs of "the King of the North" in expectancy. What is certain is that Cromwell's design of a twofold Northern Alliance was in ruins, and that the danger of a breach with the United Provinces, to avoid which was a more difficult, as well as a more important part of the same general policy, was greater than ever. The chief balance to this twofold political failure—apart from the acquisition of Jamaica, and its maintenance in the teeth of the efforts of Spain and her adjoining possessions—was the success of the Anglo-French Alliance in Flanders, and the actual tenure of Dunkirk. Yet no survey of the Protector's foreign policy and its results could rest satisfied with a reference to its material gains; the power of the country was now acknowledged by friend and foe alike, and known, at home as well as abroad, in Colonies and in Motherland, to be largely the product of the religious zeal which, resting in the last resort upon his army, he had inspired in the Government personified in him.

No change of principle or method in this foreign policy could be in question during the months of domestic faction and civil strife which ensued after the great Protector's death and brought the Puritan Revolution to a close. With the Restoration, the foreign policy of

England, although no longer animated by the religious convictions and aspirations that held possession of Oliver's soul, underwent no such complete revulsion as might have *a priori* been supposed. In 1659, the Peace of the Pyrenees was at last concluded between France and Spain; and, while any possibility of a future union between the Spanish and the French Crowns¹ was at present ignored by Spain, Spain was left so weak that her efforts to recover Portugal proved in vain. Nor could the Empire, under its new Habsburg Chief, revive any of its former pretensions to direct the course of European politics, wholly dependent as he was (except in his Turkish Wars) upon the resources of his own hereditary dominions. But, though the gains of France and the losses of Spain had been great, the policy of Lewis XIV, professedly conducted after Mazarin's death (1661) by the King himself, with the aid of Mazarin's pupil and successor, de Lionne, called for unremitting vigilance. On the death (in 1665) of Philip IV of Spain, Lewis XIV, on behalf of the Infanta his consort, pressed her claim to the Spanish Netherlands by "right of Devolution," thus laying bare his desire for the acquisition of, at least, part of the Spanish inheritance. The attempt might be prevented by a combination of the other Powers against France, such as was advocated with extraordinary persistence and resource by the eminent Austrian diplomatist Lisola. But for the execution of this the time had not yet arrived; and, of the two Powers most directly concerned, the United Provinces and England, the former, though well aware of the French appetite for the Flemish coastline, remained under the guidance of de Witt in favour of a pacific attitude, and in 1662 had concluded a defensive alliance with France.

It may be that the fact of this Alliance was unknown to, as well as left unnoticed by, Charles II and Clarendon, still his Chief Minister, and himself generally well inclined to France. They were, at the time, much perturbed by the state of the British finances, and all the more ready to gratify French national feeling by the sale of Dunkirk (1662)—a transaction which afterwards contributed to Clarendon's downfall. For the present, the acquiescence of England in the aggressive schemes of France might thus seem assured. The

¹ It can hardly be an error to regard the conditions under which King Philip IV accepted Lewis XIV's suit for the hand of the Infanta Maria Teresa—her renunciation of her rights to the whole Spanish Succession—as illusory, and intended to be such. The contention that, in consequence of the local laws of Brabant, this renunciation did not apply to the greater part of the Spanish Netherlands, was thus, actually or virtually, an afterthought.

growth of political intimacy between the two Governments had been marked by the ominous marriage of King Charles II's sister Henrietta to Philip Duke of Orleans. Soon afterwards (May, 1662), Charles II's own marriage with the Infanta Catharine of Portugal, as placing England in direct antagonism to Spanish interests, and therefore in accord with those of France, amounted to a resumption, in its most important issue, of the foreign policy of Cromwell. The policy of Charles was in accordance with that of the Protector in conciliating the mercantile interest by showing hostility to Spain, with a view to keeping hold of Jamaica, while at the same time securing access to the East Indies by the proposed cession of Bombay as part of the Infanta's dowry. Thus, after some vacillation on the part of Charles II, the marriage was concluded which, in the end, brought to Portugal, with England's aid, the recognition of her independence by Spain and to England the beginnings of her Indian Empire.

The adherence of England to the policy of France might now seem a working *entente*, while amicable relations had continued between the dominant party in the United Provinces and the French Government. But material interests and popular feeling combined, as of old, to keep asunder the two Maritime Powers, with both of whom France desired to remain on friendly terms. There had been acts of aggression on both sides, in America and in Africa; and in 1664, notwithstanding the unwillingness of King Charles II, England and the United Provinces were again at war. For a time, it seemed as if the continuance of hostilities might be transitory; for the course of the War was favourable to England; and in Holland the republican party continued to desire peace. But, before long, the catastrophic events of the years 1665-6, and the continuance of the contest at sea, made the situation one of greater danger and difficulty; and, at the same time, the problem of the impending action of France overshadowed the Anglo-Dutch War. The death of Philip IV of Spain (1665) had decided Lewis XIV to put forward the claims of the Infanta his consort to the Spanish Netherlands by "right of Devolution"; and with this end in view, he, early in 1666, as bound by his defensive alliance with the States-General to take their side, declared war against England (January, 1666). But he had no intention of preventing either of the combatants, alike reduced in naval strength, from concluding a peace which would suit his own policy. In this sense, he entered into an agreement with Charles II (March, 1667), binding him to abstain from any interference with

the action of France in the matter of the Spanish Netherlands, in return for an undertaking that France would abstain from further assistance to the Dutch. Safe as he thought himself against England and sure of her adversary, his way now seemed clear; and shortly afterwards, he invaded the Spanish Netherlands, and the "War of Devolution" began.

But, though Charles II wrote to the Queen-mother in France that he would not for a year enter into any contention against that country, de Witt had already perceived whither the situation was tending, and that the future of the United Provinces lay with the designs of Lisola. Thus a Peace, though not such a peace as Lewis XIV had had in view, was rapidly concluded between the English and the Dutch Governments at Breda (July, 1667), which, so far as their colonial rivalry was concerned, might perhaps be regarded as a fair compromise. Its European significance consisted in the curb which it put upon French aggression, before a more comprehensive effort was made in the same direction.

In January, 1668, when the hand of France lay heavy on the Spanish Netherlands, and her King was negotiating in grand style with the pacific Emperor (Leopold I) as to the future partition of the Spanish inheritance at large, the Treaty called *par excellence* the Triple Alliance was concluded at the Hague. De Witt had, a few years earlier, pointed out to Sir Willam Temple, the clear-sighted English Ambassador there, that the choice for the United Provinces lay between two alternatives—a corrupt bargain with France, and a fair but effective pressure upon her, which would be impossible without the cooperation of England. Very unwillingly, but unable to resist the flow of home opinion, to which his policy always remained sensitive, Charles II instructed Temple to offer a defensive alliance between England and the United Provinces, which should insist upon peace between France and Spain, on terms allowing France to retain what she had conquered in her campaign in the Spanish Netherlands, or an equivalent; with a secret proviso that the contracting Powers might in the pursuit of their object have resort to arms. The Triple Alliance, of which Sweden had become a member on the day after its conclusion (subsidies being promised her as a condition of her accession), was not, in any sense, a final settlement of the French design. It was a rebuff, and an exposure of the policy of France before the eyes of Europe; but, even within these limits and with many reservations as to its effect upon the aggressor, it justifies the opinion of Lord Acton, that it was "the earliest of that

series of coalitions which ended by getting the better of the power of Lewis XIV, and is therefore a landmark in History." But, as he continues, its extension into a wider European alliance was out of the question, and the jealousy between the two mercantile Powers concluding it was not one to be removed by politicians. Thus, the advance of the French Power (which was fain to outrival both on their own ground) was checked, not ended. For the rest, Charles II never ceased to remain in touch with Lewis XIV, and took care to minimise to him the significance of the Alliance jubilantly received in England. Thus, after some hesitation, Lewis decided to give way, and play before Europe the game of moderation (the actual terms of the Treaty consisting, indeed, of conditions previously offered by himself), which for himself meant a willingness to wait.

The Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle which followed (May, 1668), and which ended the first stage of the advance of France under Lewis XIV, may, therefore, be said to begin the second, which had for its primary purpose the isolation, and for its ultimate goal the absorption, of the United Provinces. To effect this, an intimate connexion and cooperation between France and England became imperatively necessary; and to subserving the policy of which this was the cardinal principle, Charles, primarily intent on the interests of his monarchical power and of his purse, now wholly lent himself.

The Secret Treaty of Dover, successfully negotiated by Henrietta Duchess of Orleans in 1670, was, therefore, merely a successful manoeuvre for binding down Charles to a line of action after his own heart, in the prosecution of which he had sought to engage from the very day of the conclusion of the Triple Alliance. The new feature added to it—the promised conversion, *at his own time*, of King Charles himself to Rome—was, on the above condition, most attractive to him, but hardly of supreme consequence to Lewis XIV, who, like his predecessors, had shown little repugnance to Protestant Alliances. It was not mentioned or reckoned as an item on either side of the money bargain in the version of the Treaty brought home from Paris by Buckingham, which alone was signed by the Protestant members of the Cabal (*le Traité simulé*). For the rest, the Treaty, in both its versions, bound Charles to the policy of his Ally both in the immediate and in the remoter future—*i.e.* Lewis was to have the assistance of England both in making war upon the Dutch, and, eventually, in securing the whole of the Spanish inheritance. The partners in the Treaty were to endeavour to obtain the adherence to it of Sweden

and Denmark, or of at least one of these States, and of the Elector of Brandenburg and other Princes.

In the meantime, the Triple Alliance having, as a matter of course, fallen to pieces, though not till after its members had resolved on an agreement guaranteeing the subsequent Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, de Witt and Lisola drafted the hoped-for expansion of the Alliance into a wide European league. The proposal was inevitably rejected by Charles II, whose immediate efforts against the republican *régime* in the United Netherlands had been met by the nomination of Prince William III of Orange to the stadholderate of five of the Provinces, with the expectancy of that of Holland and Zeeland on the day of his coming of age. Before, however, that day arrived, the Secret Agreement with France had come into operation: the Declaration of Indulgence, into which the King's religious undertakings had for the present shrunk, had been proclaimed; and, a few days later (March, 1672), the English Declaration of War against the United Provinces appeared, outrunning, like a jackal, that of France. The foreign policy of Charles II, at once timid and treacherous, had at last come into the open. This and his home policy were not so much detached from each other as antithetically mixed. For he was anxious, above all things, for the retention of the Throne which, after so long an exile, he had secured; and yet he was secretly averse from what was at bottom, though by no means consistently, the national policy towards foreign Powers whose motives he, unlike Cromwell, perfectly understood and whose action he was often personally disposed to support.

Thus, in the War which from 1672 to 1674 they had to sustain against England as well as against France, the United Provinces were left without an Ally (except the Elector of Brandenburg, who soon found it necessary to secure himself by a separate Peace). Sweden, under its youthful King Charles XI, had been early detached from the Triple Alliance, and in April, 1673, when the French had already invaded the Free Netherlands, had concluded an Alliance with France, and another with England, promising her (in this strangely inverted triple compact) Swedish help in the case of any attack "for the sake of France."

The French invasion of the United Provinces in 1672 had seemed to justify the self-confidence of Lewis XIV, till after the murder of the brothers de Witt, and the committal of the fortunes of the Provinces to the guidance of their young Stadholder William III of

Orange, the Dutch people had made a heroic stand behind their wall of waters. The bellicose English feeling against them, stimulated by factious invective such as Shaftesbury's, was dying out. Our share in the War had brought no laurels, and no East India fleet spoils, to our navy; and public feeling was becoming strongly agitated against France. Meanwhile, the desire of the other European Powers to bring about the restoration of peace in Europe had led to the assembling of a Peace Congress at Cologne, from which England necessarily held aloof, and which came to nothing (1673). But diplomatic activity continued; and, while France and England severally carried on their secret negotiations with the Dutch for a peace satisfactory to themselves, the Imperial agents were busily employed on the project of a wider combination against the aggression of France, whom it was hoped King Charles would, notwithstanding the influences surrounding him and his own inclinations, be obliged to abandon.

On the action of the English Government, hard pressed more especially by the Spanish (December, 1673), much depended; and Charles gave way so far as to indicate that he was prepared to treat as to peace with the Dutch on his own account, and without consulting his Ally. He threw himself on Parliament for the decision of a question which, by virtue of his prerogative, it really appertained to him to settle, and sought to conciliate parliamentary and popular feeling by denying the existence of any Treaty with France beyond the "simulated" one. (This suppression had seemed all the more desirable after the Test Act agitation and the Catholic marriage of the Duke of York, in the same year 1673.) Thus, he allowed himself to be detached from the obnoxious Alliance, and the result was the conclusion of the Peace of Westminster (February, 1674) between England and the United Provinces.

The conditions of this Treaty were honourable to England as well as in other ways satisfactory, so far as her claims on the United Provinces were concerned; but the Secret Article which prohibited either Power from allying itself with an adversary of the other bore ominously upon the events that were to follow. In the following August, the Coalition against France was formed, which included with the United Provinces, the Emperor, the King of Spain and the Duke of Lorraine, in the confident belief that, besides other Princes, England would soon come over to their side—and a new era in the history of Europe actually began. In this, England at first took only

a tentative and, indeed, uncertain part. The Emperor Leopold now declared war upon Lewis; and France (left with no support but that of Sweden, whose neighbour Brandenburg had joined the Coalition) resolved on evacuating the Low Countries and turning against Franche-Comté and the Palatinate. There, her arms were on the whole successful, and Charles II might feel that it was not the losing side from which he had been so strongly pressed to turn away. As a matter of fact, he had left auxiliary troops with the French army, who, by a strange irony of fate, took part in the devastation of the Palatinate; but neither this circumstance nor his known personal inclinations could incline the Emperor to accept the mediation proffered by Charles in the War against France. On the other hand, William of Orange, now Hereditary Stadholder and Captain-General of the United Provinces, would willingly have accepted such a mediation, and suggested Nymegen for requisite negotiations. But, after a series of both parliamentary and diplomatic manoeuvres, the design failed and with it, for the present, the attempt to establish a dynastic connexion between the English Throne and the Stadholderate by means of a marriage between William and the Princess Mary. But he could bide his time, and firmly stood out against Lewis XIV's endeavour to draw him over to the policy of a separate peace between France and the United Provinces. Meanwhile, in the same year (1676) Charles signed another Secret Treaty with Lewis, binding him by a yearly subsidy to adherence to the French alliance.

Thus what has been well called the period of two foreign policies—marked by an impotence due to this duality more than to any one other cause—continued into the eventful year 1677 and the beginning of the following year. In spite—or partly in consequence—of the French successes in the field, the feeling against the Court and its inclination towards France was stronger than ever; in the spring of 1677, notwithstanding the corruption of the members of the Opposition by Lewis XIV, the House of Commons unanimously voted an address explicitly hostile to France, Lord-Treasurer Danby being in favour of the policy urged by the House. It then refused to grant supplies for the defence of the country, unless the King concluded an offensive and defensive alliance with the States-General against France and for the preservation of the Spanish Netherlands. While Charles now began to haggle with his Ally, public feeling rose higher and higher; in the end, Parliament was adjourned, and an addition was made by

Lewis to the price he had agreed to pay for the English adhesion to his Alliance.

Charles II, in the pursuit of the policy on which he was bent, had many resources; but they did not include those of an inflexible will and of a deeply meditated statesmanship. William of Orange, by whom the great change in the foreign policy of England was to be brought about, and who was in possession of both these qualities, was, in the first instance, called upon to use all the tact and circumspection at his command. The proposal was unpopular in the United Provinces and suspected in England; but, with some difficulty, he gained over, first the King, and then his brother the Duke, to consent to his marriage with Princess Mary—a step which, as Charles calculated, would at least reassure the English people as to his own relations with France, without in any way subjecting him to the influence of the Prince.

But the effect of the transaction was not long in showing itself. Lewis XIV had refused the terms of peace with the Coalition offered by Charles II as mediator and proffering the return of part of his conquests in the War, including Lorraine. Now, after the Orange marriage (November, 1677) the policy of Charles II took a turn—which, if carried to its logical consequences, would imply that the last link in the European Coalition against Lewis XIV was to be supplied by the accession of England. The English auxiliary contingent in the French army was now actually recalled, and (in January, 1678) a Treaty was concluded with the United Provinces, defining the French retrocessions on which the Powers must insist. But, when Parliament assembled, it went even further in the conditions to be imposed on France, demanding that the Peace of the Pyrenees should be made the basis of the intended settlement, and that, in the meantime, all trade with France should cease. King Charles, though called upon by Parliament to inform it of the state of his Alliances, this time held to his view of his prerogative, and ventured to enter into a private negotiation with Lewis XIV, offering in return for yet another subsidy to modify in his favour the peace terms demanded. They were accordingly presented to the Powers at Nymegen (April, 1678), but rejected by them; and England found herself in the unfortunate position of standing definitely on neither side in the contest.

She had before her, on the other hand, the prospect of a new conflict as to her foreign policy between Crown and Parliament, in which

the latter went so far as to bid the King disband his army or break with France. He determined to settle the matter by promising Lewis XIV, in return for the consolidated subsidy, to preserve neutrality in case of the rejection by the Coalition of the French terms of peace.

On August 10th, 1678, Lewis XIV having at last signified his unconditional assent to the territorial arrangements demanded of him, the Peace of Nymegen was signed between France, Spain and the United Provinces. But Charles II, who was, through Temple, acting as Mediator at the Conference, declined to append his signature, or to enter into any further understanding with the Emperor and Spain. Thus, largely by the inaction (or double-faced action) of the English policy, Lewis had in the Peace obtained Franche-Comté and sixteen fortified places in the Spanish Netherlands, and (since no compromise could be mooted on this head) kept Lorraine in his hands for the present. So far as English foreign policy was concerned, Lewis XIV replied to the congratulations of Sunderland on behalf of his master, and to his claim of a share in the result as due to the action of England, that he regarded himself no longer under any treaty obligation towards her. The great advance of France towards a complete predominance in the affairs of Europe, in which consists the real significance of the Treaties of Nymegen, had thus been effected neither against England nor through her aid. The ratification of the Treaties by the States-General and other Powers was long delayed, and (so strong was public feeling in England) Temple joined William of Orange in impeding it. But, in the end, the work of pacification was accomplished (1679); and, by a series of agreements with which no one concerned in them was content, Europe had secured a breathing-time. It was within this breathing-time that English foreign policy at last freed itself from the duplicity which had beset it through the personal designs—hesitating in the case of Charles II, but persistent in both him and his brother. A statesman had come to the front who viewed the course of European politics from an international as well as from a national point of view, yet who stood too near the Throne of England for his political future to admit of being dissociated from hers.

The ink was hardly dry on the Nymegen Treaties when Lewis XIV's operations against the Empire began; and, in 1686, the Emperor Leopold I, on behalf of the Empire, concluded with Spain and Sweden the League of Augsburg, countenanced by Pope Innocent XI.

This League forms another landmark in this age of coalitions. But England, notwithstanding the Orange marriage (November, 1677) was still out of the reckoning. Charles II, after being harassed by the exploitation of the Popish Plot, was even more nearly touched by the Exclusion Bill agitation (1679-81). His increased estrangement from Lewis XIV, after an attempt at an understanding on the old lines, actually led to an Anglo-Spanish Alliance (1680). While the tortuous diplomacy of the French King aimed at rendering the breach between Charles and his subjects impassable, the States-General (without the interference of William of Orange), urged him to relinquish his opposition to the Exclusion Bill. But he was encouraged by the conservative reaction in Church and State of his last years to go his own way, trusting, in the last instance, to the support of Lewis XIV. As the Continental policy of Lewis grew more and more aggressive, Charles gave repeated proofs of his resolution to persist in his non-intervention in European affairs, and turned a deaf ear to the appeal made to him to take part in the defence of Vienna against the Turk (1682). Thus, Charles II quitted the scene, without having changed the "system" of foreign policy—ultimate dependence upon France and refusal to enter into a European combination against her—to which, with the occasional semblance of divergences, he had adhered throughout his inglorious reign.

Near its close (in February, 1684) Charles II supported new proposals for peace made by Lewis XIV to the States-General, which were denounced by William of Orange and rejected by a majority in favour of continuing to aid Spain in the defence of the Spanish Netherlands. When, in the following August, the Truce of Ratisbon left France in possession for twenty years of her acquisitions (the so-called *reunions*) made up to 1681, and of Strassburg, as well as of Luxemburg, more recently captured, Charles II, in his desire for peace, promised the Imperial Ambassador to guarantee the agreement; though Lewis XIV's intention of ultimately keeping what he had gained could be no secret to him. The importance of this double-faced course both for him and his successor is manifest. His own end, however, was close at hand (he died on February 16th, 1685). By receiving, at the last, the Sacraments of the Church of Rome, he had kept at least part of his bond with France. For the rest, he had, during the last ten years of his reign, preserved the peace of England, at the cost of refusing to throw such weight as she still

possessed into the scale of the only policy by which tranquillity could be permanently restored to Europe. If his policy is viewed as a whole, it must be said to have found no other way of deferring the catastrophe of his dynasty, than that of depressing the English monarchy to the position of a vassal State.

The event to which Lewis XIV had looked forward so hopefully—the accession of the Catholic James II to the English Throne—was to prove the final cause of the French ascendancy in Europe. At first, King James seemed not unwilling to come to an understanding with the Prince of Orange, and through him with the States-General. But the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, which was judged very differently in different parts of the Catholic world, certainly had the effect of constituting the Prince, in the public eye, the representative of Protestant feeling against the King's Catholic sympathies and policy. Thus, though neither King James nor the nation paid much attention to the course of foreign affairs, the suspicions of an understanding between him and the King of France soon spread, and William of Orange continued, to the best of his ability, to cement the defensive league of the other Powers. James II's home policy—blind from the point of view of the preservation of his Throne—was, like his foreign policy, shortsighted, except on the supposition that he had made up his mind to follow France in any event. In April, 1687, he issued the fatal Declaration of Indulgence, and, in August of the same year, he declined the Emperor's request that he should guarantee the Truce of August, 1684. Yet, to make his isolation more complete, he incensed the States-General by attempting to recall his regiments in their service, while seeking to form a body of disbanded Catholic officers with the approval of Lewis XIV. The Dutch saw through the intrigue; and William of Orange could thus lay before the States-General a plan for offensive operations against his father-in-law's Throne.

Yet, while he was engaged in these manoeuvres, he had still disbelieved in war being made upon him by the United Provinces; and had continued his course of government at home. The birth of the Prince of Wales (June 10th, 1688) had only served to heighten the public distrust in the King. On the day of the acquittal of the Seven Bishops (June 29th), the invitation to the Prince of Orange was issued, and the last stage in the catastrophe of the Stewart Throne began. From this moment till the assumption of the royal power by William and Mary, it is idle to speak of an English foreign policy. But though

by his declaration to the States-General, on September 9th, 1688, the French Ambassador formally identified his Sovereign with the preservation of the Throne of James II, the latter declined King Lewis' proposal of a joint war on the part of England and France against the United Provinces; nor is there any reference to it in the Prince of Orange's famous Declaration.

III

William of Orange, one of the most far-sighted of great statesmen, had, so far back as 1686, taken counsel with a contemporary Prince who, in this respect, most resembled him, the Elector Frederick William of Brandenburg (already the leading State of Protestant Germany), as to an invasion of England. In 1688, William had sent word to the Great Elector that the moment had come; but Frederick William died in 1688, before the sailing of the expedition. His successor (afterwards King Frederick I in Prussia) undertook to cover the United Provinces on its departure; his brother-in-law, Landgrave Charles of Hesse-Cassel, followed suit; and, soon afterwards, the Lüneburg Dukes (Duke Ernest Augustus only indirectly) took part in the enterprise. Prince George Frederick of Waldeck, whose masterly diplomacy had been invaluable to William of Orange in preparing the great stroke, was named by him his vicegerent in the Stadholderate during his absence.

The object of William's invasion was the object of his life—the preservation of the independence of the United Provinces, which, as their Stadholder only, and in uncertain relations with England, it had been beyond his power to guard effectively, but which, when in assured control of both countries, he felt confident of securing. The final warrant of success in the accomplishment of his life's task would be the formation of the Grand Alliance against France, at which William had long been aiming, and which was now consummated in fact (though in name not till near the close of his reign). The Declaration of War by England against France was the work of William; for Lewis XIV, even after James II and his consort had found a refuge with him, preferred to avoid open war; and William's opportunity was the landing of James, with French support, in Ireland (April, 1689). The Treaty of Offensive and Defensive Alliance between the Emperor and the Dutch Republic was concluded (May), after King William had announced to the Emperor his accession to the English

Throne, and had declared his readiness to adhere to all the Treaties of Alliance in existence between the United Provinces and the Empire. Its object was stated to be the reestablishment of the Pacifications of Westphalia and of the Pyrenees—*i.e.* the retrocession by France of all her subsequent territorial acquisitions. In a Secret Article, the Contracting Powers eventually promised their armed support of the Imperial claims for the whole of the Spanish inheritance. The Treaty, also, provided for the adhesion to it of England. Though Spain, Duke Victor Amadeus of Savoy, and the Princes of the Empire afterwards joined the Alliance, they neither signed the Treaty nor, so far as we know, were aware of this Secret Article. Inasmuch, however, as it provided for the mutual support of those who joined in it against the Crown of France and its adherents, it implied a guarantee of the existing tenure of the English Throne. In a word, the Alliance of 1689 amounted to an anticipation of the Grand Alliance of 1701-2, and was by no means a mere repetition of the League of Augsburg of 1686. The critical importance of the 1689 Alliance in the history of European politics can, therefore, hardly be exaggerated¹. When (on September 9th) King William, without submitting the Treaty of Alliance of May 12th to Parliament, without even requiring the signature of it by any Minister of State, signed his own Act of Adhesion to it, he, in effect, guaranteed the restoration and the preservation of the Peace of Europe, and once more placed England in the forefront of those who barred the way to the assailant Power.

Although, in the ensuing conflicts, Lewis XIV kept no ally steadfast to the end but the Ottoman Turk, and although the only member of the League whom, quite at the last (1696), he succeeded in buying off was Savoy, the Peace of Ryswyk (1697) could not be regarded with satisfaction by his leagued adversaries. Yet, although, by this Peace, he lost nothing that he had held at the time of the commencement of the struggle organised against him by William, the French advance had at that point been decisively arrested, and the recognition by Lewis XIV at Ryswyk of William's tenure of the English Throne proved which Power had taken the lead among those opposed to the 'Grand Monarch's' aggression.

In the actual Ryswyk negotiations, no reference had been made to any secret undertaking as to the eventual treatment of the Spanish

¹ Nor must the fact, though incidental only, be overlooked, that it finally abandoned the recognition of difference of religious confession as a determining element in international agreements; albeit appeal continued, from time to time, to be made on the one side or the other to confessional sympathies and antipathies.

inheritance. But Lewis XIV—though historians differ as to whether he then had any serious design of adhering to the compact—had, so far back as January, 1668, concluded an actual Treaty of Partition of the Spanish monarchy with the Emperor. Thus, the idea of a Partition was no novelty; it could hardly fail to come to the front in a period of European politics during which neither side was prepared to contemplate the appropriation of the whole inheritance by a single claimant; and it became a question of practical politics, so soon as King William's statesmanship addressed itself to this solution. He had to use great caution, for he knew how slow English politicians are in "taking up" questions of the future, more especially in the field of foreign policy; and he was, also, aware that public opinion in his English kingdom was far less interested in the employment of its forces in foreign offensive warfare than in the reduction of the standing army at home. To William III, the idea of a partition of the Spanish monarchy, *i.e.* of an arrangement whereby, on the extinction of the Spanish Habsburgs in the male line, the distribution of their inheritance should not unsettle the Balance of Power in Europe, and above all not unsettle it in favour of France, was of the essence of the result to be aimed at. To Lewis XIV, it was nothing but a *pis aller* solution, when he found it impossible, at an earlier or later date, to secure the whole inheritance for France. The logical position, in view of the result contemplated by Lewis, was that of William; but the policy which reckoned with arguments coming home to national feeling, and which, considering the possibility of unexpected incidents, had time on its side, was that of his adversary. This judgment seems borne out by the actual sequence of events, here only noticed in so far as they concern the history of English foreign policy in particular.

What is usually called the First Partition Treaty—the first, *i.e.* of which William III shared the responsibility—was concluded by him with Lewis XIV in 1698. By it, the bulk of the Spanish inheritance—viz. Spain, the Spanish Netherlands, and the West Indies—was, on the death of Charles II, to fall to his great-grand-nephew, the Electoral Prince Joseph Ferdinand of Bavaria; but the Two Sicilies, with Guipuscoa, were to pass to the Dauphin Lewis of France, and the Milanese to the Archduke Charles, son of the Emperor Leopold by his third wife. This arrangement, though seeming to go some way towards meeting the principle of the Balance of Power, was, as a matter of fact, more in the French than in the Austrian

interest, and would hardly have been favoured by William III, but for the critical condition of his own affairs at home. It was, however, frustrated by the death of the Electoral Prince in January, 1699; and, about a year later, a second scheme was devised by Lewis and William, in which the Austrian claims were necessarily treated after a different fashion, but still so as to indicate the desire of Lewis to show regard for the principle of European policy upheld by William III. The Archduke Charles was now to receive Spain, while the Netherlands and all the Spanish Colonies, together with the Two Sicilies and the Milanese (to be ultimately exchanged for Lorraine) were to be the share of France—not perhaps the lion's share, but something not altogether unlike it. The scheme was rejected by the Emperor—from what motives, it is not quite easy to decide—and was profoundly unpopular in Spain, where the indivisibility of the monarchy had become an article of popular faith. The ambition of Lewis XIV, hereupon, throwing over any further consideration of schemes of partition, exercised all possible pressure in the French interest on the Spanish Sovereign, now near the close of his days. He died (in November, 1700), shortly after signing a will, in which, in accordance with Spanish sentiment and with the approval of Rome, he left the whole Spanish monarchy to Philip Duke of Anjou, the second grandson of Lewis XIV. As such, he would not, in the ordinary course of events, succeed to the Throne of France; should he, however, come to stand next in the French Succession, and accept that position, the Spanish monarchy was to pass to his younger brother, the Duke of Berry. To this testamentary disposition the King of France agreed in the teeth of the certain opposition of the House of Austria; and there could be no doubt as to the action with regard to it of England and of the United Provinces—so long as they were under the joint guidance of William III.

Although religious motives cooperated, it had been the commercial interests of his country which had induced Oliver Cromwell to challenge the still unrelinquished claims of Spain to oceanic rule. Still more definite was the conviction of the King-Stadholder that England and the United Netherlands were alike menaced in the very foundations of their future prosperity by the prospect of the Power of Spain falling under the control of that of France. The fact that French aggressive ambition was now rising to its height had led William III to adopt irrevocably the policy carried on by him consistently since the Alliance of 1689. It had entered into no new phase when the

Spanish Succession question came to the front. Public opinion in England had cared little for the Partition schemes, and might, as time went on, have rested content with a provision for the perpetual separation of the French and Spanish Crowns; and in Amsterdam the funds rose on Philip of Anjou's acceptance of Charles II's inheritance. But William's statesmanship was not to be checkmated in the midst of the game; and the action of Lewis XIV speedily justified the attitude maintained by him and Grand-pensionary Heinsius. While formally reserving the French rights of the Duke of Anjou, Lewis XIV ordered his troops to lay hands on the Barrier Towns and (1701) promised to the dying James II to recognise his son as his successor.

The Emperor Leopold I, after at once protesting against the Will, entered into negotiations with William III, and began war in Italy on his own account in the summer of 1701. Early in the same year, an Alliance was contracted with Denmark. And, though the Empire did not formally declare war until a year later, the Coalition of 1689, of the direction of whose operations the lead was from the first assumed by England and the United Provinces, was renewed on September 7th, 1701. The limits to which the stipulations of this Treaty, the Grand Alliance Treaty proper, were restricted should be carefully noticed, if the policy of William III is to be rightly judged. It did not, like the Secret Article of the Treaty of 1689, insist on the right of the Austrian claimant to the whole Spanish inheritance; it merely demanded for him, as a due satisfaction, the Spanish possessions in Italy. On the other hand, while France was in no circumstances to acquire any Spanish Colonies in America, the question of the addition of any of these to the English or Dutch Colonies was left to depend on the course of the War. No express reference was made to the future occupancy of the Spanish Throne; except that France and Spain were never to be under the same Sovereign. A clause was added to the effect that no peace should be concluded by the parties to the Alliance, till England had received satisfaction for the insulting recognition of the Stewart Pretender by the King of France. These conditions, to a large extent, coincide with those afterwards—at the end of the great War of the Spanish Succession—secured at the Peace of Utrecht. Thus, the statesmanship responsible for engaging England and the United Provinces in the great struggle was essentially of a piece with that of the Ministers who brought it to a conclusion. The "War of the Spanish Succession" was fought

by the Maritime Powers, and by England in particular, for ends with which the actual satisfaction of the claims to that Succession was only in so far concerned, that France was to be prevented from succeeding to the Spanish dominions in the Netherlands, and becoming the leading Mediterranean, and a great Colonial, Power. These latter were the interests ultimately at stake, and through its care for them the policy of William III itself takes its place within the general course of British foreign policy.

The accession of Queen Anne was, in itself, favourable to the prospects of a War on the issues of which the whole foreign policy of her reign concentrated itself. The national support indispensable for its victorious prosecution was assured by her having inherited an ancestral Throne, and being both an Englishwoman by birth and (as now required by law) a Protestant. On the Act of Settlement (1701) rested, also, the nation's assurance against being involved without the consent of Parliament in any war on behalf of its sovereign's foreign possessions from which it desired to keep aloof. Thus, the conservatism of the nation rallied round her, and made legislation possible under her which her predecessor had in vain sought to bring about. It included the Act of Union with Scotland (1707), which, though it did not put an end to Jacobitism, was essential to the future of Great Britain as a European Power. And, at the very time when our national political life was definitively adopting the system of party government, a practical conjunction between the more moderate men of both the parties in the State enabled the Queen's Government, for a number of years, to carry on with extraordinary success the War actually in progress.

A great war, extending over several years, almost inevitably becomes an evolutionary process, testing, at each successive stage of it, the statesmanship which directs its course. The primary purpose of England and the United Provinces when, in 1701, setting on foot the Alliance, in which they had been successively joined by Denmark (1701), the Emperor (1701), the Empire (1702), Portugal (1703) and Savoy (1703), had been, as was seen, to prevent the union at any time of the French and Spanish monarchies, or the transfer of the kingdom of Spain itself, to the reigning House of France, without providing any suitable compensation for the House of Austria. In other words, the maintenance of Balance of Power had been the primary object of the last great achievement of William III's foreign policy. But, so early as 1703, the Emperor Leopold I renounced

with great solemnity his claims, and those of his elder son Joseph, to the Spanish inheritance, declaring that they scrupled to unite it with the hereditary dominions of their own line. The attempt, however, of the English Government, about the same time, to supplement the Grand Alliance Treaty by a declaration that no part of the Spanish monarchy should at any time come under the rule of any member of the House of Bourbon, failed, because of a difference on another point. Soon afterwards (1704), the Austrian claimant himself appeared on the scene, where he called himself Charles III; but his progress was slow, though Gibraltar was soon taken by an English fleet. On the other hand, Marlborough's great victory of Blenheim, in the same year, ended a long period of unbroken French military ascendancy; and in 1705, though the English Government, on good terms with Marlborough and Godolphin, was vigorously prosecuting the War, the idea of Peace was mooted. In August, 1706, Lewis XIV made his first serious overtures to the States-General, offering them a good Barrier and suggesting the recognition of Archduke Charles' tenure of Spain proper, if he would agree to Philip's sovereignty over all her Italian dominions. But Heinsius ascertained from Marlborough that the English Government would not now listen to the thought of a Partition, and that, if desirous of a satisfactory Barrier, the Dutch must act with the rest of the Allies. On the other hand, the party now in entire control of British foreign policy, in December, 1707, passed in the House of Lords an (amended) resolution, that no Peace would be honourable or safe that allowed the House of Bourbon to retain possession of any part of the Spanish monarchy¹. Thus in 1709 after Oudenarde (1708), Lewis felt forced to assent to the peace terms of the Allies, so far as the surrender of the entire Spanish monarchy; but he could not bring himself to give the required promise of joining hands with the Allies, should it prove necessary, in enforcing their demand upon his grandson. It is, assuredly, to the credit of Marlborough's good sense, that he regarded this condition as unreasonable; but he allowed himself to be overruled by Heinsius

¹ Though they form a curious chapter in the history of our foreign policy in this period, it must suffice merely to refer to two among the diplomatic efforts made on both sides to extend the range of the War, so as to include Northern Europe in its complications. Marlborough was not successful in moving King Frederick I in Prussia out of his neutrality; but (at Altranstädt, in 1708) he persuaded Charles XII of Sweden to abandon the idea of entering, with the aid of France, on the task of liberator of Protestant Germany, which had of old been taken upon himself by Gustavus Adolphus. (The Pretender's attempt, in the same year, at invading Scotland with a French force broke down.)

time, Lewis XIV had himself regarded such an event as undesirable in the interests of France, so that Bolingbroke had accordingly been induced to revive an alternative plan (in favour of Savoy). But, in itself, the policy ultimately approved and accepted by Great Britain was, in the circumstances, definite and moderate, as well as consistent with the principles to vindicate which she had entered into the War.

We must, however, pass from the special question of the Spanish Succession to the general results of the War to which it gave its historic name, as affecting the political future of the world, and of Great Britain in particular. France came forth from the struggle, no longer the arbitress of the destinies of Europe—exhausted, though (as in later periods of seeming decline in her national life) not beyond recovery; but more closely connected than before with Spain, though not by a personal or institutional union. Spain herself was sinking into a European Power of the secondary order, though by no means without hopes of a partial recovery of her former external (Italian) possessions, as well as of a beneficial change in her administrative system. To the Empire, France would have to yield up some, but not all, of her spoils when the Emperor concluded his own Peace, which he preferred to postpone, and by which he would be left in possession of the now “Austrian” Netherlands—the least-desired by him of his reextended dominions (Sicily falling to Savoy). The United Provinces, who had played their game with characteristic persistency, by the so-called Third Barrier Treaty in 1715 negotiated with the Imperial Government, and guaranteed by Great Britain, finally entered into possession of the full military security which had been their primary object in declaring and carrying on the War. Necessarily, their influence in the counsels of the Allies had sunk, in consequence of the change of Sovereign in England, and afterwards through the collapse of the Whig Government; but though they, afterwards, to some extent, recovered this influence, the time had passed for them to play a leading part in European politics; for, while their merchantmen still outnumbered those of any other country, they were certainly falling behind as a Naval Power.

The inheritance of Charles II of Spain had included a Colonial dominion far more extensive than that which had, before the date of his decease, been acquired by the Dutch in India and by the English in the New World. Had France, unlimited as her aspirations were, in this period, been allowed to annex this domain with the rest of the

Spanish possessions, and to consolidate it with her own Colonial settlements, she might have laid the foundations of an empire far exceeding, in extent, that afterwards under the sway of Napoleon. In this regard, the Treaty of the Grand Alliance (1702) had provided that France should never be allowed to take possession of the West Indies, or to enjoy any rights of commerce and navigation not granted in precisely the same measure to Great Britain and the United Provinces. In the Utrecht Treaty with Great Britain, the King of France undertook, in even more comprehensive terms, never to accept, in favour of his own subjects, any advantage in the way of trade or navigation with regard to Spain or her American Colonies which should not also be conceded to subjects of other Powers.

As for specifically British questions, we remember how, before the outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession, British popular feeling had indignantly resented the French autocrat's arrogant interference in the matter of the Succession to the Throne of these Islands. Thus it was significant as well as appropriate that the earliest article in the Anglo-French Treaty concluded at Utrecht should concern the difficult and delicate subject of this Succession. Much intrigue, more or less secret, in which "persons near the Queen" may or may not have had a hand, and of which the object no doubt was to diminish the responsibility of Lewis XIV for the observance of the undertaking which he was about to accept, had preceded its inclusion in the Treaty. France recognised the order of Succession established by the Act of Settlement (1701) in favour of the issue of Queen Anne, or, in default of such, of the House of Hanover. At the same time, King Lewis XIV promised that the son of King James II ("the Old Pretender") should not at any time return within the realm of France, whence he had "voluntarily" taken his departure.

Among the territorial acquisitions accruing to Great Britain from the Peace of Utrecht a significance of its own attached to the so-called "Dunkirk Clause"; for the control of the Narrow Seas had long been treated as a cardinal principle of English foreign policy. After Dunkirk had been taken from Spain in 1658 by France and England, and placed in the hands of the latter Power, the sale of it to France in 1662 had aroused great resentment against Charles II's Government and more especially against Clarendon; and additions to the fortifications had, beyond doubt, made it a serious menace to the English command of the Narrow Seas. In the Treaty of Utrecht, it was

stipulated that the King of France should, at his own cost, *in perpetuum*, rase the fortifications of Dunkirk, and fill up its harbour within six months. Lewis XIV subsequently showed a palpable want of good faith in his manipulation of this clause, and great agitation was provoked in England by the construction at Mardyke of a harbour connected with Dunkirk by a canal and intended to be of greater depth than the previous Dunkirk harbour. The Mardyke works had to be suspended, and finally when, under the Regency, amicable relations obtained between the two Governments, the dimensions of the scheme were so reduced as to render it harmless (1717). The "Dunkirk Clause" continued to be regarded by British Governments as a security in need of careful watching, and the question of its observance caused trouble both in 1719 and later¹. The clause reappears in the chief European Treaties till the Peace of Paris in 1783, when its abolition was, at last, obtained by France.

Of far greater importance were the British acquisitions from France secured at Utrecht, although, from the nature of the case, this fact could only gradually come to be understood, more especially by the very Power about to enter on a half century's struggle for the preservation of her overseas dominion. After the temporary overthrow of French sovereignty in North America, the whole of the former province of Acadia was, in the Peace of St Germain (1632), restored to the French Crown, and the long contest between English and French enterprise (in Newfoundland and elsewhere) seemed to have come to an end. In the latter half of the seventeenth century, the Colonial ambition of France took a wider flight than it had previously pursued, and she claimed, as her Colonial empire, the whole region from the mouth of the Mississippi to the Great Lakes and the St Lawrence. To this vast dominion was attached the familiar name of New France, though it was administered in full accordance with the political and ecclesiastical principles of the old country.

It was, therefore, a notable step towards a transformation of the Colonial relations between the two Powers, when, in the Peace of Utrecht, Acadia (once more renamed Nova Scotia) was again transferred to Great Britain. In a separate article of the Peace, France added the cession of Newfoundland and the adjacent islands (except Cape Breton and one or two others, which remained French and were

¹ See W. Michael, vol. II. pp. 236-9. In 1720, an English engineer was residing at Dunkirk to invigilate.

left in possession of certain rights of fishery¹). At the same time, Great Britain's possession was recognised of the whole island of St Christopher's (St Kitt's), where the Peace of Ryswyk had restored a bipartite occupation with France.

On the same day as the Utrecht Treaty of Peace between Great Britain and France was signed a Treaty of Navigation and Commerce between the two Powers which (besides placing them eventually on the footing of the most favoured nation) seemed to promise a more momentous change than actually ensued in a most important sphere of international maritime law². Inasmuch as a Treaty of the same purport was signed a few weeks later, between France and the States-General, these agreements would have greatly benefitted maritime (neutral) commerce, had they but been duly observed. Such, however, in spirit, at least, was not the case, certainly not on the part of Great Britain, who concluded no similar compact at Utrecht with any Power besides France, and the principle of the Anglo-French agreement had to await revival, half a century later, when the aspect of things had altogether changed.

The Peace between Great Britain and Spain, though not concluded till July 13th, 1713, formed an integral part of the resettlement of the relations between the Western Powers of Europe. Hence it is in this, quasi-supplementary, Treaty that is to be found the earliest mention of the fundamental provisions for the prevention of a future union on the same head of the Spanish and the French Crowns; while, in further Articles, the King of Spain agrees to the prohibition of the transfer to France or any other Power by Spain of any land or

¹ By the exercise of these rights, the French fishermen were enabled to carry on their trade on a large scale, so much so that, at the time of the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, it greatly exceeded the British. Hence the long-lived fishery disputes, which continued to be a source of mutual vexation, until the Peace of 1763 excluded the French altogether from the Gulf of St Lawrence and the Newfoundland waters; and even this proved no permanent settlement.

² In 1681, when the French navy had risen to a condition of unprecedented strength, and the pride of Lewis XIV as its head to a corresponding height of arrogance, a royal ordinance had declared any vessel a fair prize in which should be found goods belonging to enemies of France. This ordinance directly controverted the principle of "free ship, free goods," which was so prized by the Dutch, and which had been acknowledged by this country in several Treaties—including that with France of 1655, as well as by France herself in her Treaty with the Dutch of 1646. To the practice which, accordingly, prevailed during the following period (including that of the War of the Spanish Succession), the Utrecht Treaty opposed, so far as Great Britain and France were concerned, the provision that all goods (except contraband of war) should be held, even in the case of a vessel proceeding to a port belonging to a belligerent, to be covered by the flag of the (neutral) State to which such vessels belonged.

lordship owned by her in America. (He, also, expressly approves the Succession in Great Britain as settled by Act of Parliament.)

Among the remaining articles in the Anglo-Spanish Treaty stands forth that which confirmed the cession by Spain to Great Britain of the town, citadel and port of Gibraltar. Of this famous possession the retention or abandonment was at different times in the history of our foreign policy differently viewed by successive Governments, but never in more than one way by public opinion in this country. In Spain, the loss and humiliation suffered by the capture (almost accidental) of the Lion's Rock in 1704, led to the investment of Gibraltar, in the following winter, by a strong Spanish force, and then by a French under Marshal de Tessé. But the resistance was successful, and the British hold on the fortress was confirmed by the Peace of Utrecht, on condition that, should the British Government ever propose to sell or otherwise alienate Gibraltar, the Spanish should always have the first refusal of it. By another article of the same Treaty, Spain ceded Minorca, which had been taken from her by British arms in 1708. But this island, though at first more highly prized, from a naval point of view, than Gibraltar, was not destined to hold the same continuous place among British conquests. In the meantime, while the simultaneous possession of Minorca and Gibraltar satisfactorily secured the future of British trade with the Levant, where the French were by far the most dangerous competitors, to Spain, in the words of Philip V, a British Gibraltar was "a thorn in the flesh"; and the question of its removal could not be a transient one¹.

¹ See, for an account of the attempts made in this direction, Michael, vol. II. part I. pp. 257-82. As the peaceable return of Gibraltar to Spain was not likely to be made without a *quid pro quo* (besides the saving of expense), it seems explicable why (apart from any personal reason) the thought for a time commended itself to the statesmanship of Stanhope—if it did not originate with George I himself. Leaving aside the questionable story of Louville's secret mission, we cannot doubt that in 1717, when Stanhope was seeking to obtain the adhesion of Spain to this European Alliance, he secretly communicated the idea to Dubois, and that he returned to it in 1719-20, before he had definitively convinced himself of the reception with which it would meet in Parliament. He then resolved to identify himself with what he had recognised to be an irresistible current of public opinion, and made the position clear to the Regent Orléans (who was still inclined to harp on the idea of the cession), through the new French Ambassador Senne-terre, and was encouraged, naturally enough, by the Imperial Resident Hoffmann in his new attitude of *non possumus*. There was no question of the suggestion being discussed at the expected Congress; and as for public opinion in England, any return to the policy of a cession would have been utterly scouted. No reference need be made here to Richard Cumberland's futile secret mission to Spain in 1780, when he was instructed to abstain from any mention of the idea of a cession, though the question was, notwithstanding, the real *crux* in the endeavour to bring about a separate Peace between Great Britain and Spain. After the failure of the great siege,

No further provisions or omissions in the Anglo-Spanish Treaty need be dwelt upon in the present connexion. The Article securing to Great Britain (through the South Sea Company) the *Asiento* monopoly formerly enjoyed by France, and henceforth by her chief rival till she and Spain were once more at war, belongs to a happily transient phase of international trade relations; the British abandonment of the Catalans, whom under cover of an amnesty by King Philip the Utrecht settlement left to their fate, was a breach of good faith over which a veil must be cast.

Manifestly, the chief shortcoming of the Utrecht Treaties as securities of the Peace of Europe lay in the fact that they had been concluded without the Emperor Charles VI, on behalf and in conjunction with whose House the great War had been waged. Perhaps, had the campaign of Prince Eugene in 1712, continued by him after the Franco-British Armistice, not proved a failure, the Emperor might have, from the outset, refused to take any part in the Conferences. As it was, they duly opened in the presence of an Imperial Plenipotentiary (Count Sinzendorf); but the capture of Denain further increased the confidence of the French negotiators; and the interests of the Empire, notwithstanding the visit of Prince Eugene to London, became (as in some measure did the claims of the United Provinces) a matter of relative indifference to British statesmanship. On the evening of the very day of the signature of the Peace between France and Great Britain, the British Plenipotentiaries, the Earl of Strafford and the Bishop of Bristol (Robinson) handed to their Imperial colleagues the final offer of Lewis XIV, which proposed the Peace of Ryswyk as the basis of the present Treaty, and the Rhine as the frontier-line between France and the Germanic Empire. These terms differed widely from what France might have proposed a very short time earlier; but, though British diplomacy contrived to bring about a few further conferences between the Imperial and the French Plenipotentiaries, by May, 1713, Sinzendorf and his colleague had quitted Utrecht. The bitterness of feeling which ensued might be illustrated from the party pamphlets published on both sides; but the Imperialist invective against the servile submissiveness of British public opinion the Peace of Versailles (1783), otherwise not unfavourable to the latter Power, left her face to face with an apparently unredeemable loss. Later proposals for making it good have been hardly more than speculation. Minorca was recaptured by the French in 1756, but restored to Great Britain in the Peace of Paris (1763). The island was again subjected to recapture and recovery, before, at Amiens (1802), it was definitively given up by Great Britain, to whom, in view of her continued occupation of Malta, it had come to be of secondary importance.

to the wishes of the Crown missed fire. Continental statesmanship had been taught a lesson which it might, to its own advantage, have more readily remembered—that British foreign policy was not, as a matter of course, under the imperative control either of established historical tradition or of supposed commercial interests.

When, however, before long, the Emperor Charles VI, finding himself hemmed in by successive calamities, began to go back upon his unwillingness to fall in with the British policy, British diplomacy brought about the communications between the French and Imperial Commanders-in-Chief which led to the opening of Peace Conferences at Rastatt (November, 1713). The Peace of Baden (September, 1714), which finally wound up these negotiations, was concluded without the mediation of either Great Britain or Spain being accepted by France or the Emperor, whose frontiers were settled on a plan of mutual compromise, while the Spanish Netherlands were now definitively acknowledged to be a possession of the House of Austria. British interests had no direct concern with this Peace. On the other hand, they were not unaffected by the Supplementary Pacifications concluded at Utrecht, in February, 1715, between Portugal and Spain. This Treaty had been long delayed by the unextinguishable hatred between the two neighbouring peoples, and, also, by the hopes of the Portuguese for better terms than Spain was willing to allow to them in requital of their faithful adherence to the Grand Alliance throughout the War (which the diplomatic skill of Sir Paul Methuen had induced them to join so early as 1703). Portugal, whose Alliance with England was but an extension of relations which had now lasted for half a century, had, apart from the subsidies paid to her during the War, owed much to this Alliance; in return, she had incurred considerable losses in its course, including the French capture of Rio, with much booty. Yet, as a matter of fact, she was in the Peace negotiations left very much to her own efforts, till, at a later stage of the negotiations, Great Britain's leverage was with some effect applied on behalf of her faithful Ally.

Finally, some reference must be made to the "Barrier Treaties," concluded in this period by the Power our Alliance with whom may be described as a fundamental part of our whole policy in the War and the Peace. Nature had done less than nothing for the Low Countries in the way of Barrier; and the French invasion of 1672, which, but for the opening of the dykes, might have swept over Holland itself, was only stayed by the patriotic efforts of William of Orange,

assisted in the following year by Spanish and Imperial troops. The clause in the Grand Alliance Treaty giving the United Provinces assurance of a Barrier against France, without naming the places which should constitute it, had, therefore, led to protracted discussions between the States-General and the Court of Vienna; and, when the latter became aware of the possibility of offers of a separate peace being made by France to the States, Sinzendorf was sent to the Hague (1706) to open negotiations, under the mediation of Marlborough, on the subject of a Barrier Treaty. The Austrian point of view was that, if the Spanish Netherlands were definitively secured to the Austrian claimant, there was no necessity for a Barrier at all; while the Dutch had prepared a list of towns that were to form it, including Ostend, and at first even Antwerp. At this point, British interests came into play. A war between Great Britain and the United Netherlands could, as recent history showed, not be regarded as absolutely impossible; how then, with such an event in view, could these places be permanently committed to Dutch custody? When, however, the peace negotiations of 1709 broke down, and cordial cooperation between the British and Dutch Governments became once more imperative, negotiations on the Barrier question were renewed between the two Powers. In these Austria, though one of the Powers primarily interested, took no part; and the result was the First Barrier Treaty (1709), signed by Townshend. The British Government undertook to secure for the Dutch the right of garrisoning, at their own cost, nine strong places in the Spanish Netherlands, with two others if retaken from the enemy. This Barrier Treaty amounted, in point of fact, to a renewal, on conditions more favourable to the United Provinces, of the Offensive and Defensive Alliance between them and Great Britain. It was, accordingly, decried with much vehemence by the Tory party, soon to return to political power in England, where much jealousy and animosity against the Dutch still survived and were augmented by what seemed an undue morigeration to Dutch interests, so that, in the agitated period of British public life that followed, the First Barrier Treaty acted as a constant irritant. The Dutch, on their side, had little gratitude to spare for British promises; and when, in 1711, Marlborough was dismissed from his offices, the States-General, instead of entrusting the command of their troops to his successor, the Duke of Ormond, made it over to the Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial forces, Prince Eugene.

Hereupon, in the course of the peace negotiations of 1711 and

1712, in accordance with the general course of the relations between the Powers, the British Government was found prepared to revise its previous Barrier Treaty, after such a fashion as considerably to reduce its value for the States-General. Several of the Barrier-places enumerated in the First Treaty had now been marked out for cession to France; and it became necessary for Great Britain to conclude a Second Barrier Treaty with the States-General, which finally revoked the First. By this Second Treaty (January 30th, 1713) the United Provinces acquired the right of garrisoning eight places, four of those included in the First (Lille was one of them) being omitted in the Second. Military and naval contingents were promised on both sides for the maintenance of the Treaty; but the United Provinces lost Upper Gelders, which had now been disposed of to Prussia.

At Utrecht, as well as afterwards at Rastatt and Baden, the House of Austria's possession of the once "Spanish" Netherlands was consistently treated as part of the settlement effected. Yet, in all these agreements, provision had been made that, until the States-General should have arrived at a satisfactory understanding with the Emperor in the matter of their Barrier, they should retain their hold over the Austrian Netherlands. To bring about such an understanding, an Austro-Dutch Conference was held at Antwerp, once more under British mediation. The task was no easy one, especially after the Dutch, whose influence among the Allies had been much depressed during the last four years of Queen Anne, found their position improved by her death (August 1st) and the consequent Governmental changes in England. The death of Lewis XIV (September 1st, 1715), and the accession to power of the Regent Orléans, who was consistently desirous of maintaining a good understanding with the United Provinces, likewise redounded to their advantage.

The Third Barrier Treaty, concluded November 15th, 1715, proved a settlement with which, when it had been with great difficulty brought to paper, the Dutch had every reason to be satisfied. British policy, genuinely interested in the security of the Belgic Provinces, in view of the always possible contingency of hostilities with France, was naturally inclined to meet the wishes of the Dutch, if only because of their guarantee of the now imperilled Protestant Succession. But it had been a very far from easy task for British statesmanship to seek to reconcile the claims of the United Provinces with those of the House of Austria, which had never welcomed with any warmth the acquisition of the Catholic Netherlands, though,

of course, unable to countenance the idea, soon afterwards started by France, of forming them into a neutral State. In November, 1714, Stanhope (whose personal influence already counted for much) had paid a visit to Vienna, but found no disposition there to yield; General (afterwards Earl) Cadogan, however, who followed, proved more successful, and, in the end, an arrangement was agreed upon to which the Emperor reluctantly gave his assent. The Barrier-places were now to number seven, including Namur, Tournay and Ypres (with a joint garrison at Dendermonde); and Venloo, with a small further addition of Flemish territory, was to be transferred to the United Provinces. Great Britain (while obtaining for herself certain commercial advantages) undertook as Guarantor of the Treaty in all its parts to provide a considerable force for the defence of the Barrier by both land and sea, and if necessary to declare war against any aggressor. Thus, the Dutch had succeeded in securing a well-protected frontier against France; while at the same time a relation, which was in a measure one of dependence upon them, had been established with the "Austrian" Provinces. It is therefore not difficult to understand that the ratifications of the Treaty had to undergo considerable delays, on the particular causes of which we need not dwell. The Dutch declined, as will be seen, to join the Quadruple Alliance till the Third Barrier Treaty should be complete, and, as a matter of fact, till their joining had ceased to matter. Moreover, as was asserted by their neighbours, they had at the same time acquired a practical control of the Belgic waterways and (since the Scheldt could at any time be closed) of every port in the country, except Ostend. The delimitation of the Netherlands was finally accomplished by a Supplementary Convention signed at the Hague (December, 1718). As for the House of Austria, it had, for the sake (as will be seen) of British goodwill, consented that the fortresses of the territory acquired by it should be left, partly at its own cost, in the hands of another Power; so that, in course of time, it anxiously sought to exchange this for a less remote acquisition.

The Treaties of Utrecht (to use the term, once more, in its widest sense) had thus, taken as a whole, carried out the policy of William III, as representing the interests of Great Britain, on the one hand, and those of the Netherlands on the other; but had not carried it out in full. France had acquired for a member of her royal House, though he was no longer included in the Succession to it, part only of the inheritance of Charles II; but this part included what William

III had sought to withhold from the French candidate, viz. Spain herself. Furthermore, France was deprived of the new vantage-ground which she had seized in the Spanish, as against the United Netherlands, and which was now, though not without certain inconvenient liens, in Austrian hands. Finally, France had formally renounced any pretension to interfere with the stability of the British Constitutional settlement. So much for the results of the Treaties which ended the War of the Spanish Succession.

What may be called the moral results of that War were due, above all, to its actual course, and to its effect on the material resources of the Powers engaged in it and upon the relations between them and the political system of which they formed part. For the attainment of these results, the policy which had originated the War and that which directed the Peace were primarily and jointly responsible. And more than this: the Peace of Utrecht, though negotiated and concluded by a statesmanship in most important respects out of harmony with that of the author of the Grand Alliance, was, not less than the War itself, in the main Great Britain's work; and, if it failed to gather in fully what the War seemed to have laid at her and her Allies' feet, to her credit was to be placed what, within limits deliberately chosen by herself, it achieved for Europe and her dependencies. In this, as in all but the rarest instances of similar magnitude, history is called upon to judge by other standards than those of person or party.

IV

George I, wise in his generation with a wisdom recalling, in its degree, that of the great politician in whose school he had been bred, had fully learnt a modern ruler's primary obligation of moving with his times and acting in accordance with their exigencies. Yet, although, in his kingdom, he discreetly forbore from interfering with the existing system of government, the influence exercised by him on British foreign policy was unmistakable. To a considerable extent, it subserved Hanoverian interests, and was guided by Hanoverian advice, though these, in their turn, in a large measure, coincided with the traditions that had come down from the age of the Grand Alliance. Thus, while his reign as a whole justified the national preference—at first far from assured—of the continued acceptance of the Revolutionary settlement to a “Restoration” of the Stewart

Pretender, the doubts and jealousies of foreign Governments were successfully met by a policy blending national (British) and dynastic (Hanoverian) purposes; and, although George I was neither an Englishman nor a popular King, it was, on the whole, fortunate for Great Britain that he should have come from his well-beloved Hanover to ascend the Stewarts' uneasy Throne.

It may be worth pointing out that the "Personal Union" brought about under George I is not quite correctly described as a union between a powerful monarchy and a small secondary State. The relations between England and the United Netherlands in the reign of William III, even after the death of his devoted Queen, furnished no sort of precedent, and had never come near to what had once been Cromwell's ideal; and the course of the War of the Spanish Succession, and of the negotiations at its close, had shown how intermittently each of the two Maritime Powers kept its own particular ends in view. Moreover, at the beginning of the Hanoverian period, the foundations of the British Empire were, after all, still in the laying; and the Elector of Hanover, although hardly even among the foremost of the Princes of Germany, was entirely, in the words of a modern historian¹, "a leading personage in Europe." The politics of the Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel branch of the Guelfs had been Imperialist before the days of the Thirty Years' War; and the Lüneburg-Celle branch had, six years before the conclusion of the Peace of Westphalia, signed with the Emperor a separate pacification favourable to themselves. Thenceforward, the Brunswick-Lüneburgers had remained on the best of terms with the Court of Vienna: The Elector George Lewis, in especial, had borne an active part in several campaigns against the Turks, including the rescue of Vienna—a fact not forgotten when, at Carlowitz, in 1699, English mediation had secured to the Emperor Leopold the fruits of Austrian prowess against the Crescent, as, in substance, it again did, nineteen years later, at Passarowitz. In the West the Lüneburg-Celle Princes had, in the main (though in the case of those ruling at Hanover, not from the first), supported the policy of William III and of the Grand Alliance, and had been rewarded by the Electoral investiture (1792) of the father of George Lewis, under whom the whole Lüneburg-Celle dominions were reunited (1705).

¹ Mr J. F. Chance, in his most valuable monograph, *George I and the Northern War* (1909). As Mr Chance notes, "that George I might have succeeded Charles VI, on the Imperial Throne, was in 1714, a possibility not disregarded."

The reign of George I, regarded from the point of view of its foreign policy, divides itself most conveniently into three periods, coinciding, more or less, with those of the ascendancy in this respect of Townshend (1714-7), of Stanhope (1717-21), and of Townshend and Walpole (not yet "Walpole and Townshend") (1721-7), respectively. In the earliest of these periods, the two statesmen chiefly concerned with the conduct of foreign affairs served side by side as First and Second Secretaries of State—Townshend, who held the former post, being regarded as Head of the Government, but the disposal of business between them being left to their own discretion. The arrangement proved itself inconvenient, especially since both these Ministers were high-minded as well as able men. Stanhope's views were, to a far greater extent than his colleague's, in accordance with their Sovereign's; and, on the split in the Whig party declaring itself and Townshend giving up the Seals, Sunderland was associated with Stanhope. Among the Secretaries of State in this reign were the excellent Addison (a steady party-man) and the younger Craggs (Pope's Pollio, of whose capacity in or out of Parliament there is abundant evidence)¹.

While the chief operations of British foreign policy during the larger half of George I's reign had the approval and were due to the suggestion of the King's Hanoverian advisers, it by no means follows that they should be held responsible for the conception, any more than for the execution, of that policy as a whole. Apart from the fact that few British Sovereigns have exercised so close and continuous a personal interest over the country's foreign affairs as George I, it should be remembered that the British statesmen entrusted with the management of these affairs in the earlier part of the reign and the Hanoverian advisers of the King were, from the nature of the case,

¹ The force and lucidity of Craggs' despatches might be illustrated without difficulty. Of Addison's, that to Count Gallas (the Imperial Ambassador at Rome) asking for his mediation with Pope Clement XI, who is required, in a conciliatory tone, to redress a series of British grievances of which the arrest of Peterborough at Bologna was the foremost (October, 1717), is notable as showing the absence of direct diplomatic relations between the Holy See and the Court of St James. Cf. W. Michael, *u. s.* vol. II. part 1. pp. 309 ff. Lord Stanhope (*History of England*, etc., 5th ed., 1858, vol. I. p. 202), notices that the House of Commons remained without its due share in appointments to high administrative offices, and therefore in the direction of the administration of the country itself, till after the passing of the Septennial Act (1716). The real change in the relative importance of the two Houses of Parliament in the public eye dates of course from the age of Walpole; but the part taken by members of the House of Lords in the conduct of foreign affairs continued, for obvious reasons, to preponderate up to the days of the younger Pitt.

in substantial agreement. Townshend had been chosen as Principal Secretary of State with the approval, if not at the direct instance, of Bothmer (whose confidence, with that of the leading Dutch statesmen, he had gained during his residence at the Hague); while the entire Whig Government with which George I began his reign had been recommended to him by Bernstorff (who accompanied him from Hanover to England on his journey for taking seisin). The approval of Bernstorff implied the assent of Robethon, the inevitable (and indispensable) Huguenot refugee, whose connexion with English affairs dated from the days of his secretaryship to William III, at the end of his reign¹. For the rest, we need say nothing further here as to Hanoverian influence on British political action, except in the instances adverted to below of the Bremen and Verden, and the Mecklenburg episodes. It may, however, be worth observing that the leading members of the "Junta" were by no means always at one with each other. Bothmer's star seems to have waned as Bernstorff's rose to its height, which it reached while Stanhope's Government could still be, with any reason, popularly called the German Ministry. Of course, the Hanoverian influence was far more fully asserted in the affairs of Northern than in those of Southern Europe; and Bernstorff's political principles (as well as his personal interests) long obstructed these negotiations with Prussia, the success of which were, in 1720, followed by his downfall, the end of the Hanoverian era proper, and the reunion of the Whigs.

At the time of the accession of George I to the British Throne, the Peace recently concluded was still virtually Great Britain's peace. The Emperor would have none of it, even after he had, a few weeks later, concluded his own at Baden. The Dutch had only assented conditionally on a satisfactory Barrier being granted them by the Emperor. In France, the Peace was regarded with a sense of mingled relief and distrust. At home, it was loudly condemned by the great body of the Whigs; and, both here and across the water, the resumption of the War seemed for a time on the cards, even before King Lewis XIV's end had come (September 1st, 1715). To Great Britain the old Alliances were of more value than ever; and, so early as November,

¹ He had then entered the Celle service and had (if one may so say) become the *âme damnée* of Bernstorff, having been appointed "Privy Councillor of Embassy" at Hanover, and continued to exercise the undefined functions of this office in England till his patron's fall. The personalities and history of the members of the "Hanoverian Junta" are briefly noticed in the Appendix to Lecture II of my *Great Britain and Hanover* (1899).

1714, Stanhope, when, at Vienna, he sought to bring about the acceptance of a Barrier Treaty which would satisfy the United Provinces, confidentially propounded, in the first instance, to Prince Eugene the conclusion of a defensive alliance, to be afterwards joined by the United Provinces—the germ of the later Triple Alliance. But nothing came of the project so long as the Third Barrier Treaty remained unsigned. As has been seen, the jealousy between the Imperial and the Dutch Governments continued even after this; but, in the meantime, although the death of Lewis XIV had brought France under the rule of a Government favourable to Great Britain, the British Throne itself had been, though as it proved only transitorily, placed in a position of danger. Thus, while through the efforts of British diplomacy the Third Barrier Treaty had been brought to its conclusion under British guarantee (November, 1715), there remained behind the urgent expediency of securing to Great Britain the old Allies—more closely tied to her by their own interests, and, it may be said without prejudice, more trustworthy than the existing French Government.

The relations between these Allies—the United Provinces and the Emperor—were, however, even after the signature of the Barrier Treaty, the reverse of easy, and their dissensions about the time of the years 1715-6, owing to incidents connected with territorial transfers, rose to such a pitch that a joint alliance including both of them was for the present out of the question. The new Austrian Ambassador in London (no official of his rank had been accredited here since 1712), was a most unfortunate choice; and thus it came to pass that the first Treaty of Alliance signed by the British Government (February, 1716) was with the States-General, and that a Treaty, of mutual territorial guarantee, with the Emperor was not formally signed at Westminster till the following May. To this second Treaty, though declared by the Emperor to be defensive only, the Dutch Government never formally signified their adhesion, though they gradually reconciled themselves to it, the more readily when it proved not to be incompatible with the Anglo-French undertaking that was, above all others, of value to their most important interests. It was concluded by George I, as King of Great Britain only, and therefore contained no guarantee of Hanoverian territories; moreover, though his Hanoverian Ministers had taken part in the negotiations, their signatures were not added to the Treaty. But, though a joint alliance with both the Emperor and the United Provinces seemed for the moment impossible, there was

no doubt of the friendly intentions of both her old Allies towards Great Britain. Of the two storm-points which, in the early years of the reign, seemed to threaten a continued disturbance of the Peace of Europe and a consequent interference with the Hanoverian Succession included among its conditions at Utrecht, one had even now not yet reached its final stage. A considerable change had gradually come over Great Britain's relations with the Powers engaged in the still unfinished great Northern War, and in particular with the militant Baltic Power to which she had long been drawn by strong religious sympathies as well as by important commercial interests.

So early in the reign of Charles XII as 1700, Sweden had concluded a Treaty of mutual defence with England for eighteen years; and another immediately followed, in which the United Provinces of the Netherlands joined, and which, in a secret article, bound the Contracting Powers to use their best endeavours for preserving the endangered Peace of the North. By virtue of this compact, Sweden, in the same year, 1700, obliged Denmark to sign the Peace of Travendal, which detached that Power from the league of the adversaries of the young Swedish King. During the eventful years of his victorious advance that followed, Great Britain kept her hands free from engagements on either side, successfully foiling the efforts of Lewis XIV to gain over the Northern hero to the side of France in her own War. British trade with Sweden continued brisk, although its volume was probably not more than half that of the Dutch, the Swedish exports being, practically, confined to materials for ship-building. During the Northern War, Sweden treated neutral commerce with a high hand, so that, on the plea that they had carried contraband of war into Russian ports—of which Sweden had declared a blockade—many British merchantmen were seized by Swedish men-of-war and privateers. On the other hand, it is noticeable as bearing upon the future, that the relations between Charles XII and the Elector George Lewis of Hanover had always been excellent, and had stood the Swedish King in good stead in the earlier part of his course.

Accordingly, even after "Pultawa's day," when the counter-current of *revanche* gradually overflowed half Europe, Great Britain held her hand, and, in course of time, non-intervention in the North became part of her general policy of peace. Moreover, so long as the Spanish Succession War was still afoot, it was contrary to the interest of all the Allies, though of course to that of the Emperor and Empire

in particular, to allow Germany to be set in a blaze with the aid of large forces still indispensable at the actual theatre of war. Accordingly, a Convention was signed at the Hague (March 31st, 1710) declaring the neutrality of the German Provinces of Sweden, so as to protect them, if necessary, against attack, and at the same time to prevent their serving as bases of counter-attack.

One of the most wholehearted supporters of this Convention was the Elector of Hanover, whose dominions were bordered in part by Swedish annexations which, in the day of Sweden's dire distress, were certain to become so many coveted prizes. Among these were the "duchies" of Bremen and Verden. Apart from the fact that, when succeeding to the insecure grandeur of the British Throne, George I had excellent reason for "cultivating" what he left behind him, the ownership of these lands was a matter of considerable consequence, as well as historic interest, to the Elector of Hanover. The duchy, formerly belonging to the archbishopric, of Bremen had, after the Reformation, been held by cadets of neighbouring princely Houses, including that of Brunswick-Lüneburg, but in the Peace of Westphalia had passed as a secular duchy into the possession of the Swedish Crown. The bishopric of Verden, of old part of the dominions of Henry the Lion, had likewise been assigned to the Swedish Crown as a secular principality. The duchy of Bremen and the principality of Verden, respectively, commanded the course of the Weser from Bremen to its mouth and that of the Elbe to the sea from the vicinity of Hamburg, Holstein lying to the north-west of the river; above Harburg, the Elbe formed the north-eastern boundary of the Brunswick-Lüneburg territories. In the days of William III and Anne, the vigilance of the Elector of Hanover had been directed less against Sweden, the actual mistress of Bremen and Verden, than against her inveterate foe Denmark, who, should she possess herself of these territories, might, because of their immediate vicinity to Holstein, prove far more unwilling at any time to relinquish them.

Thus, before the question of the future of the Swedish monarchy and of its provinces had to be faced by Great Britain as a European Power, a very direct Hanoverian interest had become mixed up with it. Tsar Peter I, against whom about this time (end of 1709) Charles XII was seeking to induce the Sultan to declare war--while he was, also, believed to be in communication with the French Government--was intent upon ousting Sweden from her control of the Baltic and from the territories still belonging to her in Germany. He was annoyed

by Prussia's hesitation about asserting her dynasty's claims on Stettin and its district; and assiduously worked upon the Elector of Hanover, through his able representative there, Prince Boris Kurakin, to press his interest in Bremen and Verden. But the first actual step towards the acquisition of the "duchies" was not taken by George Lewis till the year before his accession to the British Throne. When Frederick IV of Denmark, notwithstanding his rout in Scania (1710), made another attempt to carry out his part in the anti-Swedish league formed after Pultawa, and to this end, in 1713, after a severe struggle, occupied the duchy of Bremen, the fit conjuncture seemed to present itself for carrying out the long-harboured design. In the same year, George Lewis occupied Verden, with Ottersburg, just across the Bremen boundary and, though still at peace with the Swedish Government, announced his intention of continuing to hold the lesser territory, so long as the Danes held the larger. Though, even after the accession of George I and the arrival of Charles XII at Stralsund (November, 1714), cordial messages were exchanged between them, there was no longer any mutual confidence; and, though the British ships sent in 1715 took no actual part in the Dano-Prussian siege of Stralsund, the continuance of eight of them in the Baltic implied the approval by Great Britain of the Treaty between Denmark and Hanover, finally ratified in July of this year. By this compact, the duchy of Bremen was (in return for a payment variously reckoned, but over 600,000 dollars) to be given up to the Elector. The transfer was accomplished by October, and the Elector's declaration of war against Sweden immediately followed. On the other hand, Sir John Norris, while carrying out a demonstration on behalf of trade wrongs at the head of a fleet composed of British, Prussian and Danish ships, carefully kept out of the way of the transaction concerning the "duchies," and contributed only indirectly to the fall of Stralsund (December). As for the duchies, their Estates had at once done homage to their new ruler. The Danes, fearing that Charles XII might seek to purchase the friendship of the King of Great Britain by a voluntary cession of the duchies to the Elector of Hanover, had, without loss of time, safeguarded the transfer by means of Treaties with Hanover and Prussia; but the Hanoverian possession of them was not formally recognised by Sweden till 1719 (in the Peace of Stockholm) when this complicated, and not altogether ingenuous, transaction was at last wound up. When the Hanoverian annexation of Bremen and Verden had actually been perpetrated, there could, of

course, no longer be any thought of friendly relations between George I and Charles XII. But this was not the time for the latter to think of a raid on any part of the British dominions on his own account, and the Jacobite insurrection of 1715-6 collapsed without a serious hope or fear of any such incident¹.

Meanwhile, a great design (if this historic term should be applied to a vast, but largely shadowy, web of intrigues such as "Görtz's Plot") was in preparation, which, while imperilling the continuance of the existing British Government and dynasty, had in view a complete change in the relations between Sweden and her most formidable enemy, Russia. The ultimate object of Görtz, now in the service of Sweden and loyally devoted to her interests, was a peace between the two Baltic Powers, which would have extinguished the anti-Swedish league, now, as has been seen, virtually including Great Britain. The political relations between George I and the Tsar Peter had, indeed, become friendly, as British grievances and Hanoverian cupidity jointly increased the tension with Sweden; and, in October, 1715, a Treaty had been agreed upon between the Tsar and the Elector of Hanover at Greifswald mutually guaranteeing Bremen and Verden to the Elector of Hanover: and Esthonia, with Reval, to the Tsar. But to this Treaty the King of Great Britain could not give effect without the assent of his Parliament, and, since the British Ministers were not prepared for joint armed action against Sweden, Bernstorff informed Kurakin that the full purpose of the Treaty must be kept secret and only the commercial clauses made known at present. Meanwhile, Peter ruthlessly excited the violent wrath of George I by his high-handed interference in German affairs, and more especially by taking advantage of the marriage of his niece Catharine to Duke Charles Leopold of Mecklenburg Schwerin, to quarter among the nobility there, traditionally impatient of their Sovereign's rule, a large body of Russian troops intended to take part in the Danish invasion of Scania agreed upon between Peter and Frederick IV at Altona. Prussia (who had just expelled the Swedes from Wismar) held her hand; but Russia could depend on her goodwill, while Hanover and Prussia were as a matter of course at odds. The invasion was postponed, though Sir John Norris was in the

¹ It is, by the way, illustrative of the entire relations between England and Scotland after the Union, that, there being at the time no Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain and Hanover, while a subsidiary treaty would no doubt have been deemed inadvisable, Stair's suggestion of shipping some Hanoverian battalions to Scotland at the time of the Insurrection was not carried out.

Baltic, prepared to take part in it; and King George was with difficulty prevented from sending the Admiral orders to seize on the person of the Tsar in requital of his arbitrary ways. But although the British Ministry shared the desire to keep Peter and his designs in check, his violation of German territory could not be held to warrant a *coup de main* by the British fleet against a Sovereign who was, virtually, an Ally¹.

Meanwhile, "Görtz's Plot," of which neither the genesis nor the ramifications can be traced here, had become known to British statesmen, and at the end of January, 1717, was discussed in Council. In setting it in motion, the arch-intriguer Görtz had had the assistance of the Swedish envoys, Gyllenborg in London and Sparre at Paris, and had depended on the connivance of the scheming Alberoni at Madrid and of the Chevalier, still *à disposition* at Avignon. Nor was he altogether out of touch either with the Regent of France (in the earlier stages of the affair), or with the Tsar. The discovery, though it rendered the plot as such hopeless, with the arrests, and the internment of Görtz in Holland, caused a sensation almost unparalleled in modern diplomatic annals, but exercised no decisive influence upon British policy. Charles XII kept silence, and the Regent Orléans' disclaimer of any aggressive intentions against Great Britain found willing credence. As for George I and the more resolute among his Ministers, they had already made up their minds to a more vigorous and far-reaching "system" of action, which would place Great Britain in a firm position of her own among the European Powers, unassailable by machinations such as those of either Görtz or Alberoni.

In the summer of 1716, Stanhope had accompanied King George on the pathetic occasion of his first visit home. *En route*, the Minister contrived to manage the earliest of his celebrated "unbuttoned" conversations with the Abbé Dubois, the trusted intimate of the Regent Orléans, who was anxious to safeguard his personal future against the Spanish Bourbons and their (never wholly impossible) speculations as to the French Succession. With these speculations the designs of Alberoni, inspired, in the first instance, by the ambition of Queen Elizabeth (Farnese) of Spain, were interwoven, and these naturally came to a head after the death of Lewis XIV. Their

¹ The Mecklenburg quarrel had an interesting sequel, which, however, had no direct connexion with British policy, though George I as Elector of Hanover was one of the Princes of the Empire charged with its execution against Duke Charles Leopold in 1717, and though its results led to complications which engaged the attention of George II to so late a date as 1735.

aim was, should it prove impossible to secure the French Throne for the Spanish Bourbons, at all events to revive in Elizabeth's line the Spanish dominion in Italy. While the resistance of the Emperor would of course be the obstacle-in-chief, Great Britain's attention must be distracted by the overthrow of her new dynasty. For the moment, however, since the working out of such a scheme required time, Alberoni was in no hurry to break with Great Britain, and was, indeed, desirous of cultivating her goodwill, especially since that of the French Government was no longer at the service of the Spanish. Hence the Anglo-Spanish Commercial Treaty of December, 1715, highly favourable to British interests, negotiated by George Bubb (afterwards Lord Melcombe who, before entering on the later unedifying part of his career had been Sir Paul Methuen's successor at Madrid) and Alberoni, though, on his part, neither sincere in conception nor effective in its results. Meanwhile, the British negotiations with France had been all but brought to a satisfactory conclusion. Instead of being conducted through the Earl of Stair at Paris (whose addiction to the pomps of diplomacy by no means rendered him averse from the use of its byeways), the business was, in August, 1716, transferred to the management of Stanhope and the ambitious and intriguing Sunderland, with the cooperation of Bernstorff, in the still surroundings of Hanover. Here it was brought to a successful issue by the signing of an agreement between France and Great Britain confirmatory of those portions of the Peace of Utrecht which concerned their respective interests, more especially the order of Succession in the two monarchies, and guaranteeing their territorial possessions in a form including the new acquisitions of the House of Hanover. The Pretender was excluded from France, and the Mardyke question was, with some difficulty, satisfactorily settled. The complementary assent of the Dutch Government had been assumed, to the righteous indignation of the British Minister at the Hague, Horace Walpole (the elder); but it arrived on January 4th following, and the "Triple Alliance" was now complete. It was the work of Bernstorff and Stanhope (to write their names in the order of sequence proposed by the same critic at the Hague). Townshend, the absence of whose countersignature had been suspiciously noted by Dubois, had sent it in time; but there could be no doubt that he had looked askance upon the Alliance and the policy of warlike operations in the North to which it seemed to him to point. The King, moved in his turn by angry jealousy of

Russia, was wholly against Townshend. Hence, a split among the Whigs, and a reconstruction of the British Ministry, which was completed when, in April, 1717, Stanhope became First Lord of the Treasury and Sunderland Secretary of State (1717), Townshend having accepted the Lord-Lieutenancy of Ireland, but being subsequently dismissed from this office also. (Stanhope and Sunderland exchanged offices in the following year, 1718.) Finally, whether or not the treatment of the Pretender in the Triple Alliance offended the chivalrous spirit of the Swedish King, the British Government more directly defied him, in the following March, by prohibiting all trade with Sweden, and, in the same year (1718), sent another fleet into the Baltic.

In the period of Stanhope's Ministerial ascendancy which ensued, the "Quadruple Alliance" (August, 1718) forms his most momentous achievement. It might, possibly, not have been carried through the difficulties besetting it, but for the active part played in the negotiations of the years 1717 and 1718 by Bernstorff and Bothmer¹, whose main purpose was to strengthen the authority of the Emperor in Germany and to promote the intimate relations between him and the House of Hanover. Yet, however sorely these efforts vexed the souls of Sir Robert Walpole and the section of the Whigs with which he acted, the plan courageously and circumspectly formed by Stanhope for settling the affairs of Europe was successful, in the face of reckless ambition abroad as well as of intelligible distrust at home. The Triple Alliance, well-omened as had been the fact of its conclusion, stood on no firm footing, and could not prove an enduring safeguard of the Peace of Europe, should Spanish policy, urged on by dynastic and Ministerial ambition, venture to revive the quarrel with the House of Austria, and should that House seize the opportunity of renewing its pretensions to the Spanish Throne. Cardinal Alberoni, the embodiment of the new Spanish aspirations, was, accordingly, the second stormpoint on the European horizon, which, even before the Northern War had become extinct, threatened to overwhelm the European order of things established by the Utrecht and supplementary Treaties, and including the settlement in Great Britain.

The storm broke, in this quarter, before the plan of action devised by Stanhope and Dubois could be applied as a prophylactic.

¹ Of the importance attached to their counsels, more especially by the able Austrian negotiator Penterriedter, we have ample evidence from Bothmer's own hand, in his *Mémoire* on the Quadruple Alliance.

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Amadeus II was suspected of playing a double game; but the traditional friendship of Great Britain for the House of Savoy (which, however, failed to show the steadfastness of that of Braganza) prevailed over the wiles of the Cardinal at Madrid. The negotiations for the Alliance had been difficult and protracted; for both the French and the British-Hanoverian counsels lacked unity of purpose; but, thanks to the energy of Stanhope, and the skill of his subordinates¹, the scheme of which he was the primary author reached its consummation.

The essential object of the Quadruple Alliance, which made a direct appeal to the principles of the Peace of Utrecht and the Grand Alliance, was to establish these agreements on an enduring basis, or, if the expression be preferred, to give to them their logical development. While the Emperor was to renounce definitively all pretensions to Spain and the Indies, Spain, in her turn, was to relinquish for the future any claim to any former Spanish province now under the rule of the Emperor. Sicily was to pass into his possession out of that of the House of Savoy, which was to receive, instead, the island of Sardinia, with the title of King. Finally, the Emperor was eventually to invest Don Carlos (or another son of the Queen Elizabeth of Spain) with the duchies of Parma, Piacenza and the greater part of Tuscany, but on condition that none of these should in any case become part of the Spanish monarchy.

Would Spain, under a guidance which wooed Fortune by temerity, now that her armada was at sea and the drift of her audacious designs becoming manifest to the world, dare to proceed, and to reject the compromise imposed upon her? Or would these designs, with the more or less vague hopes of support with which they were buoyed up, collapse in face of a mandate from the Powers united in the Quadruple Alliance? To decide this issue, Stanhope himself, immediately after the signature of that agreement, betook himself to Madrid, accompanied by Schaub. In one hand, he brought the offer of peace, with certain concessions, including (though with what accompanying conditions, seems to remain unknown) a secret proposal for the cession of Gibraltar²—in the other, war. Alberoni refused to give way, even when (after Stanhope's departure) the startling

¹ One of these was St Saphorin, who had passed from the Hanoverian into the British service and was British Minister-resident at Vienna. He was by birth a Swiss, like Sir Luke Schaub, who, after varied services, became Ambassador at Paris in 1721. The British diplomatic body, never more notably than in this period, recruited itself by the admission of natives of other countries.

² See Lord Stanhope, vol. I. p. 310.

news had arrived of the destruction of all the Spanish ships by the British fleet off Cape Passaro on the Sicilian coast (August, 1718). But the die had been cast. Alberoni, *more suo*, now that his scheme of anticipating the Italian stipulations of the Quadruple Alliance had failed, and that it had been joined by Savoy, resorted to fresh offensive plans. In France, however, the discovery of the Cellamare plot against the Regent put an end to any elements of hesitation; and when, in December, 1718, the Government of Great Britain, of which Alberoni was planning both a Spanish and Swedish invasion, declared war against Spain, the French Government speedily followed suit (January, 1719). As will be seen, the Cardinal had also in mind a joint attack upon Hanover by Sweden and Russia, whose Governments were then discussing conditions of peace in the Åland Islands. The Spanish War—or the War against Alberoni—was unpopular in England, except for the losses in it of the Spanish navy; for no immediate British interests were involved in the Emperor's desire to make himself master of Sicily.

Before, however, it began its course, the news had arrived of the death of Charles XII (December 11th, 1718); and, though his intentions had remained uncertain to the last, a sudden end had come to the designs of Görtz, and a severe blow had been dealt to those of Alberoni. In April, 1719, the Spanish expedition under Ormond was scattered off the Irish coast, and, in the same month, the French began their invasion of Northern Spain, seconded by a British raid by sea. On the other hand, the Cardinal was encouraged by a gleam of success which had attended the Spanish arms at Franca Villa against the Austrian reinforcements sent to Naples (June), to hold out a little longer. The persistency of the British and French Governments, however, prevailed. In December, with the aid of a series of intrigues, in which the self-proffered diplomacy of Peterborough made itself conspicuous, the Spanish Prime-minister's career as such, at last came to an end. Yet, even so, the tenacity of Philip V—or, rather, that of his Consort—once more necessitated the personal intervention of Stanhope. In January, 1720, he, at Paris, joined in a declaration on behalf of Great Britain, France and the Emperor, firmly upholding the "system" of the Quadruple Alliance. A week later, King Philip accepted that agreement, subject (secretly) to certain points left over for the decision of a Congress, to be held at Cambray in 1722. The Spanish adhesion to the Quadruple Alliance was followed by two Treaties, between Spain and Great Britain, and

between those Powers and France respectively (1721), intended, with a view to this Congress, as a sort of reinsurance against the understanding by which France and Spain, distrustful of the intentions of the Emperor, had thought to safeguard themselves. But these Treaties were alike concluded after Stanhope's death. The political structure which he had raised into being cannot, in itself, be described as built on a rock; but his courage and resolution, brought home alike to foe and friend, had successfully trodden down the embers which the efforts of Spain and the daring enterprise of her master-politician had begun to rekindle into flame in Western and Southern Europe.

About the same time, the Northern War, which, as a matter of course, had considerably affected British trade, but with which Hanoverian political interests had latterly become inextricably mixed up, had, at last, been ended by the Peace of Nystad (1721). Before the death of Charles XII (December 11th, 1718), while the effects of Görtz's now patent designs had not yet quite died out, and the Swedish negotiations with Russia in the Åland Islands were, under the influence of these projects, still pursuing their tortuous course, the relations between Sweden and Great Britain were more strained than ever, involving most of the discomfort, with much of the cost, of regular warfare. In the spring of this year, Norris had again sailed into the Baltic, ostensibly in order to redress the continued grievances of British trade and navigation, in conjunction with the Danes (still at war with Sweden), and with the less certain support of the Dutch. He had instructions to present himself at Petrograd, where he might still be able to thwart the proposed combination between Russia and Sweden. The Tsar Peter had never swerved from his purpose of extending his dominions along the Baltic. To this end, he had first joined the League against Charles XII, and there now seemed an opportunity of compassing it by treaty. But the Mecklenburg trouble was not yet over; and there was nothing really satisfactory in the assurances of the Russian Court. Thus, a reconciliation might, not without some French encouragement¹, have, after all, taken place between Sweden and Russia, which would have furthered neither

¹ The Treaty of Amsterdam of the previous year (1717) was the work of the Regent's Government, anxious to play the part of Mediator; Great Britain had no share in the Treaty, but Russia's proposed Concert against Sweden was counteracted by the effects of Prince Eugene's victory at Belgrade and Stanhope's success in bringing about the Quadruple Alliance; and Prussia, whose policy was more suspect than before to Great Britain, had, for the moment, to fall back on a waiting game.

British nor Hanoverian-Imperial interests—but for the catastrophe which happened near the end of the year.

The death of Charles XII before Frederikshald (December 11th, 1718) was one of those catastrophes which bring with them a sense of relief to half the world. The Swedish Crown descended to Charles's sister, Ulrica Eleanora, to the disappointment of his nephew, Duke Charles Frederick of Holstein-Gottorp (afterwards son-in-law to the Tsar Peter); but its diminished authority was soon made over to her husband, King Frederick I (Prince Frederick of Hesse-Cassel), with whom George I was on the most friendly terms. After the death of Charles XII, Sweden had no policy left but one of peace. Among the many claims which that peace would have to meet, Hanover's were of the latest, Denmark's of the earliest, date; Prussia (intent on the acquisition of Stettin) stood firmly by her Russian ally.

The Emperor Charles VI, whose Congress of neutral German Princes had sat long and uselessly at Brunswick, still continued as friendly to Hanover as he was adverse to Prussia. In this sense he had, not long before the death of Charles XII became known, concluded with Augustus II of Poland (Frederick Augustus I of Saxony) and the Elector of Hanover (King George I) an agreement for the defence of their German territories. The Hanoverian counsellors of King George were anxious to secure the support of the British fleet in the execution of this Treaty; and this was secured by a diplomatic *ruse*, which, as the Treaty never came to be carried out, only threw discredit upon them and him¹. Since the French Government was likewise inclined to favour Swedish rights and disregard Prussian claims in Germany, a general combination adverse to Russia and Prussia might have been formed, which would have prevented the Tsar from acquiring the supreme control of the Baltic, in return for Sweden's cession of all German territories belonging to her by Treaty. But George I and Bernstorff, with whose policy Stanhope's was in partial agreement, were not to carry through their scheme. British relations with Prussia became friendlier, and the policy of the Tsar in the end prevailed.

Meanwhile, the efforts of British diplomacy at Stockholm had

¹ The story of these transactions has, for the first time, been clearly told by W. Michael (vol. II. part I. pp. 461 ff.). It turns on the omission, in the copy of the Treaty of January 5th, 1719, sent for ratification to London, of the declaration binding King George to send a British fleet to protect Danzig and Elbing in case of a Prussian attack. The daring policy was the King's; the peccant diplomatist was St Saphorin.

not been wanting in vigour. A leading part in them was taken by Lord Carteret in June, 1719, at Stockholm, where he was actively assisted in the Hanoverian interest by the Mecklenburger Adolphus Frederick von Bassewitz. Carteret (afterwards Earl Granville and Secretary of State) was a statesman of extraordinary ability and personal charm, and had, moreover, gained the personal confidence of his Sovereign by his knowledge of the German tongue—an accomplishment then unique among British Ministers. He was, also, supposed to exercise a potent influence over the counsels of the Abbé Dubois in France. But at the root of his successes lay his self-trust; for the opinion of others he had a contempt (by no means only inspired by burgundy) which easily consoled him for his occasional failures.

At Stockholm, Carteret, with Norris's squadron in the background, lost no time in bringing about, with the assistance of his Hanoverian colleague, an understanding with the Swedish Government, which, in the form of a Preliminary Convention (July, 1719), settled the matters at issue, including the cession of Bremen and Verden, in return for the payment of a million crowns. By the time when the ratifications of the Treaty which carried out this agreement in a modified form, and provided for a renewal of the old friendship and Alliance, were exchanged (February, 1720), Carteret at Stockholm and Sir Charles (afterwards Lord) Whitworth, a diplomatist of notable insight, at Berlin had succeeded in bringing about a Treaty between Sweden and Prussia, by which on payment of a large sum Stettin, with the Pomeranian region between Oder and Peene, was relinquished by Sweden to Prussia. The network of Treaties was now nearly complete and the anti-Swedish League had been all but transformed into a protective combination against Russia. Of the former, there now only remained its earliest member—Denmark. In this quarter, the efforts of British-Hanoverian and French diplomacy at last (in July, 1720) prevailed upon King Frederick IV (afraid lest the claims of the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp on parts of Schleswig should obtain the support of the Tsar) to agree on terms with Sweden, under a British and French guarantee of that duchy¹. When, in this year, Sir John Norris arrived with instructions to notify to the Russian Government and its naval and military commanders Great Britain's

¹ In connexion with the Schleswig-Holstein question of later times, it is worth noting that this (Frederiksborg) guarantee in no wise affected the question of the Succession to the whole of Schleswig.

willingness to initiate a peace with Sweden, but in any case to concert operations with the Swedish fleet, he found nothing in readiness at Stockholm. And, though there was a strong wish that Great Britain should exert her influence with the other Powers to bring about a Concert in opposition to Russia's Baltic policy, it proved impossible in face of the Emperor's *non possumus*, Prussia's caution, the religious difficulties in Germany which placed the Lutheran Elector of Hanover in a most unwelcome position between the two chief German Powers, and the uncertainty of the policy of France. Probably, the decisive element in the resolution ultimately taken—to abandon the naval offensive (August, 1719)—is to be found in considerations which could only be usefully discussed in a Naval History. But a great political opportunity had been missed.

Norris sailed home again, and the British design of an active intervention in the settlement of the North had come to naught. This barren result of a long episode of British foreign policy was not, however, wholly due either to the European complexities of the time, or to the naval difficulties of the situation. With the moment, the spirit needed for using it was not to return. The end of 1720, in May of which year Norris had reappeared in the Baltic, dates the Bursting of the South Sea Bubble, which, in more ways than one, shook the stability of the British Cabinet. In the midst of these troubles, Stanhope died (February, 1721), and, in April, Walpole, who had rescued the country from the consequences of the crisis, succeeded him as Head of the Government. Townshend, from whom no continuation of Stanhope's actively anti-Russian policy was to be expected, had, on his death, been appointed to his Secretaryship of State.

But Sweden had, before this, ceased to reckon any longer on the direct support of Great Britain. The idea of a British League with Prussia, Denmark and Hesse-Cassel on behalf of Sweden speedily collapsed, and the Russian ships devastated the Swedish coasts. But, when Norris appeared for the last time in the familiar waters, in April, 1721, it soon came to be understood that no aid, even in the form of further subsidies, was to be expected from his Government—at all events for the present. The advice of Great Britain to Sweden was now simply *cedere malis*. In the following month, the Nystad Peace Conference opened, and the Tsar's Plenipotentiary, Rumyantseff, made it clear that if his Sovereign's conditions were accepted, he would leave the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp's pretensions to the Swedish Throne to take care of themselves. In the Peace of

Nystad (May), the Tsar Peter was triumphant. Livonia, whose possession implied the virtual command of the Baltic trade¹, was, with Esthonia and part of Carelia, yielded up by Sweden, on payment of a wholly inadequate money compensation. Finland was left to her, and a promise given that Russia would not interfere in her home (dynastic) affairs. Great Britain was not mentioned in the Treaty as mediator, guarantor or otherwise, except indirectly as an Ally of Sweden. The attempt to insert a clause for the protection of the Lower-Saxon Circle (of which Bremen and Verden formed part) had broken down; and the relations between the British and Austrian Courts and Governments had become so uneasy, that Bernstorff, who persistently adhered to the Emperor, lost his credit with his own Sovereign. The attempt to break the force of the Peace by a quadruple alliance or concert between the Contracting Powers (Russia and Sweden) and those who had not been accepted as Mediators (Great Britain and France), of course, remained a phantasm. The Tsar Peter, or as he now called himself, the Emperor of all the Russias, was master of a dominion comprising some of the fairest provinces of Sweden and clasping Poland in its deadly embrace; and British policy, after coming into conflict with Russian, for the first time in the hitherto almost wholly secluded action of the latter, had undergone a most signal rebuff, which estranged the two Powers politically for the better part of a generation².

This signal discomfiture can, at least, not be imputed to want either of prescience or of activity. One of its causes was, no doubt, the coldness between the British and the Imperial Courts, due in part to the delays in the investiture of the Elector with Bremen and Verden, caused in its turn by the Emperor's jealous hesitation as to the parallel investiture of the King of Prussia with Stettin, and in part to the religious disputes in the Empire mentioned above. So strangely were political and religious difficulties still intertwined, that the blindness to its own future interests was in this instance on the side of the Empire. As for Great Britain, the Northern policy of

¹ Of this Riga, more and more distinctly, became the centre; and it was Livonia which supplied the bulk of the war material exported from the Baltic to Great Britain.

² In 1742, during the Russo-Swedish War which ended with the Peace of Abo and the humiliation of Sweden, Great Britain concluded with Russia the Treaty of Moscow. This was the period of the ascendancy of Carteret and the so-called "Drunken Administration." Commercially, it may be noticed, the Baltic had become of less importance to Great Britain in the matter of naval materials, after these had begun to be imported in increasing quantities from America.

George I and Stanhope, as it may be described without injustice being done to either, had failed, though not more conspicuously so than that of France. It would be futile to conjecture what use Cromwell, with the support of English Protestant feeling, would have made of the situation, the commercial aspects of which can hardly be said to be quite free from obscurity. In any case, the Emperor had not been induced by the authors of the Quadruple Alliance to play an effective part in it; but, though the Alliance had in so far proved a failure, the cause of its breakdown is not, in this case, to be sought in Hanoverian motives, which no longer dominated, though they had not ceased to influence, British foreign policy.

After Stanhope's death, the conduct of British affairs inevitably passed into the hands of Walpole and Townshend, the former having, as was seen, been appointed First Lord of the Treasury and Chancellor of the Exchequer, and the latter one of the Secretaries of State. Walpole, whose thoughts were as entirely English as his ways, and who made no secret either of his personal dislike of the King's Hanoverian counsellors, or of his distrust of the House of Austria, could not pretend to any diplomatic training and at first affected an indifference to foreign policy, in the narrower sense of the word. Townshend's experience was therefore indispensable to him, and they were at one in resisting the self-assertion of Carteret, who was appointed to the other (Southern) Secretaryship, on the death, hastened no doubt by his being implicated in the South Sea disaster, of the younger Craggs. For a time, the influence of Carteret over the King seemed paramount; but, before long (April, 1724), a dispute between him and Townshend (at Hanover¹) brought about the transfer of the Southern Secretary to the Lord Lieutenancy of Ireland. Carteret's successor, the Duke of Newcastle, was an adherent of the policy of Walpole, or at least preferred to support him as the leader of the most powerful party in Parliament.

Walpole had, however, not yet taken to himself the chief direction of the foreign policy of Great Britain, when his Government was called upon to intervene in European affairs, which seemed to be experiencing a strange metamorphosis. Early in 1720, on acceding to the Quadruple Alliance, Philip V of Spain had left over some of the perplexities

¹ The intrigue to which it had reference, and which involved both the French Court and the Hanoverian clique, led to the substitution at Paris of Horace Walpole the elder for Sir Luke Schaub.

confronting him (including the perennial question of Gibraltar) to be settled by the Congress of Cambray, which however did not actually meet till four years later, and, largely because of the matters here noted, broke up without result. Marriage contracts had been arranged between the heir to the Spanish Throne and his brother Charles and two daughters of the Duke of Orleans, and the Infanta Maria Anna had, at a very early age, been betrothed to the young King Lewis XV of France. But the ex-Regent had died, and had been succeeded in the control of French affairs by the Duke of Bourbon-Condé, his deadly enemy. A few months later (March, 1725) the Duke of Bourbon, by sending back the Infanta, offered an unpardonable insult to Spanish pride. When it was found that the British Government would not abandon the French Alliance, the Congress of Cambray was broken up by the Spanish Court, and Ripperdá, the chief instrument of its policy, set to work for the conclusion of a league with the Emperor against the original members of the Triple Alliance, while waiving all the points that had remained in dispute between the Spanish and Imperial Governments.

Not only had the Emperor Charles VI been with great difficulty induced by Great Britain to join in the Quadruple Alliance, seeming thus to shut the door against any future revision of the Utrecht Settlement; but he had come very near to a quarrel with Great Britain herself and the United Provinces, on account of his project for the development of the commerce of the Austrian Netherlands by the establishment of an East India Company at Ostend. Moreover—and this was doubtless the main motive of his present line of action—he was most anxious to take advantage of the present isolation of Spain by obtaining from her a guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction of his daughter Maria Theresa's succession in all his dominions. The ambition of the Spanish Prime-minister, the newly created Duke of Ripperdá—an Alberoni of a very inferior type—met the Emperor's cherished desire halfway; and, by April, 1725, the two Governments had come to an understanding which found expression in an open and a secret Treaty signed at Vienna. In the former, which, while accepting the conditions of the Quadruple Alliance and a Spanish guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction, also contained an Imperial promise of good offices for the recovery of Gibraltar and Minorca by Spain, there was nothing directly provocative to Great Britain; but the secret Treaty was, besides promising armed assistance for their recovery and continued action on

Provinces at Paris (May 31st, 1727). While all Treaties concluded before 1725 were confirmed, any particular questions for discussion were referred to a General Congress; but—and the exception shows, so far as Great Britain is concerned, what lay at the root of the so-called Alliance of Hanover—the charter of the Ostend East India Company was suspended for seven years. Spain still held aloof, but her acceptance of the Preliminaries must sooner or later follow. Little more than a week after the signing of these Preliminaries, King George I died on his return journey from Hanover. The foreign policy of his reign was, at the moment, in a critical phase, but not in one foreboding the collapse of the principles it had followed, and the interests it had served with, on the whole, indisputable consistency. After the conclusion of the War of the Spanish Succession, Great Britain could not renounce the leading part she was called upon to play in general European politics. The Triple and the Quadruple Alliance made the Peace of Utrecht a reality, and the ambition of Spain, not once but twice, both when opposed to and when temporarily reconciled with the dynastic purposes of the House of Austria, broke down in face of the Alliance between Great Britain and France. The Alliance had not sunk very deeply into the soil; but it seemed more likely than before to hold out, as, in its general tendency, the conduct of affairs in both countries, united in resistance to a disturbance of the existing settlement, became more clearly pacific. In the North, new relations between the Baltic Powers, of which Great Britain had in vain resisted the establishment, had taken the place of the old; but towards the problems certain to arise from these and other more nearly imminent changes, the attitude of Great Britain could not yet be determined.

The first decade, roughly speaking, of the reign of George II (1727–37) is the period in which Walpole, the friend of peace, remained, virtually, undisturbed in his Ministerial sway. While the country at large saw in him its ablest financier, who had rescued it from the South Sea *débâcle*, his action in the Spanish-Austrian crisis of 1726–7, although he was inclined to blame Townshend for precipitancy, had materially contributed to check the policy of Spain, which had already begun to lay siege to Gibraltar. For, without Walpole, Parliament, when it met in January, 1727, would not have shown, by voting supplies, that the nation was prepared. Peace had been thus preserved, though the eleventh hour might seem to have passed; the Emperor had drawn back; and the Spanish question had been

reduced to that of the time needed for soothing Spain's ruffled pride, and reconciling her to the Concert.

The European position of Great Britain in these years was greatly strengthened by the cordial relations between her own and the French Government. Walpole's brother, the elder Horace, at that time British Ambassador in France, had, in ready deference to Fleury's wish, crossed the Channel to second Queen Caroline in impressing upon George II the necessity of keeping the Minister in power. This was done, though no serious danger would probably have, at least for the present, threatened the security of the Hanoverian dynasty, or that of the British interests bound up with it, had the King followed his first inclinations. The Jacobites were, as usual, quite alive to the chances of the situation, but really unprepared to take advantage of them, should an opportunity present itself. The Pretender hurried from Bologna to Nancy, whence he was formally expelled by the French Government, and had to take refuge at Avignon, and then at Rome. The Jacobite faction in the new Parliament (1728) was impotent for action, and, when the arch-intriguer Bolingbroke appeared on the scene, it was in the character of an independent supporter of the Hanoverian Throne, merely desirous that it should change its counsellors.

Meanwhile, the pacification of Europe which had seemed so near at the time of the death of George I had been, though but slowly, accomplished. The mock siege of Gibraltar was reluctantly given up; nor was the conduct of the Emperor, bound as he was by his Treaty with Prussia, altogether loyal. It was only by very vigorous proceedings on the part of the British Government (which by means of the subsidy Treaty of Wolfenbüttel with Brunswick kept that duchy open for occupation by British troops) that he was made to understand the seriousness of the situation, and that Spain was obliged to relinquish her hope of a resumption of the Austro-Spanish Alliance. Philip V signified his acceptance of the Preliminaries of Paris in the Act of the Pardo (March, 1728), in which an ulterior settlement was referred to a Congress of the Powers.

In this Congress, originally summoned to Aix-la-Chapelle, and thence transferred in the following June to Soissons, where it sat for several months, Great Britain's first Plenipotentiary was Colonel William Stanhope (subsequently Earl of Harrington, and after the dissolution of the Congress one of the Secretaries of State). The main question for settlement here was the satisfaction of Spain; for

the Emperor, intent upon using the opportunity for as general as possible a recognition of the Pragmatic Sanction, had given up both his resistance to the establishment of a Spanish Prince in the North-Italian duchies, and the maintenance of the Ostend Company. But it was the Pragmatic Sanction which Fleury, in accordance with the traditions of French policy, steadily declined to recognise, and which the Congress left where it found it. The Spanish Government, hereupon, after in vain seeking to exact the cession of Gibraltar which British public opinion showed itself determined to resist, passed over to the other side, and concluded, with Great Britain and France, the Treaty of Seville, the United Provinces, as was their custom, acceding later. This Treaty (November, 1730) which patched up the trade relations in America between Spain and Great Britain, but passed over the subject of Gibraltar in silence, was Townshend's last achievement. It was much approved in the City, whose interests had been jeopardised by the previous attempt of the Spanish Government to transfer to Austria the concessions enjoyed (since Utrecht) by British trade; and gratified the Court, annoyed by the recent Austrian *rapprochement* to Prussia (for securing whose friendship Queen Caroline had already formed projects of her own). While, however, the Emperor seemed the loser, he contrived to possess himself of the Italian duchies which the Treaty had intended to secure to Spain; whereupon it was denounced by the Spanish Government itself. The British now once more returned to the Imperial alliance, and, in the so-called Second Treaty of Vienna (March, 1731) guaranteed the Pragmatic Sanction, the Emperor in return abolishing the Ostend Company. When he further agreed to the succession of Don Carlos in the Italian duchies, Philip V of Spain, for his part, also acceded to the Treaty (July, 1731). Since it, also, received the adhesion of the Estates of the Empire and finally of the States-General (1732) a general Concert seemed to have been reached. In promoting this settlement, the conciliatory diplomacy of Earl Waldegrave, now British Ambassador at Paris, fully carried out Walpole's pacific policy. At the same time, Droysen, not without reason, regards the transaction as illustrating the "parliamentary" style of foreign policy characteristic of Walpole—a policy which provides for the day and the morrow, and leaves the day after to take care of itself. While by this Treaty the real gainer was the Emperor (as his concessions in return suffice to show), it was concluded without the assent of France; and, at a time when the relations between her and her Ally were by no

means altogether as easy as Fleury desired them to be, Great Britain had, in order that Europe should obtain peace for the present, yielded to the wishes of the House of Austria in a matter of vital importance for the European Balance in the future. France had taken no part in the Treaty. On the other side, it must be added that Great Britain and the United Provinces were afterwards accused of having failed to carry out the commercial concessions they had made to the Austrian Netherlands in return for the abandonment of the Ostend Company. With regard to the future, France, though under the genuinely pacific and conciliatory guidance of Fleury, had always been impatient of pacific Ministers, and to a generation not yet oblivious of the glories of Lewis XIV—even to Fleury himself—a realisation of the Pragmatic Sanction was intolerable. Thus, the disagreement on this head between France and Great Britain inevitably tended to bring about closer relations between the former Power and Spain, and to promote the signing, so early as November, 1733, of the First Bourbon "Family Compact." On the other hand, the renewed good understanding between Great Britain and the Emperor could, in the end, hardly fail to involve this country in the conflict between Austria and Prussia, which, although they had in 1729 concluded a Perpetual Alliance, could no longer be far distant. But, for the present, all seemed to promise well; and Walpole's method of advancing national prosperity by assuring the continuance of peace, and leaving over remoter difficulties, commended itself to public opinion. Great Britain required peace after the long strain of the active foreign policy of the first Hanoverian reign; nor is it easy to see how, without the material resources accumulated by her during the Walpolean age, she could have taken upon her the mighty responsibilities awaiting her.

Thus, we have reached a chapter of modern history marked by a European War in which Great Britain took no part. Notwithstanding the efforts of the Emperor to draw her (and the United Provinces) into the War of the Polish Succession (1733-8), she had contented herself with offering her mediation, after (in November, 1733) the Government of Lewis XV had agreed to a Convention at the Hague, by which it undertook to refrain from invading the Austrian Netherlands. The War and the so-called Third Treaty of Vienna, which in 1738 definitively terminated it, exhibit the most turbid depths of eighteenth century diplomacy; and it was only with the utmost difficulty that Walpole had succeeded in restraining King George II's dynastic and military aspirations from casting a line into

waters so troubled. Nor is it astonishing that the Courts of France and Spain which—the latter on acknowledging the Pragmatic Sanction—had been the territorial gainers in the issue, should have cherished the thought, developed in them by the course of the War, of turning their united strength against the Power whose neutrality had favoured an unprecedented growth of its commercial prosperity. They could not do so in secrecy; for, as Seeley has pointed out, the Bourbon Family Compact of November, 1733, which showed that France was weary of a policy of peace, was known from the first to Walpole, whose own policy had seemed to be an element in its prospects of success. There can be no doubt that the purpose of this Compact, besides aiding in securing the position of Don Carlos in Italy, was to resist the advances of Great Britain by sea, and, while making joint war upon the Emperor, to keep Great Britain in check by naval armaments. At all events, the promise of French aid in the efforts of Spain to recover Gibraltar was included in the agreement. For the rest, the encroachments of British maritime trade offered a constant opportunity for Spanish grievances; though it might better suit Walpole's parliamentary adversaries to find effective opportunities of attacking him in the Spanish treatment of British traders—opportunities of which, in 1738, they availed themselves with relentless factiousness. If Walpole has been justly charged with moulding his foreign policy too closely upon the necessity of satisfying Parliament, it must be remembered that a bitter personal hostility to himself was the guiding motive of the whole Opposition against which he had long stood at bay. Carteret, after he had been replaced in his Secretaryship by Newcastle, had returned to the Parliamentary arena in 1730, and, an attempt at reconciliation with Walpole having failed, he, with the often invaluable aid of Chesterfield in the House of Lords, and that of Pulteney in the Commons, divided the conduct of the Opposition between them. The Jacobites under Wyndham, and the Boy Patriots clustered round Bolingbroke (William Pitt, from 1735, among them), treated foreign affairs as they treated domestic, from the same point of view—the baiting of Walpole. In the face of such an Opposition, no harder task ever fell to the lot of a British Minister. To his honour, Walpole was animated by a sincere desire for peace; though the spirit of the nation had been effectually roused against Spain, while the Spanish Court, with the Family Compact to fall back upon, was never indisposed to war. In the negotiations which occupied the autumn and winter of 1738, Spain showed

herself willing to give satisfaction for past transgressions, but not prepared to relinquish the right of search; "No Search" had become the demand of the British mercantile interest, and, owing to the persistence of the Opposition, the cry of British public opinion¹.

Quite early in 1739, a Convention was signed at the Pardo by the Spanish Minister de la Quadra and Sir Benjamin Keene, a diplomatist who represented Great Britain at Madrid with much ability both before and after the War² which broke out later in this year. This preliminary agreement stipulated that, before the execution of the final Treaty, Spain should pay to Great Britain the amount by which the British claims exceeded the Spanish counter-claims. Into the accompanying reservations and protests it is the less requisite to enter here, since public opinion in England, led by the Opposition, would in no case have been satisfied with the Convention, which Walpole, in one of his Pyrrhic victories, only carried by small majorities (March, 1739). The Opposition hereupon seceded, thus enabling the Government to carry a Danish Subsidy Bill. Whether the object of this measure was to patch up a Hanoverian quarrel or to prevent a Danish alliance with Sweden and France and thus leave Great Britain without an ally in the imminent War, the incident at all events illustrated the inconvenience of mingling questions of foreign policy with party manœuvres. Before long, it became evident that, though the Opposition was unable to oust Walpole from office by their onslaughts, they had created a situation involving the country in the War to the avoidance of which his policy had, above all, been directed. When the Spanish Government declared that negotiations could proceed on no other basis than one repudiated by British public opinion, and that, till a particular Spanish demand (the claim on the South Sea Company) had been satisfied, Spain would suspend the *Asiento*, the chances of peace had been reduced to nothing. The usual votes followed in Supply; but Carteret's advice to conclude an alliance with Prussia was not followed. Keene's *ultimatum* was declined by Spain, and war was declared (November, 1739). France protested her pacific intentions, but began to arm.

The outbreak of the War found Great Britain without an ally (except Denmark). The Emperor Charles VI was sick to death. He had consented to the humiliating Peace of Belgrade, and was not to

¹ Pitt was, in course of time, to come to see the Spanish side of the argument.

² He was also commissioned at Madrid as South Sea Agent. It was Keene, who, in 1757, reluctantly obeyed Pitt's instructions to offer Spain the restoration of Gibraltar, if she would join Great Britain against France.

be tempted by British suggestions as to the recovery of Naples and Sicily; the United Provinces, this time, stood altogether aloof; Frederick William I (whose death, like the Emperor's, followed in 1740) would give no encouragement to British overtures, being, above all, anxious to preserve the goodwill of France. As for France, she would no doubt join Spain in the War at the moment most convenient to herself; and, though it began with Admiral Vernon's naval exploit (celebrated at home as a party triumph), this was not successfully followed up, and Anson's brilliant circuit had no influence on the course of the War: the conflict between two European Great Powers could not be decided in the Pacific. Thus the spirit of the Opposition was by no means quelled. In 1741, what Lord Stanhope hardly exaggerates in calling the "cry for the blood of Walpole" went up louder than ever. He successfully resisted a drastic censure on his entire foreign policy moved in the Lords by Carteret and in the Commons by Samuel (afterwards Lord) Sandys; but, immediately before the dissolution of Parliament, he had felt obliged to follow public opinion, with which part of the Opposition identified itself, in carrying the grant of a subsidy to the Queen of Hungary (April).

By this grant, Great Britain became a participant in the War of the Austrian Succession, for which Frederick II's invasion of Silesia in December, 1740, gave the signal, and which was destined to dominate the next epoch of European politics. Although Carteret, a consistent friend of the House of Austria, hoped from the first that Maria Theresa would come to terms with her determined assailant, the subsidy granted sufficed to make her believe that Great Britain would support her to the end; and Walpole's plans for the preservation of peace fell to the ground. Thus, the battle of Chotusitz (1742), which ended the First Silesian War, lost two provinces to her, and, while the Alliance of Great Britain had only helped her to conclude a humiliating peace, the result had still further increased the unpopularity of Walpole at home. Upon him too fell a share of the indignation aroused by the Treaty by which, in September, 1741, the Elector of Hanover agreed to remain neutral in the War, and even to abstain from voting for Maria Theresa's Consort in the approaching election to the Imperial Throne. The Prime-minister's position had become untenable¹, as was shown by Newcastle's averted

¹ His desperate, or at least paradoxical, notions of recovering popularity by a separation of Hanover from Great Britain on the King's death, and of obtaining Jacobite support by overtures to the Pretender, had, practically, no connexion with his foreign policy.

attitude; and though his was not the last instance of a peace Minister drifting into war, Walpole's sagacity failed him more signally in 1741 if less ignobly, than it had in 1739. Carteret, as Secretary of State, guided the foreign policy of the new Administration; but it was only at sea (by forcing Don Carlos at Naples to remain neutral) that Great Britain interfered effectively in the European conflict.

The Peace of Breslau (June, 1742), in which both Russia and Great Britain were included (the former continuing for the present to hold aloof from the struggle), was "mediated" by Lord Hyndford, as representing Great Britain. Although in truth there was little to effect by mediation, the friendly spirit of Carteret's policy had found occasion for manifesting itself; and, in the same year, an enlarged subsidy and a large vote in Supply testified to the nation's warlike enthusiasm, though as yet Great Britain and France, a direct contest between whom could not be far distant, were only in arms against each other on behalf, respectively, of the Queen of Hungary and of the Nymphenburg Alliance against her. At the beginning of 1743, a brighter prospect seemed opening for the Queen and her British sympathisers; and Carteret's spirited foreign policy steadily (the adverb is perhaps ill-chosen) advanced in its course. Prussia was satisfied, so long as she was left in possession of Silesia. The Tsarina Elizabeth had entered into an Alliance with Great Britain, though this was not to extend to any Russian action against Turkey, or to any British intervention against Spain in Italy, where the House of Savoy had come to an understanding with that of Austria. Thus, the time seemed to have arrived at last when the British nation, weary of a condition of things which was neither peace nor war, might take a leading part in a struggle which was now a far from hopeless one, and when King George II might satisfy both his political wishes and his military impulses by leading into battle a "Pragmatic" army, composed of both Englishmen and Germans, in British as well as (to do him justice) in Hanoverian pay. In the face of vehement opposition the vote was carried (December, 1742). The battle of Dettingen was fought (June, 1743), and, while the Nymphenburg Alliance was virtually dissolved, the Treaty of Worms (September) united, as the Allies of Maria Theresa, Great Britain, the United Provinces, Sardinia and Saxony, and promised an annual British subsidy "so long as the necessity of her affairs should require." But the Treaty was never ratified, and, though kept secret, confirmed the decision at which, though against his own wish, George II had arrived, to pass

over Carteret in the choice of a new Prime-minister (August); for the unpopularity of the Crown and of the Hanoverian interest had reached its height, and Pitt's thunder already filled the sky. A term was thus set to a line of policy which was easily held up to scorn as subservient to Hanoverian ends or motives, but in truth signified a resumption of the Whig policy in Queen Anne's reign as opposed to the vague peace policy of Walpole, and exhibited, curiously enough, points of resemblance to the ideas of Bolingbroke. Yet, as a matter of fact, Carteret's "system" would not fit in with the existing relations between the European Powers chiefly concerned. On the one hand, the two principal German Powers were too much absorbed in their own quarrels to care for a close cooperation with Great Britain; and her political action was more and more concentrating itself upon the protection of her own trade, whether lawful or illicit. She was, in fact, a Maritime Power before everything else, and, as such, unable to combine with any one other Power in an alliance like the Family Compact, which France and Spain were (still quite secretly) renewing on terms of the closest intimacy.

The outbreak of the Second Silesian War (1744-5), in which George II encouraged Maria Theresa to engage ("*ce qui est bon à prendre est bon à rendre*"), found Great Britain firm in her support. Though Henry Pelham, the younger brother of the Duke of Newcastle, and himself a more timid statesman of Walpole's school, was now at the Head of the Government, Carteret continued to conduct foreign affairs till the King was obliged to dismiss him (November, 1744), when the Earl of Harrington was appointed in his place¹. Before this, France, no longer ruled by Fleury, had declared war against Great Britain, though not till after a vain attempt had been made to throw an army on her shores, promptly answered by a British blockade of the French and Spanish ships at Toulon. There was no longer any pacifist opposition in England, while the open outbreak of war between Great Britain and France seemed once more, as in the greater days of the past, to promise that the consent of all loyal parties would enable the Crown to carry out its policy to the full. But the case was altered. Perhaps, had Maria Theresa's only Ally encouraged her to persevere, instead of concluding the Peace of Dresden (December, 1745) she might have successfully prolonged her struggle; but public opinion in England, because it was now less under the influence of sentiment, had taken a turn less favourable to her cause and was

¹ Carteret (Granville)'s return to office in 1746 lasted only four days.

certainly much preoccupied with the course of events nearer home.

Maria Theresa's prospect of recovering Silesia depended, as a matter of fact, on the continuance of British subsidies; and in the end, she had, therefore, to content herself with the advice of George II—if it was actually proffered—to wait for a better day. In Italy, Austria was, notwithstanding the assistance of a British fleet, unable to establish her claims. But, for Great Britain, the significance of the War, into which a generous impulse had mainly caused her to enter, soon concentrated itself upon what came to be more and more clearly recognised as the beginning of a struggle with France for maritime, Colonial and East Indian supremacy. The ultimate breakdown of the last and most formidable Jacobite Insurrection (1745-6) reacted but slightly on the conduct of the War (only in so far as British troops had to be transferred from Flanders). On the other hand, the British capture of Cape Breton, the "Dunkirk of the West" (1745), was a serious blow to France; and found no compensation in the surrender, in the following year, of Madras and its British settlement, which after a long and gallant contest was recovered by the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. In 1747, two great British victories—off Cape Finisterre and near the Isle of Aix—placed the superiority of the British navy to the French beyond all doubt; and, in the following winter, peace negotiations began. The previous French attempt, in the Breda Conferences (1746), to cow the United Provinces, who had little stomach for joining in the aggressive policy of Great Britain, had failed; but the consequent French invasion having (notwithstanding the French victory of Lauffeldt) led to no decisive result, the British and Dutch Governments now entered jointly into these negotiations.

In June, 1747, Great Britain had concluded a subsidy Treaty with Russia (who in the previous year had concluded a defensive Treaty with Austria, and whose troops were already on their march), and to this the United Provinces had acceded. With the view, no doubt, of putting a final pressure on France, the two Maritime Powers, at the beginning of 1748, signed a Convention at the Hague, in which Sardinia was included, declaring their alliance with Austria. Yet, by now negotiating for peace, in spite of the martial ardour of George II and the Duke of Cumberland, the British Ministry attested the fact, to which they could no longer shut their eyes, of the uselessness of the War, as undertaken in support of Maria Theresa. The essential

condition of the Preliminaries insisted on by Great Britain and the United Provinces was the *status quo ante bellum*—the restitution, in other words, of the conquests made during the War, including the Barrier Towns recently taken by the French, and Madras.

The Peace Conferences of Aix-la-Chapelle began in April, 1748, and, Maestricht having been taken early in their course, were prolonged during the summer. On October 18th, the Peace was signed, its terms being virtually those of the Preliminaries and not more favourable either to Maria Theresa or to her Ally Great Britain than they would have been, had the winding-up of the peace negotiations with France, Spain and their Allies not been delayed, in deference to the personal wishes of George II, till public opinion in England had rendered it imperative. While the House of Austria was now assured of the European recognition of the Pragmatic Sanction, and Prussia (which had kept out of the Treaty, leaving the care of her interests to France) of the guaranteed possession of Silesia, [Maria Theresa had, besides losing that Province, made definite cessions in Italy, and had been grievously disappointed by the War in which Great Britain had chivalrously undertaken to support her. Great Britain herself issued forth from the War with little clear gain. But she had well sustained her military repute, and stood before the world as the all but undisputed mistress of the seas. Thus, she had proved equal to staying the revived ambition of France, even when that Power commanded the allegiance of Spain—and had in so far justified the fears of Fleury.

The foreign policy of the Pelham Administration (1744-54) had, up to the conclusion of the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, lacked the strength of which the true foundations lie in definite political principle, and not in a "broad bottom" of caution and craft, such as respectively marked the Prime-minister and his brother, the Duke of Newcastle. Neither of them had proved high-spirited enough to withstand the King's tenacious adherence to a policy of war, which Walpole had so long succeeded in restraining; and Chesterfield, the only member of the Government possessed of the required courage, had, in 1745, after the retirement in the previous year of Granville, to whom he was bitterly opposed, been, after a successful diplomatic mission to the Hague, transferred to Ireland.

The Peace concluded at Aix-la-Chapelle had nearly been broken in the following year by the refusal of Spain to carry out a compensation clause for war losses contained in it, and to renew the

Asiento; but Great Britain proved conciliatory, and the trade between the two countries was restored to the conditions which had prevailed in the reign of Charles II of Spain. In other respects, the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, far from glorious as it was, had not been concluded too soon for British interests, considering the incompetence of either the Government¹ or the utterly factious Opposition to rise to a policy alike definite and reasonable. The German question seemed to slumber; though Hanoverian influence was at the bottom of the protracted manoeuvres for gaining the votes of the Electors for Archduke Joseph as Roman King², and for obtaining grants of subsidies to them with that object from the British Parliament. French diplomacy, on the other hand, was still hampered by the reserve maintained by King Frederick II of Prussia in his relations with France.

The Peace of Europe had now been restored; but the question of its endurance was full of uncertainty. However much the soul of Maria Theresa had been vexed by the behaviour of Great Britain in the Aix-la-Chapelle negotiations, she found it necessary to follow the advice of the majority of her counsellors, and to adhere to the British (and Dutch) Alliance, with the additional security (such as it was) of the Defensive Treaty with Russia of 1746. But, already before the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle was actually signed, Kaunitz, the Austrian Plenipotentiary there, had, at a Secret Council held by the Empress, declared his view that the King of Prussia was her most dangerous foe; but that, since the Maritime Powers would no longer come to her aid against him, the only policy left open to her was to invoke the assistance of France. In this counsel we have the germ of the Seven Years' War; but though, so early as 1750, Kaunitz went as Ambassador to Paris, it was not till three years later that he was actually called to the conduct of Austria's foreign policy; and even then no change was as yet made in its system. Thus, the idea of seeking to recover Silesia was not resumed as a practical political purpose till complications between Great Britain and France obliged the former Power to consider her attitude towards what might still be called the German question³.

Although the most important issues decided at Aix-la-Chapelle

¹ Granville, after his return to office as President of the Council in 1751, no longer influenced the course of affairs, foreign or domestic.

² The election, however, did not actually take place till after the close of the Seven Years' War.

³ Cf. A. von Arneth, *Geschichte Maria Theresia's*, vol. iv. (Vienna, 1870).

had been those bearing upon the contention between France and Great Britain for the mastery of a great part of the known world, the settlement on this head reached in the Treaty could not possibly be regarded as definitive. Great Britain had deemed it so important to remove the French garrisons from the Dutch Barrier-fortresses that, by way of compensation, she had allowed the French to recover their possessions in North America—a withdrawal which seemed intolerable to the British Colonists. In the East Indies, the warfare between the Companies continued; while, on the West Coast of Africa and in the Levant, British trade was outstripped by that of its rival. In Russia, while the Baltic trade was chiefly in British hands, in the Black Sea region France consistently kept up intimate relations with her old friend the Turk, and her rivalry was, again, dangerous. In both directions, French diplomacy—never more imaginatively active than at this season of internal decline—sought to provide for the possibilities of the future, keeping the Porte in hand as a check upon European operations of the Eastern Powers, and intriguing with the dominant party in Sweden (the ‘Caps’) for a defensive alliance against Great Britain¹. In Poland, British and French influence were at issue on the burning question of the next Succession to the Throne. In Denmark, French, in Portugal, British influence predominated, and even in the United Provinces, where, after the death of the Stadholder William IV (1751) his widow, the British Princess Anne, carried on the functions of his office on behalf of her son, a French faction asserted itself, which here, of course, was in favour of peace. On the other hand—as if to meet paradox by paradox—in Spain, where internal prosperity was the chief care of King Ferdinand VI and his Minister Carvajal, there was now evident friendliness to Great Britain, partly due to a dispute as to the succession in the Two Sicilies between the Bourbon lines, which had in its turn led to a combination between Spain and Austria.

It was thus inevitable that the conflict of interests between the two Powers which thus divided between them the good- and the ill-will of the rest of Europe should declare itself with peculiar strength in the affairs of the Germanic Empire, where the Sovereign of Great Britain had a legitimate standing as Elector of Hanover, while the intervention of France in them had—for a century past at all events—

¹ The British relations with the opposite party, the ‘Hats,’ were so close that a rumour actually attributed to George II the intention of bringing about the elevation to the Swedish Throne of the Duke of Cumberland.

been a regular element in her political action. Great Britain's subsidies had, as noted, continued, so late as 1752, to flow into the Austrian exchequer, and into the pockets of the Electors to the Roman Kingship, and, though disliked by Pelham, were defended in Parliament by his brother, who, at the close of the previous year, had succeeded in ousting from the other Secretaryship of State the Duke of Bedford and putting in his place the Earl of Holderness, a diplomatist not possessed of the Duke's parliamentary influence.

But it was not in Europe, or in connexion with European disputes, that the rivalry which constitutes the chief political interest of the years following on the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle most signally declared itself. That Peace had failed sufficiently to define the boundaries between the Colonial dominions of France and Great Britain; more especially, the limits of the Colony of Nova Scotia (Acadia) were disputed, and the frontier between Canada and New England. On the peninsula connecting Nova Scotia with the mainland, both Powers had constructed forts against one another, while Virginia was up in arms to recover a fort on the Ohio captured by the French (1754). The War between the two Governments did not actually break out on this occasion; for neither side was eager for a precipitate rupture. But there were other Colonial quarrels, and it was felt throughout the British dominions that the unbroken maintenance of them along the whole line must be very soon definitively settled. At such seasons, the most competent diplomacy may find itself incapable of doing more than delay for a time or hasten, according as it may suit the purpose of its Government, the first untraceable step. But Great Britain seems at this time to have been singularly ill-served in the most important quarter. The British Ambassador at Paris, as Lord Stanhope reminds us, was the Earl of Albemarle, whom Chesterfield held up to his son as an encouraging example of how to succeed without a single recommendation except good manners; and his political secrets were carried from his embassy to the French Government. In 1754, the year in which this diplomatist was removed by death, Newcastle succeeded his brother as Prime-minister, and entered upon the last decade of nearly half a century of public service. On his personality satire has, not always quite fairly, exhausted itself; though a consistent time-server, he was also loyal to the dynasty on the Throne, and, while he corrupted others, he, at least, took no thought of personal gains.

In choosing a Leader of the House of Commons, Newcastle had

been virtually reduced to the choice between Henry Fox and William Pitt, of whom the latter had entered that House in 1735. Since, however, neither of these politicians would submit to give up that side of the conduct of affairs which he most prized, Newcastle offered the Leadership, together with a Secretaryship of State, to Sir Thomas Robinson, who possessed diplomatic experience without parliamentary ability, and who was welcome to the King because of his familiarity with German politics. For a time, Pitt (whom the King detested) and Fox hereupon joined hands against the new Leader and his master; Robinson retired to the Mastership of the Great Wardrobe, and Henry Fox, without Pitt, allied himself with Newcastle¹. But even this makeshift was not to hold out for long. Already the storms were lowering, and the nation was looking towards its destined pilot. When Parliament met at the close of 1754, the King's wishes were met by an Address from the Commons undertaking to support him in defending his rights and dominions against all encroachments; a credit of a million was at once granted; and, had he not, with his customary want of tact, hereupon immediately set out for Hanover, this might have proved the season of his greatest popularity since he had ascended the Throne. On the following day, Admiral Boscawen sailed for Newfoundland, and soon afterwards came the news of General Braddock's catastrophe on the Ohio, which was speedily avenged. The brink of war had been reached².

Few wars, as statesmanship knows to its cost, are easily localised; but the difficulties besetting the process were nothing short of insuperable in the case of the present struggle between Great Britain and France. Apart from all questions of Treaties and Alliances, the Netherlands could not but be involved in a struggle with which they must be brought into contact by both sea and land; and, if so, Germany could not remain outside it. But there were of course now, as there have so often been, special considerations which would implicate severally or collectively the German States in a conflict between the Western Powers; and who, at the close of the year 1754 could have reckoned otherwise than that in the War now imminent Prussia would take the side of France, and Austria that of Great Britain?

And yet, as indicated above, the [Austro-British Alliance was,

¹ For these transactions cf. Earl of Ilchester, *Henry Fox* (2 vols. 1920) and the Earl of Rosebery, *Chatham: His Early Life and Correspondence*, 1910.

² As to what follows, cf. Ranke, *Der Ursprung des Siebenjährigen Krieges* (Leipzig, 1871).

notwithstanding, on the eve of dissolution. Apart from lesser grounds of complaint, which British diplomacy was certainly not disposed to minimise, a difference of great historical significance seriously disturbed the relations between the United and the Austrian Netherlands. Much importance attached to the view taken of these relations by Austria, which had grown weary of the conditions on which she held the Provinces now called by her name, while the British conception of the proper function of the Low Countries in the political system of Europe necessitated as close as possible a connexion between the Austrian and the United Provinces. Although the British, which was necessarily also the Dutch, view had prevailed at Aix-la-Chapelle, the Vienna Government had administered the Austrian Netherlands as possessing interests of their own and free from the control of their neighbours, who occupied the Barrier fortresses, and had actively promoted Belgic prosperity on these lines. When, in August, 1754, a provisional Treaty was proposed for the adjustment of these differences, it was rejected through the influence of Kaunitz against the strenuous efforts of the British Ambassador, Keith. A grievance of a different description is interesting, inasmuch as it illustrates the part still occasionally played by the old religious disputes in the philosophical "eighteenth century," and the importance attached to them by the Hanoverian dynasty, whose tenure of the Throne, after all, depended primarily upon its Protestantism. In the complicated quarrel at the Germanic Diet in 1754 as to the guarantee demanded on behalf of the Hereditary Prince Frederick of Hesse-Cassel (whose Consort was the British Princess Mary), George II and the King of Prussia were alike opposed to the House of Austria. But these and other lesser quarrels apart, Austria would certainly not adhere to Great Britain, unless the latter would aid in the recovery of Silesia and could, even as an Ally, be of no assistance to her except by making war on Prussia, from whom Great Britain, in her turn, had nothing, and even Hanover, at this time, had not very much, to fear. In other words, the interests of the two Allied Powers were quite divergent, and while certainly much British treasure had been spent and not a little English blood spilt, purely for Austria's sake, Kaunitz might, on the other hand, speciously argue that the Alliance had only been carried on by Great Britain so long as it served her own purpose.

Undeniably, the motives for maintaining the Austro-British Alliance had long prevailed, and Great Britain's differences with France continued to be regarded as the beginnings of a quarrel in which

Austria's own part was marked out for her beforehand; while, should France attack Great Britain by way of Hanover, Austria was doubly bound to contribute to the defence of the Electorate. No exception was taken in England, so late as 1755, either to the Subsidy Treaty with Hesse-Cassel (where there was an easy market for soldiers) or to a Russian Subsidy Treaty, in which the Austrian Government had interested itself. If Austria and Russia remained friendly; there seemed no reason why the present situation should not be prolonged, provided always that, as in the last year of the War of the Austrian Succession, Prussia remained neutral. Great Britain would not suffer, and, so far as the game of Alliances went, France would have gained nothing.

But this calculation was absolutely intolerable to Kaunitz and to his Mistress, who had made up their minds that, after despoiling her monarchy, Prussia must not be suffered to hold by its side the position which she had acquired among the European Powers. Thus, the more surely that the outbreak of war between France and Great Britain announced itself, the more resolute was Kaunitz, in the first instance, to turn the force of the Austro-British Alliance against the "new Power," as he called Prussia, as well as against France.

V

The British Government, for its part, had no intention of reversing the general policy it had pursued up to Aix-la-Chapelle, or, on the other hand, of abandoning the guarantee of the tenure of Silesia by Prussia, in which it had joined. According to the view duly placed before the Austrian Government, the present task of Great Britain was to aid in the defence of the United Provinces and the Hanoverian Electorate; and Kaunitz promised to augment the Austrian forces in the Netherlands and to assume the offensive against Prussia, should her troops march against Hanover. But Great Britain had no reason for apprehending any Prussian attack of the kind upon the Electoral frontier. And, as the words of Holderness (whose intelligence has perhaps been underrated) show, the British Government was beginning to understand, that Kaunitz and the Empress meant to utilise for the recovery of Silesia the Alliance desired by the British Government for the purpose of its contest with France. When it became clear that Great Britain was not disposed to fall in with an extension of her plan of action, and that

Austria would therefore not find her account in joining in such a war; there remained for her only the choice between neutrality (hardly possible, in view of the situation of the Austrian Netherlands) and the radical change of policy long and explicitly recommended by Kaunitz¹. An alliance with France would be the foundation of the new policy; the cooperation of Russia, and probably of Sweden, Saxony and the Palatinate, might be secured; and the division of the spoils after the overthrow of Prussia was already prospectively planned. France might have to be attracted to the projected alliance by a territorial cession either in Italy or in Flanders (the complicated details of which illustrate the imaginative force of the projector's diplomacy) and by the promise of Austrian support of the candidature of Prince Conti for the Polish Throne². Such was (of course in barest outline) the great design of Kaunitz; and the first move in the game was the audience vouchsafed to the Austrian Ambassador in Paris, Count Starhemberg, with Mme de Pompadour (September, 1755). At the present moment, when France was on the point of entering into an all-important war with Great Britain, there could be no question of the simple rejection, by Lewis XV's Government, of such a proposal on the part of Great Britain's historic Ally—the House of Austria. The only difficulty in the way of its acceptance by the French Government—but this, at first, seemed insuperable—was the improbability of the renunciation, by Frederick II, of the French in favour of a British Alliance; for Austria could not carry on negotiations with France on any basis but that of the severance of her Alliance with Prussia.

It was about this time (summer of 1755) that the American news already referred to arrived in France, where the remainder of the year was mainly consumed in armaments and taxation. An invasion of England was at least talked of; the hopes of the Jacobites simmered up, and the French Government resolved to fight out the struggle against Great Britain by every means in its power. True, it had other support in view; but it continued to think, as it had thought in 1741, friendly relations with Prussia, to whom, in her turn, the French Alliance must be indispensable, the basis of its system. Frederick II, on the contrary, even apart from any secret evidence he might possess on the subject, felt his position insecure, so long as Austria had the support

¹ See, for what follows, R. Waddington, *Louis XV, et le Renversement des Alliances* (Paris, 1896).

² On this head, the wishes of Lewis XV soon began to cool.

of her present Continental Allies, and so long as France was weakened by the maritime and colonial rivalry of Great Britain, as well as by the unsoundness of her own condition at home. Thus, for Frederick II of Prussia there was during these busy years (1748 to middle of 1755) but one way of staving off war—namely, that of holding himself prepared for it. There seems, however, no reason for concluding that, at any time in this period, he intended either to renew the War with Austria, or to become implicated in that imminent between Great Britain and France. But, as we know, and as the French Government was not slow to point out to Frederick II, this latter War might bring with it a French attack upon Hanover, in which the cooperation of Prussia would be of very direct value to the French. Frederick II, though he kept his own counsel, could not close his eyes to the part, at once difficult and inglorious, which he might thus find himself called upon to play.

British statesmanship, while loth to accept Kaunitz's view that a real concert with Austria required Great Britain to join in an attack upon Prussia, also perceived that Prussia could have no wish, for the sake of her friendship with France, to cooperate in an attack upon Hanover. The situation was critical; and George II's visit to his electoral dominions in the summer of 1755, with Holderness in attendance, accordingly proved the first step towards a change in the relations between Great Britain and Prussia of the utmost importance in its bearing on the impending European War. Taking advantage of the friendly relations between the Prussian Court and Duke Charles of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, Holderness contrived to elicit from Frederick II, in reply to the question whether he would refuse to prevent the defence of Hanover against a French invasion, the reply that he saw no objection to treaties concluded by Hanover with her neighbours for this purpose, but that the time had not yet arrived for a declaration on the subject. For some time Frederick II (whose present Defensive Alliance with France would naturally terminate in 1756) would go no further; but he finally made up his mind that, while he had not guaranteed to France her overseas possessions, the relative smallness of his own military forces would not justify him in going to war against an Alliance which might bring the Russians into Germany. Hence, the only course open to him seemed to be to enter into the Treaty of Neutrality as to Hanover suggested to him by Great Britain, without on that account breaking with France.

Thus it came to pass that, in the Treaty of Neutrality concluded

between Great Britain and Prussia in January, 1756, and sometime called the Treaty of Westminster, Frederick II and the British Government, directly instigated this time by the Hanoverian interest of King George II, met halfway. Henry Fox devised the expedient of adding this Prussian Treaty to a Russian (and a Hessian) Subsidy Treaty, which he carried in one of the most famous debates of the age; Pitt, who had accepted the Paymastership of the Forces in the Government, being foremost among the opponents of the proposal. One object of the Anglo-Prussian Treaty was declared to be the preservation of the Peace of the Continent, and that of Germany in especial. Holderness introduced into it a concise guarantee of the Prussian tenure of Silesia; and the Prime-minister, Newcastle, proclaimed King George II's personal anxiety to place himself on an amicable footing with King Frederick II. Henry Fox was, on the following day (November 25th, 1755), appointed Secretary of State, while Pitt was dismissed from office with other opponents of the Russian Subsidy Treaty, which the Prussian Neutrality deprived of its force.

For the "Treaty of Westminster," drafted as proposed by Frederick II, went further than George II, and his Ministers could have at first anticipated. By it, Great Britain agreed not to permit the entry of a Russian army, or Prussia that of a French, into Germany¹. Even so, the Treaty appears to have been generally approved in England, where it was regarded as preventive of any fear of trouble ensuing on account of Hanover, and the funds are stated to have risen on its conclusion. Whatever the history of its origin, its effect on the Court of Vienna was to leave no doubt that British aid in any attempt to recover Silesia was now altogether out of the question. But could Prussia, after arriving at this friendly understanding with Great Britain, remain on good terms with France? The Duc de Nivernais, sent to Berlin to find out whether French interests were in any way prejudiced by the guarantees contained in the Anglo-Prussian Treaty (from which Gibraltar and Minorca were expressly excepted), made it clear to King Frederick, who had actually thought of patching up the quarrel between France and Great Britain, that this was now impossible. And, in fact, the French Government, while seeking (by way of justification or pretext) to multiply causes

¹ This term was substituted by Frederick II for "The Germanic Empire," after Podewils had pointed out that the wider term might have been interpreted by Great Britain to comprise the Austrian Netherlands, which the King of Prussia had certainly no wish to see included in it.

of quarrel with Great Britain, declared itself unable to assent to the principle of a permanent neutrality for Hanover. Thus, at the beginning of 1756, it had, so far as Frederick II's relations with France and Great Britain were concerned, become more than doubtful whether he could adhere to the policy, hitherto followed by him, of remaining on a friendly footing with both Powers. At Vienna, the Anglo-Prussian Treaty was at first received with tranquillity; for an Imperial attack in conjunction with France upon Hanover seemed wholly out of the question, and Russia's only complaint against Great Britain was that she should have entered into such an agreement without informing her Allies. But so rooted were the jealousy of Prussia and the suspicion of the advantageous position secured by her, as between France and Great Britain, entertained by Kaunitz and his Sovereign, that they resolved on an effective counter-move to the Neutrality Treaty; and their overtures fell on receptive and well-prepared ground. France was unwilling, while carrying on a Naval War with Great Britain, to lay aside what had long been a primary part of her policy—intervention in the internal affairs of Germany. The negotiations between the Austrian and French Governments (represented by Starhemberg and Bernis) at Versailles now (February, 1756) treated the Prusso-French Alliance of 1741 as at an end, and passed on to the question whether, if France allowed her Alliance with Prussia to drop altogether, Austria would in turn consent to drop hers with Great Britain.

Thus the advisers of Lewis XV, Bernis in particular, may be said to have inspired in him the idea of avenging upon George II his Treaty of Neutrality with Prussia; while to the arguments by which Kaunitz persuaded Maria Theresa to put an end to the long-lived Alliance with Great Britain, was added the hope that the example of Austria would be followed by Russia. Austria, the Power so long identified with the guardianship of the Empire, allowed Prussia, of whose aggressiveness it stood in dread, to assume this time-honoured function, while, at this very time, itself entering into an Alliance with France. The Franco-Prussian Alliance was at an end; the relations between Austria and Russia had, on the other hand, become friendlier, and though on Bestucheff's advice, the Tsarina Elizabeth had reluctantly agreed to the British Subsidy Treaty of September, 1755, they were, by April, 1756, shaping towards a closer Alliance. But the effects of such an Alliance, more especially for Great Britain, must depend on the decision of France as to her own action. One by one, the obstacles

in the way of the actual conclusion of an Alliance between France, on the one hand, and Austria, with Russia, on the other, disappeared. The French negotiators would have been ready to conclude the business, on the twofold basis that Austria might make war upon Prussia, and France upon Great Britain, as they chose, without calling upon each other for offensive cooperation. But the Austrian Government wanted more than this—viz., the offensive cooperation itself (more especially when there would be no more British subsidies forthcoming), and, in the event of success, a territorial repartition which would avenge the shameless league which, on the death of Maria Theresa's father, had proposed to divide among its members her inheritance.

The Austro-French negotiations were resumed in April, 1756; and, after a Ministerial Council had been held at Versailles, and on the ground chiefly that the Austrian Alliance was the only way by which the King of France could use his right of attacking Great Britain through the Hanoverian Electorate, the Ministry approved the conclusion of that Alliance. The Two Treaties, known as that of Versailles, were hereupon signed, on May 1st, 1756. The first of these consisted of a Convention of Neutrality, whereby the Court of Vienna bound itself to take no part in the War with Great Britain; *i.e.*, the Imperial Power would not be used against a Sovereign who was Prince of the Empire; while France promised not to attack either the Austrian Netherlands or any other part of the Austrian dominions. This, then, was the Austro-French answer to the Anglo-Prussian Treaty of Westminster, which had been the motive cause of the Austro-French negotiations. Its effect would be to let the French into Germany, from which the Westminster Treaty had excluded them, without any resistance on the part of the Head of the Empire. But the first of these Versailles Treaties was not in itself a Treaty of Alliance, and even the second, which purported to be a Treaty of Mutual Defence between the Contracting Powers, declared that it was not directed against any other Power; and the number of troops to be furnished on both sides, if the *casus foederis* should arise, was very moderate accordingly. This second Treaty contained, however, in addition, Secret Articles corresponding more closely to the motives with which the compact had been concluded. If, during the Anglo-French War, France or Austria was attacked by any other Power, the Contracting Power so attacked should be entitled to the support of the other Contracting Power. And, further, a revision of

the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle was taken into contemplation; so that, though the Treaties by no means amounted to an offensive alliance for the recovery of Silesia or any other purpose, they contained this ominous reference to the more remote future. The Treaties, more especially since Russia would assuredly be invited to adhere to them, could not but be looked upon without apprehension in England, though they by no means implied an offensive alliance against this country; and there can be no doubt but that the religious, or confessional, aspect of the combination exercised its effect now, as it did when Great Britain had made her choice, and when a large part of her population regarded Frederick the Great as "the Protestant Hero."

It was not till May, 1756, that Maria Theresa, in giving audience to Sir Robert Keith, the British Minister at Vienna, who had been instructed to demand explanations of the Versailles Treaty or Treaties, threw the blame of her Alliance with France upon the combination between Great Britain and Prussia—her only enemy in the world, as the Empress afterwards confidentially told him, besides the Turk. Undoubtedly, this attitude on the part of the Empress Maria Theresa, formerly the subject of so much admiring sympathy in England, taken together with the ratification which speedily followed of the Versailles Treaties (the drift of whose Secret Clauses was sufficiently suspected), roused deep indignation against a Power, now the Ally, under whatever conditions, of our mortal foe—after, for the sake of that Power, we had shown so much forbearance at Aix-la-Chapelle, and when it had been the recipient of a long series of our Subsidies. Popular feeling in England had, throughout the winter 1755-6, been in so excited a state as to take the almost inevitable form of a conviction that we had been betrayed. Apprehensions had actually arisen of a French invasion; and when, at last, in the spring of 1756, the immediate designs of France had declared themselves, Newcastle's Government had been found ill-informed. Byng had failed to protect Minorca, and, though Newcastle, after sailing with the blast of popular fury against the Admiral was by a change of Ministry to escape from the responsibility of carrying out the sentence against him, this very change had shown that a vigorous foreign policy was now imperatively demanded. On May 18th, 1756, Great Britain declared War against France. Before the end of June, Port Mahon surrendered, a few weeks before Frederick II began his War against Austria by crossing the Saxon frontier (August).

Thus, Great Britain had been driven into open hostilities with France at a time when her ancient Ally, Austria, had entered into relations of mutual amity with that Power, and when an estrangement of her from Great Britain inevitably followed. There remained the question whether this estrangement necessarily implied a corresponding change of relations between Great Britain and Russia. Such had not been the design of the Tsarina Elizabeth. The negotiations concerning the still-born Russian Subsidy Treaty had not been allowed to drop; and the brilliant British Ambassador at Petrograd, Sir Charles Hanbury Williams, who had consistently promoted (in every way) the Russian Subsidy Treaty and the Austrian Alliance, and of whose diplomatic career this humiliating episode was to be the end, had been kept in the dark as to the transactions in progress between Austria, Russia and France. The Russian intentions at this time are surrounded by some obscurity; but it must be remembered that the Franco-Austrian negotiations had not come to an end with the Versailles Treaties. While Kaunitz and Starhemberg hoped for the support of France in the reconquest of Silesia, it was to be recompensed by the transfer to France of the Austrian Netherlands, or the main part of them, including, in view of the struggle between France and Great Britain, at least the temporary occupation of Ostend and Nieuport. The Naval War between the two Powers was already in progress, and at no time could an opportunity of establishing her ascendancy in Flanders have been more welcome to France than at present. The French "ideas" for a "new Europe" suggested in 1756 did not stop short with this. As for the North, Bremen and Verden might be cut out of Hanover for the benefit of Denmark; and, as for the Mediterranean, Gibraltar might be taken from Great Britain, as Minorca had been; and she might be confined to the possessions of her own chalk-cliffs, just as Prussia would again be reduced to the dimensions of a meagre Brandenburg Electorate.

But it was not till May, 1757, that the spirit of these notions was compressed within the limits of a Secret Treaty; and, on the part of Russia, upon whose military cooperation the execution of much of the airy design depended, the Tsarina Elizabeth and Bestucheff were at this time unprepared with the armaments which their share in the process would have required. At Potsdam, on the other hand, Frederick II reckoned with realities; and he had by his side the British Envoy, Sir Andrew Mitchell, a Scotsman so full of commonsense as to be without any trace of Jacobitism, and yet endowed with a

power of sympathy which on occasion induced the King to reveal his inmost feelings to him¹. Frederick II had, from the first, suspected that at the bottom of the Versailles Treaties lay the thought of an attack on Hanover; but of this, he considered, neither Great Britain nor Prussia need be afraid if they were united and prepared. For this end he was ready to make any sacrifice. But when reports reached him of a triple alliance between France, Austria and Russia, when they were corroborated by further intelligence derived by him partly from stolen papers in the Austrian and Saxon Chanceries², partly from other communications to himself and Mitchell, and when Austrian troops began to be massed in Bohemia and Moravia, he began to recognise that he was sure of no Alliance but the British, whether or not the British Government still succeeded in avoiding a quarrel with Russia³. He, therefore, resolved to explode the combination against him before it was ripe for action, arguing to himself that, besides France and Austria, Russia might, in a year's time, be prepared to draw the sword. Sir Andrew Mitchell, anxious that Frederick II should do nothing to affront British public opinion, professed himself contented with Maria Theresa's assurance that the interests of the other Power—Great Britain being of course the only Power in question—would not suffer from the measures which she had commanded. Frederick II, on the other hand, after his question, whether Austria would promise not to attack him in the current or following year, had remained without a reply from Vienna, started at the head of his troops (August 28th) from Potsdam for the Saxon frontier.

The Seven Years' War (1756-63) which had now opened in Old World and New, was essentially a double war, the two parts or sides of which had each a different origin and were fought (as the combatants recognised) with distinct objects. Yet the successes of their Ally, in the face of difficulties altogether unprecedented, came home so closely to the British nation, that to popular feeling here this War seemed throughout a single War, and that, while our own flag waved victorious over every sea, and our arms prospered in Asia as well as in America, the glory of the conflict seemed a glory earned in common. On whomsoever may rest the responsibility of its actual opening, the

¹ Cf. Carlyle's *Frederick the Great*, Bk XVIII. c. 5.

² These are the so-called "Menzel Documents" which began so far back as 1753.

³ Saxony-Poland, it seems necessary to add, had so far, notwithstanding French overtures, adhered to its neutral attitude.

Seven Years' War as a whole may be regarded as an endeavour, on the part of France, to arrest, and if possible put an end to, the growing maritime and colonial ascendancy of Great Britain, and, on the part of Austria, to deprive Frederick II of the prize which, at the end of the previous two Silesian Wars, she had been obliged to leave in his hands. The diplomacy of Kaunitz had succeeded in blending these two purposes into one. This purpose was compassed before long; but the interests for which France contended beyond the seas were not thereby rendered identical with those for which her armies fought in Germany. Thus it came to pass, that the year (1759), which may be regarded as the climax of Austria's attempt to lay low the power and the ambition of Frederick II, was also that in which Great Britain gained her most momentous success over the French in Canada. And, when the Seven Years' War came to an end—in Great Britain's case by a Peace thoroughly unpopular at home and, in that of her solitary Ally, as a gift of good fortune as well as the reward of heroic perseverance—the cup of national glory was full in each case, and the names of Frederick the Great and the elder Pitt were linked together for ever as emblematic of victory.

We are here only concerned with the policy which directed the action of Great Britain in the successive stages of the conflict. The gradual unfolding of the prospect of a great European War, and the general want of confidence, deepened by the course of the miserable Byng episode, in the competence of the Newcastle Government proved fatal to it. Newcastle's success in securing Henry Fox as Secretary of State was as ineffectual as it was transitory, and a series of overtures and manoeuvres ended in his being left without a supporter fit to cope with the opposition of Pitt, while the Duke still retained power—or a share of power—himself. The ensuing attempt at a combination between Fox and Pitt, having, thereupon, broken down, the Duke of Devonshire formed his Administration (December, 1756 to April, 1757), of which Pitt, at the King's personal request, formed part as one of the Secretaries of State¹. Newcastle's influence being still predominant, and the King dissatisfied at having had to include Pitt, whose personal following was limited to the Grenvilles, the Ministry was not so strong as it might have been.

But a new spirit had begun to reign and to animate the foreign and colonial policy, which under Pitt were from the first blended.

¹ Pitt's tenure of the Southern, and Holderness's of the Northern Department, were reversed in June, 1757.

play a mediating part between the two chief German Powers, the plan of Frederick II, against whom Imperial Execution had been declared by the Diet, for uniting the dissenting Estates in resistance against it. Of much greater importance for the progress of the War was the question of an active Alliance between Russia and Austria, which after some delay (owing to differences of opinion at Petrograd and the suggestion, rejected as insufficient, of the exclusion of British trade from Russian ports) was actually concluded (January, 1757). By it, the two Empresses bound themselves not to lay down arms till Silesia and Glatz should have been restored to Maria Theresa. In March, a Franco-Swedish Alliance against Prussia followed, and in the same month the French troops crossed the German frontier. The British Government, under the influence of the wishes of King George II, was still haggling about Hanoverian neutrality with the Austrian, when, in May, the Secret Treaty of Alliance between France and Austria—the Partition Treaty of Versailles—was signed, the final hesitation of King Lewis XV having been overcome by his being shown a forged Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain and Prussia. The Franco-Austrian compact, while providing for Austria's recovery of Silesia and for the transfer to Duke Philip of Parma of the whole of the Austrian Netherlands, except Ostend, Nieuport and Mons, ceded to France, further promised the Empress's cooperation in securing Minorca to that Power¹. The accession to the Treaty of Russia and other Powers was to be asked in due course.

The House of Austria, which in this Treaty had in fact gained all it desired, had by it completely detached itself from the time-honoured Alliance of Great Britain, but had neither undertaken to enter into any active operations against her, nor precluded a reconciliation with her at some future date. The contents of this Secret Compact remained for some time unknown. But, inasmuch as its designs, when they came to light, showed that they affected the future of nearly the whole of Europe (it is noteworthy that the Treaty itself contained no mention of the Ottoman Power), and inasmuch as there existed between the Contracting Powers no international bond of union unless the Roman Catholic religion be regarded as such, the War which it converted into a European War was surrounded with that general uncertainty which challenges the use of all the resources of statesmanship. And it was in the face of a Europe engaged or involved in such a War as this

¹ As already noted, the Utrecht stipulations as to Dunkirk now came to an end.

that Great Britain and France carried on, through its most momentous stage, their own struggle for empire beyond seas.

Two months before the formation of Pitt's first Ministry Frederick the Great's dearly bought victory at Prague had not failed to exercise its effects in England, and George II had met the attempts of the Austrian Ambassador still resident at his Court (Colloredo) with contemptuous rudeness. The Austrian victory of Kolin (June 8th, 1757) had been followed by a French invasion of Germany and a successful conflict with a British army; Russia and Sweden had followed suit. But, by this time, all hesitation was at an end in the counsels of Great Britain, though the season had advanced too far for any material effect to be exercised by British intervention on the progress of the Continental War. Great Britain had no ships to spare for the protection of the Prussian coasts against Russia and Sweden; and the States-General had, after the shedding of some tears by the Regent, the British Princess Anne, allowed the transit by way of Maestricht of French troops, who, besides garrisoning Ostend and Nieuport, occupied the chief towns of Westphalia. The Duke of Cumberland arrived in time to be defeated, though not decisively, at Hastenbeck and to sign the notorious Convention of Kloster-Zeven (September) which was, in reality, a capitulation. Even now, George II would have gladly concluded a Treaty of Neutrality for Hanover with France and Austria, and confidence was rising at Vienna and Versailles; but Pitt, who had his own plans for British cooperation in the Continental War, would not hear of the acceptance of the Convention. The ultimate refusal of George II to ratify it, accordingly, signified the final and complete adoption by the British Government of the policy of active cooperation with Prussia, instead of attempting to carry out a Hanoverian, side by side with its own (British), policy. Before the year 1757 was over, the most brilliant of Frederick's victories, Rossbach (November), sealed the compact of mutual confidence and relegated into political oblivion the Capitulation of Kloster-Zeven. The Duke of Cumberland was superseded in his military command by Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick; the Hanoverian army was taken into British pay; and success crowned the recasting, as it might almost be called, of the lines of the Personal Union¹.

¹ Not, however, so as to cause this aspect of it to be recognised in the Peace which ended Great Britain's participation in the War, and which, while abandoning Frederick II, ignored Hanover.

In December, 1757, there followed Frederick II's second great victory gained in this wonderful year of military history—the battle of Leuthen. The moral, as well as the financial, support of Great Britain had been of high value to the victor, and the question now became: in what measure was his Ally prepared to help him to carry the Continental War to the successful end which his military genius had made possible. For the British enterprises of the latter part of the year had by no means proved successful; the Rochefort expedition had been a costly failure; and in America and elsewhere the British Navy had not asserted its superiority over the French. But the great battles won by Frederick, with the news of our victorious progress in India, enabled the high spirit of Pitt to carry Parliament with him in his forward policy, and he was sanguine enough to conceive, and to embody in a famous despatch composed at this time (end of 1757), the idea of an alliance with Spain, which should subsequently be extended to Naples and Sardinia. Gibraltar was once more to be the price paid. But the scheme was as inopportune as it was unsound, and the goodwill towards it of the Spanish Minister, Wall, proved a broken reed.

Yet, when Parliament met in the last month of 1757, the German news had, together with the Indian, raised popular enthusiasm to the highest pitch in favour of the War and Pitt, though neither of the early policy of Clive, nor of the victory which crowned it in Bengal, can the credit be claimed for the British statesman. In 1758-9, however, his plans against France were in organic cooperation with the action of the East India Company, though his design upon Mauritius was diverted. (The capture of Manilla was not carried out till after his resignation.) Nor should it be overlooked that the material prosperity of Great Britain had not suffered from her warlike exertions and preparations; her credit stood high, and British trade, the interests of which were from the first at the bottom of Pitt's foreign policy, prospered under his care. The British fleet were masters of the Mediterranean, French trade with the Levant was checked, and Dutch trade in the West Indies, at the risk of a serious collision with the States-General, was subjected to a strict application of the right of search¹. Pitt's vigilance was unsleeping; nor could any notion be

¹ The difficulties as to the Dutch trade with the French West Indies by way of the Dutch West Indian Islands gave rise to a prolonged dispute, which really defied settlement, so long as there was no agreement as to the principles of international maritime law. There were similar disputes with the Danish Government, which, however, was less pertinacious. (Sweden's attitude towards Great Britain was hostile.)

more futile than that of his eloquence having been his main contribution to the progress of the War.

For the campaign of 1758 Pitt was ready to furnish Frederick II with the promised subsidies; and the demand for military and naval support, pressed by him after the Russians had occupied Königsberg, was (after acrimonious discussion with Fox) met by the Subsidy Treaty and the accompanying Declaration (April), which made the aid of troops and ships conditional upon the requirements of British action in America. This carefully drawn 'Declaration of London' is of the highest importance as marking the progress of the Anglo-Prussian Alliance from its first to its second stage; but it shows, at the same time, beyond what length Pitt was unprepared to go, well aware as he was of the outcry to be eventually expected against the employment of men and ships needed for home and colonial defence on the expulsion of the French from Hanover and the sweeping the Baltic clear of Russian vessels. This latter service, therefore, except in the interests of both the Allies, the Declaration expressly declined on the part of Great Britain.

The year 1758, marked by British successes beyond the seas (the reduction of Cape Breton and the capture of Duquesne, now renamed Pittsburg), brought no decisive results to Frederick II; for the occupation of Prussian provinces by his adversaries was, in a manner, balanced by his continued tenure of Saxony. The presence and successes of the Hanoverian army under Ferdinand of Brunswick, however, freed him from the obligation of keeping watch and ward against the French and their German mercenaries, and materially contributed to strengthen the Alliance. The Austrian Netherlands were in serious danger; and, if the British Government had chosen to support Prince Ferdinand by a naval descent upon the Belgian coast, a momentous effect might have been exercised upon the progress of the War. But the resources at hand were expended upon two of those lesser expeditions (St Malo and Cherbourg), which must be reckoned among the mistakes in Pitt's conduct of the War. On the other hand—for his sway was absolute in all directions, both before and after he and Holderness exchanged Departments—his Russian policy at this time aimed at inducing the Tsarina Elizabeth, whose forces had occupied the Prussian North-East, to conclude peace with Frederick II; and the instructions of Sir Robert Keith (who remained British Ambassador at Petrograd till the crisis of 1762) were so intended. But, though he had consulted King Frederick,

he found the political situation unmanageable. He had, therefore, to turn to the secondary purpose of his mission, the conclusion of a Commercial Treaty with Russia, whose trade had suffered grievously from British privateers, and who in her turn was suspected of designs in which she would command the support of Sweden and Denmark (with both of whom France had signed Subsidy Treaties) and might thus ultimately acquire the control of the navigation of the Baltic. It was not till after much manoeuvring, nor until after the accession of Catharine II, that the Commercial Treaty was signed. But between Sweden and Great Britain a rupture of diplomatic relations had taken place in 1758 (March), and it was only the prudence of Pitt which, in this instance, avoided serious complications for British policy.

Thus, in 1758, while on the whole the British arms had made progress both in Canada and in Bengal, the course of the campaigns in Germany had (notwithstanding Hochkirch) been such as to afford a kind of negative encouragement to Frederick II, and to raise serious doubts in influential quarters in France—even in Cardinal de Bernis, formerly one of the chief promoters of the Austrian Alliance—as to the expediency of seeking peace. But the hesitation was overcome; the Tsarina Elizabeth stood firm by the Partition Treaty; after making some pacific overtures to Great Britain through Denmark, Bernis was banished (December), and in the last days of the year a new Treaty was concluded between Austria and France. This compact upheld the promise of France as to the recovery of Silesia, and made the conclusion of a French Peace with Great Britain conditional on regard for Austrian interests; but it otherwise considerably diminished her obligations under the Partition Treaty of 1757, to which a Secret Agreement now put an end. This “diplomatic masterpiece” of Choiseul—for he was now in entire control of the foreign policy of France—amounted to no very considerable improvement of the position to which that Power had been reduced by Madame de Pompadour’s friends; and it left unchanged the essence of the situation. In other words, the Austro-French Alliance continued, while, so long as Pitt was in power, there was no fear of the bond between Great Britain and Prussia being broken. On the contrary: though Frederick II could not but long for as early as possible a peace through victory, Pitt, as the triumph of British arms by land and sea assumed wider dimensions, perceived that fullest advantage must be taken of the opportunity for utterly overthrowing the naval and colonial power of France; and George II was, after his wont, speculating on an enlargement of

his Electorate in the direction of Westphalia. But, for the present, a new Subsidy Treaty passed the House of Commons (December), Pitt taking occasion to defy the Austrians, as if they were treacherous conspirators against the honour of the British nation.

The year which followed (1759) splendidly vindicated his confidence. For it was the year of the capture of Quebec—a heroic memory—though it was not till the following year (1760) that, by the capitulation of Montreal, the whole of Canada fell into British hands, and the possessions of France in America were reduced to Louisiana alone. The fall of Quebec was only one of a long series of British victories at a stage in the War intended by Choiseul to have been marked by the invasion of England—in lieu of which the French coasts were subjected to a complete blockade. Later in the year (November), Hawke's great exploit at Quiberon Bay followed; and, after this victory, Pitt's foresight in ignoring the hopes placed by France on the cooperation of the Italian States was justified, and the gallant Thurot's invasion of Ireland ended in death and disaster (February, 1760). So far as Great Britain was concerned, the main result of the War, the establishment of her naval supremacy, had been already achieved, though part of Pitt's American design was in his eyes still unaccomplished, so long as the fishing monopoly which he wished to establish for Great Britain in the Gulf of Newfoundland was not in her possession.

Meanwhile, the year 1759 had seemed to bring Great Britain's Ally to the verge of ruin; his resources were all but reduced to his requisitions in Saxony and some petty Saxon States, and to the British subsidies. The moral advantage of Great Britain's maritime and American successes contributed to sustain him in resisting what seemed his doom; and Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, though the effects of his victory of Minden (August) fell short of what they should have been, much more than held his own against the Western foe. It is not surprising that the vicissitudes of the German campaigns in this year should have overshadowed other aspects in the history of the Alliance; but the projects, independently conceived by both Frederick II and Pitt, directed to the permanent exclusion of Austrian dominion and influence from Italy, should not be overlooked. The death of Ferdinand VI had brought to the Spanish Throne his brother Charles III, whose goodwill was of so much importance that France and Austria were alike willing to promote a drastic revision in his favour (or in that of his third son, Ferdinand) of the settlement of Italy

agreed upon at Aix-la-Chapelle. The House of Savoy (with its wonted vigilance) declined to fall in with the arrangement; and this suggested to Pitt a scheme which should at the same time satisfy that House and the Spanish dynasty, and involve Austria in a war on behalf of her Italian interests. While the Spanish infante Don Philip of Parma was to be indemnified by Tuscany, Charles Emmanuel of Sardinia was to acquire Milan, and the North-Italian duchies, with the title of King of Lombardy¹. But Charles III, who (not inexplicably) hated Great Britain in his heart, had no intention of allying himself with her and entering into a war, of which the chief Italian gain would accrue to his Sardinian rival, whose desire for territory equalled his own. He was secretly longing for the day when, by the side of Great Britain's present chief adversary, he might take revenge upon her and her dictatorial policy towards his monarchy and himself. The British proposals were refused at Naples, where, according to the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, Philip of Parma was to have succeeded Charles III on his mounting the Spanish Throne; and, when subsequently repeated by Frederick II, they met with a similar rebuff. But the new King of Spain thought it well at present to conceal his enmity to Great Britain, although he made no secret of it to the French Government, whose plans of an invasion of England in this year (1759) he warmly approved. He was, indeed, intending to proceed to his new Throne at Madrid by way of France, in response to an invitation from Lewis XV, and with a view to confirming or renewing the Bourbon Family Compact², when he was restrained, partly by the fear of offending Spanish pride, partly by the tidings of recent brilliant successes. At Madrid, he found feeling very strong against Great Britain, more especially on account of offences against Spanish neutrality imputed to British vessels. The Spanish Government, which, at the close of 1759, had offered its mediation between Great Britain and France, in the following year sent a memorial to London reciting all the Spanish grievances. Pitt received it with surprise, as he had the offer made by Don Ricardo Wall with indignation—for he was well aware of the real aim of Spanish policy. He had, before this, judiciously declined the suggestion of Frederick II, that the former Jacobite Earl Marischal, now Prussian Ambassador at Madrid, should proffer his mediatory services.

On the other hand, Great Britain and Prussia had agreed, towards

¹ See R. Waddington, *La Guerre de Sept Ans*, vol. III. p. 451.

² This was effected in August, 1761, when the most important of the three agreements known under the name of the Family Compact was signed at Paris.

the end of 1759, on the expediency of proposing to the Powers at war with them the assembling, in regular form, of a Peace Congress. This they did by handing to the Envoy of these Powers at the Hague through Duke Lewis Ernest of Brunswick-Bevern (guardian of the Hereditary Stadholder William V), the so-called Declaration of Ryswyk (November). But it remained ineffective, and was in truth designed to conciliate public opinion in England by taking advantage of the popular craving for peace in France, which Choiseul, like Bernis before him, could no longer gainsay, and which (March, 1760) actually induced him to carry on at the Hague secret negotiations with the British Government for a separate peace. But, while France was negotiating without her Allies—Austria having declared it necessary to arrive, in the first instance, at an understanding with Russia, and the Tsarina Elizabeth having sent a point-blank refusal to discuss the subject—Great Britain, from the first, loyally declared that her Ally should be apprised of every step in the negotiation. And Pitt held to his promise, while Frederick II, also, kept himself informed through a secret channel—no other than his friend Voltaire—and then directly through a Prussian agent, and, in the stress under which he was placed, showed himself not averse from the proposal of a separate peace between France and Great Britain. But Pitt judged more correctly (as his Ally was afterwards fain to acknowledge) and insisted on the inclusion of Prussia in the peace as indispensable. The negotiations, hereupon, broke down, and (April, 1760) the three Allies, once more united, presented to the Regent of the United Provinces the "Counter-declaration of Ryswyk," which, while stating that the King of France was prepared to negotiate with the King of Great Britain through the King of Spain, accepted a Congress on Peace with Prussia only on condition of the admission of the representatives of the other Powers at war with her (Poland and Sweden). All hopes of peace were now at an end; and the proverbial tenacity of the House of Habsburg had succeeded in keeping its Allies under arms together.

But, though Austria had thus been enabled to resume the design, with which she had entered into the War, of crushing her archfoe, and though bankrupt France had to continue her twofold struggle, Russia's adhesion to her Allies, albeit assured, for the period of her reign, by the Tsarina's determination, was not accorded without promises of future gains in the event of common victory. In March, 1760, these were secured to her by the so-called Schouvaloff Treaties.

with Austria (ratified in July), which, while signifying Russia's accession to the Versailles Treaty between Austria and France of December, 1758, in a Secret Article laid down the obligations undertaken by the two Powers for their respective satisfaction at the end of the War. In the event of Austria's recovery of Silesia—but not otherwise—Austria bound herself to secure the acquisition by Russia of "Prussia," *i.e.* Ducal Prussia, with the addition of Danzig; Poland, helpless as usual, notwithstanding the friendship of France, being compensated by some lesser cessions. When it is remembered that in the previous year (March, 1759) Russia had concluded a Treaty with Sweden for the effective maintenance, for trade purposes, of Baltic neutrality, and that Denmark was obliged to adhere to this agreement in the following year, it will be seen how, in the event of a victorious issue of the War, the power of Russia would have been rendered irresistible in the Baltic.

It was against an Alliance thus extended in its aims as well as strengthened in its cohesion that Pitt and Great Britain prepared to take part in the progress of the struggle, when it reopened in the spring of 1760. Pitt's Government, in order not to interfere with the British trade in the Baltic, declined to send a fleet into those waters, where it would have been welcomed by the Danes; so that the Russians and Swedes had their hands free for operating there against Prussia, while her Allied enemies could, with the exception of France, address themselves with renewed energy to the German War. Maria Theresa had made up her mind to carry it to a decisive issue. But there were differences of plan between Austria and Russia; and in the end Laudon had to raise the siege of Breslau (August) though the Russians for a few days (October) occupied Berlin. The confidence of Maria Theresa was severely shaken by the Austrian defeat (at first reported a victory) at Torgau (November); and, while Frederick II remained in his headquarters at Dresden, no important result had been reached by his adversaries' campaign against him in eastern and central Germany. In the west, Prince Ferdinand had, partly in consequence of the numerical inferiority of his forces, been unable to deal any effective blow; but, at least from the British point of view, he had not carried on the fight in vain, having kept the French forces out of Hanover and done his best to exhaust the resources of the enemy. Thus, Great Britain was the better able to continue her efforts against the same foe beyond sea, where the French siege of Quebec was raised and Montreal capitulated.

The indecisive character of the German campaigns of 1760, and the extensive losses of the French Power in the East Indies and the New World, rendered Choiseul anxious to bring about negotiations in the direction of peace with the Prussian and British Governments. But, afraid of challenging Austrian (and Jesuit) influences at Court, he once more had resort to King Charles III of Spain. The latter at this time gave much of his confidence to Marquis Grimaldi, who had convinced himself that, instead of continuing to mix herself up in the German War, France ought, in close alliance with Spain, to apply all her energies to the War with Great Britain. Spain, of whose grievances mention has been already made, actually began to arm, and a diplomatic contention followed between the Spanish Ambassador at the Court of St James' and Pitt. Though France still hesitated about changing her policy and concluding peace with Prussia, it seemed as if the year 1760 was not to end without the outbreak of hostilities between Spain and Great Britain. But the death of the bellicose Spanish Queen (Maria Amalia) and, far more signally, a month afterwards, that of King George II of Great Britain, led to a change—the latter event to an all-important one—in the situation.

King George II died—on October 27th, 1760—as the Ally of a Prince whom he detested almost more than any other, and counselled by a Minister from whom he shrank with unconquerable aversion. But it was the nation which had sustained Walpole so long as its mind was bent on peace; and the nation, not King George II, had brought Pitt into favour and kept him there, so long as its mind was set on war. The change in the system of government which began with the accession of George III was, in the first instance, fatal to the complete ascendancy of Pitt, and could not but become so to the continuation of the foreign policy with which he was identified. At the very time when the War was extending itself towards the participation in it of Spain, Pitt was on the eve of having to resign power into the hands of a royal favourite, who was prepared to conclude a peace short of the measure of aggrandisement which Great Britain had actually achieved, and which would have satisfied the nation. On the very first day of his reign, George III proposed to appoint Bute one of the Secretaries of State, though it was not till six months afterwards that, Holderness having made way for the favourite, the offer was reluctantly accepted by him. (Bute had been at once admitted by the new Sovereign into the Privy Council.) On opening his first Parliament (November 2nd) George III announced his inten-

tion of steadily pressing on the victorious War, and Frederick II was so sure of the *bona fides* of the British Government, so long as Pitt was at its head, that he even declared his readiness to acquiesce in a separate peace between Great Britain and France, provided that limits were set to French assistance to Austria. Moreover, he remained in control of the greater part of the army of Prince Ferdinand. Thus, the proposed revision of the Anglo-Prussian Treaty of Alliance came to nothing, and the old Subsidy Treaty was renewed. But some of Pitt's followers, as well as "the King's Friends," were inclining to the view that the War had accomplished enough; and Bute's acceptance of the Secretaryship, with certain other Governmental changes, no doubt weakened Pitt's position. He was ready to make peace with France, though he still pressed on British conquests in order to command what were, in his judgment, reasonable terms, and, being aware of the intimate relations between France and Spain, he was anxious to take advantage of Choiseul's increased anxiety to conclude a tolerable peace. Influenced, among other pacific symptoms, by the Swedish popular dislike of the War, Choiseul pressed his views in favour of peace on Maria Theresa, who for the first time in the course of the War, showed signs of discouragement; but Kaunitz and Russian influence prevailed, and his notion of a Congress was in the end accepted by Choiseul, in lieu of the plan of a separate negotiation between France and Great Britain. Thus, the campaigns of 1761 began without any actual movement in favour of peace, and, though Pitt's willingness to entertain the notion of concluding it with France on his terms had been in vain, his alternative of pressing on the War till these terms should have become possible remained and justified itself.

For, while, in 1761, the struggle of Prussia against Austria and Russia remained undecided, want of money, though not of men, having delayed an agreement between the Allies on a joint plan of action, and Laudon's brilliant surprise of Schweidnitz (October) having then reduced Frederick II to the defensive in Lower Silesia, things had gone badly for the French in the west. Here the French armies had been unable either to drive Prince Ferdinand out of Westphalia or to encroach further on Hanoverian territory. These failures had increased the longing for peace in France, and, though the ill-judged Belle-Isle expedition, a lesser effort of the sort on which Pitt at times set his heart, and intended to secure an eventual equivalent for Minorca, was allowed by him to delay the assembling of the proposed Peace Congress at Augsburg, he saw no objection to secret communications

with France in the same direction in Paris (through Hans Stanley and in London (through de Bussy). In these negotiations, Pitt let it be known that no separate peace with France would be allowed by Great Britain to prevent her from continuing effective aid to her Prussian Ally. But the Austrian Government succeeded in stiffening Choiseul's attitude, and even in insisting on a guarantee to Spain being attached to any Treaty with Great Britain. Thus, through the efforts of Grimaldi, Choiseul, in his Memorial of July 15th, formulated the Spanish claims against Great Britain and implicitly adopted them. Pitt's Government on the other hand, declared their inclusion in any Peace Treaty with France wholly inadmissible. The temper of the nation, encouraged by the news from the Indies both East and West, was still high; and peace with France was still out of the question, so long at least as Pitt was at the helm.

On July 25th the British Government forwarded its own conditions to the French; they proposed that Great Britain should be allowed to assist her Prussian Ally in accordance with her Treaty obligations; but the real difficulty lay in Choiseul's mind being now obsessed by the idea of the Spanish Alliance. The Third Family Compact between France and Spain, in whose mutual guarantee the Bourbon Princes in Italy took part, was signed on August 15th. It contained a Secret Article, of even greater moment than the public agreement, binding Spain to declare war against Great Britain on May 1st, 1762, should that Power then still be at war with France, and, in this event, promising the restoration of Minorca to Spain. The point of the Compact was obviously directed against Great Britain; but by concluding it France violated the Versailles Treaty of May 1st, 1756 with Austria, who had been left without so much as cognisance of it. As for the British peace negotiations with France, they were broken off, though not till October, and the Congress of Augsburg, for which the Plenipotentiaries had already been named, collapsed in its birth.

But, on finding the preservation of peace with Spain impossible, Pitt, as if desirous of taking a leaf out of the book of his Ally, and (if it may be so put) anticipating the inevitable, gained an advantage over the now accomplished Alliance at the outset. Reckoning that the seizure of Spanish ships could, if rapidly effected, be carried out without any augmentation of the British navy, and at the same time lead to the seizure of Spanish Colonies, he, so early as September 18th, 1761, proposed to the Cabinet to declare war against Spain.

But the proposal appalled the whole Ministry, except Temple, and was resisted by Bute, who thought that the opportunity had at last arrived for overthrowing the Ministry's master. The question was debated in three Cabinet meetings, and on October 2nd was finally decided against Pitt. On December 5th, he resigned, Temple following him out of office.

Bute had now the leading voice in the Government, though Newcastle remained its nominal head till 1762. Lord Egremont, who had been designated as Plenipotentiary at Augsburg, and who was regarded as wholly under Bute's influence, took Pitt's place as Secretary of State. He perceived at once that, popular as the great war Minister had been, there was no other way of ending that popularity than the conclusion of that Peace which Pitt had declined to seek to bring about prematurely, but which was favoured by the majority of the new Parliament (November), whether through the influence of the Court or through the manipulation of Newcastle, or both. The Speech from the Throne made no mention of Spain; but the Spanish Government vindicated the insight of Pitt by throwing off the mask. Its military preparations were hurried on, and Wall now propounded a long series of grievances against Great Britain, accompanied by an indignant message of sympathy with France. The request for information of the Earl of Bristol, the British Ambassador at Madrid, as to the Family Compact was received with cynical boldness, and, when a formal reply was made five weeks later, its tone was unaltered. Immediately afterwards, the Spanish reply to the British ultimatum, enquiring whether or not King Charles III designed to ally himself with the foes of Great Britain, arrived in London; and on January 4th, 1762, there followed the British Declaration of War against Spain. In March, a peremptory joint Spanish and French Note was despatched to the King of Portugal, desiring him to put an end to all correspondence and commerce with Great Britain, and, on the demand being refused, a Spanish army entered Portugal (April).

But while, in this quarter, the British Government had done what seemed indispensable, it had taken the momentous negative step of leaving the Subsidy Treaty with Prussia unrenewed. This, indeed, did not amount to her abandoning Prussia to her foes, and was not so regarded by Frederick II, who at this late stage was formulating proposals as to the terms on which, as he hoped, Great Britain would insist on his behalf in the event of her concluding a

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separate Treaty with France. Nothing, however, came of this negotiation; and there can be little doubt that Frederick's recent ill-success had, about the turn of the years 1761-2, inclined Bute and those who thought with him, or who, like Bedford, went even further in their desire for peace than he, to place very little store on the continuation of the Prussian Alliance, or to favour its abandonment. At the beginning of 1762, Frederick II was, though with a much reduced army, still holding out, and his best chance of recovering himself lay in the growing French weariness of the burden of the Austrian Alliance. But, of a sudden, the whole situation changed by the death of the Tsarina Elizabeth (January 5th, 1762) which abruptly transferred Russia's support of the Austrian Alliance to Frederick II. In the next month (February), the new Tsar Peter III issued a formal Declaration in favour of peace throughout Europe (February). To Bute and the friends of peace in England this utter change in Russian policy came at a most inopportune moment; and he revealed his ulterior intention of leaving Prussia out of account in the impending peace negotiations by proposing to her that an annual grant should take the place of the renewal of the Subsidy Treaty. Before Frederick's answer arrived, the changed attitude of the British Government had been made clear to him by the resignation of Newcastle (May), who had objected to the insufficiency of the grant asked for the expenses of the War (including that to Prussia), while Bute insisted that the perilous position of Portugal, which in this month declared war against France and Spain, was now the matter of chief moment to Great Britain. In vain, Pitt had protested that even Portugal could be best protected by upholding the Prussian Alliance. The "King's Friends" now had the ball under their feet, and prospectively, there was no doubt of Prussia being left by Great Britain to her new friendship. About the same time, Russia entered into an Alliance with Prussia, and Sweden concluded Peace with her. The complications which ensued with Denmark need not occupy us. On the deposition and assassination of Tsar Peter III (July), his Consort and successor, Catharine II, did not renew the alliance with Prussia. But, in substance, the relations between the two Powers remained unchanged till the close of the War, when, in circumstances of altered significance for Great Britain, they were reformulated as an actual Alliance (1764)¹.

¹ Treaty of St Petersburg, April, 1764. With this Treaty, accompanied by a Secret Convention concerning Poland, the British Government had no concern.